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NOTES
1. The name of the organisation, the factory and the names of all 
the members of the organisation cited in this thesis have been 
changed.
2. The dialogue written in inverted commas, thus; ”...." represent
conversations reconstructed from my fieldnotes, which were written 
immediately after the episode. Such dialogue is therefore not 
necessarily verbatim.
3. The dialogue written in script form, thus; Charlie Johnson .... 
during the planning and production meetings are taken directly 
from my notes written during the meeting, and are therefore as 
accurate as the long handwriting of live conversation will permit.
4* The dialogue written in script form(as above) in response to questions 
from myself during an interview are from tape recordings, and are 
therefore absolutely verbatim. The single exception to this is 
the conversation with Martin Keyes who was reluctant to allow me 
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This thesis is an exploratory study of the process of informing among 
a group of managers directly involved in the daily operations of a 
manufacturing plant.
In addition to describing and analysing the process of informing itself, 
the thesis depicts the process of the entire research act.
I define the process of informing as an interpretative process whereby 
managers assign meaning to data or "mere" information (processed data) 
gathered or received from official documented information, meetings, 
personal records, observations and particularly interactions. The 
managers thereby construct a definition of the situation and act or 
select a course of action on the basis of that definition.
I introduce the concept of improvisation, derived from the music and 
literature of jazz, to depict the process whereby managers construct 
or create a novel, innovative course of action in a situation which 
is defined to be unfamiliar, and for which there is no behavioural 
precedent.
I introduce the concept of loosely coupled shared arrangements, to 
depict the process by which managers align their individual courses 
of action and thus enter into joint or concerted action. These 
arrangements, through frequent occurrence, may appear as semi­
permanent structural units which give form and structure to the 
organisation. I define informant networks as shared arrangements 
to inform, where mansigers rely on each other to supply them with 
reliable, accurate and timely information.
Finally, I adopt a critical stand towards the traditional view of 
management information systems. Firstly, I argue that the MIS may 
only be viewed sis being part of the overall process of informing and 
not as constituting the whole of it. Secondly, I suggest that the 
MIS produces "mere" information which is not imbued with meaning 
until the manager's interpretative process is brought into play.
Finally, I question the assumptions about choice and the nature of organ­
isation reality underpinning the traditional view of management 
information systems.
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This research began as a multi-disciplinary project. The initial 
intention was to study the behavioural and organisational implications 
of financial,and then production, information systems. What transpired 
was a study of the process of informing, which the production information 
system may be viewed ais part of. The process of informing was essentially 
interpreted within the social psychological perspective of symbolic inter- 
actionism, rather than within the theories and concepts of the management 
information system literature.
The field research was a qualitative, longitudinal, participant 
observation study. The research was conducted over a fifty-two week 
period in a plastics container factory. Through circumstances, which 
will be outlined in the thesis, the focus of this study was on the managers 
directly involved in the day-to-day production activities of the factory, 
or as these managers themselves described it, ’’within the middle 
management level of the organisation.”
The title; Interactions,Improvisation and Arrangements in the Process of 
Informing, depicts the process by which the managers, directly involved 
in the daily operations of the factory, informed themselves, decided on 
a course of action and entered into joint or concerted action. Implied 
in the title are a number of assumptions about the nature of information, 
about the nature of human behaviour and about the nature of organisational 
reality. These assumptions,reflected in my analysis, are the result or 
culmination of a research act spanning four years and are markedly 
different from the assumptions held at the beginning of the research project.
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The aim of this thesis is to provide an account of the entire research 
act in which I include; the formation and development of a research topic 
and theoretical perspective; the selection of a research setting, 
methodology.and methods for gathering data; the presentation of the 
data and the analysis or interpretation of the findings within the 
theoretical perspective.
The research act may be compared to a journey of exploration and discovery. 
The researcher in this metaphor is the traveller. The thesis therefore, 
is a statement of where I, as a researcher, was coming from and where I, 
as a researcher, went to. It includes an account of my experiences in 
conducting the research, what I found on the way and how I analysed these 
findings in the light of my experience.
The thesis is divided into two sections. The first section (chapters 
1 - 4) is largely descriptive. Chapter 1 is a description of the process
of gaining access to the research setting and of my perceived abilities
and liabilities in terms of knowledge and experience at the beginning 
of the field work.
Chapter 2 is a description of my early days in the setting; of meeting 
the people and gaining an insight into their character and relationships; 
of becoming familiar with the physical environment, the production 
processes and the lemguage of the plastic container industry. It further
describes my "ejection" of a research topic suid the methods I employed
to gather data.
These first two chapters are thus largely autobiographical, they provide 
an account of my experiences as a researcher, as well as providing the
Ill
reader with an insight into the setting itself. In writing these 
chapters I have adopted a narrative style and have used the first person 
singular (which I persist with throughout the thesis.) I adopted this 
approach to depict the actual process of research and to make explicit 
my role in the research. I regard the role of the researcher as being 
of crucial importance to the research act. Chapters 1 and 2 will be 
discussed in chapter 12 on methodology.
Chapter 3 presents some interim conclusions based on my initial topic 
and research strategy, which was to study the organisational and 
behavioural implications of introducting a computerised production 
information system. In this chapter the managers,as far as possible, 
speak for themselves. They describe their views of information, their 
criticisms of it and the limitations it had for them, both before and 
after the introduction of the new system. I describe how the data 
gathered thwarted my change model and how a new topic, that of how 
managers informed themselves, emerged. Chapter 4 addresses this 
question. Again in the managers own words, they describe how and why 
they gathered information.
Chapters 3 and 4 are thus biographical they concern the actions and 
activities of the managers themselves.. These chapters form the 
foundation of my analysis in^the following section.
Section 2 (chapters 5 - 10) is largely analytical and represents my 
interpretation of the data within my developed and developing theoretical 
perspective.
Chapter 5 examines the mechanics of the process of informing, including 
the various media used, both "formal" and "informal," the subject matter
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of the information and the degree of contact the managers had with the 
event in question.
Chapter 6 introduces the basic principles of symbolic interaction and
analyses the process whereby the managers converted "mere" information
or data into meaningful information, within this perspective.
Chapter 7 introduces the role of others in the process of informing.
Chapter 8 introduces the concepts of self and one's role and the
implications these have for the process of informing.
Chapter 9 questions the nature of selcting or choosing a course of action 
in both familiar and unfamiliar problematic situations. I introduce the 
jazz metaphor with its twin concepts of improvisation and arrangement 
and discuss how the concept of improvisation might be used to understand 
the choice process in unfamiliar, problematic situations. I finally 
discuss the relationship between improvisation smd the process of 
informing.
Chapter 10 introduces the concept of loosely coupled shared arrangements 
as an explanation of concerted or joint action and how such arrangements 
give order and the appearance of structure to the organisational setting. 
I further explain the relationship between improvisation and these 
arrangements which provides a model for explaining change smd stability.
I then examine these arrangements and the process of informing.
At the ends of chapters 5, 8, 9 and 10, I discuss the implications that 
the concepts contained in these chapters have for the traditional view
of management information systems*
Chapter 11 presents a summary and certain conclusions of the thesis.
Chapter 12 examines the methodological implications of this project 
and draws upon my experiences as described in the thesis, particularly 
in chapters 1 and 2 .
CHAPTER I 
BEFORE THE FIELDWORK
In this chapter I describe the process of gaining access to the social 
or organizational setting. I include a brief description of my own 
theoretical perspective and methodology although more detail will be 
provided throughout the thesis. I include a description of my own 
perceived abilities and liabilities in terms of my knowledge emd 
experience at the commencement of my field work. I believe that these 
are of crucial importance to the conduct and success or failure of the 
research project.
1.1 Negotiating Entry
My appointment with Mr Thomas Bart, the Financial Director of the 
Richard Tomlinson Group, had been preceded by five months of 'negotiating 
entry* with the Area Administrator of an Area Health Authority. It had 
been my intention, and the intention of the Area Administrator, that I 
would study the behavioural effects of a proposed change in the budget­
ary control system in one of the Area's more autonomous hospitals. After 
five months of discussion and with little or no visible or tangible 
progress, I had become so disillusioned with the concept of qualitative 
fieldwork or participant observation in a social setting, that I had 
once again begun to design a questionnaire. After a year of literature 
surveys and methodological discussion groups, I was becoming increasingly 
anxious about gathering data. The idea of questionnaires and quantit­
ative analysis was becoming less of a demon than I had previously thought 
it to be.
In contrast,'negotiating entry' with Thomas Bart took a matter of hours 
rather than months. I had been given an introduction to Thomas Bart and
had forwarded a brief outline of my research interests.1 In my desire 
to gain access to a research setting I had made my bid as general as 
possible.
At the beginning of the interview I described my interest as being in 
the area of financial information systems and human behaviour. I added 
that it need not be financial information, but that any aspect of 
management information would be of interest to me.
Thomas Bart's initial response was: "Could you be a bit
more specific?"
"When I first started research at the University"» I replied^'I 
was interested in studying the behavioural implications of 
changes in an information system...but now..."
Thomas Bart interrupted. "What do you mean by the behavioural 
implications of changes?"
"Well." I said. "I feel that any change in an organisation, 
especially in the information system, will have an effect on 
a number of levels. Until now researchers have been concerned 
mainly with structural changes, and have often ignored the 
behavioural implications. I wish to study how - if at all - 
a change in the information system might effect the behaviour, 
attitudes and values of people involved in the system; either 
the people who prepare the information or those who use it."
"I see»" he said.
I realised that I had slipped into an old script from my 
'organizational change' days. My entrance depended on there 
being a change in the information system. I had wished to avoid 
this condition, and hastened to add, "Yes, but as a starting 
point I am now interested simply in how those people involved 
in "information" view it: what it means to them. I'm
not particularly concerned that there be a change taking place."
"And how would you propose to carry out this research?", he asked.
I regarded this interview as being my last attempt at qualitative 
research and replied: "I feel that if we want to understand 
peoples' behaviour, their attitudes, values and actions, we, as 
researchers must observe people behaving. Through observation, 
informal chats and interviews, we will hopefully understand how 
people view things, and how their view affects their behaviour.
I would propose using a method of research called participant 
observation. This entails spending some time in an organisation, 
collecting data through observation and by talking to the people."
Thomas Bart looked pensive, I thought he disapproved of my 
proposed approach. "I see from your outline here, that you 
intend to make a comparative study of divisions in R.T.G. and 
districts within the Health Authority. Do you think you'll have 
time to conduct your in-depth style of research?"
"Yes. That's a problem I'll face." I replied. "I might only 
have time to research one of each, but after doing this I should 
be able to compile a meaningful questionnaire which I could send 
to the other divisions and districts. This would aave me time 
whilst providing me with more data." I added this final part 
incase Thomas Bart preferred the more quantitative approach.
I was wrong.
"You know we've had researchers here before." He said. "I 
think they came from Manchester. They had a questionnaire 
which they wanted us to fill in, on how we account for inflation; 
a pet subject of mine. When they sent the written-up case study 
to us for our comments, we were frankly disappointed. It failed 
to reflect what we intended when filling it in. I think this is 
a basic flaw in questionnaires!" He paused, and, reaching for 
the phone, added "Let me give Charles Anderson a ring, he's my 
assistant."
By this time I was completely baffled, and felt the interview
slipping away from me. On the one handrl had not made it clear 
what I wished to study, and then to cap it all, I had given the 
impression that I did not know how I was going to study it. 
Charles Anderson joined us and I had to repeat my spiel. I 
tried to clarify one or two points as I went.
Thomas Bart then continued# "I think we could fit Alistair in 
at Avon as a starter. John Sims is always going on about their 
information, and now that Chris Davis is there, there should be 
plenty of changes."
"Yes." said Charles Anderson."Of course we would have to speak 
to John about it first, but I don't think there'd be any 
problem. It might take some time though, you realise we have 
the accountant's conference in a couple of weeks time, so I'll 
be tièd up with that."
Thomas Bart interrupted, "Maybe Alistair could attend."
Turning to me, he continued. "We're introducing the contribution 
approach in our costing and pricing systems, so we will have all 
the Division Accountants together at our staff college. It's 
a three-day affair, should be very interesting."
"Yes." said Charles Anderson "And Alistair could meet David 
Wright, he's the Financial Manager at Avon."
I still did not know what Avon was: Thomas Bart explained that it
was an operating division, and then went on to briefly describe it.
The following points seemed relevant to me at the time.
The factory at Avon was one part of the Plastic Container Division.
It specialised in two manufacturing processes called thermo forming 
and vacuum forming. He described the Plastics Division as their 
'new baby.' It was the growth area in the packaging market and was 
'ear-msLTked' for extensive capital investment. New younger managers.
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who Thomas Bart called the 'bright young boys of R.T.G.,' were being 
drafted in from other divisions within the company, to prepare the 
division for exploitation of the recognised market potential. The 
new managers formed an executive board, responsible for the development 
of both the Avon factory and the Injection Moulding factory. Until 
recently the two units were regarded, and run, as separate entities.
Thomas Bart then continued. "As you can see, there's a lot 
going on in the Plastics Division. Just take a look in your 
fridge when you get home and see how much of your food is 
packed in plastic containers. And, with people like Chris 
Davis in charge - he 'sorted out' R.T.G. Cups for us - even 
greater changes aure taking place. So there should be plenty of 
scope for observing change in action."
Charles Anderson then added. "Changes are taking place in the 
information system itself. Not only are we introducing the 
contribution margin approach, but we are also developing the 
use of computer facilities in the units, which should expand 
the role of the accountant to that of overall information 
manager. I've just completed a report which will be sent to 
all the Division Accountants for discussion at the conference."
Thomas Bart added. "Chris Davis is also planning changes in his 
production information." He paused and then added. "Weill 
Subject to John's approval we'll arrange for you to attend the 
conference at our staff college on the ah..."
"23rd August", Charles Anderson interjected.
"That's right, the 23rd...Charles, will you see to the details?"
The conversation paused, as if they were waiting for some 
response from me. I remembered the methodological hamdbooks' 
emphasis on negotiating a contract which should include the 
degree of access granted, and so asked. "What access will I
be given if I were to do research at Avon?" I immediately 
realised it was a stupid question.
Thomas Bart replied, somewhat amused. "Well, assuming John 
approves of the project, it will be up to him and you to decide 
on the level of access, but I think he will be amenable to your 
research, especially if he can see some spin-off for the 
factory."
The meeting broke up after this, with an assurance from Charles 
Anderson that he would be in contact with me within a week or two.
I was disappointed with my performance in the interview. I felt that 
I had tentatively found a research setting through fortuitous 
circumstances rather than personal competence. I felt the vagueness 
of my bid would have been interpreted as not knowing what I wanted to 
research. I felt fortunate that Thomas Bart was favourably disposed 
towards research, and surprisingly, favoured the qualitative, participant 
observation approach.
I felt guilty that I had compromised my research topic and was going to 
compromise my methodology. This was due mainly to ray lack of success 
with the Health Authority and my growing concern for gathering data.
At this stage of myresearch I was willing to taike whatever was offered 
for a research setting, even if this meant rethinking my research topic 
and approach. Again through fortuitous circumstances I felt that my 
rethink might hot have to be too radical.
Finally I felt anxious; I had already had too msuiy disappointments 
with the Health Authority, and could only regard my entrance as 
definite when I received confirmation from Charles Anderson. On the
7.
other hand everything seemed fairly definite, and I now had to face 
up to the prospect of becoming a participant observer and carry out 
qualitative research in a social setting.
The letter arrived from Charles Anderson within the week; enclosed 
were the conference package with details, a copy of his discussion 
paper entitled 'Management Information Systems and Use of Computer 
Facilities' and a covering letter saying that John Sims and Chris 
Davis were in favour of my research. Charles Anderson also offered 
me transport to the Staff College for the conference. Thus, after 
five months of fruitless negotiations with the Health Authority 
I was offered access to R.T.G. Plastics within a week. Thomas Bart 
had lived up to his nickname, which I subsequently learned was 
'Wizz Bang Bart.'
1.2. The Accountants Conference
As was promised, all the Chief Accountants and Financial Managers from 
the various divisions were at the conference. Charles Anderson intro­
duced me to one or two, explaining that I was going to do research in 
information systems at Avon. I was most definitely an outsider; the 
others were discussing 'old times' or current company policy. The 
atmosphere was relaxed, almost playful, the bi-annual conference 
seemed to be regarded as a vacation.
I was introduced to David Wright,from Avon,and his Factory Accountant, 
David Clark. David Wright was a large jovial man with a West Country 
accent; he reminded me more of a farmer than a financial manager. 
David Clark, in contrast, was a small, immaculately turned out 
accountant, about my age, and had only been with R.T.G. for some 
nine months.
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On being introduced; David Bright boomed out, "Oh, so you're 
the poor sod who's going to try and sort out our information 
system." There was laughter all round. "No, but seriously, we 
have a few problems at Avon. We haven't caught up with our 
expansion yet. There'll be plenty for you to do there."
"I'm not sure whether I'm going to be doing much." I said.
"I'm really there to observe and leam."
"Oh, there's plenty to learn." He said. "Learning how not 
to do things, that is." Again everybody laughed.
I was a little baffled by these remarks, and somewhat embarrassed 
by the laughter. The meaning behind these 'jokes' would become clear 
to me during my fieldwork at Avon. The conversation then swung away 
from me. I was left alone, except for David Clark who seemed to feel 
as much an outsider as I did.
"How long have you been at the University?", he asked. 
"This is my sixth year coming up." I replied. "But I did 
travel in the States for a while." I then added, without 
really thinking, "Which University did you go to?"
With a forced smile he replied, "I did it the proper way, 
working for a firm and doing day release at Sheffield 
Poly, then I took my A.C.M.A. examinations."
A great deal of snobbery and reverse snobbery exists about University 
degrees; I naively assumed that all professional accountants had 
degrees. This gaff on my part, set the style of our relationship. 
David Clark and I never really 'got on' from that day. The opposite 
of every characteristic used to describe David wsis applicable to me. 
Not the most encouraging foundation to develop a relationship!
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I saw very little of the two Davids at the conference; the days 
were tightly scheduled, and as both lived within commuting distance 
of the college, they returned home each evening. The conference 
itself was concerned with the contribution approach and the format 
of the annual financial reports required by Headquarters.
For much of the time I had no idea of what was going on. The 
concepts were, I thought familiar to me; the company was introduc­
ing a variation on the direct costing system for internal control and 
decision making. The language they used to describe these concepts 
was alien to me. They referred to the 'Boston Approach', this was 
the name of the American consultancy firm. Phreises such as "Direct 
labour until now part of oops will be regarded as part of burden*" 
completely perplexed me. The two words 'oops' and 'burden' were used 
extensively. Later that evening I asked one of the accountants 
what they meant.
He laughed and said, "I supposed they would sound a little 
strange for an outsider, 'oops' stands for out-of-pocket 
costs and 'burden' for fixed overheads."
"I see. So out-of-pocket costs are the variable costs and 
burden the fixed costs."
"Yes. That's right."
"So you now regard labour, traditionally a vsœiable cost as 
being fixed?." I asked.
"Yep." He replied. "As Thomas Bart says, labour is fixed. 
It often can't be redeployed within the factory, and it most 
definitely can't be reduced or increased with small changes 
in the level of output."
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In the evening,after the meal, we played cricket on the lawns and then 
retired to the bar to play bar billiards or darts and, of course, take 
a drink or two. It was in the evening I thought I would have an 
opportunity to discuss my research, and points of interest arising 
from the day's discussions. This, however, was not to be. A few 
people would lend a sympathetic ear but most conversations were not 
related to work. Peter Renton whose job it was to oversee the 
introduction of the contribution approach, and who obviously took it 
more seriously approached me, and asked;
"Have we met? I can't remember seeing you before."
"No." I replied. "I'm from Bath University, I'll be doing
research into information systems at Avon."
"Ah yes." He said. "Charles Anderson mentioned you. What 
exactly are you researching?"
"I'm primarily interested in the behavioural implications of 
information." I replied. "How behaviour affects information 
systems, and how information systems in turn affect behaviour. 
I'm quite fortunate that the factory at Avon is introducing 
changes in their information systems, it will make researching 
the phenomenon simpler."
"Very interesting." He replied. "One of the major problems
I'm facing is to make this lot", pointing to the other 
accountants, "unlearn suLl their traditional accounting 
principles and approaches before I can teach them the new 
methods."
I followed this point up later in conversation with one of the 
accountants.
"How much change will this system entail for you?" I asked.
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"Not much." He replied. "I just take'labour* from above the 
line 'in oops' and add it in with 'burden' below the line."
The conference was useful to me. Firstly,I learnt some of R.T.G.'s 
in-house accounting language, and a great deal more about the Boston 
and contribution concept approach. Secondly, I met the two Davids 
and so there were at least two people I knew at Avon. The greatest 
benefit, however, was that I met and socialised with a number of 
senior accountants from the group. This provided me with contacts 
which I could use at a later date, but more importantly it boosted 
my self-confidence, something I needed at that time.
I bade ray farewells to the people I had met, and agreed with Charles 
Anderson and David Wright to commence my field work at Avon on the 
4th September. The length of my stay and the amount of time I would 
be on site would depend on progress, but we agreed it would be in the 
order of three months and I would be there four days a week.
1.3 My Knowledge, Abilities and Liabilities
Before commencing my field work I could only describe myself as an 
inexperienced field researcher. I had conducted some interviews 
with the Student Union Executive at the University, and had used both 
tape recorders and video equipment. I had tried to evaluate my 
performance in these - as well as analysing the data - to examine my 
style and the amount of bias I introduced through my questions and 
comments. I did not feel at all confident about beginning field 
work in a live social setting. It was the same kind of feeling I 
had when first coming to University. I had some stereotype of a 
student, which was to be my new role, but this stereotype was crude 
and my role was ambiguous. Again, I had some stereotype of a
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participant observer, mainly taken from John Lofland's 'Analysing 
Social Settings' (1976), but even with the aid of such methodological 
handbooks, I was still uncertain of how a participant observer should 
behave. Instructions such as 'develop trust', 'keep voluminous field 
notes', 'ensure strict confidentiality' and, above all, 'maintain a 
critical distance', did not allay my anxiety.
By the time I had gained access to R.T.G. Plastics, my research 
interests had developed through a number of stages. Initially the 
title of my research wsis 'The Interface Between Organisational 
Development and Financial Control Systems.' In pursuing this title 
I carried out extensive literature surveys in both areas.
The behavioural implications were of interest to me from the earliest 
days of my research. I had adopted the concepts, and the rhetoric of 
systems theory. I had also adopted an organization development 
methodology, advocating an action research approach. My earliest 
proposal was rife with organization development and systems theory 
cliches such as the 'morphogenic properties of the organization', 
'consonance or dissonance between interrelated subsystems', 'on-going 
process' and ' organizational renewal'^ Although I had claimed an 
interest in the behavioural processes, I had no clear idea of how 
I would approach this aspect of change. I thus concentrated on the 
structural and mechanical aspects in my model. Any references to 
behaviour were in vague words such as 'attitudes' and 'values' or 
clothed in abstract jargon, such as 'inter'-and 'intra-group develop­
ment' or 'developing a synergistic relationship between structural, 
and behavioural change'.
In line with the current interest in the School of Manaigement at the
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time, suid in order to make my behavioural processes more specific, I 
joined the participation band waggon. My new model was to examine 
changes in the financial control system brought about by the intro­
duction of participative management. My emphasis was still a systems 
approach; examining how chauiges in the structure and process of an 
organization might affect the financial control sub-system. By this 
time I was also relating my work to decision-making styles, such as 
autocratic, democratic or participative and laissez-faire. It was 
with such a script that I approached the Health Authority, and 
commenced my five months of fruitless negotiations.
During those five months I began attending the Organization Behaviour 
Group's methodological seminars. This was my first introduction to 
the 'new paradigm' of research. These seminars and the resulting 
discussion with my peers and lecturers who advocated this approach, 
gave me my introduction to sociology and social psychology, and, in 
particular, to phenomenology, which included a brief look at ethno- 
methodology, symbolic interactionism, dramaturgy and social 
anthropology.
By the time I commenced my research, my vocabulary included words 
and phrases such as 'defining the situation', ' social scripts', 
'garfinkling', 'the model of man is man', 'personal construct 
theory', and 'account analysis'. I had added to the organization 
development and financisQ. control literature survey a brief survey 
of the phenomenological, sociology and social psychology literature.
I also explored the methodological handbooks which accompanied this 
view of man. Although I was still interested in organizational 
change, financial control and behaviour, my emphasis had swung away 
from change. I was nowconcentrating more on the behavioural
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implications. When I approached R.T.G. I had intended to drop the 
concept of change altogether, and had replaced the phrase 'control 
systems' with 'information systems'. During the interview with 
Thomas Bart, I had widened my scope to include any aspect of 
management information, and not just the financial.
These developments in my research interests, especially in the area 
of sociology aoid social psychology were in their infancy at the 
commencement of my field work. I could not claim to be totally 
unknowledgable; neither could I claim expertise. I described myself 
as having an acceptable level of incompetence. I could understand 
and relate to discussions in the seminars, and could in the main 
understand the literature. I could not, however, actively participate 
in the seminars, nor could I competently write or comment on the 
subjects.
I vas aware that opposing schools of thought existed in sociology and 
social psychology, without fully understanding the intricacy of the 
arguments. I had developed a preference for the more interactionist, 
phenomenological approach; this was based more on intuitive feeling 
than careful analysis of the theory. Being able to relate my 
personal experiences and behaviour to the theory, convinced me of 
its validity. I felt that I was able to explain events in my own 
social settings more appropriately using the interactionist, 
phenomenological model or approach, than using a reductionist or 
structural positivist approach. The interactionist, phenomenological 
model, I felt, gave man some hope; the positivists had sentenced and 
committed man to a prison of circumstance.
In terms of methodology; I found participant observation, as derived
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from the social anthropologists, appealing and appropriate. If I 
wished to study and understand peoples* behaviour, it seemed perfectly 
sensible to me to watch people behave, and then think about why they 
behaved in that way. I had little or no experience as a formal 
participant observer. I had, however, as a social being, participated 
in social settings and observed my own and others* behaviour.
The following is a summary of the position I was faced with before 
entering the field work stage of my research.
1.3.1 My Knowledge of the Setting
The factory was a medium sized manufacturing unit of a large division­
alized company. The unit was ear-marked for development and capital 
investment. The unit was undergoing some changes. It was being merged 
with another manufacturing unit to become the Plastics Division. New 
and younger managers were being drafted in to oversee these changes and 
to exploit the recognised growth potential. A new costing system, the 
contribution approach, was being introduced which would alter the 
financial information system.
1.3 .2 My Knowledge about the People in the Setting
I had only met two people from R.T.G. Plastics, David Wright, the 
Financial Manager and David Clark, the Factory Accountant. Both 
were pleasant; David Wright wsis a jovial friendly person; David 
Clark was more reserved; I had experienced difficulty interacting 
with him. I had heard of two other Managers; John Sims, the 
Managing Director, of whom I knew nothing, except that he was 
willing to allow me to do research in his factory, and Chris Davis, 
the Operations Manager, who had been described as one of the 'bright
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young men of R.T.G.', and to whom was attributed the 'sorting out' 
of R.T.G. Cups.
1.3 .3 Their Knowledge of Me
Except for what I had told David Wright and David Clark, the people 
in the setting's knowledge ofme would necessarily be second hand and 
brief. If Thomas Bart or Charles Anderson had provided a description 
of me based on our interview, I imagined that John Sims and Chris 
Davis would know that I came from Bath University, that I was 
interested in financial information systems, but not exclusively so, 
that I was interested in changes in systems, but not entirely so, that 
I was interested in human behaviour in some vague sense, that I wished 
to observe and interview, but that I might use questionnaires, that I 
would be staying for three months, but wasn't absolutely certain.
Any other information, for instance Thomas Bart's impression of me as 
a person, may also have been communicated; what that impressioh waisi 
was unknown to me.
1.3 .4 The Research Contract
The research contract was ambiguous; I was given access to do research 
in a factory, and with people that I had not seen or met, and of whom 
had little or no knowledge. The degree of access was not stated; it 
appeared that it was up to me to negotiate that, on my arrival or during 
my stay.
1.3.5 Myself
In my own mind I was unsure of what I wanted to, or was going to, do 
research into. I wsis interested in how people responded to, or behaved
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towards, information. I was not certain what type of information or 
indeed what type of people. I had some partially developed model of 
man which I found appealing, I could not, however, claim expertise in 
this area. I had some fairly clear ideas about t^e mode of research I 
was going to employ, but did not know how I was going to employ it.
I felt reassured that I could 'get on with' most people but the 
prospect of being a participant observer was daunting.
The major point from this summary is that prior to my entering the 
research setting, there was a great deal of uncertainty surrounding 
the event. I had very little knowledge of the setting and even less 
knowledge of the people. The people, in turn, would have been 
equally uncertain of me, if they regarded it as important. I was 
uncertain of my knowledge relating to behaviour, one of the funda­
mental aspects of my research, and was uncertain of my competence as 
a participant observer. I was unknowledgeable without being totally 
naive. I had what could be regeurded as an acceptable level of 
incompetence.
1«4 Summary
In this chapter I have provided a description of negotiating entry
and of my earliest contact and experiences with members of the
setting. I have attempted to express my feelings and apprehensions
towards conducting qualitative research for the first time. I have
further attempted to depict the confusion and naivety surrounding my
knowledge and the changes that had recently taken place in my
perspective towards human behaviour, organizations and research in
generail.
Notes
1. See Appendix 1




In this chapter I describe my early experiences in the research 
setting; of being introduced to the members of the setting; of 
becoming familiar with the physical environment and the production 
process. I further describe the methods by which I gathered data 
and the 'selection' of my initial research topic within the field.
2.1 The First Day
To get to Avon I had purchased a motor bike. On the first day it
rained. I arrived dripping wet in my protective clothing. I had 
intended to find a suitable place to remove my outer skin and intro­
duce myself in a presentable manner. Unfortunately, this plan was 
foiled when David Wright lent out of his office window and bellowed 
"Alistair, over herei". I trudged into the portacabin, which was 
serving as temporary offices, to be confornted by two secretaries; 
Janç, David Wright's secretary, and Mary, Chris Davis' secretary.
Both were highly amused with my state. I had to struggle with my wet 
protective clothing balancing on one leg, then the other, avoiding 
sitting, for fear of wetting the seats, and all the time leaving 
puddles of water on their newly polished floor. I stood wondering 
where to put my gear; Mary made space above the radiator.
"There, they'll dry out here", she said.
Jane began making me coffee. "You must be frozen", she said.
David Wright popped his head out of his office at one end of 
the cabin, and said, "Ah! Glad to see you're looking after 
him. I'll be with you in ten minutes".
"Did you ride that bike all the way from Bath?" Jane asked.
19.
"Yes", I replied. "A motor bike is all I can afford, being 
on a student's grant".
"Are we going to be treated to a strip every day?" Mary asked.
"You havn't seen anything yet!" I replied, still highly 
embarrassed and freezing cold. They both giggled at this.
"Do you take sugar?". Jane asked.
"No". I replied.
"Well here you go then, this'll warm you up", said Jane, 
handing me a welcome cup of coffee.
Jane and Mary were to become great friends of mine. I was given a 
desk in their office to write my notes. I spent many hours chatting 
to them when the bosses were out, keeping up on all the gossip in the 
factory and offices. Jane and Mary were invaluable sources of data to 
me, helping me build up a picture of the setting and the participants. 
Jfiuie relieved the switchboard operator at lunch and spent most of her 
time 'ringing around' the other secretaries, catching up on the 
gossip which she, in turn, passed on to Mary and I.
As with any friendship, time is need for it to develop. My friend­
ship with Mary and Jane was no exception. It took time before they 
would open up and include me in their more graphic conversations. At 
first, they never criticised or gossiped about the senior managers. 
Most of the conversations centred around the other administrative 
staff and the factory personnel. Their comments were often vicious 
and charged with personal feeling. Jane particularly disliked 
David Clark who she had at one time worked for; she had been moved.
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to avoid further conflict between them. She referred to him as a 
"right little Hitler".
Affairs between participants in the setting were savouredf every aspect 
of the relationship and personaü. history of the people involved was 
examined, and judgement passed. "I dont' think it's right, what 
about the family?" or "I met his wife. She's a right cow. I dontt 
blame him a bit". Over time, when Jane and Mary became familiar with 
my presence, and could rely on me not to 'blab' to the wrong people,
I became a party to aü.1 their gossip, except those parts about me, 
of course! Although most of the gossip centred around the less 
savoury aspects of peoples' lives and events in the unit, Jane and 
Mary did have good things to say about the people as well.
Jane was in her late twenties; Mary was thirty five; both were very 
attractive. I was envied by the middle managers for having a desk 
between them. Many used to come in and flirt with them whilst 
waiting to see David Wright, Chris Davis or Lynne Carter (the personnel 
officer who shared the portacabin). The middle managers recognised 
Jane and Mary's access to information, they were regarded as working 
for influential and powerful people, and they continually prompted 
me to disclose all I had heard from them.
David Wright and David Clark emerged from the office. David Wright 
explained that he was up to his neck in the quarterly accounts, and 
Chris Davis was at the Injection Moulding Plant for the week. David 
Clark, who was referred to as David C. was to show me around amd 
introduce me to the other managers. Feeling somewhat unwanted I 
gulped my coffee down.and went on a tour of introduction. This was
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an experience I was totally unprepared for, principally because of the 
way David C.introduced me.
"Ah Cyril". He said. "This is Alistair Preston from Bath 
University", and turning to me "Alistair this is Cyril 
Jenkins, our Production Manager". We shook hands.
"Pleased to meet you". I said.
"Alistair was sent by Thomas Bart to sort out our inform­
ation problems". Said David 0.
Cyril Jenkins looked somewhat amused. "Well, we could do 
with some help".
The responses from other managers were similar. They either said; 
"about time it was sorted out by somebody" or "well, best of luck 
to you".
David C. either interrupted people in their offices or we bumped 
into them in the corridors or on the shop floor. The managers were 
invariably busy and had no time to stop and chat. I tried to cover 
what David C. was saying about me, by replying that I was basically 
there to learn and help if I could. My assertions fell on deaf ears; 
it was a terrible way to meet anybody. I began to wonder whether 
David C. was doing it deliberately to embarrass me.
2.2. Lunch in the Canteen
The next incident worthy of note came at lunchtime. David C. and I 
called in on David Wright; primarily to ask where I was to eat. I 
W5L8 curious about the seriousness with which the two Davids discussed 
the issue. It was finally agreed that I should eat with David C. in
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the middle managers’ canteen, until Chris Davis returned and made the 
final decision. It transpired that there were four canteens each for 
a different group of people.
The canteens were housed in a low, square building at the far end of 
the factory. It was shared with Lansdown Paper, another R.T.G. 
Division. The kitchen was in the centre of the building with the 
four canteens surrounding it, one in each comer. One canteen was 
for factory workers; it had formica-topped tables and plastic seats. 
li was a paying canteen, specialising in sausage, beans and chips.
Next there was the staff canteen; here there was a choice of two or 
three set lunches, again self service and paying, but with set tables 
and table cloths. The next canteen was for middle managers above grade 
10 on the salary scale. Each manager had his own reserved position 
and a three-course, waitress served, meal. The food was similar to 
that in the staff canteen, but was free. Finally there was the senior 
managers* canteen, or more correctly restaurant. There was an 
elaborate table layout, and a separate menu which included fruit and 
cheese and biscuits to follow. Again this was all free.
When I considered the status implications of such a canteen layout,
I understood the two Davids' dilemma. Later I considered my own 
position - how did the middle managers read my arrival in that 
canteen? I had already met most of the managers who were sitting on 
the same long table as myself. On one hand I was a twenty-four- 
year-old, motor cycle riding, university student, with no apparent 
status or position. On the other hand I was sent by Thomeis Bart, the 
somewhat fearsome Financial Director to 'sort out' their information 
system. More significantly, I was given a place in the middle
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managers' canteen; which was later ratified by Chris Davis, the 
newly appointed Operations Manager, who was still an enigma himself.
On reflection, it was apparant that the conversation over lunch had 
been stifled in the early days, largely because of the uncertainty 
surrounding my presence. I was not immediately aware of this; I had 
no past experience on which to judge my impact. I only realised the 
effect I had when the managers became less guarded about what they 
said in my presence. On the first day the conversation was fairly 
formal, asking me about Bath, and whether I played football or rugby. 
My acceptance in the setting would have been enhanced if I had replied 
"Yes", as it happened my "No" received a murmur of disappointment.
2.3* A Trip Around the Factory
After lunch I sat in the office to write my notes, a process I found 
laborious and tedious at first. With practice, writing field notes 
became easier, but never enjoyable. I wandered around the site in 
the afternoon. From the outside R.T.G. Plastics looked uninspiring.
A small factory block, surrounded by a few outhouses and two porta­
cabins used to house administrative and managerial staff. The 
managers directly involved in production, were housed in offices 
running the length of the factory block which opened directly on to 
the shop floor. The offices were aptly, if unimaginatively,called 
the 'rabbit warren'. The Departmental Production Managers were 
housed in a glass cabin in the middle of the shop floor, from which 
they could see most of the floor itself. The factory had a number 
of exits and entrances; I often found it difficult to orient myself, 
such was the complex nature of its design. Finding my way around 
proved an effort in itself.
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Later that afternoon I was shown around the factory by Tom Jackson, 
the Quality Control Manager. The factory seemed to be an enormous 
collection of incredibly noisy machines, bunched as close together 
as possible. There was an air of untidy chaos about the place, with 
large pallets of plastic containers being stacked against the machines. 
Tom Jackson explained the production process to me, describing the 
various machines and their purpose. The noise blanketed out much of 
what Bob had to say, and his use of technicsü. jargon compounded the 
problem.
It took me a number of weeks to become familiar with the factory 
layout, to be able to identify the various machines and to know 
what function they performed. Before I could do this I had to learn 
to speak to the managers. I had to leam a new sub-language ; the 
language of the plastic container manufacturers. Tom Jackson referred 
to the machines with obvious familiarity: 'The Kaufman', 'The Bridge',
'RDMS', 'Rotoformers', 'Bollercutters', 'Waddingtons', 'the Van Dam Tub', 
'the Van Dam Lid', and 'the Omso'. He referred to the materials as 
'HIPS' (High Impact Polystyrene), and ■‘*UPVC (Unplasticised Polyvinyle 
Chlorine). He referred to the products as '8 oz circulars', '4 litre 
squares', 'seed trays', 'Ski Collations', 'R.T.G. Gallon lids' and 
'500 grams circular'.
2.4 Meeting Others
For the remainder of that first week I sat in the office writing notes, 
reading books and chatting to Jane and Mary. I experienced long periods 
of boredom, thinking that I would be just as well off at the University.
I did, however, feel that my presence in the setting was important.
Even if I did nothing, I was at least visible. People would become
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accustomed to my presence and I would become a familiar part of the 
setting.
An interesting conversation I had was with Peter Travers, the Assistant 
Marketing Manager. Peter sat opposite me at lunch.
"What is it you're here to research, Alistair?". He asked.
"I'm interested in the contribution approach", I replied. "How 
introducing this new system will affect human behaviour and vice 
versa."
"What do you mean by affecting human behaviour?". He asked.
I paused for a moment thinking of the best way to express it. 
"Well...basically how it affects the way managers make their 
decisions".
"Ah right". He said. "You know we use it for making our 
pricing decision".
"You do!" I said, somewhat surprised, after all the contribution 
approach was only just being introduced. "How exactly do you 
use it?".
"Why don't you drop into my office this afternoon. I'll explain 
to you there".
Peter Travers had initiated this conversation with me, but was quick 
to change subject when it became more involved. This was not because 
Peter did not wish to divulge any 'secrets' about the subject, but 
rather that it was taboo to discuss work at lunch. If a manager ever 
did introduce a work-related subject, it was invariably proceeded by 
an apology. "I'm sorry to talk shop, but". Such conversations
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usually ended in the same way as Peter's and mine did, that is,by 
the arranging of a meeting after lunch. I did not leam this lesson 
immediately and had a few abortive conversations over lunch before I 
realised this implicit social rule.
Although I have no evidence for this other than my personal feelings,
I most definitely got the impression that the managers were often 
embarrassed to talk to me, or discuss their work with me in front 
of their peers. I was an unknown entity and the managers were 
uncertain of me. I felt they did not wish to be seen to be 
associating with me, until they were more certain about my stance, 
my style, about my position and, above all, about my purpose.
Peter Travers was about my age and had been working for R.T.G. 
since he left school, first at R.T.G. Boxes and then R.T.G. Plastics. 
He had been a Sales Representative and was given this office job to 
help cope with the increased demand for the containers. The position. 
Assistant Marketing Manager, was specially created for him and this 
meant that he could break out of the company-wide salary structure.
The Commercial Manager, Clive Jones, thought so highly of Peter, 
that he arranged this promotion to entice him off the road.
"Ah Alistair - sit down. I'll be with you in a moment". He said, 
greeting me on the way out of his office. He shared an office 
with John Stratford, the Marketing Msmager, because they were 
so cramped for space in Sales.
"Now then, about this contribution approach". He said. "We use 
a principle called 'factor one pricing'. Have you come across 
it?"
"No I haven't. I've never heard of it". I replied.
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"Well". He said. "We determine our prices on what the msurket will 
bear. We're a commercially centered business. A Rep comes in with 
a prospective new order and the price that the customer is willing 
to pay. We then calculate the factor price and if it's greater or 
equal to one we give the Rep the go-ahead".
"How do you calculate the factor price?" I asked.
"It's part of incremental costing". He replied. "We calculate the 
'oops' or out of pocket expenses and add an agreed percentage for 
'burden' and profit. We divide this by the proposed selling price, 
and calculate the factor; when they are equal, that is the 'factor 
one price'. That is the lowest we cam sell for, and still meet 
our targets".
I realised that this was a slightly distorted contribution margin 
approach to pricing. "So if you are choosing between a number of 
products you choose the product with the highest factor?".
"That's partly right". He replied. "We also have to take into 
account the size of the order and the rate of production".
"Ah, yes". I commented. "In my language you'd be calculating 
total contribution as well as the contribution per hour, and 
then obviously trying to maximise it".
"Yes". He replied. "That's exactly it but here at Avon we call 
it factor pricing".
"I see. Do you ever accept orders below factor one?". I asked.
"Oh, yesl". He replied. "That's where our judgement comes in.
If it is a new customer, or one of our competitors' customers, 
we might accept a below factor one price, just to get the new 
order. Then we can compete on quality and reliability and 
increase the price to factor one. Then,of course, if we've got 
spare or idle capacity, we might take a bàow factor one order".
"How long have you been using this method?". I asked.
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"About a year now". He replied.
"A year!", I exclaimed. "I thought it was only just being 
introduced".
"No. We've been using it for a year, at least". He said.
I was a bit taken aback by this piece of information; I had planned
to study the introduction of a new system for costing and pricing.
If the system had already been in operation for a year that would 
upset my plans.
Later that day I spoke to David Wright and he confirmed Peter's 
statement. It transpired that R.T.G. Plastics at Avon had been
used in the pilot study. After the one-year trial, the other
divisions in the group were introducing the new approach. I began 
wondering why I was there. This brought into question the comments 
by David C, and David Wright about me sorting out their information 
system.
2 .5. All is revealed
I had an appointment to see Chris Davis on Monday, the 11th, in the 
afternoon. We were introduced during the day, but I had to wait 
until almost 4 o'clock until I saw him formally. Jane and Mary 
assured me that he was a 'good bloke'. I was nevertheless anxious 
about the meeting; I felt that I would finauLly find out what I was 
there for, and I did.
"Alistair. Pleased to meet you at Ismt". He said, greeting 
me. "I'm sorry to have kept you waiting. Take a seat".
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"Oh! That's o.k. The place has to be kept going". I replied.
After the polite pleasantries Chris Davis got down to business.
"Arthur tells me that you are interested in information". He 
said.
"Yes. That's right". I replied.
"Any specific area?". He asked.
"At one time I was only interested in financial information".
I replied. "Now I've widened my scope to include any type of 
management information. You see, my main emphasis is on the 
behavioural aspects of information, rather than on information 
per se". I paused and then added. "I had hoped to study the 
introduction of the contribution approach, which I though was 
happening right now but it seems I'm too late".
"Yes". He said. "John Sims volunteered Avon as guinea-pig, 
things are working out well though". Chris paused and, with 
a wry smile added. "I've got a proposition for you Alistair.
As you know I've only been here for a few months. I'm still 
a new boy. My first priority is Production. We've got to 
move away from the crisis management situation we're now in. 
Production runs are being broken for rush orders, waste is 
unacceptably high and productivity is down. Before I can take 
measures to improve the situation. I've got to know, in detail, 
what is going on and that's where the problem is. What I see 
out there", he said, pointing to the factory block, "is a big 
fuzzy box, and I need detailed information to sharpen the 
image. My predecessor, made do with the information I now 
receive. God only knows how. What I get is always late; one 
form comes in on Tuesday, another on Friday; each form is 
different; nothing matches up and figures contradict each 
other. What this means is that I can't compile trends and 
I can't monitor improvement". He paused, thinking for a while.
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"What I need is good, reliable production information, and as 
Operations Manager that's where I intend to make the first 
changes".
I began to realise why I was at Avon and why David Wright and David 
Clark referred to me as "The bloke from Bath University who was going 
to sort out their information problems for them". I had the distinct 
feeling I was going to receive an offer I could not refuse.
Chris Davis continued. "My first course of action is to set up 
a Working Party to examine the whole area of information coming 
out of the factory. If you think this would fit in with your 
research interests I would like you to be on that Working Party",
I thought for a while and then said, "in principle it seems fine, 
I hadn't thought of production information in terms of my 
research, but if that's where the changes are taking place, then 
that's where I should be. I don't know how much I could contrib­
ute though. I don't know the difference between a 'Waddington' 
and a 'Kaufman'.
"Neither do I, and that's why I want you there. The others who 
will probably be on the Working Party will have been here for 
years, they'll be set in their ways, they'll be used to the 
existing information. Now if you're there asking questions I 
think it might inspire them to look at it from a new angle. 
Improvements must be made immediately. Anyway, there is a 
meeting on the 15th to discuss this whole issue. Think it over, 
and let me know before the meeting".
I spent the next few days reviewing my position in the organisation. 
The proposition put to me by Chris Davis seemed to have all the 
necessary ingredients of an organization development investigation. 
I could conduct a 'before-and-after' study. I could interview
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managers concerning their impression of the existing information.
What purpose did it fulfil? What use was it for their decision making 
activities? How much of, and, how often did they use their information? 
What areas did they think needed improving? These interviews could be 
compared with subsequent interviews, after changes had been brought 
about. I could then try and match up changes in the production inform­
ation with changes in peoples* perceptions and use of it.
There were a number of implications to my potential research: I would
be a member of the change group, therefore I might become a change agent 
myself. This would be a reversion to my action researcher role, rather 
than my passive participant observer role. Would I just be Chris Davis' 
front man or agent, thus biasing the change to concur with his require­
ments? Would I be ostracised from the other members of the setting by 
associating too closely with Chris Davis, who was regarded with a 
certain awe? On the other hand by helping Chris Davis I might be 
given wider access to other areas of information. By being on the 
Working Party I would be able to view the change process, and the 
process of designing a new information system. I would be actively 
involved in a live project; managers would be obliged to consider 
this area of information if they had not been doing so already.
Finally, was I prepared to risk my access to this setting and thus my 
data, by not complying with the wishes of one of the most influenital 
managers? Was I prepared to go back to square one and search for 
another setting?
I chose to stay, and accept the position as a member of the Working 
Party. I explained to Chris Davis that I still had reservations 
about my contribution, and to appease my conscience I asked for
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permission to gather data from all sources, to have access to documents 
and to be able to interview other managers. After a moment's thought 
Chris Davis agreed in principle.
"Yes that seems fair. You won’t be able to attend our Senior 
Management Policy Meetings, but there's no reason why you 
shouldn't attend the Production and Planning Meetings; in 
fact I think it would be a good idea to do so. As long as the 
managers themselves don't object to you interviewing,I myself, 
have no objections. I personally can only give you access to 
production related informatioh; if you want other types we will 
have to discuss that with the managers concerned."
I felt I had been conned. Chris Davis had aigreed to my request, without 
any commitment on his part. It was not long before I realised just how 
persuasive Chris Davis could be.
2 .6 Selecting a Working Party
Present at the meeting on the 15th September, called to discuss 
production control,were:
Chris Davis - Operations Manager
John Stratford - Marketing Manager
David Wright - Financial Manager
Cyril Jenkins - Production Manager
David Clark - Factory Accountant
Simon White - Works Study and Information Manager
Mike Sampey - Production Controller and Material Buyer
I had met all the managers present, and as there was no need for 
introduction, Chris Davis opened the meeting.
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Chris Davis The purpose of this meeting is to decide on a 
strategy, or course of action to improve production 
control...I think we are all agreed that there are 
problems in this area.
(There were murmurs of assent from all present.
Chris Davis continued.)
To begin with, I propose that we first tidy up the 
information coming out of the factory, then we will 
be able to see where the problems lie. I would 
like to see a more co-ordinated set of production 
information, a system or a format that will bring 
together and correlate the various forms we now 
receive. What I have in mind is something aLlong 
these lines.
(Chris Davis handed out a sheet of analysis paper 
to each of us outlining his proposal. He 
continued.)
This was jotted down in a few minutes off the top 
of my head, but will serve eis a starting point for 
discussion.
(Each of us glauiced at the document for a moment, 
then Chris Davis opened the meeting for discussion.)
David Wright I dont mean to sound like a long playing record, 
but I feel that most of our control problems Eure 
to do with the use - or should I say misuse - of 
our Folio System on the Works Order Forms. 
Production runs are not being matched with the 
correct Folios. I've said this all before but 
I havn't seen any real improvements.
Cyril Jenkins That's not strictly fair, David. The Supervisors 
and Charge Hands now know how to use the Folios
in the correct manner.
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David Wright Yes, but are they doing so? We're still getting 
as many mistakes.
Cyril Jenkins We've only just introduced the new Works Order 
Forms, which you agreed with. The numbers produced 
are being recorded, so we should be able to match 
the run with the folio reference...But these will 
take time to work their way through the system.
David Wright How accurate is the recording of numbers produced? 
We've come up against that problem over and over 
again, as well.
Cyril Jenkins We recognise that accuracy's a problem, and we're 
taking steps to rectify it. We've increased 
supervision and we're investigating all irregular­
ities. These problems can't be solved overnight.
(The conversation continued to swing between David Wright and Cyril 
Jenkins and it was obvious there was conflict between the two. Chris 
Davis finally interjected.)
Chris Davis O.k. We know there are problems and we know we're 
taking steps to solve them. This meeting is not to 
allocate blame. We're here to decide on a strategy 
of improvement. Now can we return to the problem 
of information? If we can first find out where the 
problems are, we can take effective action and 
remedy them.
David Wright We know whre the problems are, and we know what 
action is needed. We have all the information we 
need to tell us this.
Chris Davis You may have David. I don't!
(After a pause)
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John Stratford In terms of information, my major problem is to do 
with stock control. The information we receive 
from Accounts and Stores is contradictory. We 
can't rely on the stock balances we receive.
(This statement by John Stratford took the heat out 
of the moment. Chris Davis wrote down Stock Control.)
Chris Davis Now we're getting somewhere. Any other areas with 
problems?
(David Wright,now somewhat subdued.)
David Wright Materials. We've got a problem in the are of the 
'materials issued' and the 'material used' figures; 
they never correspond; in effect we always under­
recover on material.
(Chris Davis wrote down 'Materials'.)
Chris Davis Anymore?
David Clark Dispatches. There are still irregularities there.
David Wright Yes. That's right1
Chris Davis O.k., but that all comes under the problem of 
Stock Control.
The conversation then concentrated on Stock Control. There was 
another brief flare up between David Wright and Cyril Jenkins over 
Sean Davies, the Storeman. Chris Davis again had to interject to 
cool things down. After half an hours ' discussion Chris Davis 
turned the conversation round to his sheet. The ensuing discussion
centred around the what was meant by Planned Output* When Chris Davis 
explained Simon White thought there might be problems calculating such 
a figure.
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Chris Davis As I said, this was off the top of my head. 
Something we used at Cups. It might not work 
here. I don't think we will get much further 
today. However, before we adjourn I propose 
thgt we form a Working Party to examine the area 
of production information, material usage and 
stock control...agreed?
(There was a murmur of assent.)
Now who will be on the Working Party?
David Wright I nominate David (Clark) here, or should I say 
volunteer.
Cyril Jenkins Simon White, as Information Officer, is an 
obvious choice.
Chris Davis O.k. Simon?
Simon White Yes...Yes... That's O.k.
Mike Sampey As Production Controller, this will be in my 
province. I nominate myself.
Chris David And I nominate Alistair here.
All heads turned towards me. I got the distinct impression that 
nobody was expecting this and obviously wondered why I was si.ected 
by Chris Davis. As there were no objections, the meeting was closed 
with the agreement that the Working Party should meet on Wednesday,
37.
the 20th September, and would report to Chris Davis as soon as some 
progress had been made.
This was the only occasion where everybody got together to discuss 
the problem of production information. From then on the Working Party 
reported directly to Chris Davis following each of it's meetings.
The conflict between Cyril Jenkins and David Wright became more 
apparent as time went by. After the meeting David Wright asked me 
what I thought of his 'aggessive style'; implying that there really 
was no hard feelings between Cyril and himself. However, David 
frequently referred to Cyril Jenkins' age and inexperience. Cyril 
Jenkins, who never became an informant of mine, rarely mentioned 
David Wright or any conflict between them. He was invariably on the 
defensive against David's aggressive attacks.
Cyril Jenkins was a tall, extremely handsome man who had been 
Assistant Production Manager at R.T.G. Bags. He was one of the 
bright young boys, drafted into the Plastics Division. He seemed to 
find the additional responsiblity and authority associated with the 
full Production Manager's function onerous. Few of the managers on 
the shop floor respected Cyril and referred to him - once they got 
to know me better - in derogatory terms. Chris Davis referred to 
Cyril Jenkins' inability to delegate responsibility as one of his 
major short-comings as a Production Maneiger.
Prior to the first meeting of the Working Party two incidents 
caught my attention. Firstly, Clive Jones, the flamboyant, cigar 
smoking, golf-playing, Don Juan of a Commercial Manager stopped 
David C. and myself in the orridor.
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"Ah, you're the two who are dealing with our stock control 
problems are you. Jolly good. Drop in and see me sometime. 
I'll tell you what's needed."
We never did 'drop in to see him', but it was interesting to note how 
Clive Jones, who must have been informed by John Stratford, defined 
the purpose of the Working Party. Peter Travers, again from Sales 
and Marketing, made similar observations over lunch.
Secondly, David Wright called David C. and myself into his office to 
discuss what he as Financial Manager would want to see on a Production 
Information Sheet. He presented me with a copy of a Memo he had sent 
to Chris Davis. Although the Memo had a general introduction, it was 
essentially to draw attention to David Wright's information requirements 
on stock and materials. It made the same points he subsequently made 
at Friday's meeting.
He then produced a copy of a schematic diagram and some forms which 
he described as his bid for a system of material control. At the 
time neither of these documents meant much to me; the language was 
alien, and the history surrounding the documents was unknown to me.
"This is the information I need to calculate the material 
recoveries each month, which incidently are then sent to 
Lansdown Street", David Wright explained.
"What's Lansdown Street?", I asked.
"You've been there, haven't you? It's Headquarters". He replied. 
"Oh yes". I said. ''I wasn't thinking", and a^ded, "What is a
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'p£Ü.let load docket?"* A phrase used on his memo to Chris 
Davis.
"Each time a pallet is completed and ready for Stores a pallet 
load docket is attached, stating the customer and quantity of 
goods. This is then used in Stores to calculate the goods sent 
to Stores figure for stock control". He replied.
"Right...but why do you want a copy of it?" I asked.
"This is another real problem area in the factory". He replied. 
"It's nearly as bad ais the folio problem. Pallets sometimes go 
through Stores without being recorded, which messes up the 
Stock balance. If we have a copy of all pallet load dockets 
and a copy of all dispatch notes, we can keep our own stock 
check. This will be a damn sight more accurate for calculating 
recoveries than the one we receive from Stores. But...before 
we start this we need a complete stock check, which is difficult 
to airrange. We have no Store of our own, and so farm out our 
stores to outside warehouses".
I had many other questions about the meaning of words appearing in 
the documents, such as 'virgin', 'regrind', 'the reel store* etc. 
but I felt that the two Davids were becoming impatient with what must 
have appeared to be my naive questions. David Wright finished the 
meetings with the suggestions that David C. knew what was needed.
Although David Wright carried the title of Financial Manager he seemed 
to be concerned more with his purely accounting and reporting functions 
than with the financial control or management information roles, as 
described by Charles Anderson at the Conference. David Wright seemed 
particularly concerned with his recoveries and preparing information 
for Lansdown Street. This somewhat narrow view of his role was largely 
responsible for his transfer to Lansdown Street at Christmas. His
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replacement was Ian Harrison, a much younger Chartered Accountant, who 
fitted in more with the new Plastic^s image.
Later that day I met Chris Davis, and mentioned David Wright's stock 
and material control recommendations. His reaction was:
"That's exactly what I'm trying to avoid; more ad hoc 
additions to the production information. That might be what 
David Wright needs, but in that form it will be of little use 
to anybody else. If we're going to make improvements, it 
must be a concerted, co-ordinated effort, and not simply 
adding a bit here and adding a bit there".
2 .7 . Designing a Production Information System
The Working Party convened on the 2Qth September: Mike Sampey, the
chairman, was absent and, in fact, never turned up to a single 
meeting. When I commented on this to Simon White (who assumed the 
role of chairman) and David C., they chimed, in chorus, "Oh, he's too 
busy". I got the same response from Make Sampey himself whenever I 
wanted to interview him; "Not just now, Alistair, I'm too busy". 
Charlie Johnson, a Departmental Production Manager, who was to become 
a key informant of mine, had dubbed him, 'Mike (I'm too busy) Sampey'.
Discussion in the early days of the Working Party was concerned mainly 
with the terminology on Chris Davis' sample sheet.
David Clark What does he mean by estimated output,planned
output and planned run hours?...Is there any 
difference between them?
Simon White Who knows, maybe estimated output comes from our
estimates; the estimated output per hour times
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the size of the order. Planned output presumably 
comes from the production plan, such as it is.
Alistair Surely those must be the same?
Simon White I suppose they must.
Alistair Chris did say these were off the top of his head
so we don't have to stick to them.
Throughout our discussions Simon White and David Clark continually 
referred to what Chris Davis wanted, and what he meant by the various 
terminology. They both seemed reluctant to question Chris Davis' 
suggestions. I asked whether we should be asking questions such as:
1. What does the information mean?
2. Who provides the information?
3* Who does it go to?
4. What is it used for?
5. What decisions or action does it lead to?
They both agreed with and then completely ignored my comments. I 
increasingly felt that my role on the Working Party was superfluous. 
Rather than contributing to the work I tended to hold up the 
proceedings to seek points of information or clarification.
"What is the Machine Production Chart?"
"Who fills it in?"
"What do you mean by non-productive time?"
Each of these, and many more questions often required lengthy
explanation, usually furnished by Simon White. Simon had been
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with R.T.G. since leaving school, first at R.T.G. Boxes emd then for 
the past eleven years at Avon. His knowledge of the production 
process was extensive. He was responsible for preparing much of the 
existing production information, and for calculating the Operator's 
work-related bonuses.
Simon White was ailwaystolerant with me, but I felt he often became 
frustrated with my presence. He had to deal with me in my infancy; 
when I was still learning the language. My naive questions, and 
often meaningless suggestions held up proceeedings. However, Simon's 
replies were invaluable to me, in that they helped speed up my 
learning about the production process and the language of plastics.
In the long run Simon White had little time for me. I assumed he 
questioned the relevance of my research, when it appeared that I knew 
so little about production information and nothing about manufacturing 
plastic containers.
After two meetings of the Working Party, with little or no evidence of 
progress, we arranged to meet with Chris Davis. On Simon White's 
recommendation we decided that Chris Davis' sample sheet should be 




We decided to tackle production as a group. I volunteered to produce 
a brief report on stock control, and Simon White was to produce a 
report on materials. This policy was intended to speed up the
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process of designing a comprehensive system covering the above three 
sureas. In terms of production the main problem was the 'planned' and 
'estimated output' columns. Firstly, we did not know what Chris Davis 
meant by these phrases. Secondly, little or no planning took place in 
the factory at that time. And finally,certain machines ran on three 
shifts whilst others ran on two; these changed from week to week 
depending on the products being produced, making a machine-by-machine 
plan impossible.
Simon White The best we can come up with is to fill in 
planned hours, after the run; this means it will 
be retrospective. However, it will be calculated 
on the estimated running speed.
Chris Davis (looking somewhat puzzled). I see the problem.
I don't like the idea of retrospective ploumirig, 
but in order not to hold up progress I will accept 
it, but it will have to be a stop-gap measure, 




I don't want you to get too bogged down in 
terminology. I personally don't mind what you 
call the headings as long as you tell me what 
they mean. What I want at the moment is an 
accurate, timely and unified production information 
sheet. That must be your first priority.
At the end of the meeting Chris Davis handed another analysis sheet 
in which he outlined a few more ideas 'off the top of his head.' 
This was the pattern that evolved. We, on the Working Party, would 
examine a number of issues, produce a series of suggestions and
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submit these to Chris Davis. He would either accept one alternative, or 
provide his own solution. At the end of such meetings Chris Davis 
would then offer further ideas for our consideration.
Finally, through this process of gradual development and acceptance, 
a final format for production information was produced. Simon White 
had included the previous week's figures to test the workability of 
the format. After some discussion about the meaning of 'downtime',
Chris Davis approved of the format and called for a full meeting of 
those involved for the 20th October.
The final meeting was remarkably peaceful; David Wright once again 
chipped in with:
David Wright This is O.K....as far as it goes: it doesn't
tell us anything about materials or stock.
Chris Davis No. That's true, (turning to Simon White).
David is looking into materials and Alistair is 
looking into stock control for us, and they will 
be reporting on them shortly.
After the now so familiar discussion over terminology the format was, 
in essence,accepted. The two remaining questions were; who was 
going to compile the information? and how often and when was it to 
be prepared? It was agreed that the information was to be prepared 
weekly and distributed on Tuesdays. Simon White was "volunteered" to 
produce it, and he accepted, after it was agreed that David Clark, in 
Accounts, handled some of his existing workload.
I was surprised how little effort was needed to reach agreement in
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this meeting. I later found that David C. had continually informed 
David Wright about developments on the Working Party. Simon White 
had performed the same role for Cyril Jenkins. In other words, 
except for some minor reservations, members of the meeting were all 
aware of our work and agreed on the outcome and all had already seen 
the final format.
After this meeting the Working Party dissolved. I produced a report on 
finished goods stock control. Chris Davis approved of the report and 
commissioned me to conduct a more detailed investigation, which includ­
ed examining the feasibility of computerising the system. I was 
slightly concerned; not only had I become a change agent on the 
Working Party but I was now offered the role of paid consultant.
I chose to accept Chris Davis' offer, not least because of the two 
hundred and fifty pounds fee. Conducting this investigation put the 
finishing touches to my education in plastic container manufacturing 
and its language. By the time I had completed the report (in mid- 
February) , I was fully conversant with the production process and the 
product range; I could enter into conversations without making 
myself conspicuous through continual interruptions. I now knew all 
the managers, supervisors emd many production workers by name, and 
could converse at will with most of them. My presence was so 
familiar that I no longer needed to explain it, or my purpose.
2.8 Gathering Data
Apart from my activities on the Working Party and my commissioned 
work on finished goods stock control, I occupied my time by 
attending the weekly planning meeting, the weekly production meeting.
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socially interacting with managers and interviewing some of them 
using a tape recorder.
The members of the Planning Meeting were: Martin Keyes, the
Production Planner, Cyril Jenkins, Peter Travers, John Stratford 
and the Account Executives, James Alton and Bert Simons. The 
Planning Meeting was held on Tuesday morning in the sales conference 
room. This venue was interesting in itself: I imagined that Martin
Keyes would chair the meeting, however Peter Travers invariably took 
the reins. Over time it became apparent that the Planning Meeting 
was used as an opportunity for the Sales Staff to list their customer 
priorities in terms of urgency, then elicit assurances from Martin 
Keyes and Cyril Jenkins, whenever possible, that the goods would be 
available for dispatch on the required date. The following are a 
number of extracts from the Planning Meetings.
Peter Travers Express tubs and lids. I'm a bit worried about 
the lids. We've promised them some lids by 
mid-November, with the vinaigrette design...




We must not let Express down this time.
No! They're using this as a test for us. So 
what's the position? We have three weeks to 
dispatch.
Martin Keyes I should rate this as an outsider. We've got 
priorities on the Bridge.
Cyril Jenkins And we've said good bye to the Kaufman. It's 
still in pieces.
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Sales knew about this but they still shook their heads in disgust.
My field notes are an endless record of such discussions. The meeting 








Can Windsor lids be fitted in between Danish 
Turnkey and Melba?
No. The schedule is too tight already. 
What's the shift pattern on Waddington 1? 
Double.
Could we madce it treble?






Isn't there anybody else?
No.
Great! We get a bottle neck auid probably loose 
the order because Pete Smith has migraine.
Well it's not my fault.
On the first of November Martin Keyes was transferred to the job of 
Assistant Material Buyer and Jim Brown, the Assistant Quality Control 
Maneiger, was appointed Production Planner. I asked Peter Travers, who 
was now a friend of mine, what he thought of the changes.
"To be honest with you Alistair, it's about time. Martin 
was never a planner....If there was any planning done, it
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was done from over here and that was all back to the wall 
stuff."
"That's definitely the impression I get from my notes." I said. 
"Do you know the story of Martin?" He asked.
"No." I replied.
"Well." He said. "Three years ago he was a machine operator on 
the R.D.M.s, a bloody good one as well, from what I hear. He 
got a lung infection and claimed it was the fumes from the 
factory. Well after some wrangling it was agreed he should be 
given an office job; so he became Planner."
"Planner! Why Planner? That's a bit of a jump isn't it?"
I commented.
"That's what I think; shows you how much Mike Peters thought 
of planning when he was General Manager. He was more interested 
in running his pub."
"Yes. I heard about that." I said»
"Now, Jim." He said. "Well he's different. I think he'll go 
a long way to improve planning. He's a bright boy."
I already knew that Peter Travers had been instrumental in Jim's 
promotion but thought it best not to mention it.
Jim's appointment transformed the Planning Meeting.
Peter Travers Melba lids. When will they be printed?
Jim Brown They'll be in tomorrow...middle way through the
morning shift, twenty-four hour run...should be
ready Thursday midday. You realise the delivery 
dates come forward on that.
(There was clapping all round.)
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Peter Travers Alistair. Put that down in your notes; it's 
the first time that's ever happened.
(Later in the same meeting.)
Jim Brown R.D.M.s...there's nothing booked in for 
December on 4 and 5*
Peter Travers Bert. What about Peerless?
Bert Simons The whole situation is hairy. They've slowed 
down; it's this metrication problem; there's 
talk that they may change the design altogether,
Peter Travers So you don't want to build stocks,
Bert Simons Not until I hear something more definite; 
we've got enough to the year-end in any case.
Jim Brown Well that's your problem boys. You give me 
the orders and I'll run them.
Peter Travers Well it's looking bloody good, it looks like 
it's our problem to fill the machines, instead 
of the other way round.
John Stratford That's how it should be.
Peter Travers I couldn't agree more.
By January Jim Brown had developed a three month plan for Rollercutting 
Formers and was working on the Extruders.
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Jim Brown Any questions?
James Alton What about the Extruders?
Jim Brown Well...things are a bit clearer. We're seeing
some common sense in this area. However... 
we're still very busy, so we've got to treat it 
with respect and caution. You buggers have to 
get your extrusion requistions in earlier!
Jim Brown had taken over the Planning Meeting, which then gradually 
faded out. As Peter Travers said, "there's no need for it any longer. 
We just have to look at Jim's Board."
The members of the Production Meeting, held on Monday mornings in 
Cyril Jenkin's office, were: Mike Shilling and Charlie Johnson, the
Departmental Production Managers, Tim Steed, the Maintenance Foreman, 
Ron Welch, the Tool Engineer, Martin Keyes, Mike Sampey, Simon White 
and various shift supervisors. In November, Jim Brown replaced 
Martin Keyes.
If the Planning Meeting could be described as being for crises over 
customer deliveries, the Production Meeting was for crises over 
making the products. The three areas that discussion invariably 
centred round were:
1. Mechanical breakdowns.
2. Personnel problems, including absenteeism
and lateness.
3. Space restrictions.
The following are extracts from the Production Meeting:
Martin Keyes Peter Travers said that Country Kitchen are shouting
for deliveries.
Cyril Jenkins That's Waddington 1. How is that going, Tim?
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Tim Steed The shaft should be here at lunch; then it 
has to be drilled and assembled.
Cyril Jenkins I thought we had some breathing space on the
Waddies. Now eü.1 of a sudden we're under 
pressure again.
Martin Keyes We would have been O.K. if we didn't have this 
problem on 1.
Cyril Jenkins How much time have we lost?
Martin Keyes About a week to ten days.
Mike Shilling We're still tight on Rotoforms, we have to keep
bashing away.
Cyril Jenkins Is the R.D.H. running again?
Mike Shilling It ran well over the weekend. There's still
oil leaks though.
Cyril Jenkins Tim. Have you got the new seals?
Tim Steed Yes. But it'll take me a good shift to get 
them in.
Cyril Jenkins Mike...when can he have it?
Mike Shilling We can't afford to have it down.
Cyril Jenkins What about the weekend?
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Mike Shilling Too tight.
Cyril Jenkins Well, you and Tim get together and find a time.
It's got to be done quickly.
Mike Shilling It's all very well saying that!
Cyril Jenkins I know, Mike.
There was continual conflict between Mike Shilling and Cyril Jenkins 
which tended to frustrate progress. Cyril Jenkins often advised two 
parties to get together later, when a decision couldn't be made during 
the meeting. Because of this Mike Shilling criticised the meeting. 
"It's just a talking shop; nothing ever gets done."
Jim Brown I want to run mini seed trays but I hear there's 
some query on space.
Cyril Jenkins It's over to you Mike.
Mike Shilling It's utter chaos out there. It's the sheer volume
of fibre pots.
Cyril Jenkins You Mike,and Peter Travers should get together
over this; see if you can find an outside store.
Mike Shilling I'm sorry, but the goods must stay in the factory. 
They're no good at Queen's Road, we can't cope.
Jim Brown There's going to be more congestion in January. 
We've got one hundred and fifty thousand to make 
then.
Mike Shilling We've never had enough space to store goods for
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the roller cutters. This site is just not equipped 
for this job.
Cyril Jenkins Could we do the packing off site?....Would that
help?
Mike Shilling It would help.
(And at another meeting)
Cyril Jenkins Any other business. Mike?
(Mike consults his list.)
Mike Shilling Lates. Any developments?
Cyril Jenkins Developments?
Mike Shilling Yes, the meeting on the 8th December.
Cyril Jenkins Ah yes, about the ruling. I haven't heard from
John Sims. I'll look into it.
Mike Shilling We need that ruling. Lates are my biggest problem.
Cyril Jenkins Anything else.
Mike Shilling Yes. The lack of Production Controller here at
this meeting.
Cyril Jenkins How come?
Mike Shilling I think the Production Controller should be at
the meeting and know something about what's 
going on in Production.
Cyril Jenkins Well, Mike's just come back from holiday. He
has delegated controllership to Jim. However,
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I agree with your general comment. The Production 
Controller should know what's going on.
Charlie Johnson He's too busy.
(Roars of laughter all round, except from Cyril 
Jenkins who only managed a smirk.)
In the above excerpts Mike Shilling is a dominant voice; this was 
deliberate. Mike Shilling occupied most of the time each meeting. 
Charlie Johnson, the other Departmental Manager, and most of the other 
people, rarely commented unless specifically asked to.
Early in the New Year, owing to Jim Brown's plan, maintenance wsis 
carried out on a regular planned basis. Nigel Plant was appointed 
Maintenance Manager, directly under Chris Davis, and he was instru­
mental in improving the efficiency of the machines through a policy 
of overhauling each machine according to an agreed plan. A third 
extruding machine was purchased and installed which alleviated the 
bottleneck in this area. Towards the end of March 1979i the 
Production Meetings were considerably shorter, simply because less 
immediate problems existed. There was an identifiable and recog­
nised improvement in performance.
2.9 Reaction to Me
Initially, I found most of the managers reserved towards me. At 
lunch the conversation was guarded ; sensitive topics, which later 
became a feature of lunchtime conversations, were suppressed. During 
meetings where I took notes, the people speaking would invariably 
look towards me after they had finished. I was never quite sure
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what they were thinking. Were they seeking my approval? Were they 
seeking acknowledgement that I had captured their gem, or were they 
hoping I had failed to write down their comments? Gradually I 
became less obtrusive at lunch and at the meetings. Managers would 
bring me into conversations at lunch even those which might be 
termed 'sensitive*. At the Production Meeting, Mike Shilling once 
asked me to verify a point he made at the last meeting, by asking 
me to refer to my niinutes of the meeting; this was how most had 
come to define my presence and purpose in such meetings.
My first report on stock was invaluable to me as a means of making 
contact with the managers directly concerned with production. Most 
managers had a vested interest in the measurement of total goods 
produced, the area in which most of the stock control problems arose. 
By approaching the managers with the script of helping improve stock 
control I was made more welcome. I had, up until then, found contact 
difficult with my general, academic researcher script. In one 
particular instance David C. came to me with the rumour that Mike 
Shilling was going to refuse to be interviewed by me:
"Do you hope to interview every manager?" David G. asked.
"Yes, well at least every manager concerned with production."
I replied.
"What if one refuses?" He asked.
"That's my tough luck." I replied. "It's all voluntary."
It struck me as being a strange conversation and so I asked, 
"Why do you ask; is somebody going to refuse?"
"I heard that somebody might." He replied.
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"Who is that?" I asked*
"Ah, it's only a rumour," He replied,
"Ohl I think I know who it is." I retorted.
By this time David C. and I were considerably less friendly. David 
seemed to resent my position on the Working Party, and especially my 
access to Chris Davis. I have no evidence for this, but I felt that 
my association with Chris Davis was a major cause for the other 
managers'initial reserve towards me.
Mike Shilling did eventually consent to be interviewed by me and 
produced some interesting material. However,he never totally accepted 
my presence; rather he tolerated my being there when I proved to be no 
threat to him.
Simon White was another who tolerated me, but never really accepted 
me during my stay. He seemed to be embarrassed by his close assoc­
iation with me on the Working Party. If I asked a question at lunch, 
even concerning the scheduling of our next meeting, I would receive 
only a minimal reply.
Peter Travers was the first manager to exhibit any friendliness 
towards me. He gradually began including me in conversations during 
lunch. At first they were of a formal nature, about Bath University 
or R.T.G. but gradully less formal topics became the order. Towards 
Christmas I arrived at lunch, on a number of occasions, suffering 
from the previous night's entertainment, and was greeted with 
comments such cis:
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"You look bloody terrible."
"It's all these Christmas parties. I didn't get to 
bed until three this morning." I replied.
"Alone?" He asked.
"Well not quite." I replied.
"Ah to be young again." He said.
"I'm only a year younger than you." I replied.
"Yes but you dont' have a wife; that's what ages you."
He replied.
Peter then invited me to the pub on Friday lunchtime; he, Jim Brown 
and some of the Account Executives frequented the Lion on Fridays. 
The conversation was strictly non-work related; other than that, it 
covered a wide range of topics.
"Are you still riding that bike of yours?", asked Tim.
"Yep, it's getting a bit cold though, I might take you 
up on that offer of a lift soon." I replied.
"I thought the elastic band would have perished in this 
weather".Said Peter.
"Bloody cheek! My Honda would outstrip that leaky old 
Norton of yours." I replied.
"Huh! Calling your Honda a motor bike is like calling 
an instamatic a camera."
Jim Brown lived in Bath. It transpired that his local was a rival
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"real ale" pub to mine. We continually ribbed each other about the 
relative merits of the 'Rose and Crown' and the 'King William'. 
Occasionally we visited each others' pubs to confirm our suspicions.
Although such conversations provided little data on information 
per se^ they were an important part in the process of my being 
accepted in the setting; at least by some of the middle managers.
Social contact did provide me with a great deeü. of information 
relating to events taking place within the factory, and about the 
personal lives and characteristics of the individual members. Mary 
and Jane were my greatest source. However, Peter Travers embellished 
our talks with accounts of events such as Martin Keyes' promotion 
to Production Planner (see page 4?) as did many other managers, 
especially Charlie Johnson, who became a key informant of mine.
Charlie Johnson was a short, stocky. West Country man, with white 
hair and a magnificant moustache. He was respected by the shop 
floor workers, his supervisors, peers and senior management; he 
was a formidable adverssiry. At first Charlie was somewhat reserved 
towards me until I had to sit at his table at lunch to make room 
for Peter Travers' visitor.
I knew what was coming when Charlie asked:
"Do you mind me asking how old you are?"
"No. I'm twenty four." I replied.
(The next question was inevitable.) "Have you ever had
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a real job? I mean, where you earned your living, or have 
you always been a student?"
"Well." I replied. "When I left School I worked as a 
cutterman in a paper mill for a year. I've worked in Airsprung 
at Trowbridge and Frys at Keynsham but they were really just 
Summer jobs. I worked as a porter in a hospital for eight 
months; that was to save money for my trip to America.
I used to have to do mortuary duty on the night shift 
putting the bodies away."
"America. How long were you in America?"
"Five months. That was my great adventure when I graduated."
"I'm planning to go to America when I retire...next year, 
in fact. Which parts did you visit?"
"Well I hitchhiked about fifteen thousand miles all told, 
from New York to Seattle, then to San Francisco, Dallas,
Chicsigo, back to New York, Boston and then up to Toronto 
in Canada."
"You hitched?" He asked.
"Yep. I spent ten dollars on transport the whole time I 
was there." I replied.
The conversation carried on from there. Charlie became a great source 
of data to me, inviting me into his office; describing events in his 
typically colourful language. I couldn't help wondering how things 
would have turned out if I had answered his initial question any 
differently; for instance if I had been aggressive and said:
"Why do you want to know how old I am anyway?"
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The information I received from the various managers differed.
Charlie Johnson tended to concentrate on events in the factory. Mike 
Shilling continually informed me of his pet gripes which mainly 
centred around Cyril Jenkins. David Clark restricted his conversat­
ion to explaining various forms and documents to me. Only Jim Brown, 
Peter Travers, Nigel Plant and, of course, Mary and Jane fully opened 
up to me.
As people became more certain of my purpose and presence in tie 
factory they began calling on me to reciprocate in our social inter­
action. Now,not only did they inform me of events, they, in turn, 
expected me to inform them. This conversation took place at lunch:
Tom Jackson Come on Alistair, you sit beside Mary. Who's 
the new Personnel Officer going to be?
Alistair I reckon it's going to be Lynne Carter from 
Boxes.
David C. You reckon or you know?
Alistair Well it would seem the obvious choice. Lynne 
Carter weis at Cups with Chris Davis, and 
Mrs Hyde is moving to Boxes and that's where 
Lynne Carter is at the moment, so I reckon 
it'll be her.
Peter Travers I hope so!
There was agreement all round. Lynne Carter was appointed; I knew 
for certain that she was going to be but still wished to cover myself. 
The reason why everybody hoped Lynne would be appointed was because she
61
was an extremely attractive womam.
I was nervous of this transition, but could do little about it if I 
desired to interact further with other managers. In the above con­
versation I was cedled upon to provide information. Later, however,
I found that I volunteered information. On one occasion I visited 
James Cook (who will be mentioned later) in Lansdown Road and he 
explained R.T.G.'s new salary structure which was going to be made 
public the following week. On my return to Avon I mentioned that I 
had heard about the new seuLary structure, and went on to explain it 
in detail.
Just as the type of information passed on to me differed from each 
manager, I found that I was selective, about who I passed information 
on to. I was willing to tell all the middle managers about the 
salary structure, but was only willing to tell Jim, Peter, Nigel, Mary 
and Jane about seeing Chris Davis - a married man - with Carla 
Hutchinson, the new Personnel Assistant, holding hands in Bath on 
Saturday afternoon.
I conducted interviews throughout my stay in the factory, both with 
and without tape recordings. Some interviews were short; concerning 
specific events or incidents which had come to my attention, and 
which I wished to know more about. To distinguish these from the 
more arrsuiged interviews, I describe them as 'tsdks with Peter 
Travers' etc. An example of such a talk is that concerning "factor 
one" pricing on page 26.
I conducted two main blocks of interviews; one in February/March
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just prior to the introduction of the new Production Information 
System; the second in early July, this being three months after the 
new systems introduction. Throughout my stay 1 carried out almost 
reuidom interviews, using tape, with those managers willing to spare
the time. 1 found it required considerable effort to arrange an
interview with any manager. They were obviously regarded as of 
secondary importance to their day-to-day activities. 1 encountered 
a frustrating number ©f cancellations, particularly when 1 could not 
present a specific topic to be discussed. Most of the managers
accepted the logic of my before-and-after study of the information
system and complied with my request for an interview; hence the 
concentration of interviews in February/^arch and July.
The data gathered from these interviews were more specifically related 
to information than informal social interaction. This being the case, 
the content of these interviews will serve to illustrate ideas, 
observations and conclusions in the next two chapters rather than 
being listed here.
Some interesting facets of the setting were uncovered by the use or 
proposed use of taped interviews. No individual actually refused to 
be interviewed in this manner; however, at the end of my field work 
1 realised that certain managers had never been taped. In the case 
of Chris Davis 1 genuinely believe he was too busy to find a con­
venient time, as he had to share his time between Avon and The 
Injection Moulding Plant. Mike Sampey was simply always too busy 
and after a few attempts to pin him down to a time 1 gave up. Martin 
Keyes exhibited fear each time 1 mentioned the tape recorder; although
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he agreed to be interviewed I could not bring myself to subject him to 
what would be a highly stressful situation. I received most cancell­
ations from Cyril Jenkins. Finally he concluded that he had already 
given all his views on information through our contact over the stock 
control report, auid that an interview would simply re-iterate them.
David C. argued that he would have to conduct any interview at his 
desk in order to have access to his documentation. His desk was in a 
room shared with others; this made the use of a tape recorder impossible.
Mike Shilling, who initially refused to be interviewed, finally con­
sented and provided me with some interesting data. Charlie Johnson 
was always accompanied with one of his supervisors, and seemed thorough­
ly to enjoy the interviews. On his third occasion, he introduced Peter 
Short, one of his supervisors, by saying:
’’It's all highly confidential so you’re quite free to 
say anything you want. It's on tape but there's.no one 
else going to hear it. So he tells us, anyway1”
When he mentioned anything controversial he invariably said, "Oh Godl 
That things not on is it?", knowing perfectly well that it was. I 
suspected that Charlie treated the whole process as a slightly daring 
game.
My other interviews were with Simon White, Jim Brown, Peter Travers 
David Wright and Robin Slater. Except for Simon White and David 
Wright, the rest were willing to be interviewed on more than one 
occasion. They seemed to become more relaxed with each interview. 
Throughout the taped interviews names were never named, phrases
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such as "not naming names," "keeping names out of it" or "leaving 
personalities aside" were continually used. This was not the case in 
untaped informal talks. When I heard such phrases in the interviews 
I simply pushed the pause button and said, "Do you mean David Clark?" 
or whoever I suspected. The interviewee would invariably confirm my 
suspicion or correct me if I were wrong.
I always commenced an interview by asking a number of specific
questions, to set the topic of the discussion. This procedure in
some cases did not work. On one occasion, when trying to discuss the 
new information system, Charlie had other ideas.
Alistair I want to ask some questions about the new
information system.
Charlie Johnson Are you talking about the incentive schemes
now?
Alistair No...you know that computerised system.
Charlie Johnson Chi The print-out thing?
Within ten minutes we were discussing incentive schemes and remained 
on that topic for the duration of the interview.
Apart from the initial questions, the interviews were unstructured. 
Although I endeavoured to keep them within the broad confines of 
information related topics, they did tend to flow in an unstructured 
but interesting way. They were similar to a normal conversation, 
centering around some fairly general topic.
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I found the interviews provoking in that they often referred to 
events and processes in the factory that I had not been aware of, 
which I could subsequently observe happening. In reverse I could 
confirm my observations and my interpretations of them, during the 
interview, by saying such things as "the way I see it is..." and 
so forth.
I felt guilty that I was less persistent with certain managers in 
getting them on tape than I might have been. There was, however, 
always the risk of outstaying my welcome or becoming an irritant, 
a social itch, which the managers wished they could scratch and I 
would go away. I put a high value on my not being a nuisance and 
I felt this paid off in the long term, permitting me to stay in the 
factory for just under a yeeir without any significant social hassles, 
official complaints or warnings.
I felt that during ray interviews I sometimes contaminated replies 
with the lanaguage I used in questions. For example, 'feedback', 
'evaluating performance' and 'control documents', were my phrases 
which were adopted by most managers during my stay in the factory. 
Although my langusige contaminated my data I was more concerned that 
my ideas did not. However,because of my work on the Working Party 
I felt that some level of contamination was unavoidable. I felt it 
was important to be aware of it taking place, and then to be honest 
in evaluating its significance, if necessary omitting sections that 
were deliberately contrived to prove my point. Fortunately the 
managers knew me well enough, and were themselves strong enough, 
to contradict me if they disagreed with any point I made.
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2.10 Computerising the Production Information
In January, David Clark, Simon White and I were called to a meeting 
with Chris Davis. Present at the meeting was James Cook, a stranger to 
all of us. He was attached to the Computer Service Department at 
Lansdown Street. James Cook headed a specialist section of the 
Computer Service Department called MADCAP (Management Action Data 
Computer Analysis Program).^ James Cook described the system as a tool 
for the general manager concerned with controlling resource utilisa­
tion and progress towards objectives.
After the preliminary introduction, James Cook examined the system we 
had designed and, after a brief discussion of terminology, he con­
cluded that MADCAP could handle such a system with ease. He insisted 
that Simon White and David Clark go on a MADCAP course and be directly 
involved in programming the data.
This process of computerising the Production Information continued 
throughout January, February and early Msirch. Simon White was 
responsible for most of the work; I adopted an observer role, little 
involved with the mechanics. By mid-March the test runs were over and 
the system was ready for weekly computerisation. Not only was the new 
information collected and prepared in a systematic manner, it was also 
successfully processed by computer, thus allaying fears of excessive 
workloads•
I visited James Cook in Bristol on one occasion to discuss the MADCAP 
Program. I gathered some highly revealing information:
"When were you called in on the Avon Project?" I asked.
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"Right at the beginning." He said.
I didn't quite know what he meant by this and said, "You 
mean at the beginning of the computerisation?"
"No. I mean at the beginning. Back in September I think."
"So Chris knew about MADCAP in September?"
"I bloody well hope sol He helped design the program. He
was my assistant before he went to Cups...He used MADCAP 
at Cups."
"So he was in contact with you all along?"
"I was staying with him in September after my separation."
I could not believe what I was hearing. James Cook found it amusing. 
From the very outset Chris Davis had it in mind to use MADCAP. The 
ideas he had fed us with during the initial design, were not simply 
off the top of his head, but rather, were ideas that would comply with 
the MADCAP program.
Chris Davis admitted that he was aware of the final design but did 
not know, with his limited experience, whether the program was feasible 
in Avon, without significant internal changes. He further added, 
"committment by the people in the organisation is important. This is 
why James insists that the managers design their own system and then 
program it."
Although I do not think that Chris Davis was totally selfish in the 
design of the system, there was little doubt that we had designed an 
information system which largely conformed to his requirements, rather
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than specifically with the managers directly involved with day to 
day production matters.
2.11 Summary
In this chapter I have outlined selected experiences in the early days 
of my research, including the various managers’ reaction to me and the 
development of contacts with certain managers who became my friends 
and key informants. I further explain my "choice" of a research topic 
and my involvement on the Working Party set up to design a production 
information system.
In addition to my involvement on the Working. Party, I gathered data 
through observation, informal chats, taped interviews and through 
attending the production and planning meetings.
NOTES




By mid-July I had been in the factory for nine months; six months 
longer than I had intended. I now viewed my research as an in depth, 
longitudinal study. I felt that, apart from the work with the 
Working Party, the first three months had been simply a process of 
settling in. The data I gathered after that three-month period was 
qualitatively different from that during the period. Some managers 
were more open, their descriptions of events more colourful and 
their opinions of other managers more forthcoming. On the other 
hand, other managers, notable David Clark, Simon White and Kevin 
Linsey, the Plastics Technologist, had as little to do with me as 
possible.
By early February I felt I had become a pseudo-member of the setting.
I was sufficiently familiar with the workings of the factory, and 
sufficiently informed about current or recent events to talk shop in 
a competent manner. I was 'well up' on current gossip and could 
contribute unknown events to the managers in our social interactions.
I had become a familiar face on the shop floor, in managers' offices, 
in the canteen at lunchtime and at the production meetings. Finally 
I had excellent rapport with three of the four key middle managers 
at production level, and a tolerable relationship with Mike Shilling 
the other departmental manager.
By July I was ready to pull together data from my observations, social 
interactions, talks auid interviews to prepare an interim analysis and 
some tentative conclusions. It would be untrue to claim that I sat
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down and immersed myself in the data; waiting for a theory to emerge. 
With each observation, talk or interview I would consider the data I 
had gathered; I would consider whether it contradicted previous 
observations or complied with them; I would also reflect on how such 
a piece of data might orrespond with or contradict the literature and 
theory that I was familiar with. The process of analysis was princip­
ally one of pulling together a series of ideas and concepts, that had 
developed over the previous nine months, into a presentable framework.
3.1 A History of the Information System
During the interviews I experienced difficulty in obtaining a definition 
of management or production information from the middle managers. As 
one used to textbook definitions I found this disconcerting. I was 
unable to frame or plot the existing information system. The reason for 
this, I assume, was because no systematic information system existed. 
Although managers received information in a routine manner, such pieces 
of information were so disintegrated that managers did not seem to 
regard them as constituting a management or production information 
system per se. This was,of course, why Chris Davis desired to improve 
the standard of production information.
The history of the information in the factory was difficult to construct; 
peoples' memories were either vague or the managers were new and had 
inherited the existing pieces of information without knowing their 
origin.
David Wright I think we've had a system that's just grow'd.
We introduced a production chart which we stole 
from Boxes. I think it's now at a stage where it
needs an overhaul as we're trying to do. A sort 
of simplification; tidying up.
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Alistair The work we've done on the Working Party. Do you 
have any faith in it? Do you think it's going to 
change anything?
Simon White I don't know really. Historically we've had a 
situation where senior management has been closely 
associated with what's going on on the shop floor. 
Obviously as you grow things have to change. We 
probably have a situation where information has 
been secondary to first hand knowledge in the 
past, and we might have reached a situation where 
that has changed. It's now the other way round. 
And we'll have to wait and see if it does bring 
about changes.
Peter Travers I think you've got to look at the history. I 
think Plastics started off as a fairly small 
project. We're now in a growth situation; nobody 
knows how big it will get yet. I think you'll 
adways find that in a new business the production 
comes before the systems. The growth comes 
before the realisation that the growth is there, 
and therefore, we must have the systems to go 
with it. I think it's just got to such a stage 
that we've been going round and round in circles 
if you like. The growth has been there, all the 
signs have been good, but we have not had the 
systems to back that up. We haven't looked at 
it in a professional way, if you like.
It's just been done on a one-man basis; one man
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keeps the information in his head and, provided 
he's in, everything is alright. The other thing 
is that until you're a certain size you can't 
have individuals responsible for individual jobs. 
You've got individuals tending to do two or three 
jobs, and there's no established system of passing 
information on from one job they're doing to the 
other job they're doing. You have to have the 
formal system when things get so big that each job 
is becoming a job in itself. You've got to devise 
a system that will go with it.
In constructing the history, it appeared that the information grew in 
an ad hoc manner. Individual manaigers would gather data or have it 
gathered for them; for their own personal information, to prove a 
point or justify an action or decision they had taken. This inform­
ation would be shown or presented to another manager, who would then 
request a regular copy. A distribution list would grow in this fairly 
random manner. A situation then emerged where information was gathered 
and collated by a vsuriety of people, and was distributed from the 
offices on various days of the week to a randomly chosen circle of 
managers. Often duplication occured; the same information being 
prepared in two departments and circulated on different distribution 
lists. A stock balance was prepared by Sales, by Stores and by the 
Accounts Department. The information used to prepare the stock balance 
in each case came from different sources. When John Stratford received 
all three copies on one occasion, it was realised that the stock 
balances differed; hence the concern over finished goods stock control.
A considerable amount of information was available in the factory.
The new production information system required no new data. It was
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a case of pulling together data from the various sources and processing 
it in a meaningful manner. Jim Brown reinforced this observation.
Alistair Do you think much information is available?
Jim Brown I've learnt and I keep on learning about information
that is available in this place...
But I learn about it at the wrong time. I learn 
about it when I need the bloody information and 
somebody says "Well, that information has been 
available. Why didn't you know about it?"
There's so much information that, I think, if 
it was supplied,all the rushing about could be 
forgotten.
With the managers' inability to define management or production 
information they were also unable to describe its purpose. Peter 
Travers was the only manager to supply me with a succinct descrip­
tion. This description, however, was related to information in 
the Sales Department, which was generally of a more orderly nature.
Alistair What is management information for?
Peter Travers From our point of view in here (Sales); I would
say it's to see where we've been going for the 
last month, compared with the previous month and 
so on. It's also to see where we should be going 
in the next few months.
Alistair How do you go about doing this?
Peter Travers Really, what I think we do is look at every
piece of information that comes to us and see 
how we're going to use it. For example, one
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thing we like to see very quickly at the end of 
each month is the 'orders booked.' Now one of the 
main reasons we do that is so that we can record how 
many hours have been booked on the various machines. 
We had a situation last year with Waddingtons; it 
looked as though they would be empty for about six 
months...Knowing that two months in advance, it 
gave us enough time to promote some business in 
that area, below price, just to keep the plant 
running, and we took some mushroom punnet business 
on that basis.
Alistair So information is to take action?
Peter Travers As far as I see it. Yes. Ahi but not only that.
I would say that's where you need urgent inform­
ation, you must be able to react quickly and so on. 
But you also need to build up a long term picture 
of what's going on, and we do this again with the 
orders inward, sales inward and so on. All these 
things give us a picture, which we can put together 
and see just how the business is going from our 
point of view.
These points made by Peter Travers were endorsed by the other managers. 
Mike Shilling referred to the need for good historical data to plot 
improvements. Jim Brown described information as a means of examining 
trends. Less emphasis was placed on action taking, however.
3 .2  Interest in Information
I had assumed that production information would be a live topic to 
study. I thought every manager involved in daily production matters 
would have a vested interest in the outcome of the Work Party's efforts. 
I was surprised when I found that our work generated such little interest,
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Alistair Why do you think information hsis become such a 
concerned area in this Company?
Peter Travers When you say a concerned area, how do you mean? 
Who do you feel is concerned about it?
Alistair Well! The fact that Chris Davis has formed a 
Working Party to look into Production Information
Peter Travers Oh yes...
Alistair Do you know what our role on the Working Party is?
Peter Travers Not really. I know who's on it, and from that 
you get an idea of what the main concerns and 
interest are. But as to why it^s been formed 
and the actual purpose of it. No I don't know 
anything about that at all.
And on a similar vein with Charlie Johnson.
Alistair Have you heard about the work we're doing on 
information, the new computerised stuff?
Charlie Johnson This is what Whity's doing,is it?
Alistair Yes.
Charlie Johnson No. Haven't seen it.
Mike Shilling, a close associate of Simon White, was better informed 
but still lacked enthusiasm.
Alistair What about this new computerised information system 
we've been producing?
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Mike Shilling He's (Simon White) shown me the type of stuff 
he's doing.
This lack of knowledge or interest in our work was not because the 
managers were satisfied with the information they received; as we 
shall see later there was no shortage of complaints. Rather, other 
problems, which the managers defined as more pressing, occupied their 
thoughts and attention.
Alistair You mention production planning. Is that the 
most important aspect of your work?
Peter Travers No. I would not say that it's the most important 
aspect. It's the aspect that at the moment is 
getting most attention, because we're not at all 
happy about how it's being done.
Charlie Johnson The supervisors are trouble shooting all the 
time. That's the trouble. You see we get our 
blokes from the Labour Exchange. They might be 
bloody milk roundsmen; they could be any bloody 
thing.
"You interested in car mechanics?"
"Yehi I take the engine out, do a few repairs?" 
"O.K. You might do as a setter."
So we take him on and he's just a sort of handy 
bloke at home. Now you're trying to train that 
guy into a setter. They're going to learn the 
job in two years. So say, it's taken him (pointing 
to Robin Slater) twenty years daunn near to get 
what he knows. So a lot of their time is snagging - 
you can call it snagging - or getting people out 
of the shit, because they're not conversant with
what they're bloody well doing.
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Robin Slater There's a broken pump on the Rotoformer; everybody 
knows about it; it should be tackled; it's on the 
action points at the Production Meeting. Then nine 
times out of ten you go back up there and it's still 
the same.
Jim Brown We've got a situation, and it's the third this month, 
where we've got a Rotoformer down and nobody has got 
a bloody clue how long it's going to take to put 
right. Obviously we're loaded on every machine. It's 
a god only knows bloody job to rehash the plan when 
you've lost 2Qf)(> of your capacity without causing 
anybody any problems.
Mike Shilling The fact that we've got double shift supervisor 
cover is better than the day shift cover. It's 
still not ideal. There's only a charge hand on at 
night, so we don't have as much control on that 
shift.
David Wright summed up with the following.
David Wright I'm cynical, I know, but I don't think the inform­
ation system is needadto highlight the areas where 
action is needed. To strengthen the reporting 
sort of aspect as we appear to be doing is useful 
and it will improve, one hopes, the quality of 
information. Having said that, the information
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we've got at the present time is good enough, at least 
to highlight the sort of steps needed.
To improve the quality of the reporting seems to me 
to be the second step; the first step is to get on 
with it and then we can improve the information and 
improve our actions even more.
Each of these, and many more comments, gleaned from the Production and 
Planning Meetings, and talks with managers, highlighted the problems 
the managers were facing, and which they defined as being important.
The main areas or categories of problems were; planning, personnel 
training, mechanical breakdowns, shift supervision, space restrictions 
and personnel discipline. These problems compounded to cause bottlenecks 
in production and a continual series of crisis decisions, which occupied 
most of the managers' thoughts and actions. It was apparent to all the 
managers that problems existed in the information they received; 
however,only Chris Davis seemed to give it high priority.
3 .3  Criticisms of the Information Before MADCAP
The managers levelled a number of criticisms against the pieces of 
information they received. The major area of concern was to do with
the inaccuracies thought to exist in the information.
Alistair Where does the information fall down?
David Wright In the basic information that it used to work
on. It's the classic one isn't it? "Garbage in.
Garbage out." I think that's overstating it, but 
there are too many inaccuracies. If you get it 
wrong at one stage then invariably it's going to 
be wrong throughout.
Here, David simply commented on the fact that inaccuracies existed and 
were introduced at the input stage. Jim Brown wais more explicit about 
the cause of the inaccuracies.
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Jim Brown I get a daily up-date on the totals. Personally 
I don't have too much faith in the accuracy of 
some of them. Having worked on the shop floor 
for a time I've seen all the fiddles. I've 
seen how people treat those figures. There eure 
also quite a few mistakes made on the Production 
Record Charts. I mean, once or twice a week, I 
go back to Work Study to query a couple of 
figures. On quite a few occasions they have 
proved to be wrong; but, you know, that's just 
the human element.
Alistair Do you think that's all it is, just carelessness?
Jim Brown Well in some cases that's all it is, but in other 
cases I'm bloody sure it isn't. Bonuses are all 
linked to it.
Following up the issue of deliberate falsification I spoke to Simon 
White, who handled the Production Record Charts.
Alistair Is the information ever deliberately falsified?
Simon White Sometimes the information is uncheckable, but we 
do have a particular instance of that, where there 
is no doubt that the information was deliberately 
falsified!
Alistair Which instance was that?
Simon White The labourers in material recovery; they just book
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the loads they move, so they can put down as many 
as they like; the bonus is based on the number of 
loads they move. On an overall basis you can say 
this can't be true. Last week ten men had put 
down ten loads each; this means they moved one 
hundred loads altogether; we only bought ten bins 
so how did that happen?
This was a particularly severe example and, as Simon said, the 
information was largely uncheckable. However, the girls on the Roller- 
cutters invariably recorded that they had cut more trays than they 
received from the forming machines. These two groups of machines were 
controlled by different Departmental Production Managers, and they 
received different pieces of information. Only when the figures 
produced on the Rotoformers were compared with the figures produced on 
the Rollercutters was it realised that some falsification of inform­
ation was taking place.
During a talk, Peter Travers admitted that he deliberately held back 
sales orders from one month, if the level was already high, to the 
next month in case orders fell during that period. This gave the 
impression that the demand for goods was fairly even throughout the 
year, whereas, in reality, there were monthly fluctuations.
Mike Shilling also experienced inaccurate information.
Mike Shilling What annoys me is that sometimes the Utilisation
figures that come through to me - admittedly they 
are last years', auid there were problems in Stores ■ 
some of them were quite ridiculous. You have some 
PVC on a Rotoformer which was short. There's
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no point in me even discussing that; obviously a 
Stores' problem somewhere! But there might be 
people in the organisation that say, "Ah bloody 
Rotoformers. Fancy wasting 409^ ," but I'm never 
given the chance to explain. I think I know why, 
and it's because nobody has any faith in the 
figures.
In this statement Mike Shilling was not simply interested in the 
inaccuracies, in terms of the quality of information, but also how such 
information, provided by the Accounts Department, would reflect on his 
department's performance. Note also that although this interview took 
place in March, the material utilisation figures were for the previous 
year, such was the time lag necessary for Accounts to prepare the 
document and even then it was highly inaccurate.
Peter Travers offered another cause for inaccuracies other them 
falsification or carelessness.
Peter Travers Well it's like everything else; it's a chore.
You've got people filling in the initisil paper 
work who don't fully understand just how it is 
going to be used later on. So why bother?
It's a chore so just slap in a tick, get it 
away sis quickly as possible. It's so often the 
case that the information is coming from the 
grass roots if you like, and they don't under­
stand why it's needed.
Inaccuracies were silso to be found in the recording and processing of 
information; clerks working by procedure sometimes allowed quite 
ludicrous errors to slip through, either whilst recording or processing
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the information; these inaccuracies were both the result of careless­
ness and lack of understanding. The processing of information was 
largely mechanical i.e. adding this column to that column times one 
hundred.
Simon White commented on the problem of recorder error in relation to 
the machine operators:
Simon White We have to correct one hell of a lot of it which is
incorrectly entered. We try and make sure it's 
reasonably accurate. I certainly feel that if the 
production charts were just taken on their face 
value the information wouldn't mean anything, 
because there are so many errors, misinterpretations 
and so on.
In this comment Simon White mentions the word 'misinterpretation' of 
information. Much of the information provided on the factory floor 
was precisely defined, e.g. the number of trays produced. However, 
in the area of downtime the setter had to judge the cause of the 
breakdown or stoppage and this judgement allowed misinterpretation 
of events to occur.
Peter Travers Take 'wait labour'. That means the machine is
shut down waiting for people to bloody run it. 
From talking to various people I get the 
impression, and I think everybody gets the 
impression here, that 'wait labour' is used as 
a general dogsbody. Any problem that doesn't 
fall into the other categories gets lumped 
into it.
Jim Brown made a similar comment.
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Jim Brown With those boxes on the production record chart,
you're asking those people to make a judgement 
as to what those reasons were. You're also 
giving them a chance to chicken out from putting 
in the true reason.
This last point by Jim reinforces his belief that information is 
deliberately falsified although not in this case for pecuniary reward.
Charlie Johnson criticised the information he received because of the 
mesisures used.
Charlie Johnson Everything in this place is in kilos. The sooner
we get back to a yardage issue the better. All
they bloody give us is kilos, kilos!
Mike Shilling makes a similar comment, although, on this occasion he 
is referring to measuring the speed of the machine.
Mike Shilling If it was in strokes per minute then we could
relate directly to the estimates. You know, 
to see whether it's up or down.
gimon White- drew my attention to the fact that information prepared 
on a weekly basis is often too late for the managers to use in their 
day to day, or hour to hour activities.
Simon White Another thing, of course, is that most management
information is bound to be so far behind. Section 
Managers must react much quicker. They've got to 
react on an hour by hour basis.
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David Wright confirmed this point.
Alistair Is the information provided in time?
David Wright Some of it, no. I think some of it comes through 
too late. Information is relevant only as long 
as it can be used.
Peter Travers I mean they have problems over timing. It takes 
a lot of time to get information out of the 
factory.
The managers criticised the lack of detail provided in the information,
Charlie Johnson What I get from Whity at the moment is the 
daily production figures, which shows the 
performance for that particular day. It has the 
name of the job, how many strokes, say 10, and the 
number made that day. Unfortunately the next 
column should say how many we ought to have made. 
We've got to work that out. With another column 
it would save us some work.
Mike Shilling Not enough detail is a problem; take this example. 
From the Works Order I see 'Material: 2000 kilos',
- that is the order for 300,000 trays. Now...they 
might have issued 2100 kilos. When it gets to 
completion and I see an order for 300,000, and we've 
made 320,000 I don't know at this stage how much 
materials was actually issued. All I can say is - 
Yes that looks alright and sign it off - great, 
no problem; it looks as if they've gone under 
the stroke and we haven't had any waste.
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(In a similar vein.)
Jim Brown The overall picture is good enough; it's just that
the detail is not good enough in some cases.
I think there's got to be some area on these sheets 
where you can explain extenuating circumstances. I 
meem - there's nothing - it's all hard and fast. 
It's either 'wait labour* or 'wait instructions' 
or 'wait material.' There's no area where you can 
put extenuating circumstances in. I meem if you've 
got 'wait engineer.' I mean that covers a multi­
tude of sins. I mean if you haven't got a spare it 
goes down as 'wait engineer' or 'mechanical break­
down. ' For 'wait engineer' you can have eleven 
hours on RDMs; that's quite possible because they 
didn't have a spare part and not because there was 
no engineer. So a lot of things are misrepresented.
This not only referedto the lack of detail but also reinforced an
earlier point that events were often misrepresented in the information.
Simon White sums up this point with:
Alistair Do you think the information we're providing gives
a full picture?
Simon White Maybe not a full picture; it certainly gives a
guide. I don't think any information tells you 
exactly what's happening.
Charlie Johnson had his own particular view of management information.
Alistair Do you receive information, forms and so on?
Charlie Johnson Yes, but I don't understand half of them...
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Because I haven't got time. I dont' bother to 
bloody read them. I'm terrible; I've always 
been terrible; some people are paper minded 
or figure minded. What I'm really concerned 
about is to run it as fast as we can, as 
efficiently as we can and as cheap as we can.
I get a lot of papers that mean bugger aü.1 
anyway. I think there's a lot of emphasis on 
things that are irrelevant.
Again with reference to information:
Alistair Are the production record charts much use to 
you?
Charlie Johnson No. Do you know why?
Alistair No.
Charlie Johnson No bloody time to look at them. It seems to be 
more important that those things are up in the 
Works Study Office them us having a look at the 
buggers, because at half past eight they're 
grabbed and disappear and that's the last we'll 
bloody see of them.
Finally Charlie did not approve of the presentation of the information.
Charlie Johnson I don't know what I can do about it; they're 
just showing me some bloody figures aren't they? 
What can I do about figures? They just mean 60, 
70, or 80, or whatever the bloody figure is. It 
doesn't tell me what to do to get better figures.
As mentioned in the previous section, the information was gathered in
87.
a piecemeal manner and no manager received all the information 
available. Jim Green reinforced this point (see page 73 ) Furthermore,
the type of information received differed between the two production 
departments. Mike Shilling claimed he did not receive his speed 
measures in strokes per minute, yet Charlie Johnson refers to strokes
per minute in his comments.
3.4 Summary
From this data and my observations I would conclude that the information, 
as received by the managers, before the introduction of the computerised 
production information could be described as a routinised process con­
ducted by individuals performing a variety of roles, with the intention 
of providing and distributing an account of events which had taken place 
within some chosen time span. The information was prepared and circul­
ated in a fragmented manner on various days of the week and to a limited 
number of managers. No managers received a copy of every piece of 
information produced. The information, at best, provided a partial and
distorted account of the events. The following describes this defin­
ition more fully:
3.4.1. Role Types
An individual could perform the role of provider, recorder and or 
processor of information. A single individual could perform more 
than one of these roles. The machine operator or setter was a 
provider and recorder of information. If a machine were to break 
down, the setter would decide on the cause, measure the downtime 
and record this information on the production record chart.
3*4.2. Routine Process
The provision, recording and processing of pieces of information
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was routine in that these steps were carried out in a regular, 
procedural manner. The information to be provided, recorded
 ^ and the means by which it was to be processed were predetermined.
The process was governed by rules and method. Others, familiar 
with the rules and method could interpret and understand the 
information they received. New comers such as Chris Davis,
Cyril Jenkins and myself were not familiar with the rules and 
method, and therefore experienced difficulty in understanding 
and collating the information.
3.4.3* An account of events which had taken place
The pieces of information as received by the managers on the 
various distribution lists were necessarily historic; they were 
in effect a 'post hoc account.* The term 'account' is used 
purposely to reflect that information was subject to interpret­
ation by the provider, recorder, processor and receiver. Inform­
ation was atleast in part a subjective account of events, and not
an objective measurement of the actual event.
3*4.4. The information was prepared and circulated in a fragmented manner
The provision, recording, processing and distributing of inform­
ation was piecemeal; it was not a co-ordinated systematic 
activity. Managers did not receive information, they received 
pieces of information from a variety of sources at various times 
of the day, week and month. From these pieces of information, 
managers constructed an overall picture of events which had 
taken place in the factory. As no managers received every piece 
of information available there we» gaps or fuzzy areas in the 
picture.
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3.4.5. The information at best provided a partial and distorted account
The account was partial; firstly, as mentioned above because 
managers did not receive all the pieces of information that were 
available. Secondly, the information chosen to be provided, 
recorded, processed and distributed was subject to a process 
of selection. It was obviously impossible to record every event, 
or in fact every aspect of every event. This process of 
selection took place on a number of levels. Firstly, the 
managers must have selected which events or which types of 
events were to be recorded. Secondly, which aspects of the 
events were to be considered. Thirdly, the method of processing 
the data would have to be decided upon.
This process of selection was influenced by the ease with which 
the information could be provided and recorded. Information 
pertaining to material issue and usage was an area that was 
difficult to measure. 'Waste* could be reground and used again 
but was, however, inferior to 'virgin* and had to be measured 
separately. In view of the difficulties in measurement, material 
usage was not recorded.
Much of the information was inaccurate; inaccuracies wem intro­
duced when the information was provided, recorded or processed; 
inaccuracies could be introduced through lack of understanding, 
through carelessness and through deliberate falsification.
I have deliberately omitted from this section the managers' 
comments on the use of the pieces of information they received.
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The uses of information constitute a section in themselves and 
will be dealt with shortly. (See page 104 )
5*3 The New Computerised Production Information System (MADCAP)
The brief of the Working Party was to prepare unified, timely and 
accurate information covering the areas of production performance, 
material usage and finished goods stock control. By July the 
production performance information was being prepared on a 
weekly baisis, processed by computer and circulated to most 
managers with any interest in production. Apart from the 
reports prepared on material usage and finished goods stock 
control no further progress was made in these areas.
Chris Davis and Cyril Jenkins conveyed their satisfaction with 
the newly produced information, although they were not specific 
in their comments. Other managers receiving the information 
were more specific in their praise.
Alistair Do you think MADCAP is an improvement?
Mike Shilling Obviously.
Alistair For what reasons?
Mike Shilling The previous information was given in hours
very simply, therefore you had to do all your 
own working out. In a nut shell that's prob­
ably the most important aspect of it. Now it 
gives you some sort of guideline. It's broken 
down, perhaps a little more sensibly than it 
was before. I don‘t think I could sirgue with 
the breakdown at all; so really, as far as
I'm concerned, it's far better than it was before; 
it's useful.
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Alistair Do you think MADCAP is an improvement on the 
previous information you received?
Jim Brown Yehi...Undoubtedly. No question. Well I think the 
difference is that you've got information together 
which gives you an indication of the trends in 
production without having to go to about ten 
different places to find it. I think it's a useful 
document.
Alistair Do you think MADCAP is an improvement?
Peter Travers It's a form of information now, whereas before it 
was piecemeal. You used to get what you asked for 
and nothing else. Now you know exactly what you're 
going to get. Bearing in mind, of course, that 
MADCAP is only a very smsLLl psurt of the information 
we get anyway. There are many other things and, 
generally speaking, that's all been formalised.
The monthly reports and so on, we know exactly 
when to expect things. All the information we 
need to plot progress is now available in a formal 
form. I don't think there's any information we 
need that we have to chase around for.
After a struggle I managed to get Charlie Johnson to make a comment 
about MADCAP.
Charlie Johnson Oh yes. I don't see much wrong with it. All I'm
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really concerned about is the overall picture of 
the machinery; the stroke rates and so on; the 
overeQ.1 efficiency; well,not so much the overall 
efficiency because some of those figures are out 
of my control. I really only want my own perform­
ance when the machinery is running; the running 
efficiency.
Alistair Does it produce all the information you need.
Charlie Johnson Yeh...more than enough.
This was very high praise indeed. From the comments I felt we, the 
Working Party, had satisfied at least the first two of Chris Davis' 
criteria; the format was now unified and was processed and distributed 
each Tuesday, thus producing a co-ordinated set of production inform­
ation. All four managers, cited above, were now awso'e of an inform­
ation system; it was universally titled MADCAP and obviously, from 
the comments, the managers appreciated the new format. Reports on 
our attempts to improve accuracy were less encouraging.
Simon White,whilst computerising the new system commented:
Simon White I think in a lot of the information which is 
provided for MADCAP there is a bit of doubt in 
its accuracy. That will still be a problem. 
It will certainly give guides and trends even 
if every single figure is not correct. It 
will be information on which senior management 
will be able to take action.
It is interesting to note how Simon White defined the purpose of
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this new information and who he had in mind whilst developing it.
"It will certainly give guides and trends" and "senior management will 
be able to take action."
Alistair Does MADCAP provide you with most of your inform­
ation requirements or do you need other documentation 
to go along with it?
Jim Brown Well, I think the information itself is the right 
sort of information, but I'm not really happy that 
some of it is, if you like, valid. As I've said 
before I've seen a lot of doctoring of sheets for 
bonus on the shop floor and I'm sure that must be 
reflected in the information that's recorded in 
MADCAP.
Alistair Any examples of that?
Jim Brown There's a couple of examples. A while back there 
were some instances on the Waddingtons where we 
had two or three days down 'wait labour' where in 
fact it wais nothing to do with waiting labour; we 
had sent a cutting plate to be reruled and it was 
just put down as 'wait labour'.
Alistair So 'wait labour' is still a problem?
Jim Brown Always will be.
Alistair Do you find people investigating these things now?
Jim Brown No. I don't think people do investigate. I 
think.there's an awful lot of things that go on 
the production sheets that, from the point of view 
of what people are doing or why the machines are 
stopping, which are never investigated.
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Peter Travers made similar points to Jim Brown; I however wish to 
reference those later in a different context. Charlie Johnson had 
little to say on MADCAP; I suspect he rarely used the document. As 
mentioned previously, he was more concerned with incentive schemes 
during the interview than with MADCAP.
Mike Shilling, on the other hand, found the accuracy of the figures 
satisfactory.
Alistair Do you think the figures are accurate?
Mike Shilling Yesi Once I found a wrong one, but I haven't 
got any real argument about the figures.
Alistair 
Mike Shilling
What about the number of goods produced?
Yes, SIS far as I'm concerned I'm quite happy. 
Every now and again you get a slight hiccup if 
a bloke forgets to do something. But no, as 
far as entry into this (pointing to MADCAP) is 
concerned - forget the Rollercutters, that ain't 
nothing to do with me - as far as entry in Print 
and Rotoforms go...within a # or so. I would 
say that these figures are bloody good.
This response from Mike Shilling was not surprising. After all he was 
responsible for ensuring that the information generated in his depart­
ment was of a high standard. He was also a close associate of Simon 
White and, through courtesy, would ensure accuracy.
A number of other reservations were levelled at MADCAP.
Alistair Do you think MADCAP provides the full
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picture of what goes on in the factory?
Jim Brown No, I don't. Some of the situations I've already
outlined to you. I think all MADCAP shows is the 
black and white area, and the problem with a 
black and white area, where you identify every­
thing very clearly, is that when you put into 
little boxes why a machine stopped etc., etc., 
you automatically open the door for people, if 
you like, to take advantage of that system and, 
at the moment, I don't think there's anybody to 
ask enough questions on the factory level; to 
ask what's happening and where and why to provide 
the correct flow of information for MADCAP.
Here Jim Brown made a very similar point to that which he made about 
the previous information he received. The little boxes on the 
Production Record Chart provided the basic data for the new system 
as it did for the old information system. Peter Travers makes a very 
interesting observation in line with Jim Brown's comments.
Peter Travers There's a risk you always run with anything
committed to paper or computer, it gains credib­
ility. A written document is always suspect as 
far as I can see it; you know, if you get a 
handwritten piece of paper from the girl in the 
factory saying that's what the completion figures 
are or anything, you tend to say. Ah yes, that 
looks alright, or you go away and check it. As 
soon as they're committed to computer or are 
typed, people tend to think they've gained 
credibility. You've got to fight against that 
because all that information is based on bloody 
hand-written notes by girls. They're reflections 
of what they think or what they suspect has happened,
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Following on from this point made by Peter Travers; prior to the new 
system, the same piece of information might have been collected from 
two sources; any irregularities would be shown up when the two pieces 
of information were compared. MADCAP gathered information from single 
sources; thus comparison of figures did not occur in the same manner. 
The managers did check on information, this will be discussed later.
Peter Travers Here we've got change-over efficiences and all
these things look wonderful. Harrison and Barber 
200^ change over efficiency. That means running 
adjustments,took half an. hour instead of one 
hour, big deal! It looks dramatic; it means 
absolutely nothing!
Here Peter Travers implies that figures such as the 2009^  efficiency 
could be misleading to those people who do not know the background 
or the reality behind the figure. In the same vein Peter Travers 
made the following comment:
Peter Travers But the fact that it's taken over a full week
and it is just a per cent up or a per cent down 
does not really bring it down to its basic level 
for us. Again you know there are hours when 
the machine will be running well and there are 
hours when the bloody machine is running badly. 
All these sorts of things. It's showing the 
general efficiency. It's not showing the 
reasons why. The only time it does or tries 
to show why is when it shows why the machine 
stopped for an hour because there wasn't any 
labour or there weren't any instructions on the 
machine. It doesn't get down to the nitty 
gritty, hour to hour» Again it's a general
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picture: And I don't think anyone expected it to.
MADCAP should be the first step to show you where 
the problems lie; then you investigate from there.
These comments implied that MADCAP did not supply enough detail for the 
managers directly involved with the day-to-day production activities.
It also implied that MADCAP itself only provided a partial account of 
events as did the previous information.
Mike Shilling You have to take into account that a running
adjustment is only recorded for quarter of an 
hour;* now on the print section without any 
doubt there is a lot which are not a quarter of 
an hour which are not recorded. So if you take 
a figure at the end of the week it doesn't include 
all the adjustments, so it's even higher than that 
that's recorded.
Here Mike Shilling states that the information excludes minor events 
which are difficult to measure, and argues that the cumulative effect 
of this omission affects the overall picture portrayed by the inform­
ation. This reinforces the point that MADCAP only produced a partial 
and distorted account of events.
Jim Brown commented on the timing of MADCAP.
Jim Brown Normally I'm aware of the information before it
comes to me because I'm checking on a daily 
basis, or making myself aware on a daily basis 
of what down times are incurred aind why. So 
generally speaking I'm aware of the information 
from production before MADCAP comes out.
Mike Shilling made a similar comment:
Mike Shilling Now I can show it to my supervisors and 'sus out*
what's happening. Mind you the dynamic department 
that-we are, we obviously know what's going on in 
any case. You know MADCAP comes to us a week later, 
and confirms what we already know.
From these comments it is possible to see that MADCAP was perceived 
as an improvement on the existing information in that it provided a 
regular, unified account of events which had taken place over the 
period under measurement. The information was produced to a standard 
procedure and thus followed standard rules and method in its con­
struction. These rules and method were universally known and thus 
managers were able to interpret and understand the information.
Nevertheless, middle managers had reservations about the accuracy, 
timeliness, generality and detail of the information provided on 
MADCAP. In the words of Simon White the purpose of MADCAP was:
"It will certainly give guides and trends even if every single figure 
is not correct. It will be information on which senior management 
will be able to take action." MADCAP was designed for senior msuiage- 
ment and, in effect, by senior management. Chris Davis had skill­
fully manipulated the Working Party into designing an information 
system which would provide him with sufficiently accurate, timely, 
general and detailed information for his purposes, which were to 
monitor trends and improvements emd point to general problem areas 
where he could direct his own and his managers' attention. As 
mentioned previously I do not think Chris Davis was totally selfish 
in his outlook; he had intended that the information be in a form
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to be of use to all managers. However, Chris Davis' own requirements 
appeared to have the highest priority.
3 .6. My Research Model Collapses
It was my intention at the outset to compare the situation before and 
after the introduction of MADCAP. As seen above peoples' perception 
of information had changed with the introduction of MADCAP, although 
there were still serious reservations. Other changes had taken place 
during this period. Peter Travers summarised what he called the 
transformation.
Alistair When I first came here there were considerable 
problems, with a great deal of crisis management 
going on. What's the position now? Has this 
improved?
Peter Travers Oh you know damn well it has. There can be no 
question at aü.1. I'll give you the commercial 
view if you want. I can't believe the trans­
formation this place has gone through in the 
leist six to eight months. Firstly, there were 
some outside problems last year which we must 
not forget; there was an Engineers' dispute 
which really did cock us right up. Another 
thing was that we started the year on double 
shift; we ran stocks right down because of a 
lot of hoo-ha from Accountants and so on. So 
we started the year off unable to react to 
customer requirements, and we spent the whole 
of 1977 fighting fires and the net result, 
without any shadow of a doubt, was total 
inefficiency in the factory. Even when the 
machines were running, you could only guarantee 
them running for about five hours before we had
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to put some other job in. It wsus chaos. Every 
other day there were changeovers. So we were getting 
shorter and shorter runs and we were disappearing 
up our own arses.
Conscious decisions were then made; we decided not 
to run stocks down to the same level at the end of 
last year. We decided to keep the factory running 
on treble shift, with overtime at that time. We 
decided to formalise planning which was lacking in 
the previous year, people were keeping things in 
their heads. Those things had to be put right 
for 1979 and they were put right. On planning 
and control, we put boards up, we educated 
Representatives and Customers into thinking ten 
week lead times instead of the silly bloody three 
weeks.
The difference is absolutely unbelievable, it 
really is. You can now come in on the morning, 
sit down and you know damn well you're not going 
to get a panic phone call. O.K. Everything is 
fairly well sown up. Marvellous job, we mustn't 
get complacent about it, though.
Thé interesting thing is that we had the girls go 
out on overtime ban, so they wouldn't do any 
weekend overtime. We thought "Christ. How are 
we going to manage?" We bloody did it.
We've now got to the stage where people are coming 
in to us and saying, "Come on. Let's have some 
more orders, the machines are looking a bit thin 
in six weeks time," or "there's a gap there."
That's marvellous. Fantastic, never seen it before, 
never seen the planning people come into this place 
and say, "where are the orders?" The pressures 
gone from one side to right round. We were fairly
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complacent in that we thought the salesmen were 
doing what they could, they wouldn't do any more, 
because what's the point of stimulating things if 
we couldn't really cope with it. Now it's gone 
arse about face, now we're,putting pressure on 
them, and saying the plants waiting. The plant 
hasn't increased in size, the labour force hasn't 
increased in size. I suspect that we will show 
a 30^ greater output this year, if not more than 
that.
In the RDMs now you csui run for a week solid, 
without a changeover, maybe two. We're maximising 
runs all the time, and we're not really building 
massive stocks if you look at the stock levels and 
so on. We've been able to organise the thing so 
tightly that we've been producing exactly what we 
want, when we want it. And those goods are almost 
going straight out the door.
You still do get the odd problem, the odd panic, but 
generally speaking these are customers' problems and 
not because we couldn't achieve something for them.
One of the great things about our system is that 
we've still got flexibility. We can still react 
to customer problems. We now think a panic is 
something that's wanted in six weeks time rather 
than on Monday. You know that's the difference 
and that is one hell of a difference.
Alistair Has your relationship with Production improved?
Peter Travers I got to keep saying it, really the planning side. 
We have an absolutely 100^ right relationship with 
the planning side. We're fully kept in the picture 
about what's going on.
102.
Peter Travers The reasons for changes and so on are explained to
us fully. If we genuinely have a problem, I think 
it's a question of everybody being honest with 
everybody else then we know damn well that somebody 
will do something about it. I honestly get the 
feeling that Planning will move heaven and earth 
just to get something right.
I think Planning now have a commercial awareness - 
quite honestly - I think they know the implication 
that if you do let a customer down his factory 
will be stopped. Then this company loses face.
You can sit down with a customer: Last week we
were talking about new projects with Express 
Dairies and the guy actually sat there and said,
"we would not consider you for a new project last 
year, but we would today."
The feeling you get is that the whole thing is 
controlled, it's down tempo, it's professionally 
organised, as opposed to that out of hand, out of 
control situation, where you felt you're going 
headlong down a hill.
Other managers confirmed Peter Travers' view. The better planning of 
production enabled planned maintenance to occur on the machines, 
reducing the level of waste and downtime. The introduction of a 
treble shift did, in effect, increase the capacity in the plant, 
relieving many of the bottlnecks. The new Extruder which Peter 
Travers failed to mention alleviated the pressure on this department. 
Prior to my arrival some structural changes had been introduced, the 
production process had been departmentalised with Charlie Johnson 
now concentrating on the Extruders, the RDMs, the Rollercutters and 
the Granulator. Mike Shilling took over the Print Room and the
103
Rotoformers. These changes in policy, procedure and structure had led 
to the dramatic improvements within the factory. Nobody I spoke to 
attributed any of these improvements to the new Information System.
I had assumed that the middle managers were receiving the new 
information from December onwards, firstly in the manual form, then 
the computer print-out from March onwards. This was not the case.
Mike Shilling The management information stuff, which I don't
get at the moment incidently, which I'm a bit 
annoyed about because I thought I should be 
provided with the stuff at the moment. The only 
way I can guage performance at the moment is to 
see the following Thursday what the blokes have 
earned in bonuses.
Mike Shilling did admit that he could go to Simon White at any time 
to check on any peice of information he needed.
Mike Shilling To be fair. I said I didn't receive any management
information - but to be fair I do know that Simon's 
got some and I can go along and have a look. And 
he has shown me the type of stuff he's been doing.
Jim Brown was in the same position as Mike Shilling
Jim Brown Well I was supposed to be getting the production
efficiency records (the previous system) but they 
seem to have dried up. There's also some inform­
ation that's been compiled by David Bright which 
once again I was meant to be getting a copy of, 
which I'm not.
These conversations took place in February. I asked Simon White about 
it:
10 4.
Alistair Who now receives the new information?
Simon White Chris Davis, Cyril Jenkins, David C., and myself.
Alistair Is that all?
Simon White To be perfectly honest, Alistair, I stopped 
circulating the old information around Christmas 
and haven't heard a murmur from anyone.
Jim Brown and Mike Shilling were awaire that they did not receive the 
new information, however they did not complain to Simon White. This 
raised the question of how important such information was to the 
Middle Managers directly involved in production.
3 .7 The Emergence of a New Topic
It would be artificial to assume that I had never enquired about the 
use managers made of the information. I have deliberately kept such 
comments until this section for the sake of structure.
Mike Shilling There are occasions where you think, Ahi, now 
I measured that once and the supervisors measured 
it shift by shift and they told me it was such 
and such a rate. Then at the end of the week 
here's the management information and there are 
occasions where the figures don't tie up. Then 
we have to try and analyse why there was a 
difference. In the end we get to things like 
"we had trouble with the size of the rolls and 
the blokes were a bit lethargic putting them up.
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thinking their backs were going to go any minute." 
Certain instances which weren’t picked up at the 
time which over the run did contribute to a down 
situation. Then we can check to see if the blokes 
were on the ball putting the rolls up or were they 
out having a fag when the rolls ran out, this sort 
of thing.
Here Mike Shilling reinforces the classic definition of management 
information. It provides a guide to problem areas which can trigger 
investigations. However, what is interesting is that the trigger 
mechanism is à comparison of day-to-day observations, with the 
information on MADCAP. If there was a discrepancy then an investig­
ation would take place. Mike Shilling has already commented that his 
dynamic department would know the information in MADCAP before it 
was distributed. When some discrepancy occurred between what Mike 
Shilling expected to see on MADCAP and what was actually recorded, he 
would investigate further. One could deduce from this that MADCAP 
served as a means of confirming Mike Shilling's knowledge of events 
in his departments.
Mike Shilling The job is so much a day-to-day job that it's
interesting to have the historical background 
to see whether the department is becoming 
terrible or whether it's improving or what.
In this comment, Mike Shilling harks back to a point made much 
earlier by Peter Travers (see page 75 ) which is that such regular 
information is useful as à means of examining past performauice and 
monitoring improvements. All managers agreed that this was an 
important use of MADCAP,
Jim Brown made similar points to Mike Shilling,
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Jim Brown I've got daily totals and I'm also checking machine 
totals. So all I use MADCAP for is a sort of 
cumulation of information I've seen during the 
week, presented to me in a statistical form; so 
I can look at it and say Christ I that was 429^ . It 
also jars my memory of things that have fallen by 
the wayside. So MADCAP tends to reinforce inform­
ation I've already gained anyway.
And then.
Alistair Do you think that MADCAP itself is a control 
document?
Jim Brown No, I don't. I think it just gives you a base of 
information about what has happened. I don't think 
it gives you any control, because I don't think 
it's used as such. The information is presented, 
but in the time span of MADCAP I've never once 
been to a Production Meeting where anybody from 
the Production Departments including the Production 
Manager said "Right. Last week's figures on MADCAP, 
we had 53 hours down on Waddingtons." It has never 
been mentioned.
Firstly,Jim Brown reiterated that MADCAP produced historic data, but 
then went on to comment about the lack of reference to MADCAP in the 
Production Meeting. I, in my observations, had not heard it mentioned 
either, which I found surprising. Charlie Johnson agreed.





Well, you've been to the meetings; they 
haven't changed at all.
I'm on record as saying that the meetings were 
rubbish and a waste of time.
I personally did not agree with Peter Short. However, feelings did 
run high about the worth of the Production Meetings. This point will 
be discussed later.
As usual Charlie Johnson had his own unique comments to make about 




Has Chris Davis or Cyril Jenkins ever come to you 
with specific issues from MADCAP?
Noi Sometimes they say we've had a bloody poor 
week, last week, and I just ignore that remark.
Do you think any more action should be taken on 
MADCAP?
Charlie Johnson No thanks, it might give me more work! No I
don't think so.
Peter Travers made some very interesting and lengthy comments on the 
use of MADCAP. It was largely these comments that inspired me to 
investigate the phenomena described in the next section. In October 
1978 I had asked Peter Travers the following question:
Alistair What do you need to know about?
Peter Travers We need to know things like orders inward, and
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60 on; what is planned to happen over the next few 
weeks, so we can tell our customers what we expect 
to happen, because it's very important for them to 
know when they're going to get their goods and so 
on.
That I would say is the main thing we need to know 
about; that's what you'll find us doing; spending 
an awful lot of time in the factory just getting 
together that sort of information.
Alistair You find that you have to go into the factory to 
get it; it's not supplied to you?
Peter Travers Very rarely, auid, as I say, the information we get 
from that side of the business from the dispatch 
department, the factory and so on is always suspect 
anyway, and personally, I always feel I'd rather go 
and check it and talk to the people involved. You 
can learn an awful lot more from talking to people 
about something than you can by ringing somebody 
up and asking for a figure off a card.
If you go over and explain what you want and what 
you want to achieve at the end of it, people tend 
to try and give the information that you need in its 
entirety, rather than just giving you the bits that 
are recorded.
Alistair So you say that communication by word-of-mouth is 
important to you?
Peter Travers Oh yes, we probably rely on that a lot more than 
perhaps we should because the systems that back 
it up aren't very good. I wouldn't like to see that 
change an awful lot, really.
Alistair You wouldn't?
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Peter Travers Not personally. I think it's very good for people 
to be communicating in that way, so they genuinely 
know if you've got a problem. I mean we do get 
problems obviously. I mean you can go and 
communicate with somebody that you're dealing 
with everyday, anyway; they know that's a serious 
problem. You don't go over there just when you've 
got a problem, you're over there anyway, you get 
to know the people and so on and I think that's 
very, very important•
From this point on I was interested in informal information; that 
is, information used by managers which is not part of the officially 
recognised information system. I continued to collect comments 
relating to such information out of interest. In the July interview 
I asked Peter Travers the following question:
Alistair Are you still relying on informal information?
Peter Travers Yeh. I'd say we still use a lot of informal 
information; which very often backs up MADCAP 
and the other bits of formal information, or 
very often gives you reason to doubt some of 
the information that comes by the formal route. 
We still have some doubts about MADCAP and very 
often it's informal information that leads you 
to believe that some of that information is, 
strictly speaking, not true.
Alistair Have you got any examples of that?
Peter Travers We get completion figures and so forth as one 
system of formal information. Whenever a job 
is completed we get a completion figure. We 
are very often led to believe that these
n o .
figures aren't strictly true. We may get inform­
ation from Sean Davies something like "Well you 
know those figures coming out of the factory, well 
they're a load of nonsense aren't they? That 
wasn't the correct number of pallets coming out, 
or the pallets were only half loaded," so that 
puts a query under the formal information.
I was saying about rollercutting; we to some 
extent know they inflate the figures they roller 
cut. That's our opinion; very often we hesir that 
it's because of bonuses.
And then you (Alistair) say, how much do you rely 
on figures coming out of the factory, and how 
much do you rely on MADCAP, and so on. Ah m-m,
I think there we try and check, if we feel it's 
necessary, try and check the figures that go into 
Stock at the end of the production line, rather 
than just taking them at face value.
Alistair So you're cross-referencing sources of information?
Peter Travers We only do that when we need a specific piece of 
information about an individual situation rather 
than a general picture. I think, as the general 
picture goes, we take the formal information as 
being fairly reliable because if you're taking 
averages and so on, what you lose on one you're 
probably going to gain on another, and it's all 
going to come out in the wash the following month 
and so on. So for the general trend it's fine.
But when you get down to specific accounts you 
would then tend to check information a little 
more carefully, for a specific reason. If you're 
talking about stock containers, it's not so 
much of a problem. You know you have stock and
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the customer is not going to clear you out of stock, 
but when it's a specific job, when you're only 
running it once every six months, you have to know 
exactly where you are with it, because if you are 
running out of stock and you don't know it then 
you're in trouble.
I have described the information received by managers, both before and 
after MADCAP, as being a partiail account of events. Throughout my 
period in the factory I felt that by concentrating on the information 
officially documented and circulated, I myself was presenting a partial 
account of how managers informed themselves. If the information received 
by the managers was indeed inaccurate, too general, too late and lacked 
detail, and given that for one period no information was available at 
all, how did the managers go about informing themselves, how did they 
gather sufficiently accurate, specific and timely information? Henry 
Mintzberg has posed a similar question and answered it in the following 
manner:
"a major reason managers do not use formal information as 
specialist think they should is that managers find difficult­
ies with the M.I.S.; it is too late and too unreliable, too 
limited and often too general; instead managers turn to ad 
hoc informal information systems that they design and prove 
for themselves."
Mintzberg 1973*
The comments made by Jim Brown, Mike Shilling, Charlie Johnson,
Simon White, Peter Travers and David Wright confirm Mintzberg's 
impediments to management information. I would like to add that 
managers may also have difficulty in understanding information, have 
too little time to fully analyse it, find it irrelevant and may not 
be aware of its existence at all. The comments made above by Peter
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Travers imply that managers do indeed use informal information to 
confirm the formal information and to fill in the lacking detail. These 
comments led me to question the nature and process of this informal 
information; was it indeed ad hoc?, could it be described as a system?, 
and was it used simply to supplement formal information, or did it have 
a more fundamental purpose or role in the factory?
3«8 Summary
In this chapter I have presented data and an analysis of how managers 
defined the official documented information both before and after the 
introduction of MADCAP. Although the managers viewed MADCAP as an 
improvement over the previous information they received, they had 
serious misgivings about its use as an action document, claiming that 
it was inaccurate, too general and arrived too late.
The gathering of this data was an attempt to implement an organisational 
change model. It was to examine the changes in the organsation brought 
about by the introduction of the new information system. Over this 
period a number of changes did occur; however, the managers did not 
attribute these to the introduction of MADCAP, hence my data thwarted 
my research model.
During this stage of my research I gradually became aware, from my 
observations and from comments made by the managers, that the official 
documented or'formal*information constituted only a small part in the 
process of informing. That is, the managers relied heavily on informal 
information sources to receive information about events. Thus,through 
my research experiences a new topic emerged which was to provide the 
basis for the remainder of my research.
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CHAPTEE 4
FINDING OUT WHAT THE HELL'S GOING ON
I had not been at the factory for very long before I realised that the 
managers spent a considerable amount of time talking to each other, and 
that contained in these conversations were large amounts of information 
concerning past, present and future anticipated events in the factory.
The msmagers themselves described these processes of mutual informing 
or information exchanging as "getting filled in on the details,"
"getting the full story," "getting clued up," getting genned up,"
"getting the full picture," and Jim Brown described it most aptly as, 
"finding out what the fuck's going on;" a slightly watered down version 
of this phrase "finding out what the hell's going on" became the title 
of this chapter. Implicit in these phrases is the process of gathering 
information about events in the factory; also implicit is the awareness 
that some untoward or interesting event has, is or is going to take place, 
which prompts the managers to gather information. What is not implicit 
in these phrases is the nature of these processes, that is, the means 
by which the managers gather information or the mechanisms and motives 
which prompt them to gather it. It was toward these issues that I 
directed my attention for the remaining three months of my stay in the 
factory.
It is fairly evident to an observer of any organisation that information 
is transmitted informally, by word of mouth, between members of that 
organisation. The observer need only stay in the organisation long 
enough to find out where managers meet, formally or informally, to 
talk. I decided that as this phenomena was so self evident, I would
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not seek to prove its existence, but rather describe, and then anailyse 
its nature. The question I posed myself was simply: "How do managers
find out what the hell's going on?"
4.1. MADCAP as a Trigger to Seek Information
Before examining how managers gathered the information, I was interested 
to find out what prompted or inspired them to do so. To begin with, the 
formal information, provided in MADCAP, often triggered investigations; 
on page 104 Mike Shilling commented on how there were occasions when 
MADCAP did not "tie up" with his observations; this then prompted him 
to carry out a more detailed investigation by "susing" it out with his 
supervisors. Jim Brown made a similary point on psige 106 » "It
(MADCAP) jars my memory on things that have fallen by the wayside:" In
most of the criticisms of the formal information cited in this thesis, 
both before and after MADCAP it is suggested that managers are obliged 
or prompted to gather additional information to overcome inaccuracies, 
lateness, and lack of detail. The comments further suggested that the 
managers had gathered information from other sources prior to receiving 
the formal information. Jim Brown stated on page 106 $ "so all I use
MADCAP for is a sort of cumulation of information I've seen during the
week." And Mike Shilling on page 98 , "Mind you the dynamic depart­
ment that we are, we obviously know what's going on in any case."
From these comments and others to be quoted later,it became apparent 
that although formally supplied information may have acted as a trigger 
mechanism to investigate some events it was not the sole mechanism.
What else prompted managers to 'look into something?'
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4.2 The Production and Planning Meetings
I had attended the Production and Planning meeting and it struck me 
that as managers from the various production and service departments 
got together at these pre-determined times, for a meeting, information 
would be transmitted between them. This was undeniably true of the 
planning meeting while it lasted. The Sales Department continually 
questioned what was going on in production and vice versa. Peter 
Travers would wish to know how long it would take to produce an order, 
or ask why the order was not completed on time. The information he 
received would then affect the manner in which he responded to product­
ion or the customer. The Production Planner would, in turn, seek 
information about the priority ratings of the outstanding orders and 
thus organise his plan, as best he could, around these priorities.
The conversations at the production meetings also contained inform­
ation about events that had, were or were going to take place in the 
factory. The topics, aa mentioned previously, were mainly to do with 
mechanical breakdowns, lack of space and personnel discipline. The 
information content in my view was high. I was, therefore, surprised 
to receive such scathing comments about the meeting.
Alistair What do you think of the production meeting?
Charlie Johnson Waste of time!
Alistair I notice that when Cyril Jenkins is not here
there is no production meeting.
Charlie Johnson Well yes, we don't have a meeting, we will
go over the canteen for a cup of coffee.
All we're interested in is the plan.
That's resLlly all that interests me. There's 
so much talk in that meeting, but there's no 
follow up or anything. If you've got the minutes 
of three months ago, some of those bloody things 
are still on it today.
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Alistair What do you think of the production meeting, 
what do you think it's there for?
Jim Brown AhI Well at the moment I think that all it does 
is really indicate in the production department 
what's going on. I think it serves very little 
else. I think it's very rare that there's any 
positive action taken from the Production Meeting,
Neither Charlie Johnson or Jim Brown had much interest in the Production 
Meeting. Charlie stated that there was a lot of talking, and we could 
assume that information is contained in these conversations. Jim was 
a bit more explicit and stated that it did indicate what's going on in 
production. However, neither seemed to regard this as being important, 
both claimed that it failed to achieve its primary function which was 
to take action. I got the impression from Charlie and Jim that the 
information transmitted in the Production Meeting was 'old hat' to 
them.
Simon White, who was not so directly involved in day-to-day activities 
in the factory viewed the production meeting a little more positively, 
although he still mentioned the lack of action resulting from these 
meetings.
Alistair What do you think the production meeting is used for?
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Simon White It gives some people a soap box on which to air
their views (Mike Shilling) But um - it's urn, 
always useful just for a quick exchange of views. 
It's to let everybody know what problems other 
people are getting, and lets them get things off 
their chests. I don't think it solves every 
problem we've got right away.
I'm more of an observer, but I find it useful. 
Sometimes I get a query up in the office, where 
somebody asks "What's going on here?" I can say... 
Ah, that cropped up at the production meeting. It's 
good background information.
Cyril Jenkins described the production meeting as helping him "keep 
abreast of events in the factory." The production Meeting served a 
similar purpose for me.
In summary,I think it is fair to say that the Production Meeting 
communicated information to those people not intimately involved with 
the daily or hourly activities on the shop floor. It informed 
outsiders. The insiders or those intimately involved in the hourly 
activities viewed the information with some disdain. They already 
knew what was going on. The insiders and outsiders defined the 
purpose of the production Meeting differently. To the insider its 
purpose was to make decisions, which it failed to do, and thus was 
regarded as a talking shop. To the outsider, it provided good 
back ground information which could prompt further investigation.
For example on the ^th March 1979»
Jim Brown We've got problems on Rotoform 2. Mike might




...We've got three problems on the Rotoformer; 
one the heaters; two, the oil, it's pouring out 
everywhere and there is a water leak. I think 
you'll agree that the machine is now almost useless.




They're in Bristol, but we've been promised them 
tonight.
So you have about half throughput.
No; at the moment it's stopped completely; we're 
mopping up the oil, then we're going to run with 
more bottom heat.
Cyril Jenkins Tim; we will have to look more closely at this 
problem of oil leaks.
In this conversation Jim Brown by introducing the topic had obviously 
been informed about the event prior to the meeting. Cyril Jenkins, 
however, had not. He, by his questioning,was being informed there and 
then. He then decided that more information was needed and invited 
Tim Steed to look more closely at the problem.
From my observations and the above comments the planning and Production 
Meetings did provide a forum where managers not directly involved in 
production could gather information about events in the factory. It, 
however, did not appear to be the only source of information available 
to all managers.
4.3 . Social Groupings
Following on from the idea that information was exchanged when
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managers get together and talk with each other, that is, when they 
interacted, I began to note when and where such interactions took 
place. Apart from those at the official meetings, managers would 
congregate regularly at lunchtime in the canteen, at morning coffee 
and afternoon tea in various offices. As I myself had lunch in the 
canteen and shared my coffee and tea breaks with the managers I wsls 
in an excellent position to observe these gatherings.
Within the overall middle management level of the organisation I began 
to recognise smaller social groupings. Certain managers would sit 
beside each other at lunch, congregate in particular offices for 
coffee and tea, and drink in their chosen pub on Friday lunchtime.
I myself was part of a social group, comprising of Jim Brown, Peter 
Travers and Nigel Plant; we sat together at lunch, had coffee and 
tea in the Sales Office and drank together in the Lion on Fridays.
Another group, who sat at the far end of our lunch table, was com­
prised of Simon White, Mike Shilling, Ron Welch and Tom Jackson. This 
social group tended to have their tea in Simon White's office and 
drank in the White Horse on Fridays.
Charlie Johnson, Tim Steed, Mike Sampey and Roger Davidson sat at a 
smaller table in the far corner of the canteen; they tended to go 
over to the canteen for their tea and coffee breaks; they did not, 
however, frequent any pub on Fridays.
Martin Keyes and Sean Davies who had only recently been given 
managerial status, were not entitled to the free lunch. They had 
lunch, coffee and tea in the workers canteen where they played cards
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with members of the workforce.
The remaining two middle managers were David Clark and Kevin Linsey 
who did not seem to belong to any particular social grouping.
The existence of these social groupings was not immediately obvious or 
apparent to me. They were part of a very subtle informsil web. Their 
existence only became obvious to me after I had become sufficiently 
familiar with the setting. There was no formal membership to the 
groupings and no formal demarcation between them. I became aware of 
the social groupings simply through a realisation that particular 
mainagers always congregated together in certain places at particular 
times of the day.
I began questioning the make-up of these social groups; how and 
why had they formed? I first imagined that their make-up was due to 
their work relationships. Jim Brown, Peter Travers and Nigel Plant 
did work closely together and I assumed this would be true for all 
the social groupings. It soon became apparent that this was not the 
case. Mike Shilling spent more time on work-related issues with Jim 
Brown and Nigel Plant than with Simon White or Ron Welch. The same 
appeared to be true with Ron Welch and Tom Jackson. The close working 
relationship between Jim Brown, Peter Travers and Nigel Plant did 
contribute towards the formation of the social group, but this did 
not appear to be the only reason.
Simon White, Mike Shilling, Tom Jackson and Ron Welch were all 
ex R.T.G. Boxes men; they had been drafted into R.T.G. Plastics
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when demand fell for cardboard containers and rose for plastic 
containers. Even though they had been at Avon for eleven years 
they still talked about the old days in Boxes; they shared a similar 
personal history. I imagine they 'stuck together' when they first 
came to Avon and simply continued sis a social grouping. The group 
seemed to hold together more through mutusü. tolerance rather than 
genuine affection. I got the distinct impression that Simon White 
did not particularly like Ron Welch, and was known to cast aspersions 
on Mike Shilling!s character.
Charlie Johnson, Tim Steed and Mike Sampey had been at R.T.G. Plastics 
for practically their whole working lives. Charlie and Tim were 
extremly good friends in the factory and socially. They supported 
each other in meetings sind respected each others' knowledge of the 
factory. Mike Sampey associated with Charlie and Tim mainly I think, 
because he was part of their era.
Jim Brown, Peter Travers and Nigel Plant, in addition to their close 
working association shared other things in common. They were all 
fairly new; they were in their middle twenties as was I; they were 
married and owned new houses; they shared interests in motor cars 
and motor bikes; they each had an enthusiastic approach to their 
work and were consciously developing their careers.
David Clark and Kevin Linsey, as I mentioned, did not seem to belong 
to any social group. They tended to regard their position in middle 
management as being purely temporary, and placed their affiliation 
squarely with senior management.
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The social groupings appeared to have formed because the members shared 
a similar personal history, had a similar perspective or stance and 
shared similar interests.
4.4. Setting Specific and General Information
Having recognised these social groupings I began noting the topics of
conversation. Access to data from my own social group was easy, I
could freely join them for tea or coffee and enter into the conversation.
My presence in the other social groupings was more conspicuous; however
I was often invited to stay for coffee if I wais already in Simon White's
office examining the Production Record Charts or enquiring about MADCAP.
The table lay-out at lunch was as follows, and my position permitted me 
to overhear conversations from Simon White's group as well as particip­
ating in my own:




SIMON WHITE JIM BROWN
RON WELCH NIGEL PLANT
DAVID CLARK ALISTAIR
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The majority of conversations that took place at break times were of 
a general nature. Politics, sport, current affairs, local events, 
local intrigue, rising interest rates, car purchase, entertainment, 
including television programmes, films and local galas, do-it-yourself 
home improvements, vegetable growing and so on. The topics under this 
banner of general conversation were endless.
Conversation also centred around events relating to organisational issues 
as distinct from those in the factory itself. The newly introduced 
Staff Management Committee inspired much talk and speculation. Chris 
Davis' restructuring of managerial personnel was a favourite topic. The 
proposed expansion plans were at the forefront of most conversations 
especially towards the end of my stay, when the work actuailly commenced. 
Six Portacabins were purchased to house the office staff during the 
alterations. Large neoprene tents were used as temporary warehousing.
The sales department building were demolished after considerable effort; 
it had been a blast proof building during the last war; all these 
events inspired much talk. Chris Davis' pending operation on his back 
created much interest and speculation, "who would take over the reins?" 
"how long would he be away for?". Appointing the new Personnel Officer 
generated great interest. David Wright's move to Lansdown Street, the 
purchase and installation of the new Extruder, visits by specialists 
from Van Dam Printers in Holland, the Lorry Drivers' Strike, the 
mysterious disappearance of raw material (subsequently found to have 
been an accounting error), union unrest in the Printing Department, the 
introduction of the self appraisal scheme, the annual salary review,and 
many other topics all inspired the managers to talk. Again such con­
versations might take place in any organisation.
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At a more personal level, the lives and personal characteristics of 
other members of the organisation were discussed. These gossip 
sessions generally took place at coffee and tea, where there was 
more privacy. Rarely was somebody's personal life openly discussed 
at lunch. For example; if Jim Brown were to comment on Mike 
Shilling he would not do so when Mike's social group was present. 
There was a definite stigma attached to being seen to be a gossip.
I suspect that all managers did gossip, although I was only a party 
to the comments made by Jim Brown, Peter Travers and to a lesser 
extent Nigel Plant. I was associated with this social group and thus 
was excluded from some conversations in the other groups.
I have stated on page 26 that there was an implicit social rule that 
one did not discuss work over lunch; this rule was not as strictly 
enforced at coffee or tea. Events that had taken place, were taking 
place or were going to take place in the factory were discussed at 
lunch; however such conversations were for general interest rather 
than designed to solve a problem or result in a decision. Jim Brown 
or Peter Travers would comment on an unusual or striking incident in 
the factory which they had direct involvement in, or had heard about, 
simply because they felt it was of interest, not to elicit aid in 
solving the problem. For example ; at lunch:
"You know on the Extruder last night." Said Jim, "They ran 
natural then blue. This morning we had to go back to 
natural, you know why?"
"No." W@ replied.
"Because some silly bugger put a load of breeze blocks
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against the octabins and they couldn't get any natural regrind 
out; that means I have lost four hours of extrusion time."
Jim mentioned this incident out of interest, or because he thought we 
might be interested in it. It was not his intention that Peter, Nigel 
and myself should go out and remove the breeze blocks, or even devise 
a way to avoid it happening again. Many such conversations arose over 
lunch. Interesting tidbits of information about events, which had 
come to the attention of one member of social group would be shared with 
the others.
Coffee auad tea breaks were not treated with the same rules as the lunch 
break. An important event, with implications for other members in the 
social group might be discussed over tea or coffee with the intention 
of arriving at a solution. Often the coffee or tea break did not result 
in the stopping of work, a discussion might continue through the break.
In many cases not all the members were present at tea or coffee. Ron 
Welch, renowned for appreciating his breaks would invariably be in 
Simon White's office at the appointed time. Tom JJackson and Mike 
Shilling, through pressure of work, often missed the break. At lunch, 
however, there was a definite stopping of work.If a manager were to 
arrive late a certain amount of ribbing would take place by other 
members of his group. On one occasion Mike Shilling appeared ten 
minutes late; Simon White commented on this:
"Doing overtime again, Mike?"
"Very funny1 That de-nester was not designed for circular
lids. I'm up to my bloody ankles in waste."
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When we, on the Working Party, arrived a full half an hour late 
because of a meeting with Chris Davis, Ron Welch said, "Oh I thought 
you'd be eating in there" pointing to the senior managers' canteen. 
Senior management lunched at one o'clock, whereas the middle managers 
lunched at twelve o'clock.
In conversation^,which were based on hearsay, there was an implicit 
absolver of the authenticity of the account. When the topic weis of an 
important or sensitive nature, an explicit absolver was often added, 
such as; "I can't swear to this but," "I don't know if this is gospel
but" or "the way I heard it was." This meant that in some cases the
content of the conversation might be suspect. Managers had to filter 
out those aspect which they regarded as being legitimate. As the
content wsis not intended to be used for decision-making or action-
taking many suspect conversations passed without eliciting comment 
and were subsequently ignored.
The social groups acted as pools where information about events taking 
place in the organisation as a whole and about the personal lives and 
characteristics of the members could be shared with each other. This 
enabled each member to construct a composite or at least a fuller 
picture of what was taking place within his own setting. Managers, 
through their daily activities encountered numerous individuals and 
observed a multitude of events. No single manager could be aware of 
every event or every aspect of every event. The social groups and 
their conversations were a means by which the managers could fill in 
the missing pieces. They were undoubtedly a means by which the 
managers could find out what the hell was going on.
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Much of the information contained in these conversations wais specific 
to the setting, however it was rarely specific to a task. These 
social groups were the grapevine where information or gossip could 
be transmitted freely throughout the setting. The social groups, in 
pooling information, acted as accelerating points. Information 
gathered by interaction and observation throughout the day were 
pooled and then passed on in later interactions with persons outside 
the social group. Through this process the spread of information 
WSLS increased. Jane, who gathered tidbits of information through­
out the day in her office, rang round the other secretaries whilst 
on the switch board. These secretaries passed on the information 
they received from her. They then reciprocated by informing Jane 
about events they had observed or had heard about, which she passed 
on to Mary and myself. We were not part of the same social group as 
Jane.
It was interesting to note that certain information disclosed in the 
social groups was not subsequently passed on. Towards the end of my 
stay, Jim Brown was informed by Chris Davis that on Charlie Johnson's 
retirement he was to be promoted to Departmental Production Manager. 
This, in itself, was expected by all. What was not expected was 
that he was to be in charge of Extruding and the Print Room. This 
meant that he was taking over a section which until then had been 
Mike Shilling's responsibility. Jim confided in Peter, Nigel and 
myself, but it was understood that this piece of information was to 
go no further.
There was a subtle but very important distinction between the role of 
an informant sind the role of an informer. By gathering information,
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passing it on to members of one's own social group and then 
subsequently passing it on to members from other social groups, one 
was an informant, providing that the information did not have adverse 
implications for a member of ones own social group. If one passed 
on this latter type of information one was regarded as an informer, 
a role which had an unpleasant stigma attached to it.
4.5. Social Groups and the Process of Informing
What role did this type of interaction play in management information? 
The most important role was that, in providing a composite picture of 
events and of the personal lives and characteristics of the members of 
the setting, a manager could see the implications that these events
might have for himself or for his task. Managers on hearing a piece
of information could say, "Now how does this affect me?" or "Now how 
does this affect my job?". In discussions about Chris Davis' manage­
ment reshuffling, you could almost hear the managers at lunch thinking 
"Where does this leave me?" Such information permitted managers to 
be strategic. On another level a piece of information might prompt 
a manager to investigate the event more thoroughly, because it might 
have implications for his job. The incident cited on page 125 
where Mike Shilling mentioned that he was up to his bloody ankles 
in waste, prompted Peter Travers, who overheard the conversation, to 
call in on the stores after lunch, to check the stock level of the 
lids referred to by Mike Shilling. He then went to the Print Room 
to see the extent of the waste. The purpose of these visits was 
to ensure that there were sufficient Birds Eye Melba lids to be 
dispatched the following day.
In a similar vein Charlie Johnson related this incident:
é
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Charlie Johnson There’s a lot goes on toolwise that just comes
out by sheer accident. This is only a small 
incident but it is the sort of thing. We've got 
a plaster form machine; it's basically obsolete, 
a poor buy really, it's now surplus to require­
ments. The buzz goes around that they're going 
to sell it, and they've had one or two people 
in to have a look at it and so on. And I then 
say to Tim, at lunch, "When's the bloody thing 
going?"
"Oh it's not going yet."
"Well why isn't it going yet?"
"Didn't you know we might sell this to Australia; 
we've ordered three tools for it."
"Chi"
"Yes, we're going to try polypropylene in it 
and if it works we're going to sell it."
That sort of thing, you know.
In this incident Charlie Johnson had learned about an event that could 
have implications for his department. Trials of new material required 
a skilled operator, drafted from his regular activities, leaving a 
gap in production.
Gossip about members of the setting aided managers in constructing a 
profile of the individual. This enabled them to make a judgement 
about the personal reliability and competence of the individual. Mike 
Shilling was judged to exaggerate; Kevin Linsey was described as a
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worrier or flapper; David Clark was nicknamed 'Diddy David’ and was 
viewed with some amusement. These opinions played an important role 
in the information process, as we shall see later.
This information had an important role to play in the daily activities 
of the managers concerned with production. It did not seem to provide 
a sufficiently specific or detailed account of events which required 
action by managers. The next phase of investigation was to study how 
managers gathered information during their working period, when they 
were on the shop floor or in their offices. How did managers gather 
task-directed information, i.e. information specific to their work?
I already had a fairly good idea of how they did this, from my own 
observations, talks and interviews.
4.6 Gathering Task Directed Information
The means employed to gather information by the various managers 
differed according to the nature of their work.
Mike Sampey, the Material Buyer, could rely on material requisition 
slips and material returns to compute the existing stock levels and 
thus determine when to re-order. Only when new or experimental 
material was used did he enquire informally as to the results. Mike 
Sampey's informal information relating to his work came primarily 
from his oustide contacts, namely the Sales Personnel of the Material 
Suppliers.
Simon White and David Clark were primarily concerned with processing 
data supplied to them through the formal channels. Only when a 
peculiarity occurred, or when an obvious mistake was spotted did they
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personally investigate, or seek information. Simon White, however, 
waswell informed of current events in the factory. He purposefully 
sought what he described as good background information, through his 
social group at the Production Meeting, by observation and through 
interactions on the sliop floor; this information was not crucial to 
his work. This desire to be in the know will be discussed later 
(see page 244 )
4.7 Charlie Johnson and Mike Shilling
Charlie Johnson and Mike Shilling,because of their close physical 
proximity to the production process and because of their intimate 
relationship with their supervisors, chargehands and operators were 
well informed about events that had taken place, were taking place or 
were going to take place in their own departments.
Both managers relied on their own observations. The two managers 
spent most of their time on the shop floor, amongst the machines.
They were thus engaged in almost continual observation of events as 
they were taking place. Charlie and Mike were watching what was 
going on. In addition, both managers through constant contact with 
their supervisors, chargehands sind operators gathered information 
about events that they did not actually see for themselves. In the 
following comments Mike stressed the importance of informal inform­
ation gathered through his observations and contact with his 
personnel.
Alistair How much word-of-mouth information do you use
in a day?
Mike Shilling Oh, day-by-day, a fair old bit I think. I think
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one of the biggest effective ways of keeping the 
thing ticking within the department is obviously 
fairly regular word-of-mouth contact. How about 
this or how about that? There's no doubt about 
it. When you're in a production environment most 
of what you're involved in is word-of-mouth quick- 
fire decisions.
Alistair I see you spend a lot of time on the shop floor?
Mike Shilling Yes, probably more than I should. Problems can 
happen anywhere at any time, usually all at once. 
You can't see everything, but we like to keep in 
touch as much as possible.
Alistair 
Mike Shilling
Do you receive much information from the setters?
Well...to be fair, the setter is a "class one" 
man. Three or four of my people have been 
working on the machines for many years now, and 
they are in a more perfect situation - shall we 
say - to record or tell about the problems that 
they experience.





So, all in all, you gather a lot of your own 
information?
Mike Shilling Yes, that's right, from whatever source, not much 
of it is official.
Charlie Johnson supplied me with a brief outline of his daily
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activities in terms of gathering information. Charlie, like Mike, 




What do you spend most of your time doing?
I wish I knew, I wish I knew at the end of the 
day what I bloody did today. What have I done 
today? I come in, usually I walk around the 
yard and the floor, come into the office. I 
ask the supervisor what's happening today? 
What's happening now? Are they all running? 
Are they making the rate? Then I ask them to 
make sure they take a reading. Any one out? 
Things like that.
Alistair So you're gathering information?
Charlie Johnson Yepi I'm gathering information.
It would appear from the above comments that Charlie Johnson was 
fairly methodical in his approach to gathering information. On 
arriving at work he always looked around, before even taking his 
coat off. He then questioned his supervisors. Mike Shilling 
reinforced this point:
Alistair Has anybody asked you what figures you need, 
has anybody asked you what information you 
want?
Mike Shilling M-m-m no. But to be fair, as far as I am 
concerned, I think I've got all the short term 
information I need. This is the day-by-day 
stuff which I collect myself or the blokes
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do it for me, I collect that daily I'm concerned 
here with the speed or effectiveness that we're 
running the plant at.
The fact that Mike Shilling gathered the information that he needed 
implied that he had some preconceived idea of his information 
requirements. He then methodically gathered that information on a 
daily or, sis we see from the following comment, on a shift-by-shift 
basis.
Alistair How do you measure the speed of the machines?
Mike Shilling The speed is done on a shift-by-shift basis; 
then if there are any problems I ask why we are 
not achieving the speed.
Alistair Is this information passed on to Cyril Jenkins?
Mike Shilling He, as far as I'm concerned...No, not from me.
As far as I'm concerned he will receive it from 
the management information thing which is passed 
through a week later. I'm working hour by hour. 
I'm working on a...what's the situation on a 
job? As far as I'm concerned it's my job to 
effectively run the department and therefore 
I'm doing that hour-by-hour and my supervisors 
are as well.
Although Mike Shilling collected information in a methodical routine 
manner, he was essentially informing himself; he was not gathering 
information for general circulation.
Charlie Johnson made a similar point in a continuation of his last
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comments record above.
Charlie Johnson And then Jenkins appears on the bloody scene, and 
he wants to know what I know. So I’ve got to give 
him the same information.
Alistair Does he do this every morning?
Charlie Johnson He generally used to come down about half past 
eight, he doesn’t do it as much now. When I talk 
to him I might make some complaints. I might go 
into his office during the day and make some 
complaints. For instance, we had a problem last 
night with bringing stuff in, we had two blokes 
out sick. That kind of thing. He may know they're 
out sick, but he doesn't know the problems we've 
got.
Alistair So in the morning you gather information then you 
report that to Cyril Jenkins?
Charlie Johnson No, no, sorryi He comes and gets the information. 
The only thing I point out to him are the problems 
I've got.
Charlie Johnson was emphatic that he did not supply information to 
Cyril Jenkins except when asked, or when he had a problem that 
required Cyril Jenkin's assistance.
Apart from the methodical gathering of information to inform themselves, 
Mike Shilling and Charlie Johnson recieved a considerable aunount of 
information concerning unexpected events.
Charlie Johnson Robin said to me "RDM5 will be running out sometime
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today, about midday." Why's that?" "Because 
we ain't got any more bloody material." This is 
the sort of thing we're getting all the time.
If an event took place on the shop floor in Charlie Johnson's absence, 
the supervisors could be relied on to report the event to him at the
earliest possible opportunity. Charlie Johnson had considerable
respect for his supervisors and pointed out that they would often
make decisions about minor events prior to informing him.
Charlie Johnson If these fellow (pointing to Robin Slater)
think there's a lot of granulating to do, they 
say "We'll bring a bloke in on Sunday" and then 
they will tell me or show me their list.
Robin Salter confirms:
Robin Slater Yes. Now if I see this morning that there's a
lot of granulating to be done, or the yard's in
a mess. I'll get somebody to stay on. If I 
think it needs somebody tomorrow. I'll leave a 
message with the supervisor this afternoon, to 
say can you ask someone to come in at ten o'clock 
tomorrow morning.
The above comments raised an important point. Both Charlie Johnson 
and Robin Slater made reference to written information. "And then 
they will tell me or show me their list," and "I'll leave a message." 
This meant that not all information was transmitted verbally; 
mauiagers and supervisors had recourse to written information in the 
absence of the other party. The use of informal written information 
was particularly noticeable at the change over of shifts.
Alistair
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Do you have hand-over reports at the end of each 
shift?
Charlie Johnson In our section Yehl We have a standard form with 
all the machines on, which these guys (pointing 
to Robin Slater) would tick off RDM1 and put what 
was running on that: give him a tick if he's
running O.K.; make some comment on there like 
'nice one,' 'rough cut' or whatever. And in the 
office they have a communication book sis well. 
'Fred Paint didn't turn up Isist night,he was 
sick with tonsillitis' or I might leave a message 




Do you wait and speak to the guy who comes in after 
you?
Charlie Johnson Always...Always.
Robin Slater Yes, ten, fifteen, twenty minutes, maybe half sui 
hour. I run through our sheet, obviously the 
sheet only covers the production machinery. 
Obviously you've got to pass on information about 
the granulator, or what's happening out in the 
yard or materials. In the mornings the night 
shift supervisor's got to pass it on to two 
supervisors.
Handover reports were filled in and a communication book used. 
However the supervisors agreed that they should meet at the shift 
change-over to verbally pass on information in greater detail and 
include events which were not covered by the hand-over reports. 
These hand-over reports were not circulated; they were designed by 
the managers and were used to inform themselves.
Mike Shilling makes a similar point in reference to his department.
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Alistair Is a three-shift supervisor cover important for 
effective control?
Mike Shilling It's important for effective continuity. The 
fact that we've got double shift cover is better 
than the day shift, because at least at either 
end of the shift, the night shift, there are 
people who cam pass comments on. Which was 
never there before. It's not ideal but we've 
got to do the best we can with the double shift 
situation. Bearing in mind that I do impress 
upon the supervisors to make sure that at the 
beginning and the end of the shifts they do 
find out what's going on, and if there's any 
problems, "for Christ's sake try and sus them 
out, or at least point the night shift bloke in 
the right direction."
Alistair Do the supervisors have to produce a written 
report at the end of the shift?
Mike Shilling They obviously use the production charts for all 
the comments on an ongoing basis. They have a 
form which they make out every shift which I 
insist on; which is basically a resume of 
what's gone on during the shift, what the 
situation is at the end of the shift, together 
with things like the estimated rates or actual 
against estimated stokes. Then comments about 
any problems that have to be looked at or 
tackled in the early part of the next shift.
It is interesting to note from the above that Mike Shilling mentioned 
the comments on the Production Record Charts. Charlie Johnson had
already commented that he had no time to look at them. I had previously 
asked Simon White what use was made of these comments.
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Alistair The omments on the production forms, are they 
ever recorded or anything?
Simon White No, they're only used as "what the hell went 
wrong? Let's have a look at those sheets." 
They're not necessarily summarised or collated 
or done as a matter of course. They're only 
back-up information when something has gone 
wrong.
Now Mike Shilling had highlighted a situation where he informally used 
what was essentially formal information. Continuing on this vein I 
asked Mike Shilling the following question:
Alistair Do you think anybody else makes any use of 
those comments?
Mike Shilling On the Production Charts...I'm still doubtful 
as to whether the actual comments are used by 
anyone, other than in the department. On the 
other hand, when you think about it, most of the 
comments are departmental comments. I think 80^ 
or 905  ^of things that happen are - yes things 
that I should know about, or the supervisors 
should know about - which build up a picture 
either of that run or what might happen on the 
next run. I think the important thing is what 
you're never going to get - management inform­
ation wise or whatever - you're never going to 
get specifics. You're always going to get 
percentages. You're never going to get the 
specific instances where you might explain what
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or why a mould was faulty. You can't put that on a 
management information form. But that chart does. 
The supervisors look at them every day. I look at 
them every day and obviously all these comments are 
either used by me or noted.
Mike Shilling re-iterated his view of the limitations of formal inform­
ation and emphasised that many of the events that took place in his 
department were departmental matters, which need not be included in the 
management information system.
Alistair Do you pass much of this information on to Cyril 
Jenkins?
Mike Shilling If it is important enough, or if he specifically 
asked me to sort something particular out, then 
I would go back and say this is what I've 
organised but, of course, much of the stuff is just 
keeping the thing ticking over and it's basically 
quickfire stuff. Much of the day-to-day things 
that go on are minute-to-minute decisions that 
have to be made...whether you limp on with the 
job or whether you get the fitters to sort it 
out, this sort of thing. All these things have to 
be pro'd and con'd.
Mike Shilling implied that he was unable to supply Cyril Jenkins with 
all his information because most of it related to minute-by-minute 
decisions or a great portion of it was not important enough for 
Cyril Jenkins to be bothered with. This, combined with other comments, 
led me to believe that he had a deliberate strategy not to inform 
other persons, especially Cyril Jenkins of events which he regarded 
as being purely departmental matters. By withholding information from
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others Mike Shilling could minimise interference in his department,
Charlie Johnson expressed his dislike of interference in what he regarded 
as his departmental matters:
Charlie Johnson This particular tool, this is the worst one, I 
had to pick the worst one. We put it in, we had 
the bloody thing in one machine, we had it out, 
we put him back in, we had him out, put him back 
in. We tried him in another machine and eventually 
got going after a fashion. It was a struggle, 
a mighty struggle. After itTs been running for 
ten days or a fortnight the problems had been 
forgotten. Then it comes up again, you say that 
was a bastard last time. They say oh, it ran 
aLIright, you were ten strokes or twelve strokes. 
That'll be the sort of bloody comment.
Charlie Johnson had plans to contend with such interference by people 
who, he thought, did not know what was going on.
Charlie Johnson What we are going to do is to have a history card 
with the tool. So on any run with the tool, the 
date it goes in and all the faults on that run 
will be put on that history card so that in two 
months time when there's a bloody inquest on 
it. When they say why did you only run so fast 
that time when you ran so fast last time? I'll 
say "hsuig on a minute, here's the bloody history 
card; that's what happened last time, we had 
six water leaks, the bloody dye was buggered up 
or hairy cut or all sorts" suid we can throw it 
back at 'em.
Alistair Will that card be sent to somebody,say like 
Steve Baker?
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Charlie Johnson No, it bloody well won't. It will be kept in our
office.
Alistair As a record for you?
Charlie Johnson Yes, as a record for me.
In this instance Charlie Johnson was being strategic in his collection
and use of information. He deliberately gathered information to protect 
or defend himself against future investigation. However such an invest­
igation could be averted. If Charlie Johnson circulated the history 
card his superior could then see the problems on that particular job 
and avoid making a comment which would annoy Charlie Johnson. It seemed 
that Charlie Johnson would prefer the mauiager to investigate so he could 
have the pleasure of getting one over on him - "I'll say, hang on a
minute, here's the bloody history card." We can see from these comments
that information was not used simply to know what was going on, but 
could be used strategically; withholding or introducing the information 
at the most effective time to fulfil the manager's own strategic 
purposes which might simply be for sport.
Although some events that occurred on the shop floor were 'departmental 
matters.' In many cases outsiders had to be involved in the event, 
either to provide information or aid in solving a problem. Outside 
contact was principally with Jim Brown, the Planner and the Maintenance 
Department.
Mike Shilling A situation, where, say the order is for
300,000 and we've made 280,000. I think, 
oh bloody hell, what's gone on here? I wonder
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if we've had any problems. Then I might say 
to the planner "Look Jim, this looks a bit 
funny. Do you know what happened to this?" He 
might know there was 1000 kilos short on 
delivery.
Robin Slater You've got to go and find a lot of information.
For instance on the Waddington. We've now got 
two pallets of material left. Now as far as 
I'm concerned if I'm not told, at the end of 
those two pallets. I'd put the next job in.
It appears now, because we haven't got any 
space in the extruder plant. I've got to stop 
down for three or four days until there's 
space on the extruder. I had to ask Jim what 
was next on the Waddy. He didn't know about 
the material problem, so he had to go and find 
out about it, then come and tell me.
In both these cases contact with an outsider, Jim Brown, was sought to 
gather information about an event that was taking place or was going 
to take place. It is interesting to note that in both instances Jim 
Brown was contacted. The problems were to do with material; rather 
than going to Martin Keyes, the Material Controller, Mike Shilling and 
Robin Slater chose to go to Jim Brown who they had more respect for.
Jim Brown complained about this.
Jim Brown The problem I'm facing is that I'm probably not
planning as much as I should do. I probably 
spend 509  ^of my time running round amassing 
information from the sales office, investigating 
shortages in production and problems in pro­
duction.
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Jim Brown was viewed as a reliable and accurate source of information 
and was used extensively by other managers*
If a machine was down due to mechanical problems, the Supervisor or 
Departmental Manager would make contact with the Engineering Department. 
If more than one machine was awaiting attention a priority system was 
introduced. Extruders were number one priority and so on. It was 
possible, however, to circumvent this priority system.
Charlie Johnson It's not too bad now, 'cos each machine has a
priority number. There might be a clash when 
the other bloke (Mike Shilling's department) 
thinks their priorities are more important.
Alistair Then what do you do?
Robin Slater When we have a clash I go suid see
(the Engineering Foreman) euid we decide what 
we're going to do.
Robin Slater had been at Avon for many years, in fact he was the longest 
serving supervisor; his knowledge of the factory and his friendships 
with the engineers and so forth often resulted in him receiving prefer­
ential treatment over Mike Shilling's department, where he and his 
supervisors were fairly new. Charlie Johnson was a personal friend of 
Tim Steed and invariably sought his advice and help rather than relying 
on the Engineering Charge Hand. Because of Charlie's and Robin's 
considerable experience on the shop floor and of the personnel, they 
knew exactly where to go to find out a pice of information. This point 
will be raised more fully in relation to Jim Brown's and Peter Travers' 
gathering of information.
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In summary: the Departmental Managers used a combination of observation
and interaction with key individuals to inform themselves of events.
The gathering of information for their exclusive use was done on a 
regular basis through verbal exchanges, receipt of departmental forms 
and hand-over reports. Information was gathered from any source, 
official or unofficial. In addition they received a constant supply 
of information concerning non-routine or unexpected events.
Information was used strategically, that is, it was withheld from 
individuals outside the department and or was kept for defensive 
purposes. Contact with outsiders was selective, based on the 
msuiagers opinion of the reliability and competence of the individual 
concerned.
4.8 Jim Brown
In contrast to Mike Shilling and Charlie Johnson, Jim Brown and Peter 
Travers did not enjoy a close physical proximity to the production 
process, nor did they have constant contact with supervisors, charge 
hands or operators. Inspite of this Jim Brown and Peter Travers were 
extremely well informed of events on the shop floor and in each others 
departments. In the very first conversation I had with Jim Brown 
the topic of gathering information came up.
Alistair As a planner what do you do?
Jim Brown The way I see my function really, is to amass
SÜ.1 the relevant information that’s needed to 
translate our customer requirements into a 
production plan, and at the same time read in 
some degree of sense. In other words to meet
our customers' requirements while at the same time 
minimising wastage within our own areas.
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Alistair Where do you amass the information from?
Jim Brown Well, generally speaking, I suppose I get it from 
a number of sources. I try to use the sales guys 
as much as possible. I spend a lot of time 
communicating with the Account Executives. I also 
try to use the technical people as much as possible 
obviously, because I've got à technical background 
I try to use Steve Baker, Tom Jackson and Kevin 
Linsey ais much as possible. Generally speaking 
I just try and use ray knowledge of this place and 
the people that work here to get as much informa­
tion ELS I can about production.
In these comments Jim Brown stressed the importsuice of contact with 
people who had direct involvement in the area he was interested in. 
Jim Brown spent a considerable amount of time in the sales office 
discussing issues with Peter Travers and the Account Executives; 
gathering information on delivery dates and customer priorities.
Jim would then use this information in preparing his Production Plan. 
Jim would also use other sources of information to arrive at a 
balanced plan to "meet our customer requirements while at the 
sametime minimising wastage within our own areas." He mentioned 
that he used the technical department; I then asked the following 
question:
Alistair What kind of technical information do you use?
Jim Brown Well! There's a lot of fallacies been built up 
over a long period of time about what we can and 
CEumot do. The system as it was; the way it
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used to run was governed by a few people who said 
yes or no, we could or we couldn't do something 
and that was it. So what I try to do really is 
to get the information from the people who should 
know. Ah, in other words, from people who know 
the capabilities of the machine, from a purely 
technical aspect, instead of the people who say 
"Ah, we tried that ten years ago and it didn't 
work so we're never going to use that again."
So I try to gain information in that way.
Jim, in the above comment, implied that he was selective in who he 
chose to be informed by. He used Tom Jackson, his previous boss, 
Kevin Linsey, the very competent Plastics Technologist, and Steve 
Baker, the Engineering Manager. Jim was also selective in his 
acceptance of information; he would disregard that which he felt 
to be unreliable or invalid. Jim by virtue of being the Assistant 
Quality Controller had a thorough knowledge of the workings of the 
factory,and relied on this knowledge to validate information he 
received.
Developing this theme of selective contact I asked the following:
Alistair Do you use the Departmental Managers a lot -
Charlie and Mike?
Jim Brown Yes. I communicate a lot with Mike; Charlie
is a little bit more difficult to communicate 
with. I think possibly with Charlie's section I 
probably have morecommunication with his 
supervisors. I think there's a slight differ­
ence between the two departments. In Mike's 
department, because it's a double shift
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operation, Mike’s there most of the time. Mike is 
probably far more aware about what's going on in 
his department than Charlie. Charlie has a treble 
shift operation and his supervisors are a lot more 
experienced. They probably tend not to communicate 
as much to Charlie as they should. But in the same 
way they're far more aware than the other two 
supervisors about what's going on, and so on that 
basis I tend to communicate a little more with them.
I was slightly surprised by these comments on Charlie Johnson,,neverthe­
less it reinforced the point that Jim wcis selective in choosing the 
person he wished to be informed by. In the case of Mike Shilling's 
department he chose to be informed by Mike himself, as he regarded 
his supervisors as being inexperienced. In Charlie Johnson's depart­
ment he chose to use the supervisors who he regarded as knowing more 
than Charlie himself.
To conclude this conversation I asked the following;
Alistair So you go to the people who you know will know 
what you want to find out?
Jim Brown I try to do that. I think there are two things to 
think about here. I think to a certain extent - 
I mean I've worked on the shop floor; I know what 
the situation's like down there. They tend to 
feel that decisions are taken without anybody 
bothering to consult them about what can and 
what cannot be done, and I think that's a very 
dangerous thing - so whenever possible I try to 
communicate with the supervisors and even the 
extruder operators and people like that...
O.K. sometimes you have to make a decision where 
people Eire told to do. something they don't want
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to, or feel that they can't do. Although I do 
try to communicate with them and tell them why 
I still have to make the decision.
Jim stressed the importance of letting people on the shop floor-"even 
the setters"“know what was going on. A two way process of communication 
existed; Jim was informed about events that took place on the shop 
floor; he in turn informed people on the shop floor of events that 
might affect them. Information was reciprocated; I shall return to 
this later.
4.9 Informant Networks
Jim Brown had developed an informant network. He selected key individuals 
who he judged as being competent and who could provide reliable and 
accurate information about events that had some bearing on his job as 
planner. Paramount to the informant network was the concept of reliab­
ility. Not only did Jim require reliable information about events, he 
also had to rely on his informants to inform him, when untoward or 
important events were taking place.
Jim Brown The feed back from the factory is now far, far
better. Generally speaking if a machine is 
shut down for more than about an hour I will be 
told why...and when it will start again.
Alistair While it's happening?
Jim Brown Yes, while it's actually happening. If there
are any major problems I get involved in it
pretty quick. I'm quite pleased with the flow
of information out of the factory.
Alistair And who does it come from?
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Jim Brown Mike, Charlie, Ron, Robin, most people down there, 
depends who's on and who's availaole.
Alistair 
Jim Brown
They actually come over to you?
Yes,they come to me. But if I'm there I'll ask 
the questions when I'm there. I spend a lot of time 
in production but if I'm not there they'll come to 
me.
Alistair Do you, in turn, keep them informed?
Jim Brown Yes, it's a two way thing.
This conversation throws up a number of interesting points. Firstly,
Jim felt fairly confident that he could rely on individuals on the 
shop floor to inform him of important events. A single machine shut 
down for one hour could significantly affect Jim's plan for the week. 
Secondly, Jim mentioned that there was a two way relationship; Jim 
received information from his key informants and in turn informed 
them. Information was exchanged; it was a process of mutual informing. 
The exchange of information was not based on any concept of relative 
worth or bartering. An individual would be willing to pass on inform­
ation, whatever its magnitude, if they could rely on the other to keep 
them informed, possibly at some later date. Thirdly,Jim mentioned that 
feedback was now far, fau? better. In a previous conversation I asked 
the following question:
Alistair You've got your formalised plsui; changes sometimes 
take place; how do you get information about the 
things that cause it? Say breakdowns, how do you 
find out about things like that?
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Jim Brown Well I think the feedback about breakdowns and 
machines in general is bloody diabolical. The 
responsibility for that I'm sure lies in two 
areas; one must be with the Departmental Managers, 
and two must be the Engineering Department. The 
feedback's lousy. Normally I find out by getting 
my arse down on the shop floor every morning and 
finding out; asking questions.
Alistair So you actually go and ferret out a lot of inform­
ation yourself?
Jim Brown It's a case of having to, 'cos otherwise you just 
don't get it. And obviously if you haven't got 
the bloody information it makes you look like a 
bloody idiot, which means that your credibility 
suffers and people think you don't know what you're 
talking about. The reason is because you're not 
fed with the correct information in the first 
place.
The above conversation was in early February. Jim was still finding 
his feet as Production Planner. He had only just developed a 
formalised plan for the factory and it appeared had difficulty with 
information in the factory. At this stage Jim had not developed 
his informant network. He could find out what he needed to know "by 
getting my arse down onto the shop floor every morning and finding 
out; sLsking questions." He could not however, rely on individusüLs 
on the shop floor informing him, this came later. Charlie Johnson 
and Mike Shilling by being in charge of their departments could 
instruct their supervisors, charge hands and operators to keep them 
informed. Jim had to ask them. He had to develop his informant 
network, develop relationships with individuals who he could then 
rely on to inform him with reliable information.
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Once developed, the informant network was by no means a fixed, 
structured system. The network was in a constant state of flux. In 
March Jim had stated that he relied on information from Mike Shilling 
and had difficulty with information from Charlie Johnson (see page 14?) 
In the following comments, recorded in July, the relationships were 
reversed.
Jim Brown Well you see I have to run round and get information, 
I think I've got a reasonable aunount of respect from 
the supervisors. And I think I've got a reasonable 
amount of respect from Charlie Johnson. As far as 
Mike's concerned I think there's a certain form of 
animosity between Mike and I. I've got no personal 
quarrels with him, but Mike is...ah...I think he's 
somewhat annoyed that we've managed to establish 
some form of planning because he said it couldn't 
be done. And from that point of view I'm in constant 
conflict with him. The feedback from Mike is very 
poor to me. I have to run round and get information 
from other sources about his department which I 
shouldn't do.
I was, at first, troubled by this inconsistency. I was naive enough 
to assume that by rolling back the structured formai system of the 
organisation I would find an equally tidy structured informal system.
The informant networks, however, were in a state of flux. Relationships 
between managers were subject to interruptions; conflict could 
devlop between managers, interrupting the flow of information and 
changing the make-up of the informant network. These interruptions 
could be more or less permanent. In the case of Mike Shilling and 
Jim Brown conflict was often in the air. Jim's success as a 
production planner was threatening to Mike; rightly so; Jim was 
ultimately given control over one of Mike's departments. Conflict
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between Jim Brown and Charlie Johnson was less lasting, a brief flare- 
up, Conflict about a minor change in the Plan might cause hostility 
between them; such incidents were usually soon forgotten.
When conflict occurred Jim would have to rely on other sources for 
information. In the case of Mike's department, Jim may have used
the supervisors or charge hands, or would rely on Peter Travers; the
relationship between Peter Travers and Mike Shilling was less thorny.
Jim Brown took his role of supplier of information seriously. Provid­
ing correct reliable information was important to Jim. Nurturing the
informant network required that the members of it could rely on Jim
to inform them with reliable information.
Jim Brown Chris has said that I'm solely responsible for
communicating to the commercial department what 
is going on in production. Now I find that, that 
being the case, I have to use my own experience 
on the quality of information I get, and obvious­
ly I'm luckyenough to know a reasonable amount 
about production.
Most of the information given to me I will have a 
reasonable idea whether or not it’s true or 
accurate. But if I do get given a piece of 
information which I don't think is correct then 
I might go the backhanded way and check it. Quite 
simply because I'm solely responsible for commun­
icating with the sales office. If that's the 
case I feel I must ensure that the information 
I've got is correct before I take it over to them. 
And sometimes I have to go through ways that I 
shouldn't really have to to ensure that it is 
correct.
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Alistair What kind of instances?
Jim Brown Well I might have to go round the back doors and 
double check with engineers on breakdowns, just to 
be sure that I'm getting the right information and 
the right time scale.
Jim would check on the validity of a piece of information if he 
suspected, through his own familiarity with the factory, that it 
might be incorrect. If the information had to be passed on to other 
members of his network he would be particularly thorough in his checks. 
I then asked the following questions:
Alistair Are there any particular sources that you always 
check on?
Jim Brown I always check on anything to do with the Engineers 
because as far as I'm concerned the Engineers are 
not the most consistent within the factory and so 
a lot of problems with the Engineers. I check 
with the Engineering Supervisor,(Tim Steed or 
Steve Baker).
Jim had judged the Engineers as being unreliable and chose to check the 
information he received from them. Engineering information on break­
down was crucial to Jim's effective planning.
4.10 Information From Other Sources
Informant networks played an important role in informing Jim Brown 
of events taking place on the shop floor, but it was not the only 
means. As stated on page 150 Jim Brown spent a lot of time on the 
shop floor. "I spend a lot of time in production...." and again on
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page 151 "Normally I find out by getting my arse down on the shop 
floor..." Jim Brown relied on his own observations to keep him 
informed of events on the shop floor. Jim would don his white coat 
(a requirement for a factory manufacturing containers for foodstuffs), 
and do the rounds, visiting the various departments, talking to the 
various managers, supervisors, charge hands and operators. Jim would
visit each of his key informants, visit the trouble spots, i.e. areas
or machines which he knew were having problems. Chance encounters 
would also occur on his rounds and he would gather information from
these individuals by interacting with them.
Alistair What other (than MADCAP) information do you use?
Jim Brown Well obviously I get the daily totals from pro­
duction, taken from the Production Charts, which 
I use to make sure they don’t run over on jobs 
etc., etc....Obviously if I see any machinery 
stopped, I ask questions. I try to find out why 
it's stopped, how long it will take to get going,
Alistair Do you ever read the comments on the Production 
Record Charts.
Jim Brown Yehl I look at them when I'm about in production 
to find out if there's any problems on the 
particular machines. When I say look at them,
I only look at them from a general point of view. 
I don't specifically go down there every day and 
look at every machine chart. What I do is when 
I'm by a machine I'll look at them in passing.
But I know most of the things that are said anyway 
because I get the feedback from the supervisors.
These comments confirmed that Jim was a regular visitor on the shop floor,
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They also pointed to the fact that he was gathering information from 
a variety of sources. He observed events, he asked questions and he 
read the Production Record Charts. Gathering information from the 
various sources built up Jim's overall stock of information, and 
constructed a fuller picture of the setting for him. Information 
from various sources could act as a means of verifying the inform­
ation. "What I do is when I'm by a machine. I'll look at them in
passing. But I know most of the things that are said anyway,
because I get the feedback from the supervisors." Information
gathered from the Production Record Charts would serve to back up
information from the managers, supervisors, charge hands and 
operators.
Alistair There's a Communication Book, do you ever use
it?
Jim Brown I do, yeh, not to put things in, but to take
things out and read it, just to see what's 
happening.
The Communication Book, as with the Production Record Charts, was 
used for general information, just to see what's happening.
Stressing the importance of regular observation Jim Brown made the 
following comment:
Jim Brown We've had instances where I've planned us to use
twenty per cent regrind on the extruders, and 
over the weekend it's not happened. The 
supervisor in the production department says, 
right, we won't run it or we can't run it, so 
he doesn't run it.
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Alistair Were you told about this?
Jim Brown You know,when you come in on the Monday morning 
and check the level of the Silos, it’s down to 
one per cent, and you say, "why the bloody hell’s 
that down to one per cent?" Then you go downstairs 
and find that they hadn’t run regrind at all over- 
the weekend.
Jim visited the silos where virgin material was stored each Monday 
morning to check the level, thispombined with his other observations , 
aided him in finding out what happened over the weekend where he 
claimed control was not as tight. If any detail struck him as 
being unusual Jim would investigate further through the Departmental 
Managers or Supervisors.
Jim Brown used formal information, informally.
Alistair Do you ever get financial information?
Jim Brown I don’t get it; I’ve got it; I’m not given 
it. The first thing I did was to go and get 
contribution rates for every machine in the 
factory. I try to use those when situations 
arise where people ask me to do things in 
production where I think it’s extremely stupid. 
One instance; a claim was made that we couldn't 
co-extrude at 10 thou, on the Kaufman, and I 
was then asked to stop production to do a trial; 
which wouUhave taken me at least two shifts, 
which is 16 hours at 60 odd pounds an hour, 
just for the sake of a four tonne trial order. 
Obviously these are the types of things I try 
to look at or weigh up. Whether things are 
going to be cost effective in production and 
try to read some form of sense into it.
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From these comments we can see that Jim deliberately gathered inform­
ation, not supplied to him which he then explicitly used in his day 
to day decision making activities.
Jim Brown would also arrange to be supplied with information at 
regular intervals from other departments. The information was supplied 
by arrangement rather than instruction.
Jim Brown Another piece of information I get now, because
I've asked for it. One of the big problems I 
used to get,and I've raised it in production a 
few times,is when material is rejected from the 
machines, it gets fed straight back into the 
stores without me knowing about it. Sometimes 
we've had situations where maybe 2 or 3 tonnes are 
rejected; I wasn't told; the machines run out 
3 or 4 days early without me knowing anything 
about it. That's been corrected now I get a slip 
of paper which is a carbon copy showing the amount 
of material which goes back to the granulating 
room.
Jim specifically requested this information from the storeman in 
charge of extruded material.
Jim Brown further gathered information verbally from particular 
sources at regular intervals.
Jim Brown Each Monday, before the Production Meeting I have
to go out to the Stores and get hold of the 
Storeman for half an hour and ask him how many 
pallets of this, that and everything else he's 
got. Now ELS far as I'm concerned that's inform­
ation that should come to me. Again it's one
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of those things I have to go and get.
Jim Brown shared an office with Martin Keyes, the Material Controller, 
and yet chose to go out to the Store each Monday to gather this inform­
ation, rather than asking Martin Keyes, whose job it was to know the 
stock level of extruded material. Martin Keyes was not part of Jim 
Brown's informant network. Notice also that Jim Brown regarded the 
information as something that should be supplied to him.
Information about events in the factory and in the sales department 
were crucial to Jim Brown to enable him to effectively plan production,
i.e. for him to carry out his job. On a secondary level it appeared 
to be important to Jim Brown to be informed because of his overall 
credibility. This issue was commented on,on page I5I when Jim 
responded to a question and then added:
Jim Brown And obviously if you haven't got the bloody
information it makes you look like a bloody idiot, 
Which means that your credibility suffers and 
people think you don't know what you're talking 
about.
Jim Brown placed a premium on being informed or being in the know. 
Loss of Êice could result if he was uninformed, "it makes you look 
like a bloody idiot," and again, "people think you don^t know what 
you're talking about." These comments were made in February when 
Jim was still fairly sensitive about his new position but he confirmed 
the view in July:
Alistair Do you think you have a good rapport with the
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Sales Department?
Jim Brown Yes, most certainly. To a certain degree a lot of
my credibility depends on it. If I have not got 
the right commercial information about how far we 
can go, all I do is undermine my own credibility, 
and so it's got to be right.
Jim Brown viewed reliable information as playing a major role in his 
own credibility and status. Jim's concern for his credibility may 
be explained by a comment he made concerning his colleagues.
Jim Brown It's bloody downright aggession. It really is a
case of 'dog-eat-dog.' I mean I try not to get 
involved in it too much but it certainly is a case 
of personalities. It's certainly a case of "one- 
upmanship." People will very often go out of their 
way to nail your backside to the wall for fun. You 
know, just for personal satisfaction.
Jim, by gathering as much information as possible was able to protect 
himself against the back-biting oneupmanship. Thus again, as in the 
case of Charlie Johnson and Mike Shilling, information was gathered 
for defensive or protective purposes. Added to this, being well 
informed permitted Jim Brown to indulge in a little oneupmanship 
himself. In the Production Meeting on 5 Februaury, the following 
conversation took place:
Jim Brown One point, the case where 300,000 Melba lids were
made on bad sheet, it's going to happen again. Bad 
sheet is being sent to the material store enough 
for 900,000 lids.
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Cyril Jenkins I don't understand that. In future we will have
to impress on people that they should declare bad 
work where it occurs,.as it causes havoc at other 
points.
Jim Brown The bad sheet should have been picked up at the
Extruder by QC (Quality Control), that's their 
area.
Here Jim shows his extensive knowledge of events, and has a go at 
Quality Control, his old department. I never detected any real 
animosity between Jim Brown and his old department, such comments were 
for oneupmanship.
4.11 Peter Travers
Peter Travers was in a similar position to Jim Brown in that he did not 
enjoy a close contact with the people and events in the factory. 
Information from the factory was of considerable importance for Peter 
Travers although not as crucial as for Jim Brown. Much information 
relevant to Peter Traver's work came from his customers or Sales 
Reps, with whom he had close working relationships.
I have already cited lengthy comments made by Peter Travers on 
informal information (see page 111 ). As with Jim Brown, Peter 
Travers spent "an awful lot of time in the factory just getting 
together that sort of information." He stressed the importance of 
close contact with individuals directly involved in the events he 
was interested in. He often used informal information to back up 
what he felt were inconsistencies in the formal information, using 
the informal information to cross reference the formal information 
on particularly important issues.
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The use of an informant network was not as obvious in Peter Traver's 
case because he relied so much on a single individual to provide him 
with relevant and reliable information. This was, of course, Jim Brown. 
Although Peter Travers used the informant network less than Jim Brown 
the characteristics of his method of gathering information were 
similar.
Peter Travers relied on information to be supplied to him by members 
of his network, mainly through Jim Brown. Peter Travers stressed the 
importance of reciprocating information.
Peter Travers It's back to the word of mouth again. We'd like
to think that people from the factory can come 
over, which happens a lot, suid they'll come over 
and say they've got a problem. Quality Control 
may have a problem with colour. We've had 
trouble with Bees lately. I'd like to feel 
they could come over here and say, "Look, we 
think this is acceptable, do you go along with 
that?" I'd like to think they'd bring us into 
it.
The nature of Peter Traver's work required that he spent most of his 
time in his office in contact with customers and Reps; he thus 
encouraged people from the shop floor to come over to the Sales 
Department to share information.
Peter Travers stressed the importance of reliable information and 
of choosing the source of his information carefully.
Alistair How much informal information is rumour and
how much is factual?
Peter Travers
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It depends on the source actually. Informal 
information, rumour or whatever, from certain people 
you can almost guarantee as being right. With other 
people you can gueurantee as being grossly inflated 
or exaggerated or whatever.
Alistair So the person involved in transmitting theinformation 
is important?
Peter Travers Yes, I think so (I won't go into personalities) but 
there are people we can rely on 1009^  as far as we're 
concerned. Until such time as something goes wrong 
we take their information as being factual.
Alistair So you make some judgement about the people you're 
receiving information from?
Peter Travers Yes, there's no doubt that you do, and you know, 
you react accordingly. If the information's from 
a certain source you do something about it; if 
you hear it from others, that's O.K. you may 
probe a little bit and try and find out if it's 
true, but you probably don't take much notice of 
it quite honestly.
I think what happens is that the suspect sort of 
information tends to be a catalyst on which you 
build. You hear something then you go and check 
on it; you probe and you try and find out what 
is happening. Other information then comes from 
that source, the legitimate information comes 
from the sources from which you're checking. So 
what I'm saying is that you may not rate the 
information very highly but you will go aw^ and 
check to see if what somebody said was factual. 
And in doing that, using other sources of inform­
ation you find out what you feel to be the true 
picture.
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There are a lot of cases still, where you think 
you ended up with the true picture. Then you 
talk to somebody else about it or you put forward 
your theory or something, just to find you’ve got 
the whole bloody thing wrong sinyway because the 
information hasn't been strictly speaking correct, 
or there have been developments. So I think the 
whole area of information does come down to people 
in the end, individual people - certainly the 
individual does build up a feeling toweurds other 
people, no question about that, and decides just 
how reliable that person is.
In these comments Peter Travers explained how information even from 
unreliable sources may be useful as a starting point to an investig­
ation and this reinforces the incident on page 125 where Peter 
checked up on the waste situation which Mike Shilling mentioned at 
lunch.
Peter Travers also mentioned a situation where he would construct what 
he regarded as being a full factual picture only later to find that he 
was incorrect. One notable case in point was where some black specks 
appeared on the extruded sheet. The Kaufman was shut down and cleaned; 
the black specks re-appeared; the Kaufman was shut down and cleaned; 
pure virgin material was run through the machine; the black specks 
re-appeared; the same virgin material was run through the Bridge 
(another extruder); the black specks appeared.
At this stage Peter Travers commented:
Peter Travers The Kaufmeui was stripped down, they began to use
some of that natural styrene on the Bridge. Only
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to find that that also started throwing out dirt.
So they came to the conclusion that there was dirt
in the silo rather than dirt in the machine. So 
we had spent a week out of production cleaning the 
screw. A massive amount of lost production, about 
7,500 tonnes. Any you ask yourself why the bloody 
hell didn’t somebody check the silo to see if that 
was where the problem was?
I was one-up on Peter in this instance. I had already heard that they
checked the silo only to find that no contamination was in evidence.
The Production Managers, Quality Controllers, Plastic Technologists, 
Engineers and even Chris Davis were at the extruder; each had a 
theory; each communicated his theory. Speculation was rife. Finally 
Charlie Johnson recommended that they examined a small feed pipe, 
which he requested to be replaced, and which had not been done. It 
had begun disintegrating and thus contaminating the material as it 
passed through the pipe. Peter Travers thus had to alter his account 
of the event in light of the new information.
Peter Travers gave me this excellent example of checking the validity 
of information.
Peter Travers Let’s give you an example of how the thing works.
I think that’s the way. Yesterday morning (again 
I’ll leave personalities out of it) somebody came 
to me and said "I see we’re running Norton 
collation tray; it seems to be running very 
quickly." Fine, but he mentioned whilst saying 
that, "Of course it would be running quidiy, they 
are running on 6 thou, material." Now 6 thou, 
isn’t the specified material for that job, 8 thou, 
is. So the first thing you would say wsis, "O.K.
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would you check out the stroke rate, and if it is 
true the next time it’s run we should increase the 
stroke rate.’’ Then you would say ’’Thank you very 
much for coming and telling me the information, 
would you keep an eye on it, and, yes, we would 
be very interested to see what the effect of it 
is.’’ That’s the one side of it.
The other side is that he’d mentioned something 
completely off the top of his head; that he 
thought it was being run on 6 thou, instead of 
8 and that’s very important. O.K. that is serious 
because if he was right we would be producing trays 
far under specification. So then you say, do you 
ignore that kind of information or not? Well you 
can’t afford to ignore it because it could have 
serious consequences, so what I then did was follow 
two lines of information. One, I checked the works 
order to make certain the specification is right on 
the works order so I know that this is factually 
correct. The other thing was to ask the people 
involved, in this case Jim and Production Control 
to make sure they are running the right material 
and yes, they were.
So the guy who came over in the first place had got 
it wrong. He is usually a fairly reliable guy. So 
he had got one side of the story right. The stroke 
rate was up. The other part of his story was 
incofrect but had to be checked because it had 
consequences, then you go and follow your well tried 
reliable route, to try and check what is happening.
Although nurturing the informant network was of considerable importance 
to both Peter Travers and Jim Brown, there were instances where slightly 
distorted information was passed in order to achieve some desired end.
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Alistair Do you feel you make some devious moves with regard 
to information?
Peter Travers We do make some devious moves without a doubt. But 
having said that, it’s for the best possible motive. 
This obviously doesn't get back to Planning and so 
on.
Alistair No, no, strictly confidential.
Peter Travers There are times when we are building in extra time, 
knowing that the factory cannot do what we want them 
to do. Over a period of months we have found that 
they cannot achieve what we expected them to achieve 
and so on. We begin to realise that it’s gonna 
take a lot longer than they expect. So if you like 
we assess what we think is going to happen and we add 
a certain amount of time to give ourselves a bit of 
breathing space. So we’re putting pressure on maybe 
a week before the pressure really has to go on. But 
that’s the only way we can safeguard our customer- 
relationships and so on.
Such deceit became less of a feature in the Sales Department when 
Jim Brown prepared three-month Production Plans but it still existed, 
especially when new orders or trials were being produced.
In summary. Through experience and familiarity with the members 
of the setting Jim Brown and Peter Travers developed informant 
networks, loosely coupled groups of individuals in key positions 
who could be relied upon to inform them with reliable,accurate 
information. They in turn supplied individuals in the network with 
equally reliable information. It was a process of information 
exchanging or mutual informing.
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In addition to the networks Jim Brown and Peter Travers would inform 
themselves through direct regular observations of key areas, and 
chance observation of unexpected events. Information gathered from 
multiple sources permitted them to validate information by cross- 
referencing.
Jim Brown and Peter Travers would informally use formal or official 
information; they would further reach agreement with other departments 
to supply them with information on a regular basis.
In addition to the information being important to their work, Jim 
Brown and Peter Travers valued information as a means of preserving 
their credibility or status. They used information as a means of 
protecting themselves from back-biting oneupmanship. They also used 
information for their own back-biting oneupmanship.
4.12 Cyril Jenkins and Martin Keyes
I have deliberately avoided producing a diagrammatic representation 
of these informant networks. Their make-up and use were so dependent 
on situations and relationships at a particular moment in time that 
producing a rigid structure would misrepresent them. What was 
noticeable however, was that certain individuals were excluded from 
the informeint networks. Two noteable individuals were Martin Keyes 
and Cyril Jenkins.
As cited on page 4? Peter Travers had little faith in Martin Keyes,
"To be honest with you, Alistair, it's about time. Martin was never 
a planner..." Martin Keyes was regarded as being incompetent at his 
job both as Production Planner and later as Material Controller.
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Jim Brown chose to visit the Storeman each Monday to gather information 
which should have been given to him by Martin Keyes.
Martin Keyes tended to be less well informed because of his exclusion 
from the networks. He did inform himself in much the same way as 
Peter Travers and Jim Brown, but he could not rely on being informed. 
During one conversation, when we was still Planner, I asked him what 
information he received back from the shop floor.
Martin Keyes None. I've got to get on my feet and walk down 
there to see what's going on. I come in....in 
the morning and see a machine still running and 
have to go to the setter and ask "what'^ s going on?"
Alistair Do you get information from Works Study concerning 
the Machine Record Chart?
Martin Keyes No. They do supply me with some information 
concerning numbers produced, but that doesn't 
explain why these numbers were or were not produced, 
At the Production Meetings people ask me what's 
been produced, then they want to know why, and if 
I haven't been out there to find out what happened 
they'd tear me down. With the situation we're in 
now I'm worried that soon I'm going to drop a real 
clanger, cause a serious upset in the factory.
All too often Martin Keyes was not well-enough informed and was 
often subject to attack by the other managers. At a Planning Meeting 
on 14 November 1978, when both Martin Keyes and Jim Brown were 
present:
Bert Simons How many blue tubs will be ready tonight, my
customer wants delivery?
Martin Keyes Four thousand.
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Jim Brown Two thousand, one hundred and sixty.
Peter Travers (Laughing). Come on, which one is it?
Jim Brown
Martin Keyes
Nearly half the tubs have pin holes, at least 
that’s what the packers have told me.
(Bert Simons shakes his head in disbelief)
I'll go and check. (On returning). Yeh. About 
two thousand, practically 509» of the tubs have 
holes.
Such incidents severely affected Martin Keyes credibility. During 
my talk with him, in October, Peter Travers called into the office
Peter Travers I've got the Managing Director from
saying he will have to shut down his plant because
the cartons have not arrived. When can he have
them?
Martin Keyes looked out of the window and saw that the machine wasn't 
running. Somewhat surprised, he phoned Charlie Johnson who was not 
in his office; he finally had to rush down to the shop floor to 
gather the information. When he had gone Peter Travers shook his 
head in dismay.
Martin Keyes had the reputation of being the last one to know. This 
became clear when I was having a talk with Jim Brown and Martin Keyes 
Ccune in.
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"The Waddy's down again," he said, "it looks like they're 
taking the main rollers out."
"Yeh, thanks a lot." Jim replied.
When Martin Keyes had gone I asked Jim whether he would take action 
on that information.
"What, I knew they were taking the Waddington apart after this 
run," pointing to his planning board, he added, "It's been on 
the cards for weeks."
"So it wasn't that important."
"No, Martin always brings me history."
As Material Controller, Martin Keyes was able to function adequately 
from the information he received through the formal channels. He was 
enthusiastic in telling people what was going on; however, the 
information was often unreliable and historical.
Cyril Jenkins exclusion from the informant network was more complex 
than Martin Keyes. In the first instance Cyril Jenkins was distanced 
from the middle management network because he was a member of senior 
management. His membership of senior management meant that he had 
some power of authority over the middle managers. If a middle 
manager were to report an event to Cyril Jenkins which involved the 
actions of another middle manager, he would be regarded as an informer. 
Such informing did take place. Peter Travers might comment on the 
inefficiency of the Storeman, Sean Davies, to Cyril Jenkins; however
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such a comment was not made lightly, it would be deliberate and 
usually made as a last resort. Mike Shilling's comment on Mike 
Sampey, the Production Controller, (on page 53 ) is another instance
where he was deliberately drawing Cyril Jenkinè attention to Mike 
Sampey's absence.
A number of events in the factory were a result of inefficiency or 
malpractice; the middle managers had no jurisdiction over each other 
and thus information of this nature could be passed fairly freely.
Cyril Jenkins was excluded from much of this type of information 
because he could use it in a penal manner.
A similar division of authority existed between the Departmental 
Managers, their supervisors and charge h.ands however information 
flowed more freely between them. Charlie Johnson and Mike Shilling 
were from a similar background and upbringing to the supervisors 
and shop floor operators; they lived in the same housing estates; 
drank in the same pubs; attended the same football matches and 
drove the same type of car. On the other hand Cyril Jenkins was 
university-educated and was of a different background altogether.
This made open communication between these levels more difficult. 
Charlie Johnson and Cyril Jenkins spoke a different language; their 
loyalties differed. Charlie Johnson made the following classic 
comment about Cyril Jenkins.
Chrlie Johnson A bloke goes to University or a College of
some sort. Whether he reads anatomy, zoology 
or bloody mechanics, if he gets a degree in 
law, he's got the ability to learn, he's got 
the knowledge up here. Now he should be able 
to apply his brain to run a factory,do you agree?
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Alistair Well, yes I suppose he should.
Charlie Johnson Well that's a load of balls I As far as I'm 
concerned. No offence to you, you may be 
different. He's got to have experience. Most 
managers - senior management think if the bloke's 
got the brain power to take a degree in law he 
must have the brain power to run a bloody 
factory. From a production level you've got 
to have experience.
Another factor that restricted the flow of information was that Cyril 
Jenkins by being a member of senior management was often unable to 
transfer information from those sources to the middle management 
level; in other words, he could not fulfil his obligation to recip­
rocate information.
Alistair Do you think enough information is passed down to 
you?
Mike Shilling No, I think that's because the Production Manager 
is loath to pass on information, because they 
might feel it might be used against them or 
something.
Jim Brown sums up the problem of the senior management/middle 
management split;
Jim Brown I think generally there's a lack of control, most 
certainly at the lower levels. You seem to 
have this tremendous void between the top and 
the factory managers or staff generally. Where
1?4.
the flow of information’s not good the general 
presence of management isn't good. I don't 
• know, maybe it boils down to personalities.
There are some abrasive personalities in here, 
but I think those people are bloody best working 
for you, not against you, which is what is 
tending to happen at the moment. You know all 
their aggression and enthusiasm instead of 
being directed into their bloody job is directed 
against their own bloody manager.
In addition to Cyril Jenkins' position in the organisation he was
further excluded from the informant network because he was not highly
respected.
Alistair Do you think there is an old guard and new guard
in this place?
Mike Shilling Oh obviously, that's the problem with my boss,
poor bugger, he's the young lad from down the 
road who doesn't know what he's on about, that 
is a major problem for us as well.
And later Mike Shilling slipped in the following comment:
Mike Shilling Changes are happening, I mean we have a new
, Production Manager which is a disaster itself.
We had a general manager who was quite in­
capable. Without any word of exaggeration.
Ha. Ha. Ha. Unfortunately it came to a point 
where we. had to tell him so, but there, that's 
beside the point.
Jim Brown was a little more sympathetic but still critical of
Cyril Jenkins.
Alistair Do you think he knows what's going on in the 
factory?
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Jim Brown No I don't think he does in some ways. It's very 
difficult to be halfway, you've either got to be 
totally involved or away. Now I think Cyril is 
in the hopeless position of being halfway. Cyril, 
he's not completely involved, at the sametime he's 
not detached. So he's not managing through his 
Departmental Managers; he's downstairs on a day- 
to-day basis going through them, which means they're 
using their knowledge of the plant and factory to 
take advantage of him. And I think he lets them 
get away with it perhaps a little bit more than 
he should do.
Later in the interview Jim Brown describes his contact with Cyril 
J enkins.
Jim Brown I've been here for seven years so I think I know what 
I can suid cannot make decisions on. What I try to do 
is I make decisions on things that I know'll work.
Now if I'm in any doubt about anything I'll decide 
on what I think should be done, work out the 
alternatives or the implications. Then I'll go 
to Cyril Jenkins and say "look Cyril here's the 
problem, this is what I want to do." And he will 
either agree or disagree and we will discuss it.
Alistair So you don't go and ask him what to do, you go and 
say this is what I want to do?
Jim Brown Yes.
Alistair How often does he disagree?
Jim Brown
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Well, I've only had him disagree with me once so 
far. In fact in that case he didn't take a 
decision on that, the ultimate decision was left 
to Mike and myself.
Alistair Does that happen a lot?
Jim Brown I think with decisions relating to what goes on in 
the factory itself, yes. Normally they're made 
between Mike, Charlie and myself. Cyril doesn't 
normally make decisions in relation to what we do 
in the factory.
Alistair Is this a weakness or strength?
Jim Brown I think it depends how you interpret it. There are 
those who say it's a weakness. There are those 
who would say, "well it makes people develop and 
so on." I think in some ways it is a weakness. I 
think there are people who take advantage of it.
I think there are times when he could give more 
direction. To be honest, as a person I think he's 
a very nice sort of bloke. There are the occasions 
when from the point of view of everybody's per­
formance in their job he doesn't help them as 
much as he should do, by being a little bit more 
positive.
Apart from the cagey criticism of Cyril Jenkins these comments highlighted 
the fact that middle managers would go to Cyril Jenkins only when they 
were in doubt. By presenting him with the alternative choices they 
were not asking him to make a decision, they were asking him to ratify 
one of theirs. They were protecting themselves in uncertain situations.
If there was an investigation they could then say, "well I told Cyril 
Jenkins and he agreed." which would absolve them of responsibility.
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Charlie Johnson had a critical view of Cyril Jenkins' knowledge of 
the factory.
Alistair Does Cyril Jenkins know these things are going on?
(This question was asked in reference to the new 
incentive scheme).
Charlie Johnson I'm bloody sure he doesn't. That's a fact.
The lack of confidence in Cyril Jenkins was another reason for his 
exclusion. Notice that a person could be excluded from the informant 
networks on two levels. Firstly, information provided by an individual 
(Martin Keyes) may be disregarded. Secondly, information may not be 
passed on to another individual (Cyril Jenkins).
4.13  Summary
This chapter, and to a certain degree chapter three, constitutes a 
store of data on which I will base my analysis. The collection of the 
data and its presentation was designed to allow the managers to speak 
for themselves. The data in this chapter describes how the mauaagers 
went about informing themselves, and why they did so.
This chapter is a descriptive narrative, it is more than a mere data 
bank for it tells a story in its own right. It tells how managers 
were active in gathering information from various sources; from 
their interactions with other managers; from their personal records; 
from the observations as well as from the official documented sources 
and meetings. It tells of the reasons why managers gathered inform­
ation from the various sources; to find out what was going on, what 
had gone on and what was likely to go on; to confirm that which had
178.
already come to their attention from other sources; to protect 
themselves and to be able to fulfil their functions. It tells of 
the different ways different managers went about informing themselves, 
which may be largely explained in terms of the contact they have with 
the events they are responsible for, although other,more personal, 
factors are involved. It tells of the existance of informant networks 
and social groupings; the role these play in the process of inform­
ing; the concepts of credibility and reliability on which they are 
based. It tells of managers who are excluded from these groupings and 
informauit networks and describes the distinction between informers 
and informants.
What follows is my interpretation of this story. I shall be drawing 
on the data to explain emd justify my interpretation. I shall not use 
all the data presented, for much of it speaks for itself and needs no 
analysis. I, however, would stress the importance of its inclusion, 
because it serves to build up a more complete picture of the process 




A theme to be developed throughout the remainder of this thesis is 
that the perspective, conceptual lens or metaphor we choose to view 
some phenomenon will influence the way in which we interpret it. As 
will become clear I have chosen my own particular metaphor which in 
itself is influenced by my ontology and view of human nature. The 
data as presented in the previous chapters will be interpreted in 
terms of that metaphor, ontology and view of human behaviour. Possibly 
another researcher or the reader, by adopting a different perspective 
or conceptual lens, will interpret the data differently. In presenting 
the data I have already imposed some structure. This structure I 
would argue was developed on the basis of my observations and the 
managers’ accounts of how they went about finding out what was going 
on. The following chapters link my observations or my empirical 
evidence to my own and other theorists' conceptual frameworks.
Before embarking on the analysis I shall present a brief discussion 
of two alternative methods of viewing organisations.
Viewing Organisations
It has been suggested that the metaphor we use when viewing an 
organisation will influence the way in which we view the activities 
and processes of individuals or groups of individuals, acting within 
that organization, (Weick 1979). The process of activity that I am
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particularly interested in is the process of informing i.e. how managers 
attempt to find out what is going on. I would argue that the process of 
informing is concerned largely with the actions of individuals or groups 
of individuals and occurs within a social or organisational setting. Thus 
the following analysis has been influenced by the metaphor or the way in 
which I view organisations. Rather than attempting a detailed present­
ation of my metaphor at this stage I would prefer to allow it to emerge 
in the analysis, thus reflecting more accurately the process of its 
construction. On the other hand a brief statement of my position is 
required to inform the reader of my stance and to contrast it with the 
numerous antagonistic and complementary positions found in the liter­
ature .
The Orthodox Approach
The study of organisations has been dominated by the "rational model" 
or "goal paradignm" (Benson 1977). This approach involves explaining 
organisational patterns or social structures, in terms of hierarchical 
structure, based on variables such as technology or environmental 
uncertainty. Organisational behaviour is explained in terms of the 
goal-seeking or need-fulfilling tendencies of its members. Information 
and information systems are viewed as motivational strategies and 
co-ordinating mechanisms used to achieve organisational goals as 
internalised by the members, and to fulfil their needs within the 
constraints of structure, technology and environmental uncertainty.
Within this approach, authors attribute relative degrees of importance 
to the organisation as a bounded rational entity, to the pursuit of
i8i
goals or fulfilment of needs or to the role played by information 
systems as the dependant suid independant variables*
( i i ( i i
For example, a correlation between technological features and social 
structure would be explained as the result of a rational goal-seeking 
tendency of organisations which produces effective combinations of 
technology and structure (Perrow 19&7). The view that organisations 
are information-processing entities, and that information systems in 
part determine organisational design is forwarded by Galbraith (1977).
Methodologically this field has been dominated by a fairly simple form 
of positivism. Critics argue that organisational features have been 
measured without much cohbm about the process through which those 
features have been produced and reproduced by participants. It is 
argued that researchers have tsiken an uncritical stance towards data:
"Documents produced by organisations have been treated as non­
problematic indexes of organisational features, for example 
organisational charts have become measures of structuraJ. 
differentiation. Likewise self reports and rating scales 
completed by participants are accepted sis indexes of objective 
fact. These measurement strategies ignore the processes of 




The orthodox stance or dominant view as expressed above has been 
challenged in recent years. The challenge has come from such diverse 
sources as ethnomethodology, phenomenology and symbolic interactionism, 
Using these sources, a common underlying theme emerges; it concerns 
the grounding of organisational phenomena, the structures, goals.
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technologies etc. in the activities and practices of the people. The 
research focuses attention upon the production and reproduction of 
organisational reality in the ongoing interactions of people. It 
directs its analysis to the ongoing day-to-day interactions through 
which a produced reality is sustained.
"The upshot of these approaches is to render problematic 
exactly those features which conventional organisational 
theory has taken for granted. While conventional ansilysts 
examine the patterned regularities characterising organ­
isational life at a particular time the action critique 
directs attention to the underlying processes through which 
that reality is negotiated, reproduced and altered."
Benson 1977
Organisations are portrayed as consisting of patterns of interaction 
which entail the fitting together of separate lines of action (Blumer 
1969; Mangham 1979). Organisational reality from such a view is 
located nowhere but in these patterns of interaction. The basic 
elements or an organisation are individuals and individual relation­
ships in which the individuals not only create the organisation, they 
are the organisation (Greenfield 1973; Colville I98I).
Weick (1979) elevates the importance of information in such a perspec­
tive. Members of organisations spend considerable time discussing 
among themselves and arriving at sin acceptable version of what is 
going on.
"The basic raw materials on which organisations operate are 
informational inputs that are ambiguous, uncertain and 
equivocal. Whether the information is embedded in tangible 
raw materials, recalcitrant customers, assigned tasks or 
union demands, there are many possibilities or sets of 
outcomes that might occur. Organising serves to narrow the
183
range of possibilities, to reduce the number of "might occurs." 
The activities of organising are directed towards the establish­
ment of a workable level of certainty. An organisation attempts 
to transform equivocal information into a degree of unequivocal­
ity with which it can work and to which it is accustomed. This 
means that absolute certainty is seldom required. It also means 
that there can be enormous differences among organisations and 
industries with respect to the level of clarity they regard as 
sufficient for action."
Weick 1979
From this perspective, organisational life is seen as part of social 
life Sind is capable of being understood in the same way as some 
sociologists and social psychologists seek to understand social behaviour 
in general (Mangham 1978; Colville I981). This approach stresses the 
continuity between the social and organisational world.
"I believe that at the hub of all social life is the process
of face-to-face interaction; if we can develop some framework
to further our understanding of what goes on when two or more 
people meet and talk, I believe it will not only help us 
understand what is happening in organisations, but will also 
provide us with some clue as to how we ourselves may act more 
effectively."
Mangham 1978
The alternative approach,described briefly above,depicts the way in 
which I viewed, or came to view, organisations during my research. The
choice of this approach will be discussed in the chapter entitled
'Methodological Implications.* Specific detail of my particular 
interpretations of this approach will emerge in the following chapters.
The question to be answered is "How do managers at the operating
level of the factory inform themselves?"
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CHAPTER 5 
HOW DO MANAGERS INFORM THEMSELVES?
5.1 Media for Gathering Information
The chapter title raises a number of related issues. The first of these is 
the issue of the mechanics of the process of informing, that is, how inform­
ation is generated and circulated. In the data I have identified a number 
of different ways that managers go about finding out what's going on.
These ways could be described as the media through which managers receive 
information. Firstly, managers read reports, they read stock reports, 
MADCAP, time sheets, bonus payments, pallet load dockets, production record 
charts, sales orders, dispatch notes, hand over reports and the production 
plans. These could be classified as the official documented information 
sources. Secondly, managers kept their own personal records of material 
usage, numbers produced, dispatches and stock levels. Thirdly, managers 
talked with each other on the shop floor, in the canteens, at tea or 
coffee in their offices and at the pub on Friday lunchtime; these inter­
actions were either arranged or routine, chance or accidental. Fourthly, 
managers attended production and planning meetings where they talked with 
each other and hence provided and received information. These meetings 
could be described as arranged interactions; however, they appeared to 
be of a different nature to those described above and are thus defined 
separately. Finally managers directly observed events as they were 
taking place on the shop floor.
The management information systems literature almost exclusively 
considers only the officially recognised documented information or 
the formal information system. Whereas very little specific research 
is directed toward what is traditionally termed informal informationi 
systems a number of authors have drawn reference to their existence.^
185
The following are a number of examples:
"We have evidence that managers spend a great deal of their time 
collecting grapevine information - gossip, hearsay, speculation."
Mintzberg 1973
"Verbal channels allow for the immediate feedback and inter­
action which managers find so important."
Mintzberg 1973
"The manager's other information may include a vast array of 
inputs, gossip, ideas, news and so on, provided through less 
formal (and irregular reporting) channels."
Mintzberg 1975
Aguilar (I967) makes extensive comments on the existence and use of 
informal information:
"Mauiy tidbits of information that an executive picks up through 
informal conversations with other businessmen serve...in 
alerting the business man that something has changed...that 
there is something more to be learned."
Aguilar I967
In Neustad 's (I96O) study of U.S. Presidents he refers to the 
Presidents helping themselves to reach out as widely as they can for 
"every scrap effect, opinion and gossip."
Simon (1954) has referred to informal information systems:
"Almost every company has some colourful term to describe 
the unofficial reports kept by operating executives - 
'black books', 'bootleg reports', 'butcher books.'"
Simon 1954
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Hopwood (1974) termed the unofficial budgets kept by managers as 'bottom 
drawer budgets.'
Gore (1956) in his highly illuminating study of administrative decision­
making in federal field offices devotes a large section to the use of 
informal information, and states;
"The field offices generally did not circulate information on 
policy problems through formal channels ; rather they used the 
more flexible channels of communication of their informal 
organisations•"
Gore 1956
Sutton and Porter (I968) replicated an earlier study conducted by 
Davis (1953) to plot the flow of nine pieces of information or 
"grapevine items." Wikesberg (I968) conducted a similar study. Clancy 
and Collins (1979) attempted to establish the existence of informal 
accounting records and measure the importance of these informal records 
vis-à-vis the formal accounting system. They further cited some 
interesting attitudes towards informal information. For example, the 
original designeer of the formal system described informal systems 
ais;
"rump records of little validity and value. We hoped to rid 
the company of these useless and inaccurate records by 
designing a new system."
Another director of an information system described informal information 
systems as;
"A necessary evil of little real value. The informal records
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are necessary to support weak managers in their struggle to 
justify themselves.”
However, managers outside the formal system were highly supportive of 
informal records and described them as;
"Absolutely necessary for a good manager to do his job. I wonder 
about the quality of any manager who does not keep some detailed 
data of his own. Such a man just couldn't lack it. The lack of 
such records implies that a mauiager is approaching his job in 
an extremely naive way.”
And similarly the Director of Maintenance felt that;
"my own records are absolutely necessary for the department to 
operate. The data on maintenance that we collect is not even 
considered important by the Information Systems Department.
All they care about is cost and hours. Mainly we are interested 
in machine reliability and scheduling of people on repairs. They 
don't care about our departmental needs.”
Clancy and Collins (1979) concluded their quantitative analysis by 
arguing that 799^  of the managers studied maintained informal accounting 
systems, and that respondents perceived formal and informal accounting 
systems positively. They finally conclude that "the informal account­
ing system should be considered as a useful and necessary adjunct to 
the formal system rather than an unnecessary dissipation of resources.”
The Subject Matter of Information
A second issue posed by the question, How do managers inform themselves? 
concerns the subjects on which managers received information through
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the various media. The range of possible subject matter contained in 
official documented reports or personal records is limited by their 
predetermined format and content. The range of possible subject matter 
that could be discussed at planning and production meetings is greater 
than in documented reports, but is still restricted by the parameters 
imposed on the meeting by the participants' definition of it. The 
subject matter contained in personal interactions between managers 
is almost infinite. Finally, although observable events which take 
place within an organisation are often repetitive, the variety of such 
events in the Avon Factory continually surprised me and the managers.
Some order can be imposed on this multiplicity of subject matter.
In the data I have identified three broad categories. Firstly, there 
was information relating to task-directed issues; managers informed 
themselves about events that would directly impinge on their function 
and on which they may have to take some action. Secondly, there was 
information relating to setting-specific issues; managers informed 
themselves about events that were taking place within the organisation 
which may have no bearing on their function, but which were nevertheless 
of interest to them. Finally, there was information about events that 
took place or were taking place outside the organisation or in the 
world at large.
Degree of Contact With the Event or Situation
Another issue posed by the question, is the degree of contact the 
individual manager hsis with the event or situation the information 
pertains to. I define information relating to the direct personal 
experience or observations of the individual concerned, as being
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first hand information. Information relating to the experiences and 
observations of other individuals, and communicated, could be described 
as second hand information. Information that does not relate to 
tangible experiences or observations of any of the individuals 
concerned,could be described as speculative information.
The above three issues and the classification provided, may be com­
bined to form a useful diagrammatic representation of the media, subject 
matter and degree of distance reflected in the overall complexity of 














To verbalise this diagram; managers receive information about task - 
directed,”setting-specific»'or general "world-at-large" issues through 
observation, interaction, meetings, personal records, and or official 
documents; such information may be grounded in their own experience, 
in the experience of others or in speculation.
Many of these boxes are redundant or at best spurious, for example, 
first hand information must come through observation but could be 
task-directed, setting-specific or general. However, first hand 
information could be included in personal records; this would usually 
be restricted to task-directed issues. Speculative information, as I 
have defined it, would not be made explicit in any of the media but 
would have to be read "between the lines" by the managers themselves.
As with EÜL1 classifications each of the dimensions outlined above have 
their flaws. Firstly, the media through which managers received inform­
ation were not mutually exclusive, managers informed themselves about 
a single event through official documented sources as well as through . 
interaction. Secondly, a subject which might appear to have no 
bearing on the managers' task, might subsequently turn out to be crucial 
to their choice of action. Information about the world at large may 
impinge on the organisation and subsequently on the managers' functions. 
A case in point was the Lorry Drivers' Strike; this was much discussed 
as a general subject which in turn had consequences for the organisation 
by restricting the flow of goods, which in turn affected the production 
plan and operations. Finally speculative information must have its 
roots somewhere even if only in rumour.
It should further be noted that information may concern events that
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have occured in the past, events that are occuring at present or 
events that gure likely to occur in the future. Thus a manager may 
find out what has gone on , what is going on or speculate about what 
may happen. The official documents and personal records tend by 
their nature to be concerned with reporting historical events as do 
meetings. However managers may anticipate or speculate about future 
events on the basis of the historical information provided by the 
above sources. It is in the area of interactions and observations 
that information concerning current events is most likely to be 
generated.
Apart from the flaws in the classification system itself a further 
criticism of such a framework is that it fails to do justice to the 
complexity or integrity of the phenomena (Douglas 1976 ). The 
framework may describe some external manifest phenomena, that is 
how information is generated and the scope of its subject matter; 
it fails, however, to account for the internal subjective processes 
through which managers select some pieces of information and then 
convert this "mere" information or "data" into meaningful information 
on which they can base their course of action. This issue will form 
the basis of the following chapter.
5.if Summary
The managers utilised a variety of information sources to inform 
themselves about past, present or anticipated future events, concerning 
task directed, setting specific or general issues. The sources of 
information were; official documents, personal records, meetings, 
observations and face-to-face interaction. In addition, the manager
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might have first hand experience of the events, receive the information 
second hand or construct the event through speculation.
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IMPLICATIONS FOR THE TRADITIONAL VIEW OF MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEMS; 
THE SINGLE TOTAL INFORMATION SYSTEM MYTH
Within the traditional view of management information systems, inform­
ation sources other than the formal official documented, are largely 
ignored; if not ignored, then condemned. McCosh Rahaman and Earl 
(1981) note that;
"If a management control information system cannot produce the 
information which fulfils the needs of managers in content, 
character and quality, managers create their own information 
systems. Numerous growths of such ’information systems* may 
create confusion, produce unreliable data, duplication of 
effort, make co-ordination difficult and finally may alienate 
the managers from the corporate control system."
McCosh Rahaman and Earl I98I
Management information systems are typically viewed as the single, 
total, legitimate information source within the organisation. They 
comprise of a financial information subsystem, a production subsystem, 
a marketing subsystem and a personnel subsystem. Data from preselected 
transactions are gathered and stored in a central computer data bank.
The data are then retrieved and selectively processed for distribution 
to the various levels of management. Typically the organisation is 
viewed as a hierarchy, separated into three levels of management 
activity, strategic planning, management control and operations control 
(Anthony 1963). Each level of management requires a particular type 
of information. At operations control, where problems are defined as 
being programmable (Simon I960), managers require detailed information 
which is then aggregated and summarised as it filters up through the 
hierarchy. At stratégie planning, where the problems are non-programmable 
(Simon I960),. managers require less detailed, analysed information. The
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Based on this model, information systems designers prescribe the 
characteristics of information necessary for managers at the various levels 







Source Largely internal --------- - > External
Scope Well defined, narrow------ Very wide
Level of Aggregation Detailed----------------- Aggregate
Time Horizon Historical --- — __________- > Future
Currency Highly Current --- Quite old
Required Accuracy High Low
Frequency of Use Very frequent - > Infrequent
Gorry and Scott Morton 1971
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By untilizing this model it is argued that the 'formsü.* management 
information system is able to supply all the information that managers 
require. If the system does not supply the required information, the 
fault is in the design and operation of the system and not with the 
general principles of the model.
I have already noted (see page 90-99) that managers in the Avon factory 
found problems with the management information supplied by MADCAP which 
in this model would be described as the "production information sub­
system." These problems conformed with what Mintzberg (1975) describes 
as inherent impediments to the use of management information. Information 
was too late, too general, too unreliable and lacked detail. Other 
authors to recognise these impediments are: Davidson and Trueblood 
(1970); Johnson and Derman (1970); Pfiffner (I960); Hoos (1971); 
Wilensky (I967); Nuestad (I96O) and Alexander (I960).
If these impediments are indeed inherent and I would argue that they 
are, it is necessary to consider the validity and legitimacy of other 
information sources, that managers actually use, in their attempts to 
inform themselves in a timely, detailed and accurate manner. These 
other sources in the literature are traditionally termed the "informal 
information system," sis contrasted with the "formal". The distinction 
between "formal" and "informal” has a number of implications.
Firstly, the term 'informal' is used as a de&nition for so msiny 
heterogeneous types of information or modes of informing that it is 
fast becoming meaningless. The types of information or processes of 
informing defined as 'intelligence systems,' 'informant networks,'
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the ’grape vine,' 'gossip,' 'hearsay,' 'tidbits of information' and 
'rumour' have significantly different characteristics to those defined 
as 'bootleg reports,' 'bottom drawer budgets' and 'butcher books.' The 
problem lies with using, or over-using, the simple formal/informal 
dichotomy. This dichotomy has the same short comings of most simple 
classification systems; namely, that while some types of information 
will lie close to the formal or informal classifications, others will 
fall between the two, exhibiting characteristics of both. Given this 
limitation of the simple dichotomy it might be more appropriate to regard 
them as opposite ends of a continuum rather than as dichotomous types.
The officially recognised statistical production information such as 
MADCAP would constitute one end of the continuum, the information 
exchanged during verbal interaction between the managers in the 
informant networks,and more so,in the social groupings would constitute 
the opposite end. The production meeting possibly defined as the 
'official verbal' and the personal records possibly defined as the 
'unoffical documented' would be somewhere in the middle of the 
continuum exhibiting characteristics of both the official or formal 
and the unofficial or informal. The continuum would be thus:
FGRMAL SEMI-FORMAL INFORMAL
OFFICIAL DOCUMENTED UNOFFICIAL VERBAL
(TALKING - THE
(MADCAP) GRAPEVINE)
OFFICIAL VERBAL UNOFFICIAL DOCUMENT-
(PRODUCTION/ ED (PERSONAL RECORDS)
PLANNING MEETING)
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Whilst I feel that viewing the formal/informal as a continuum, rather 
than as a dichotomy is more appropriate, I would suggest that the 
distinction between the formal and the informal in organisations is an 
artificial construct used by academics and managers to simplify or 
order their view of organisations. When Jim Brown received a piece of 
information the formality or informality of that information was of 
little consequence. What was of consequence was the reliability and 
credibility of its source, its accuracy and timeliness, and its meaning­
fulness to Jim in selecting a course, of action. Silverman (1971) 
suggests that many features of organisational reality, and I would 
include the formal/informal distinction, which are taken-for-granted 
by conventional approaches,are reifications. These he argues are not 
real entities, but have a false objectivity attributed to them. Further­
more, building such constructs into theory only contributes to their 
reification.
A. second point to emerge from the formal/informal dichotomy and related 
to the above point, is concerned with the colourful phrases used to 
define the various types of 'informal' information or modes of informing; 
'intelligence systems,' 'the grape vine,* 'gossip,' 'hearsay,' 'tidbits,' 
'rumour,' 'bottom drawer budgets,' 'bootleg reports' smd 'butcher books ;' 
these all add up to create a picture of secretive clandestine activity. 
They imply that these processes of gathering information are illicit or 
illegitimate, that there is something underhand about people talking 
to one another and keeping personal records. Attempts to stamp out 
such modes of informing have been noted by Clancy and Collins (1979):
"they are rump records of little validity and value. We hope 
to rid the company of these useless and inaccurate records by 
designing a new system."
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and
"they are a necessary evil of little real value. The informal 
records are necessary to support weak managers in their 
struggle to justify themselves."
Clancy and Collins 1979
Conceivably any piece of information be it officially documented or 
'informal' may be used to fulfil some strategic or political aim, 
which in turn might well be defined as clandestine or underhand. 
Alternatively, any piece of information may be used for perfectly 
legitimate purposes, such as solving a problem or monitoring 
performance. It might be argued that 'informal' information lends 
itself more readily to misuse, however, it would be wrong to label 
all 'informal' information as clandestine or illegitimate. The 
phrases used to describe 'informal' information are in many cases 
highly descriptive: however, the connotation that they are in some 
way clandestine or underhand should be lifted. All modes of inform­
ing used by managers may be regarded in the first place eus being 
legitimate; the manner in which the piece of information is subsequent­
ly used may be questioned, and judged to be illegitimate.
A final point I would like to make in relation to 'informal' inform­
ation concerns the empheisis placed on the reason for its existence. 
Mintzberg (1975) sums up the dominant emphasis.
"Managers find difficulties with the MIS - too limited and 
often too general, too late and too unreliable. Instead, 
managers turn to ad hoc, informsil information systems 
that they design and prove for themselves.
Mintzberg 1975
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Herein, is implied that 'informal' information is used because of 
limitations in the 'formal' system. The US Presidents became their 
own directors of their own central intelligence because the 'formal' 
information was too bland or not sufficiently rich, (Neustad I960).
Such personal records as kept by Peter Travers and Jim Brown were 
indeed kept because of the limitations in the 'formal'systems.
On the other hand I would argue that the verbal communications or 
interactions between the various managers were conducted inspite of 
the 'formal' information. As I have argued, social interaction,and 
thus verbal communication,is a fundamental building block of our social 
and organisational life. Given certain conditions, for example the 
absence of hostility, people will talk to each other on a wide variety 
of subjects. Contained in these interactions are large amounts of 
information concerning events in the factory or organisation which 
the participants use to make sense of their surroundings and thus 
decide on their actions.
Given this perspective it is fallacious, detrimental and impossible to 
eradicate 'informal' interaction or communication by simply improving 
the reliability, accuracy, timeliness and content of the 'formal' 
information. This is not to suggest that 'formal' information should 
not be improved, but simply to reinforce the point that social inter­
action or verbal communication is an integral part of organisational 
life and has a legitimate role to play in the process of informing, 
as have personal observations, personal records and meetings.
Clancy and Collins (1979) make a similar point concerning informal
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accounting records:
"the informal accounting system should be considered as a 
useful and necessary adjunct to the formal system rather 
than an unnecessary dissipation of resources."
Clancy and Collins 1979
The official management information system within this view may only 
be regarded as constituting a part (and at the level of the organisation 
in this thesis) a minor part in the process of informing.
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NOTES
1. A more detailed discussion of the formal/informal dichotomy will 
be presented at the end of the chapter*
2. The literature on the formal information system has almost 
exclusively been concerned with the issue of design and implement­
ation of such systems. The focus of this thesis is not toweurds the 
design and implementation of information systems. The "design"
of MADCAP, the computerised production information system,may 
only be regarded as a process of tidying up the existing inform­





The question posed at the end of the last chapter was, How do managers 
select, from the vast array of information or data they receive or 
gather, those pieces which they regard as being of some importance said 
which requires their consideration? I defined this as the process by 
which msmagers convert "mere" information or data into meaningful 
information on which they can decide upon a course of action.
The Literature
A number of theories to explain the process of informing have been 
put forward by various authors or schools of thought. The Human 
Information Processing School draws heavily on psychology in an 
attempt to measure psychological variables which impinge on the process 
of informing. The major thrust is to examine the mediating variables 
between the receipt of information and the resultant decision (Driver 
and Mock 1975i Libby and Lewis 1977: McGee, Shields and Birnberg
1978). The human information processing school, by dwelling on 
individuals psychological variables ignores the organisational impact 
on behaviour. Furthermore the concept of personality is based on the 
belief that consistencies in behaviour are both temporally and 
situationally stable. Thus,it is argued that individuals will respond 
or process information in a consistent manner allowing the prediction 
of the outcome of a decision based on the information received. Whilst 
this approach has some appeal, it would appear that by concentrating 
on within-person factors which are taken to be stable through time 
and situations, the approach ignores the role of social order in
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determining individual behaviour and the concept of change over time 
and situations that take place within the social order. Birnberg, 
Frieze and Shields (1977) and Shields, Birnberg and Frieze (I98I) 
borrowed another theory from the social sciences, namely attribution 
theory, to describe or provide a model for understanding the way in 
which managers process or interpret information. The general idea of 
attribution theory is that people interpret behaviour (or events) in 
terms of its causes said that these interpretations play an important 
role in determining reactions to the behaviour (or event) (Kelly and 
Michela I980). Thus attribution refers to the perception or inference 
of cause. The theory is conducted primarily in social psychology, 
the focus has been the perceived causes of another person's behaviour. 
A parallel analysis has been made of the perceived causes of one's own 
behaviour, and the liveliest recent topic has concerned differences 
between 'other-perception' and 'self-perception.' (Jones and Nisbett 
1972). The theory argues that attributions have antecedents one of 
which is termed information; it is on the basis of this information 
along with beliefs and motivations that perceived causes are attributed 
and behaviour decided upon.
The reference to information and causality makes attribution theory 
an appealing concept to management information theorists. Whilst 
Birnberg, Frieze and Shields consider the process by which managers 
inform themselves their major thrust is directed toward the process of 
control. Concentrating upon the attribution theorists' work on the 
differences between 'other-perception' and self-perception,* the 
approach is concerned with the superiors' and subordinates' use of 
accounting data to make inferences concerning causality. The argument 
suggests that causality is usually not known in an objective fashion.
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The result is that the supervisor and subordinate may hold different 
views of causality for the subordinate's reported performance and thus 
there are significant opportunities for conflict in a multi-person 
control system (Shields, Birnberg and Frieze I98I).
Weick (1977) addresses the issue of processing information in terms 
of making sense of events or situations. Weick argues that through 
enactment the individual brackets raw data from the ongoing stream of 
experiences. He uses a grammatical metaphor said describes the process 
of punctuation and connection. Punctuation means chopping up the 
stream of experience into sensible, nameable and named units and the 
activity of connection involves imposing relationships (typically 
causal relationships) among the punctuated elements. This process 
of punctuation and connection Weick calls 'parsing.'
Weick argues that the process of enactment which punctuates or 
brackets raw data and the process of connection or selection which 
assembles that bracketed data into information should be analysed 
separately, lest the distinction between raw data and information 
becomes obscured. Using a quote from Thayer (19&7) Weick explains 
the distinction;
"It is not the "things" of the world - material or non-material 
with which we deal. We deal with "information" about these 
things...the things themselves are sensory data that are 
sensed and transduced by the individual sensorium to 
provide him with raw sensory data. The function of the 
psychological system at this point is to select out and
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convert raw data into information - i.e. into "mental" 
material for thought or "decision." It is this event or 
occurrence - that of consciously or unconsciously 
ascribing meaning or significance to raw sensory data 
and thus of converting it into information - that I prefer 
to call "communication." Thus communication occurs when 
some raw data input has been meaningfully related to some 
portion of the total psychological system for immediate 
or later use in thought or action. It follows from this, 
and other notions of intra-personal functioning, that the 
meaning of any experience is constituted by the very 
process of its accommodation into the dynamic psychological 
system."
Thayer 196?
Thus Weick argues that enactment involves generating raw data which 
is eventually trsmsformed by other processes into information and 
action. Again I have sympathy with these ideas, however I would 
argue that raw data or mere information is generated by other means 
in addition to enactment. Data may be received second-hand through a 
variety of sources, for example, from official documents or meetings.
In the management information systems literature the distinction 
between data and information at its amplest level, is that, inform­
ation is processed data or conversely data is raw information. The 
information system then, in part, is a mechanism for processing data 
into information. This definition implies that data once processed 
and communicated becomes information which is imbued with some 
inherent meaning for the user, it fails to consider the interpretative 
process stressed by Thayer (I967) and Weick (1977). Other authors, 
for example Mason and Mitroff (1973) and Lucas (1978) have recognised 
the role of the individual in the process of informing
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or in the information system, Wilensky (1978) refers to the point that 
information is "dumb data" until converted into information (in 
Wildavisky's paper) by the policy analyst.
It is possible to consider the gathering, processing and the distribution 
or receipt of information as being a process of interpretation on a 
number of levels. The first level of interpretation arises when an 
individual recognises and interprets an event or transaction as being 
important. Within the formal system such an event or transaction if it 
was sufficiently regular would be recorded. The second level of inter­
pretation arises when deciding on the "best" means of recording, 
processing and reporting the event or transaction. A third level of 
interpretation arises when an individual receives the report, decides 
on its importance and possibly selects a course of action. Thus, 
through the process of interpretation "sensory perception" is recorded 
and thus converted into "data" which in turn is processed and converted 
into "mere information," which in turn is converted by the individual 
into "meaningful information."
In informal information the recoring may be that of memory and the 
reporting may be verbal. However, the interpretative process at 
each stage still occurs; unless the data is not processed but simply 
communicated; in such a caise the individual would directly interpret 
the data itself.
The above concept of interpretation contains the nub of my aoialysis, 
particularly with reference to the conversion of data or mere inform­
ation into meaningful information,through the individual consciously 
or unconsciously assigning meaning to that data oi^'mere"information.
The question that remains is: How are these meanings derived?
207
Thayer (I967) argues that;
"The data to information conversion policies are largely a 
product of socialisation."
Thayer I967
However, he further argues that the individual's psychological system 
is seen to be both self-generative and self-organised as well as being 
mediated by the process of socialisation.
A perspective with similar characteristics to the points outlined above 
is that of symbolic interactionism which Boland (1979) argues might 
be useful in understanding the process of informing and control.
It is this perspective I have adopted to analyse my data. The basic 
postulates of the symbolic interactionist tradition are provided by 
Blumer (I969). These are, that people act towards things on the basis 
of the meaning that things have for them, that meaning arises out of 
social interaction and that meanings are developed and modified through 
an interpretative process. These postulates provide a basis for under­
standing the process of informing; they specifically incorporate the 
individual, the individual in social interaction, an explanation of the 
derivation of meaning and an explanation of how meaning may be subse­
quently modified or changed.
To return to the question. How do managers inform themselves?. I have 
defined organisations as consisting of patterns of interaction which 
entail the fitting together of separate lines of action. The basic 
elements or building blocks through which organisational reality is 
produced, reproduced and sustained are the ongoing interactions of
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people. In the section which follows I demoted interactions to simply 
one of the many ways which managers receive information. It is an 
observable phenomenon that managers do receive "mere" information or 
data in interactions; what is missing in this definition is that 
managers also assign meaning to that'biere"information or data through 
the process of interaction. It is through this process that 
managers inform themselves.
6.2 People Act Towards Things on The Basis of Their Meaning
The first premise of symbolic interactionism entails the recognition 
that human beings do not typically respond directly to stimuli but 
assign meaning to the stimuli and act on the basis of the meaning 
(Mfiuiis and Meltzer 1978). This premise elevates humsui behaviour above 
that of non-human organisms. Humans can, through the medium of 
symbols and their meanings, interpret stimuli and act on the basis 
of that interpretation. It wsis with this distinctively human behaviour 
in mind that I argue that managers inform themselves. Managers attach 
meaning to the stimuli they receive in the form of"mere"information or 
data from the various sources outlined above. In effect the stimuli 
only becomes information when the managers interpret them and attach 
meaning to them. Until the interpretative process is brought into 
play, until meaning is attached to the stimuli, information remains 
"mere"information or data. Thus managers inform themselves by attaching 
meaning to the stimuli or data they receive through the media of 
official documents, personal records, meetings, interactions and 
observations. In addition to attaching meaning to the information 
received on specific events, the managers attached meaning to the 
media themselves.
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6.5 Information Sources and Their Meanings
Charlie Johnson was highly critical of official documents and described 
them as being largely meaningless.
"I get a lot of papers that mean bugger all anyway. I think 
there's a lot of emphasis on things that are irrelevant."
(Page 86)
"I don't know what to do about it; they're just showing me 
some bloody figures aren't they. What can I do about figures? 
They just mean 60, 70 or 80 or whatever the bloody figure is.
It doesn't tell me what to do to get better figures."
(Page 86)
Jim Brown assigned greater meaning to official documents, for him 
they provided a summary of events that he had observed or heard 
about during the week. Official documents, particularly MADCAP 
provided sin overview and a means of confirming information he received 
from other sources (see page 97). Jim Brown did however,express 
concern over the accuracy and lack of detail in MADCAP which he 
felt resulted in it being a less meaningful document (see page 92).
Mike Shilling attached similar meaning to MADCAP but in addition it 
had meaning for him as a way to "sus out what's happening." He 
could show it to his supervisors and through discussion determine 
the causes of unfavourable performsuice or inconsistencies.
"Then at the end of the week here's the management information 
and there are occasions where the figures don't tie up. Then
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we have to try and analyse why there was a difference.
(Page 104)
For Mike Shilling management information was used as a means to trigger 
investigations. The discussing of MADCAP with his supervisors was an 
example of how information from one source was used in subsequent 
interactions.
Peter Travers regarded official documents as a meaningful way to monitor 
past performance, plan future events and to take immediate action, (page 
74). Again Peter Travers had reservations about the accuracy, timing 
and detail of information in the official documents.
The managers assigned meaning to the Planning and Production Meetings. 
Charlie Johnson described the Production Meeting as a "waste of time 
(see page II5). Jim Brown described it as "little else than a way to 
provide a rough indication of what's going on in the production 
department" (page II6). Simon White regsurded it as "useful just for 
a quick exchange of views" (page II7). Cyril Jenkins, however, attached 
more meaning to the Production Meeting; it helped keep him abreast of 
events in the factory (page 117).
The meaning attached to the Planning Meeting changed over time. At 
first Peter Travers regarded it as important as a means of communicating 
to production the requirements of the customers. However with the intro­
duction of Jim Brown as Production Planner, the Planning Meeting lost 
its meaning; in Peter Travers' words:




Many of the personal records kept by the managers, the stock levels, 
production numbers and hand-over reports were regarded as sui important 
means of overcoming the problems of accuracy and timeliness in the 
official documents as well as a means of informing in their own right, 
and were used extensively by the managers, (see pages I38, 137, 155).
Observations and interactions as a means of gathering information were 
universally regarded as being meaningful. Mike Shilling regarded word- 
of-mouth contact as:
"one of the biggest effective ways of keeping the things 
ticking."
(Pages 131-132)
Charlie Johnson spent most of his time observing events and asking his 
supervisors questions such as "what's happening today?", "what's 
happening now?", "Are they all running?", "Are they making the rate?", 
"Any one out?" (Page 133).
Jim Brown described his function in terms of gathering information:
"The way I see my function really, is to amass all the relevant 
information that's needed to translate our customer requirements 
into a production plan."
(Page 145)
Jim Brown gathered information from a number of sources, but stressed
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the importance of observation and communication with the other managers, 
the supervisors and the shop floor workers (see pages l46-l4y).
Peter Travers stressed the importance of interaction sis a means of 
informing himself.
•’I think it's very good for people to be communicating in 
that way (by word-of-mouth)."
(Page 109)
ànd stressed that he would not like to see it change an "awful lot."
An important point to be gleaned from the above comments is that 
managers often assigned different degrees of meaning or different 
definitions to the various sources of information.^ Charlie Johnson 
expressed this very appropriately:
"I don't bother to bloody read them. I'm terrible; I've 
always been terrible; some people are paper-minded or 
figure-minded."
(Page 86)
Given that people act towards things on the basis of the meaning that 
things have for them, and that individuals can assign different 
meanings to the same object, it follows that the managers will develop 
idiosyncratic approaches to the process of informing themselves. This 
view has been expressed by Manghara (1979)»
"Each social actor, as a consequence of innumerable successive 
involvements with other people and other events will have
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developed an idiosyncratic approach, a way of interpreting 
and behaving, of ascribing meaning to the event which is 
peculiar to himself and may not coincide with that of other 
actors."
Mangham 1979
Charlie Johnson who was "terrible" with figures assigned a different 
meaning to MADCAP and acted towards it differently than did the more 
"paper-minded” or "figure-minded" people such as Mike Shilling.
6.4 Events and Their Meaning
In addition to assigning meaning to the various sources of information, 
managers assigned meaning to the events reported in these sources. The 
way in which events or situations were interpreted, and the meaning 
assigned, again varied from manager to manager. Based on previous 
experience with what were taken to be similar circumstances, the 
managers' particular goals at the time and anticipating the consequen­
ces of the event, the managers constructed a scenario or picture of 
the situation. They were in effect constructing a definition of the 
situation (Thomas 1937); this process is described most aptly by 
Thomas himself;
"Preliminary to any self-determined act of behaviour there 
is always a stage of examination and deliberation which 
we call the definition of the situation."
Thomas 1937
How a manager defines an event or situation will largely determine 
his response to it. Therefore a manager's response to a piece of 
information will be determined in part by his definition of the event 
it purports to describe.
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"Thus the individual's response in any particular situation 
is a result of how he defines that circumstance rather than 
by how the circumstance may "objectively" appear to others."
Mangham 1979
In response to Mike Shilling's comments on the level of waste for 
Birds Eye Melba lids (pages 125 and 128), Peter Travers called in on 
Stores, to check the stock level and then proceeded to the Print 
Room to see the extent of the waste. For Peter Travers, based on 
his experience of similar events involving high levels of waste, on 
his goal to meet the following day's delivery and his anticipation 
of the consequences of another late delivery, he defined this piece 
of information as being of sufficient importance to warrant further 
examination to ensure that there were sufficient lids available.
A similar case is the incident on page I65 where an unnamed informant 
reported to Peter Travers that Norton Dairies collation trays were 
"running very quickly" and were running at six thou, material instead 
of eight. Peter Travers was persistent in his attempts to increase 
stroke rates on competitive products; this permitted a reduction in 
the estimated price. The information that the collation trays were 
"running very quickly" had some meaning to Peter Travers. He defined 
it as a situation through which he could argue for sm increase in the 
rate and a reduction in the price. The information concerning the 
material's gauge also had meaning to Peter Travers based on the 
anticipated consequences of producing such trays 'far under 
specification." ^
"OK, that is serious, because if he was right we would be 
producing trays far under specification...Well you can't
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afford to ignore it because it could have serious con-
(Page 166)
sequences."
The fact that Peter Travers* response in both cases was to gather 
more information before he directly acted on the event itself will 
be discussed subsequently.
Robin Slater cited an example (page I36) where he would respond to 
the process of interpretation directly to an observation he made.
"Now if I see this morning that there's a lot of granulating 
to be done, or the yard's in a mess I'll get somebody to 
stay on."
(Page 136)
The observation that there was a lot of granulating to be done or 
that the yard was in a mess meant something to Robin Slater. Excess­
ive granulating or an untidy yard meant that operating in those 
conditions became difficult, material was spoiled or wasted which 
in turn would elicit the wrath of Chris Davis. Based on his definit- 
tion of the situation Robin Slater would respond by "getting somebody 
to stay on."
Thus managers defined the situation by interpreting or assigning 
meaning to the reported information which in turn would influence 
their response to the event or situation.
Thus as Hall (1972) suggests;
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"Without meaning, people lack the ability to know how to act 
towards a 'thing', in fact it is the transformation of the 
'thing' into an object that makes for action." 4
Hall 1972
6.5 Meaning is Derived Through Social Interaction
How is meaning derived? Tracing a piese of behaviour and the definit­
ion of meaning on which it is based, back to its origin is an almost 
impossible task. It is however argued, in symbolic interactionism, 
that meanings through which people come to define situations and then 
choose courses of action are ultimately derived through interaction 
with others.
"Whether one is confronted by the absence of meaning in an 
ambiguous situation or is being indoctrinated into a 
business organisation the establishment of meaning occurs 
through the exchange of social interaction."
Hall 1972
A newcomer,on his first day.at the factory, would be confronted by 
a variety of events, situation or stimuli which had little or no 
meaning to him. Through interaction with others he would learn 
the meaning of events, situations or stimuli, he would also learn 
the appropriate way to handle such events. Through successive inter­
action (which may include comments and criticisms of his action) and 
increasing familiarity with the events themselves, the newcomer would 
modify or sustain the initial meaning he assigned to the events.
He would continue to encounter new events, situations and stimuli 
and would seek the meaning of these by successive interactions with 
others. The newcomer's actions, that is what he does, will depend
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on interaction with others through which he derives, modifies or 
sustains the meaning of events, situations or stimuli.
In the incident involving Robin Slater, where he observed the high
level of regrind and untidiness of the yard there was apparently no
interaction with others. Robin Slater simply responded on the basis
of his observation. The problem here lies in viewing episodes in
5
isolation, as always being one-off unique events. Meaning is derived, 
modified or sustained through successive interactions with others and 
involvement with what are taken to be similar situations. Robin 
Slater had experienced high levels of regrind and untidiness before.
He would, at one time, or on many occasions have experienced diffic­
ulties in operating under these circumstances, or have been instructed 
by Chris Davis or Charlie Johnson to "get the bloody mess tidied up." 
The meaning was not inherent in the stimuli themselves, as a stimulus- 
response model might have us believe, but rather, was a product of 
interaction with others and involvement in similar situations.
To use a concept from the dramaturgical perspective; Robin Slater 
through previous interactions and or experience, had developed a 
scripted response to deal with the situation (Manghara 1979). Robin 
Slater had learned an appropriate script of how to respond to the 
cues incorporated in his observation. This is not to argue that 
such situations were clearly scripted, in the sense that specific 
responses were learned and rigid patterns of behaviour were followed.
As Mangham states;
"Scripts in the sense that I am using the term imply nothing 
more or less than relatively predetermined and stereotyped 
sequences of action which are called into play by particular 
and well-recognised cues and circumstances."
Mangham 1979
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If meaning is derived through social interaction it is necessary to 
consider what factor or characteristics are taken into account in 
the interpretative process during interaction. The symbolic inter- 
actionist would suggest that the definition would include the 
assigning of meaning to the object or event, to others and to oneself.^ 
These issues will be considered in the next three chapters.
6.6 Summary
Managers develop idiosyncratic approaches towards the various sources 
of information based on the meaning they assign to them or the way in 
which they interpret them. Through examination aind deliberation 
managers arrive at a definition of the situation or event to which 
the information relates. Thus, managers inform themselves by assigning 
meaning to events brought to their attention through some source of 
information.
The mesining is derived through interaction either in a contemporary 
interaction for new or novel situations or through successive previous 
interactions for situations that are taken to be simileur to previous 
experiences. Derived meaning is learned from others and is modified 
or sustained through successive involvement with others.
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NOTES
1. Within the context of designing information systems, the processes 
of interpretation in terms of selecting events or transactions to 
be recorded and the means by which they are processed would require 
consideration. I would suggest that it is possible for a discrep­
ancy to exist between the system designer's interpretation of what 
is important and how it should be processed, and that of the user. 
Deardon (1972) suggests that systems designers from the computer 
professions are possibly the wrong type of person to design 
information systems for managers.
2. Schütz (1964) makes a similar point where he states:
"The fact that the same object has a different appearance 
to various observers has been illustrated by some 
philosophers."
3. It appeared that the anticipated consequences of an event were 
more important in arriving at the definition of the situation 
than discovering its cause in cases where immediate action was 
required. Identifying the cause could be considered in a post 
mortem after a solution to be problem waa implemented. This 
brings into question the attribution theorists'claim that the 
attributed cause of an event will influence behaviour; it 
appears that the anticipated consequences of an event play an 
equally important role.
4. The transformation of a thing into an object may be equated with 
Thayer's (I96I) concept of information about things (page 205 )•
5. The notions of common recurrent events and unique or novel events 
will be developed throughout the thesis.
6. Boland (1979) considers that research into information systems 
should consider the following:
a) Self-indications (what individuals notice, pay attention to,
and treat as meaningful.)
b) Objects (the persons, events, categories and
measurements made available by an inform­
ation system).
c) Interpretations (the myths, stories, symbols and ideas
shared by systems users).
d) Interactions (the patterns of formal and informal
exchange of verbal and non-verbal commun­
ications taking place within the 
organisation).
The following chapters include the above categories although a 




In this chapter I discuss the role of others in the process of informing.
Mead suggests that sill human behaviour is social behaviour; all human 
acts are social acts; the content and the very existence of distinctly 
human behaviour are accountable only on a social basis. It is recog­
nised that individuals act and interact within larger networks of 
other individuals and groups. Some of the networks are far removed 
from given individuals in time and space, and yet have an appreciable 
impact on them (Manis and Meltzer 1978)» Few actors can afford to 
ignore the impact on, and response of, others. Thus in defining a 
situation and deciding on a course of action the anticipated response 
from others plays an important role. Individuals assign meaning to 
others, to others' actions and to the responses of others to their 
own actions. The assigning of meaning to another may take place 
during an interaction or the 'other' may be distanced by time and 
space. The awareness and definition of others, others' actions and 
responses to their own action from others are of considerable 
importance in the process of informing and thus to our understanding 
of the process.
7.1 Others' Involvement in Events
Each event or situation which comes to the attention of a manager in 
the form of information involves the actions of others, and in many 
cases is the direct result of the actions of others. The incident 
on page 124 where Jim Brown lost four hours of extrusion time was 
described in terms of the actions of others:
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, "Because some silly bugger put a load of breeze blocks
against the octabins. "
(Page 124)
In Robin Slater's example some person or persons had edlowed the regrind 
to build up and had left the yard untidy. In the two examples concern­
ing Peter Travers some person or persons were involved in creating the 
waste or running the machine above stroke or using the wrong gauge of 
material.
Within the concept of events arising out of the actions of others, I 
include the possibility of events arising out of a person not taking 
action when it was expected of him. A case in point is the episode 
concerning the black specks where the maintenance engineer neglected 
to replace the feed pipe when requested to do so by Charlie Johnson 
thus creating the problem (see page I65).
On page 157 Jim Brown cites the case where on checking the silos on 
Monday morning he found them to be down to one per cent. He again 
defined the situation in terms of the actions of others.
"Then you go downstairs and find that they hadn't run regrind 
at all over the weekend."
(Page 157)
On pages I60 and I61, the issue of bad sheet was attributed to the 
actions of the Quality Control Department. They had failed to identify 
bad sheet which resulted in making defective Melba lids.
The actions of a customer or somebody outside the organisation might
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create am unfavourable situation. Bert Simons, the Sales Account 
Executive, described the lack of work on RDM 4 and 5 in terms of 
the customer's actions:
"The whole situation is hairy, they've slowed down; it's the 
metrication problem; there's talk that they may change the 
design altogether."
(Page 49)
Favourable situations were also defined in terms of the actions of 
others. Jim Brown's preparation of a workable production plan was 
recognised and praised by Peter Travers.
"Well it's looking bloody good, it looks like it's our problem 
to fill the machines instead of the other way round."
(Page 49)
Prior to Jim Brown being promoted to Planner, Martin Keyes was held 
responsible for the problems associated with planning. Finally,in my 
study of stock control the actions of the labourers, the supervisors and 
the storemen were defined as the causes of the unacceptable situation 
concerning stock reports.
Certain events did not appear to be caused by the action of others, a 
mechanical breakdown, or the lack of space may have been defined as 
the cause of the event. On page 52, Mike Shilling described the 
situation concerning mini seed trays in terras of the shortage
of space:
"We've never had enough space to store goods for the roller
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cutters. This site is just not equipped for the job."
On page 118 the problem on Eotoform 2 was described in terms of the 
faulty heater, the oil leaks and the water leak.
Even if the initieil situation did not originate in the action of others, 
the solution or non-solution of the situation would invariably involve 
the actions of others. In the case of the mini seed trays it 
was recommended that somebody would find an alternative space to pack 
the goods. In the case of the Rotoformer the engineers were involved 
in replacing the heater and remedying the leaks.
Managers were thus acutely aware of the actions of others both in 
creating a situation and then subsequently solving it. Managers were 
equally aware of the inaction of others in creating a situation and 
of those who subsequently did not solve it. The action of others 
played an integral part in the managers' definition of a situation.^
This tendency was so prevalent that even what appeared to be a situation 
caused by a purely mechanical fault was attributed or traced to the 
action of others. The high level of breakdowns were attributed to the 
lack of planned maintenance by, and inefficiency of, the engineers; to 
the age of the machines which should have been replaced by senior 
management; and to the lack of training and inexperience of the machine 
operators. As Charlie Johnson so succinctly put it:
"So a lot of their time is snagging, you can call it snagging - 
or getting people out of the shit, because they're not con­




I would suggest that the actions of others are not viewed in isolation, 
Through successive involvement with others, through observation of 
others' actions and through hearsay about others, people form definit­
ions of each other. Individuals attribute characteristics to one 
another and in doing so make judgements about other individuals and 
often attach descriptive labels to them. The general definition or 
label one attaches to another may differ from the individuals' own
definition of themselves, although others' definitions influence one's
2
perception of self. The importance of these labels or general def­
initions is that, once formed, they will influence the interpretation 
of the others' subsequent actions. Jones and Nisbett (1972) note that:
"the actor's perceptions of the causes of his behaviour are 
at variance with those held by outside observers. The 
actor's view of his behaviour emphasises the role of 
environmental conditions at that moment of action. The 
observer's view emphasises the causal role of stable dis­
positional properties of the actor. We wish to argue that 
there is a pervasive tendency for actors to attribute their 
actions to situational requirements whereas observers tend 
to attribute the same actions to stable dispositional 
characteristics."
Jones and Nisbett 1972
In the incident noted on page 141 where Charlie Johnson intended to 
keep a history card of problems encountered on each tool, in order to 
defend himself against "a bloody inquest," Charlie proposed to account 
for his performance in terms of the physical problems involved, "six 
water leaks, the bloody dye was buggered up or hairy cut." Steve 
Baker, the Engineering Manager, who was Charlie's superior, would 
define Charlie's behaviour or performance in terms of his general 
definition of Charlie or his more stable dispositional characteristics.
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Charlie was noted by Steve Baker for his stubborn and cantankerous nature. 
Thus,a discrepancy would exist between Charlie's definition of the 
situation and his performance and that of Steve Baker's.
I have borrowed the concept of labels from labelling theory which is 
traditionally associated with the study of deviance. Rose Giale-rabardo 
(1966) depicts the social roles in a prison for women in terms of the 
labels attributed to various persons. Women were labelled as "snitchers" 
"inmate cops" or "lieutenants," "squares" and "jive bitches," or "rap 
buddies" and "homeys". These labels were attached to individuals eind 
when these labels were shared, they influenced the behaviour of others 
towards that individual. At Avon such labels were in evidence. Jim 
Brown was defined by Peter Travers as a competent production planner.
"I got to keep saying it, really the planning side. We have 
an absolutely 10C^ right relationship with the planning side.
We're fully kept in the picture about what's going on."
(Page 101)
On the other hand Martin Keyes was defined in less favourable terms:
"To be honest with you, Alistair, Martin was never a Planner."
Although he was defined as a "bloody good" machine operator (page 48).
David Wright regarded Cyril Jenkin's as an ineffectual Production 
Manager; this was made fully evident in the first meeting to set up 
the Working Party (page 33)» The nickname given to Mike ('I'm too busy') 
Sampey was due to successive situations where Mike Sampey would not, or
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could not,deal with a problem situation at once. David Clark was 
defined as "Diddy David" because of his apparent inability to deal 
with trivial situations. Kevin Linsey was defined as a ’flapper" 
because of his tendency to overstate the importance of fairly trivial 
events. Chris Davis was the "trouble shooter" brought in to sort out 
the factory’s problems. Based on involvement with and observation of 
Cyril Jenkin's actions, Mike Shilling defined his appointment as a 
disaster (page 1?4). Jim Brown although thinking Cyril Jenkins was a 
"very nice sort of bloke" did claim that he could be a "little bit 
more positive" (page 1?6). Charlie Johnson observed that although 
Cyril Jenkins had a university degree, that did not mean he was a good 
Production Manager (page 173). Charlie Johnson was defined by Jim 
Brown as a difficult person to communicate with (page 148). The shift 
supervisors in Charlie Johnson's department were defined as being "more 
experienced" and "far more aware" than those in Mike Shilling's 
department. Mike Shilling himself was defined as an "exaggerator" and 
was difficult to deal with (page 152).
In view of the possibility that there may exist a difference between 
the definition one holds of one's own actions and the definition another 
holds, it is possible that individuals will construct different definit­
ions for what is apparently the same situation.^
7.3 Others as Informants
In addition to the action of others playing an important part in the 
definition of a situation and thus in the process of informing, the 
role of others in the provision of information played an equally 
important part. In the factory, information from whatever source,
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was provided by another person or persons. The other person or persons 
who provided the information influenced the manager's assignment of 
meaning to that piece of information and thus to the event or situation 
it pertained to. This in turn influenced the course of action the 
manager decided upon. The definition a manager had for the person or 
persons who provided the information, largely determined the manager's 
response to it.
Jim Brown viewed information from the engineers with a certain amount of 
scepticism, as he stated;
"I always check on anything to do with engineers because as 
far as I'm concerned the engineers are not the most consis­
tent within the factory."
(Page 154)
The fact that Jim Brown defined the engineers as unreliable sources of 
information influenced the course of action he would adopt on receiv­
ing information from them; namely he would always check on them.
"I have a lot of problems with engineers (so) I check with 
the engineering supervisors (Tim Steed or Steve Baker)."
(Page 154)
Information on breakdowns was crucial to Jim Brown; he could not 
afford to simply disregard information from the engineers. However, 
because of problems with engineers in the past he would not accept the 
information at face value but would "go round the back doors and 
double check." Thus the perceived reliability of the informant
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played a crucial role in the process of informing.
Jim Brown described the feed-back or information received from Mike 
Shilling as being very poor and thus he would not wholly rely on it. 
(see page 152). Jim Brown did not rely on information received from 
Martin Keyes concerning Material Control but rather would go out to 
the Store each Monday to gather information from the Storeman, who he 
regarded as a more reliable source (see page I58).
On pages 146 - l4y Jim Brown summed up the importance of the source of 
the information:
"There's a lot of fallacies been built up over a long period 
of time about what we can and cannot do...So what I try to 
do really is to get the information from the people who 
should know...instead of the people who say "Ah, we tried 
that ten years ago and it didn't work so we're never going 
to use that again."
(Pages 146 - 14?)
Peter Travers reinforced the importance of the source of the inform­
ation or the person it was received from.
"It depends on the source actually. Informal information,
-rutoour or whatever, from certain people you can almost 
guarantee as being right. With other people you can 
guarantee as being grossly inflated or exaggerated or 
whatever."
(Page 165)
The reliability or credibility of the source influenced Peter Travers' 
response to the information.
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"If the information’s from a certain source you do something 
about it; if you hear it from others, that's OK you may 
probe a little bit and try and find out if it's true, but 
you probably don't take much notice of it, quite honestly."
As I mentioned at the beginning of this section, information from any 
source was provided by some person or persons. Hence, the credibility 
or reliability of the source of information was also applicable, to 
official documented information. Unless the recording process was 
governed by some mechanical or electrical device a person or persons 
must be involved. The information on the machine record charts, on 
which MADCAP was based,was provided by the machine operators. The 
actions of the machine operators, in providing information, were 
explicitly taken into account by the managers when interpreting 
that information. Managers were aware of machine operators manipul­
ating the machine record charts and their time sheets, as Jim Brown 
pointed out;
"I'm not really happy that some of it is, if you like, valid.
As I've said before. I've seen a lot of doctoring of sheets 
for bonus on the shop floor and I'm sure that must be reflected 
in the information that's recorded in MADCAP."
(Page 93)
It was apparent, from my data, that managers did not simply sit and 
wait for information to come to them, but were active in seeking 
information about unknown events and seeking confirmation or greater 
detail about events that came to their attention. In seeking inform­
ation the managers would approach individuals whom they defined as 
reliable sources of information. Jim Brown would have a chat with
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Charlie Johnson who he regarded as a reliable source of information when 
he was on the shop floor to find out what was going on.
Previously I described the situation where Peter Travers on hearing about 
the high levels of waste and the high stroke rate and gauge of material, 
responded by seeking out additional information. In doing so he went to 
his "well-tried reliable route, to try and check what is happening"
(page 166). Jim Brown described how he had to "run round and get 
information from other sources" about Mike Shilling's department because 
of the unreliable nature of the information received directly from Mike 
(page 152). Thus both Jim and Peter were selective in their choice of 
informants.
A further justification for managers carefully selecting sources of 
information was because they had experience of being misinformed;
Peter Travers commented on this:
"There are a lot of cases still, where you think you ended up 
with the true picture. Then you talk to somebody else about 
it or you put forward your own theory or something just to 
find you've got the whole bloody thing wrong anyway, because 
the information hasn't been strictly speaking correct."
(Page l64)
Misinforming may not necessarily be malicious; an informant may 
simply misinterpret an event and quite innocently pass on that 
misinterpretation. It is appropriate to view information from others 
as accounts of events; they are reconstructions of an event or 
situation based on the interpretation of that event, by the informant.
The manager may receive the account second or, possibly, third-hand.
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and must then interpret not only the event, but also the account, based 
on his definition of the informant and his interpretation of the inform­
ant's actions. The manager in effect must analyse the account in much 
the same way that Harre and Secord (1972) advocate that researchers do. 
The manager is unlikely to express the analysis in terms of its intellig­
ibility and warrantability. Nevertheless,he will consider the feasibiity 
or likelihood of the event in the light of his knowledge of the workings 
of the factory, as well as considering the intentions of the informant.
From my observations it was apparent that the managers made a clear 
distinction between reliable and unreliable sources of information.
This distinction was based on the manager's definition of the other 
and the other's actions, which in turn were derived, modified or 
sustained through successive involvement with the other and through 
interaction with other third parties.
The defined reliabiity of informants played an important role in the 
formation of the informant networks (page 149). Another dimension of 
reliability was also involved, managers would rely on others to inform 
them of events taking place. Jim Brown would rely on Charlie Johnson 
and the supervisors to keep him informed;
"The feedback from the factory is now far, far better. Generally 
speaking if a machine is shut down for more than about an hour 
I'll be told."
(Page 149)
Thus, key informants which made up a manager's informant network, 
were individuals who the manager could rely on to provide him with 
reliable information.
232
Managers did not automatically reject information received from 
individuals who they defined to be unreliable; they simply treated 
such information more cautiously or with scepticism. They were 
careful to receive information from all sources, no matter how 
unreliable, with gratitude. In Goffman's (1959) terms the managers 
suspended their disbelief when receiving information from those who 
were defined to be unreliable sources. Thus Jim Brown thanked Martin 
Keyes for his information concerning the Waddington (page 175) before 
describing it to me as history. This suspension of disbelief pre­
served the social fabric or relationships within the factory; for, 
after all, Martin Keyes might on certain occasions provide an 
important piece of information.
7.4 Implications and Consequences for Others
The importance of others in the process of informing was apparent in 
another dimension; a piece of information coming to the attention of 
one manager might be defined as having implications for another manager. 
This is implicit in the previous section, for an informant will inform 
another because he defines the event as having meaning for the other. 
Charlie Johnson would inform Jim Brown of a breakdown lasting more 
than one hour because he defined the event as having some meaning for
Jim. Jim Brown would in turn inform Peter Travers if he defined the
évent as having some meaning for Peter. Managers were aware of the 
consequences or impact of an event on other managers and their 
functions. They attributed meaning to an event in terms of the role 
or function of other managers. Jim Brown defined his role in relat­
ion to Sales in terms of his reponsibility to communicate to the
commercial department "what is going on in production" (page 153).
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Information gathering and interpreting may be viewed as purposeful 
behaviour. Manager gathered information to find out what was going on 
and to find out whether some action was required by them.^ The 
managers were aware of the consequences to, or impact on,others of 
the action they chose to take on a piece of information. Jim Brown 
was aware that a mechanical breakdown could mean that he would have 
to change his production plan which in turn would have implications 
for the Departmental Production Manager concerned and for the Sales 
Department. Jim would explicitly take into account the impact of his 
actions on others and would imagine or anticipate the responses of 
others to his intended course of action. The anticipated response of 
others was therefore important to a manager in defining the situation 
and selecting a course of action. Managers had to consider the approp­
riateness or acceptability of their course of action based on the inform­
ation they received, in the light of anticipating the responses of 
others. This is not to imply that the course of action chosen was 
wholly determined by others, for a manager may consciously decide on 
a course of action which was regarded as being inappropriate or 
unacceptable by others.
Jim Brown reinforced the importance of informing others of his intended 
course of action:
"They tend to feel that decisions are taken without anybody 
bothering to consult them about what can and what cannot be 
done, and I think that's a very dangerous thing - so whenever 
possible I try to communicate with the supervisors and even 
the extruder operators and people like that....OK 
sometimes you may have to make a decision where people are 
told to do something they don't want to, or feel that they
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can't do. Although I do try to communicate with them and 
tell them why I still have to make the decision."
(Page 148)
The previous section implies that a process of socialisation takes 
place, where managers learn to assign meaning to physical events or 
situations, to the actions of others and to others themselves,through 
the process of interaction. Furthermore by imagining or anticipating 
the response of others, managers learn appropriate and acceptable 
course of action whereby they participate effectively in the social 
setting. Taken to its limits the socialised individual becomes little 
more than an automaton responding to the socially-derived meaning 
learned through interaction with others, whereby he acts within the 
predetermined parameters of acceptable social behaviour. This view is 
all too simplistic, in that it fails to consider the apparent ability 
of individuals to choose a course of action, which may be described 
as new or innovative or, alternatively, as inappropriate or unaccept­
able by the other members of the setting. To accommodate such 
behaviour in the analysis it is necessary to incorporate the concept 
of self which is the topic of the following chapter.
7.5 Summary
The role of others in the process of informing are threefold:
Firstly, situations or events involve the actions of others and may be 
the direct result of the actions of others. Managers are aware of the 
involvement of others in situations. The meaning which they assign 
to the action of others and the definition they hold for the others
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themselves influence the managers' subsequent definition of the 
situation.
Secondly, information, in whatever form, is supplied by some other 
person or persons. The definition a manager holds for the informant, 
usually expressed in terms of reliability and credibility, will 
influence the way in which the manager assigns meaning to the inform­
ation which in turn will influence his subsequent action.
Thirdly, managers assigned meaning to events in terms of the implic­
ations those events were likely to have for other managers. Further­
more managers imagined or anticipated the response of others to their 
proposed course of action.
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NOTES
1. Shields, Birnberg and Frieze (I98I) note from the works of Garland 
et al (1973), Freize (1976) and Carrol and Payne (1977) that 
individuals, when asked what information they would like to have, 
typically sought information about the person performing the task 
as well as about the task being performed.
2. Cooley (1922) illustrates the social origins of self by referring 
to it as the "looking glass self." He suggests that the attitudes 
and reactions of others are important to the individual's self 
concept in a reflective manner, see chapter 8.
3. The possibility of multiple and conflicting definitions of a single
situation will be discussed in chapter 9*
4. Informant Networks will be more fully discussed in chapter 10.
3. Throughout the management information literature, information or
information systems are linked directly or indirectly with decision 
making or selecting a course of action. This issue will be dis­




In this chapter I introduce the concepts of self and role and outline 
their importance to the process of informing.
8.1 A Definition of Self and Role
An individual has the ability to act towards himself as an object unto 
himself; he may praise, blame or encourage himself; he may become 
disgusted with himself, he may wish to punish himself and so on. 
Individuals are able to interact with themselves, that is, they are 
able to engage in thought or engage in minded behaviour, and in doing 
so are capable of forming new meanings and new lines of action. This 
does not mean that human beings transcend all influences, however, it 
does draw attention to their activity in modifying these influences 
and in creating and changing their own behaviour (Manis and Meltzer 
1978).
When an individual thinks or engages in minded behaviour he carries 
on an internal conversation; he is able to observe, monitor, plan 
and justify his own behaviour. The individual is able to assign 
meaning to, define, interpret and thus direct his own behaviour.
This proposition points to the fact that the socialised human being 
both enmeshes himself in society and frees himself from society.
The individual with a self is not passive, but can employ himself 
in an interaction which may result in behaviour divergent from group 
definitions (Manis and Meltzer 1978).
The process by which an individual assigns meanings to his actions
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or forms a definition of himself, is similar to the process by which 
he assigns meanings or forms a definition of other social objects, 
that is, he does so through a process of interaction.
"The self like all other social objects emerges from the process 
of interaction as the individual responds to and internalises 
others' definitions of him."
Mangham 1978
Cobley (1922) introduces the concept of the "looking glass self" where 
he argues that the definition of others are important to the individ­
ual's definition of himself. Through monitoring and internalising the 
comments and criticisms of others of his own behaviour, the individual 
forms a definition of self. The self is not an entity or fixed object, 
but a fluid and dynamic process. Through continual observation and 
monitoring of his behaviour and successive involvement with others the 
definition of self like other social objects is sustained or modified.
Mead (193^) defines the self as a social process involving two 
analytically distinguishable phases. The I and the ME. For Mead the 
I is the impulsive tendencey of the individual. It is the initial 
spontaneous, unorganised aspect of human experience. Thus it represents 
the undirected tendency of the individual. The ME represents the 
incorporated other within the individual. Thus,it compromises the 
organised set of attitudes and definitions,'understandings and expect­
ations - or simply meanings - common to the group. In any given 
situation the ME compromises the generalised other and often, some 
particular other. Thus using the concept of self as I and ME we have 
the basis on the one hand for social control and on the other for novelty 
and innovation. Every act begins in the form of an I and usually ends
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up in the form of a ME,for the I represents the initiation of an act 
prior to its coming under control of the definition or expectation of 
others (the ME), The I gives propulsion while the ME gives direction 
to the act. Human behaviour then, can be viewed as a perpetual series 
of initiations of actions by the I and the acting-back upon the act 
(that is the guidance of the act) by the ME. The act is the resultant 
of this interplay (Meltzer 1964).
The distinction between I aind ME, both of which constitute the process 
of self, provides the basis for understanding the mutuality of the 
relationship between the individual and society. The individual can 
be seen as existing in a dual system, or what Mead referred to sis 
'sociality.' By adopting the ME perspective the individual may con­
form, but should the I prevail, innovative behaviour will result.
Thus society does not determine behaviour, nor does behaviour 
determine society; society and individuals are both determined and 
determiners, (Mangham 1979).
The above analysis of the process of self in terms of the I and the 
ME provides a basis for understanding on the one hsind routine or 
common acts, and on the other hand novel or innovative acts. However, 
as an explanation of self it is still lacking. The question that 
remains to be answered is, how do we as individuals define ourselves, 
or very simply. What am I and What is ME?
The discussion centres around the concept of self in terms of one's 
individual internal persona which includes one's thoughts, feelings 
Sind emotions and the concept of self in terms of ones role or function 
within a particular setting. Zurcher (1977) argues that the individual
240
has a self as process, which he equates to Mead’s I, thus it incorporates 
the spontaneous emotional responses of the internal individual. In 
addition, the individual has a self as object which includes the concept 
of Mead's generalised other. The self as object originates through the 
process of socialisation where the individual learns values (guiding 
principles),norms (rules), status (positions or places in the social 
order), and roles, (behavioural expectations in association with these 
statut, Zurcher(1977)•
In considering the definition of self it is therefore necessary to 
consider an individual's definition of self as a process or as McCall 
and Simmons (I966) call it the 'personal identity' and the individual's 
self as object or the 'social identity;' The former is made up of the 
individuals inner thoughts, feelings, fantasies and self esteem, the 
latter being defined as the role within some setting. The individual 
therefore might have multiple social selves or roles applicable to the 
various settings he is a member of. McCall and Simmons (I966) argue 
that such a sharp distinction between personal identity and social 
identity is simplistic,for an individual's personal identity, will 
impinge on his social identity and vice versa. They describe the 
interrelationship as the role identity or role performance and state;
"Social position alone is not sufficient to specify role - 
behaviour, for the demands of such a position are filtered 
through one's character or self-conception and are modified 
to blend with it."
McCall and Simmons I966
I would suggest that the definition of one's self plays an important 
role in the process of informing. Furthermore, the distinction
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between one’s personal identity and social identity (or one’s self and 
role) and the interrelationships between the two, are useful to under­
stand the role and self in the process of informing.
8.2 Interpreting Information In Terms of Oneself and One's Role
The argument that managers inform themselves, implies the awareness of 
self. Situations or events coming to the attention of a manager in the 
form of information at Avon were first and foremost defined in terms of 
the impact that the situation might have on themselves and on their 
roles. Subsequently interpreting the event in terms of the impact on 
others might modify or sustain the initial definition and influence the 
course of action chosen. On the other hand it might not. The manager 
may interpret information purely in terms of his personal identity or 
self and select a course of action which complies with his own self 
interest. However, the manager also has a social identity or role 
within the organisation; this role incorporates the generalised other, 
which includes the values, norms and status of the organisation. By 
interpreting information in terms of his social role, the manager 
may choose a socially acceptable course of action.^ McCall and Simmons 
would suggest that the selection of a course of action would be 
influenced by both the personal and social identity of the manager.
"Such a role identity is his imaginative view of himself as he 
likes to think of himself being and acting as an occupant of 
that position."
McCall and Simmons 1966
At Avon each manager was able to define himself in terms of the 
requirement of his job or function and indeed they had specific 
titles which described their role in the organisation. Jim Brown
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was the Production Planner, he defined his function as;
"to translate our customer requirements into a production 
plan."
(Page 145)
Charlie Johnson was a Departmental Production Manager; he defined 
his function as;
"to run it (the machine) as fast as we can, as efficiently 
as we can and as cheap as we can."
(Page 86)
Peter Travers was the Assistant Marketing Manager; he defined his 
function as "getting orders from customers to fill the machines" and 
then satisfying the customer requirements in terms of price, quality 
and service.
In having constructed a definition of their roles, managers were able 
to assess the impact of a situation or event, on their function or job. 
In the case of Peter Travers and the information he received concerning 
waste from Mike Shilling, and the high stroke rate and the gauge of 
material from the unnamed informant, he was able to assess the impact 
that these events were likely to have on his function. The meaning of 
these incidents could be expressed in terms of the impact on his job 
by having dissatisfied customers and uncompetitive prices.
The incident on page 129 where Charlie Johnson learned of the proposed 
trials on the obsolete plaster form machine is another example where
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the event was defined in terras of the impact the situation was likely 
to have on the individual's function. The trials required a skilled 
operator drafted from his regular activities, leaving a gap in pro­
duction, which meant that Charlie could not run the machines as fast, 
as efficiently or as cheaply as he would like.
Jim Brown actively sought information from the Material Storeman 
(page 138) because of the direct impact, on him sis planner, when bad 
sheet was fed straight back into stores without his knowing about it.
The definition managers had of their own role or functions was not 
necessarily in agreement with that held by other managers. Jim Brown 
argued that a considerable portion of his time was spent performing 
the function of Production Controller.
"I probably spend 309^  of my time running round amassing 
information from the sales office, investigating shortages 
in production and problems in production."
(Page 143)
Other managers defined Jim Brown's role as that of controller and thus 
used Jim in that role. On Page 143 Bobin Slater asked Jim about 
material problems on the Waddington, and on Page 147 Mike Shilling 
enquired about material deliveries - both these events were the 
responsibility of the Material Controller and not the Production 
Planner.
Mike Sampey held the title of Production Controller whereas the other 
managers defined his role as Material Buyer and rarely if ever contacted 
him about Production Control issues.
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In Martin Keyes'reign as Production Planner the other managers relied on 
Peter Travers to plan production and directly contacted him on planning 
issues.
Thus memagers were not only aware of their own definition of their 
function but internalised the definition that other managers held for 
them. Although Jim Brown and Peter Travers criticised other managers 
for miscasting them, they both responded to the role assigned to them. 
Much of the ill feeling on Jim Brown's part was used as a means to 
criticise Mike Sampey, and at the same time imply that he should hold 
the title of Production Planner and Controller. Regardless of the 
political implications, managers defined situations in terras of the 
impact they had on their own defined role and that role assigned to 
them by others.
8 .3  The Importance to Oneself of Being Informed
Managers were particularly concerned about being well informed or in 
2
the know. Jim Brown made the following comment:
"And obviously if you haven't got the bloody information it 
makes you look like a bloody idiot, which means that your 
credibility suffers and people think you don't know what 
you're doing."
(Page 151)
Martin Keyes reinforced the importance to oneself of being in the know:
"At the production meetings people ask me what's been produced. 
Then they want to know why, and if I haven't been out there 
to find out what happened, they'd tear me down."
(Page 169)
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Managers spent a considerable amount of energy gathering information of 
a general nature to ensure that they were well informed. Jim Brown
explained that he looked at the machine record charts and the communica­
tion book from a "general point of view" or just to see "what's happening" 
(Pages 135» 156). Charlie Johnson on his arrival in the morning would 
walk around the yard and factory to see the general state of things 
(Page 135). Mike Shilling would gather information about his own and 
other departments seemingly out of interest or curiosity. The 
gathering of general information had a deeper significance than simple 
curiosity. In gathering information the managers were arming themselves; 
they were aware of the implications to themselves of being caught out by 
being ill-informed. Managers were never sure when they might be put on 
the spot or have to explain some event. In view of this type of uncertainty, 
managers attempted to ensure that they were familiar with a wide variety 
of events in the factory. The managers were aware that others might try
to 'score points off them' by showing up their ignorance. As Jim Brown
described the situation;
"It's bloody downright aggression. It really is a case of 'dog- 
eat-dog.' I mean I try not to get involved but it certainly 
is a case of personalities. It's certainly a case of one- 
up-man-ship. People will very often go out of their way to 
nail your backside to the wall for fun. You know, just for 
personal satisfaction."
(Page 160)
Charlie Johnson would arm himself with very detailed and specific 
information on the event in question:
"What we are going to do is to have a history card with the
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tool. So on any run with that tool, the date goes in and 
all the faults on that run will be put on that history card. 
So that in two months time when there's a bloody inquest on 
it, when they say why did you only run so fast that time 
when you ran so fast last time. I'll say "hang on a minute, 
here's the bloody history card; that's what happened last 
time, we had six water leaks, the bloody die was buggered 
up or hairy cut or all sorts' suid we can throw it back at 
'em."
(Page 141)
By gathering such information Charlie Johnson was protecting himself 
or his department from an investigation by others.
Managers therefore gathered information to protect and enhance their 
personal identities. Crucial to both the managers social identity and 
personal identity, and implicit in the above section, is the importance
of the response of others to one's action or proposed action.
8.4 The Importance to Oneself of Being Correctly Informed
I have suggested that managers would explicitly take into account the 
impact that their actions would have on others. In effect the managers 
were concerned with the consequences of their actions. The managers 
would evaluate the consequences of their actions, based on a piece of 
information, by imagining or anticipating the response of others to 
their actions or proposed actions. Managers were thus concerned that 
their chosen course of action was based on an appropriate definition 
of the situation or event. The managers sought to confirm or modify 
their initial definition of a situation by gathering additional inform­
ation from the various sources, to avoid acting upon an incorrect 
definition of a situation.
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Jim Brown took great pains to check information or to check that the 
situation was real before he took it to the Sales Office (Page 153). 
On page I3I he confirmed the importance to himself of being correctly 
informed;
"To a certain degree a lot of my credibility depends on it.
If I have not got the right commercial information about 
how far we can go, all I do is undermine my own credibility,
and so it's got to be right."
(Page 151)
Martin Keyes was continually concerned about his lack of correct 
information:
"With the situation we're in now I'm worried that soon I'm 
going to drop a real clanger, cause a serious upset in the 
factory."
(Page 169)
Thomas' (1937) classic quote "If people define situations as real 
they are real in their consequences," has an important bearing on 
understanding the responses or behaviour of the managers. For Robin 
Slater, in directly observing the level of regrind or state of the
yard (Page I36) there would be little doubt in his mind about the
reality of the situation. In consequence Robin Slater would take 
action on the basis of his definition. If Robin Slater chose not to 
take action on this very real situation, the consequences would be 
equally real, working conditions would become more difficult and 
Chris Davis would be on the 'war path.' Robin Slater was aware of 
these consequences.
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In the two examples concerning Peter Travers, (the level of waste, the 
high.stroke rate and the gauge of material) he did not have direct first­
hand experience of these events and was in some doubt as to how real the 
situations were. He was aware of the consequences of the events given 
that they were real. He however, chose to elicit additional information 
to confirm or modify his initial definition of the situation. Before 
taking direct action on the event Peter Travers wished to assure himself 
that the situation was real. In Peter Travers' own words:
"The other part of his story was incorrect but had to be checked 
because it had consequences. Then you go and follow your well- 
tried reliable routes, to try and check what is happening."
(Page 166)
The definition that the manager holds of a situation is constantly 
subject to confirmation or modification even after the manager defines 
it to be real. As Peter Travers comments:
"There are a lot of cases still, where you think you ended up 
with the true picture. Then you talk to somebody else about 
it, or you put forward your own theory or something, just to 
find you've got the whole bloody thing wrong anyway."
(Page 164)
Defining a situation to be real which subsequently turns out not to 
be real has a double set of consequences, both equally real. In the 
csLse of the black specks in the extruded sheet (Pages 164 and I63), 
at first one manager, (unknown) had defined the situation in terms of 
dirt in the machine; in consequence, the extruder wasëiut down for 
one week, resulting in the very real loss of 7,500 tonnes of
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production. This definition of the problem turned out to be incorrect; 
the consequences were still real, the 7 ,500 tonnes were not produced.
The unknown manager had then to contend with a second set of consequences; 
his incorrect definition prompted other msuiagers to question his 
judgement which in turn affected his credibility. In a somewhat oblique 
reference to all those concerned Peter Travers made the following comment:
"And you ask yourself why the bloody hell didn't somebody 
check the silo to see if that was where the problem was?"
(Page 165)
A further more detailed enquiry was instigated when the cause was 
identified aus a small feed-pipe which should have been replaced.
Information thus was of particular importance to reduce ambiguity, 
uncertainty and equivocality (Weick 1979) about events so that managers 
could avoid taking inappropriate action on incorrect definitions of the 
situation.
Even after deliberation and further investigation it was possible that 
a manager could still be uncertain about the nature of the event. In 
such cases the manager may have to adopt a"try it and see”approach.
When this occured the memagers gathered or received information about 
the progress of the course of action. The managers required to be "kept 
in the picture" to monitor and later justify the consequences of their 
action.^
^•5 Oneself as an Informemt
One particularly important definition of self, in terms of the process
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of informing, was the definition of oneself as an informant. Both Jim 
Brown and Peter Travers relied on others as informants, however they were
also aware that they in turn must be informants themselves. The informant
networks were based on reciprocal informing or mutual information-eschang- 
ing. Jim Brown could rely on Charlie Johnson and the supervisors to 
"keep him in the picture," however he stressed the importance of his role 
as an informant to them, describing the process of informing as a "two- 
way thing," (Page I30 ). Jim Brown was further aware of his role as 
informant to the commercial or sales department.
"Clive has said that I'm solely responsible for communicating 
to the commercial department what is going on in production."
(Page 153)
Peter Travers was more office-bound but nevertheless regarded his role 
of informant as being important. He had to rely on people from the
factory to come to him.
"It's back to the word-of-mouth again, we'd like to think that
people from the factory can come over, which happens a lot."
(Page 162)
As seen previously,Jim Brown was concerned with the reliability of 
the information supplied by others and of the informant himself. He 
was also concerned about the other's perception of his reliability 
as an informant, for if Jim was defined by others as un unreliable 
informant, it would jeopardise his position in the informant network 
and thereby starve him of important information. Jim actively checked 
on doubtful information he received, before passing it on to other 
managers.
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"I feel I must ensure that the information I've got is 
correct before I take it over to them and sometimes I 
have to go through ways that I shouldn't really have to, 
to ensure that it is correct."
(Page 153)
Managers were not only concerned by being defined by others as reliable 
or credible informants, they were equally concerned not to be defined 
as informers. Managers not only defined each other and themselves as 
being reliable suppliers of information, they also defined each other 
and themselves as being reliable receivers of information. On 
receiving information, which often included a description of another's 
actions, the manager would have to be careful to whom he passed it on, 
lest he be described as a "grass," "stool pigeon" or informer. David 
Clark and Kevin Linsey were recognised as having a close affiliation 
with senior managers and were suspected of passing on information to 
senior management; they were defined as informers and largely excluded 
from the informant networks (see Page 121).
Between the middle managers, information circulated relatively freely; 
however, between the middle managers and senior managers the informer- 
inforraant distinction was acute. On pages 134 - 135 both Charlie Johnson 
and Mike Shilling stressed that they did not often volunteer information 
to Cyril Jenkins; rather, they only responded to his enquiries. Cyril 
Jenkins, because of his status as a senior manager and because of his 
lack of credibility, was excluded from much of the information 
circulating within the middle manger informant networks, (pages 172 - 17&) 
Chris Davis in turn was cautious about supplying information to the 
middle managers which he receivedfrom other senior managers (Page 173).
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8 .6  Information and Conflict
As Mangham (1979) states, not all human behaviour can be viewed as co-op­
erative. Individuals can strategically manipulate the actions of others 
for their own interest. Managers were not above deliberately misinforming 
others to achieve their own objectives or goals. In the factory I 
observed that much of the managers behaviour in dealing with each other 
was co-operative, in that, the managers recognised that they must deal 
with each other to accomplish certain tasks. However, in some cases the 
managers' behaviour did appear to be unco-operative, antagonistic or in 
conflict. Conflict between individuals appeared to stem from two sources, 
these weifepersonal or strategic. In the organisation behaviour
or organisation theory literature, the fact that certain individuals 
actually dislike' each other or cannot "get along with each other" is 
ignored. However, I would suggest that in any social setting conflicts 
will develop between individuals based on their personal feelings towards 
each other. The cause of such animosity is difficult for the researcher 
to ascertain; however, the consequences of such animosity are very real.
The animosity between Jim Brown and Mike Shilling (page 132), which was 
essentially personal, manifested itself in a number of ways. Firstly, 
information flow between these two individuals was poor. Secondly, 
minor planning issues tended to be exaggerated and made an issue of.
And finally, there was a considerable amount of backbiting and one- 
up-manship. Each of these consequences had an impact on the working 
relationship between Jim and Mike and hence on the two departments.
Another example of personal dislikes creating conflict was between Martin 
Keyes and Charlie Johnson, the cause of such deep feelings was never
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made known to me, however the result of such conflict manifested itself 
in Charlie Johnson continually ridiculing Martin Keyes, openly behind 
his back and in a more disguised fashion during meetings when Martin 
was present. Again the result of this conflict was a non-existent flow 
of information between Martin and Charlie.
The middle managers were considerably less strategic than
the senior managers, (for example Chris Davis) in that they appeared
to have less career ambition. Simon White, Ron Welsh, Charlie Johnson,
Mike Shilling and Mike Sampey appeared to be quite content with the 
position they held in the organisation. However, Jim Brown, Peter Travers 
and Nigel Plant were more ambitious and strategic. Jim Brown was intending 
to become a Production Manager either at Avon or anotherR.T.G. Unit.To 
this end he was conscious of his performance sind was not above impeding 
other managers through the withholding of information or through deliber­
ately misinforming for his own personal gain. He continually criticised 
Mike Sampey as Production Controller and intimated that he was performing 
that function and should carry that title. His attempts at a plan for 
the Print Room (Mike Shilling's department) were less committed than for 
the other departments, the cause of which he attributed to inadequacies 
in that department. On Charlie Johnson's retirement Jim Brown was 
promoted to Departmental Production Manager, and was given charge of 
the Print Room, much to Mike's displeasure.
Thus there was a balance between co-operation and antagonism in the 
factory and information was used both for problem solving or decision 
making and for offensive or defensive purposes, (page 246 )
Not all tiis misinforming or withholding of information was combative
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that is, for offensive or defensive purposes but could be used for 
semi-legitimate purposes or for the "good of the company." Peter 
Travers cites an example on page 16? where he deliberately misinformed 
production to give them some breathing space.
"So if you like we assess what we think is going to happen and 
we add a certain amount of time to give ourselves a bit of 
breathing space. So we're putting pressure on maybe a week 
before the pressure really has to go on. But that's the only 
way we can safeguard our customer relationships and so on."
(Page 167)
8 ,7  Summary
The managers' definition of self both in terms of personal identity 
cind social identity played an important role in the process of informing. 
The managers would interpret the situation or event in terms of the 
impact it would have on them and their role within the organisation.
Managers were aware of the consequences to themselves of being ill 
informed and therefore gathered data to protect and enhance their 
status. Managers were further aware of the consequences to themselves 
of taking action on a misinterpretation or an incorrect definition of 
the event. In order to guard against this, managers thoroughly 
checked information on serious or important events, and information 
brought to their attention by unreliable informants.
Managers defined themselves as informants and were conscious of their 
perceived reliability as suppliers and receivers of information by 
others. To maintain one's position in an informant network and
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thereby have access to information from others, the manager had to 
reciprocate and in turn inform others with reliable information.
Not all behaviour in the process of informing was co-operative, 
managers may deliberately misinform another or withhold information 
for defensive or offensive purposes or to manipulate the other's 
response and thereby achieve their own goals or objectives.
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IMPLICATIONS FOR THE TRADITIONAL VIEW OF MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEMS: 
MEANINGFUL INFORMATION
The traditional view of management information, is that data, processed 
according to the prescriptions of the information system design, are 
somehow imbued with meaning. It appears that a fairly simple stimulus- 
response model of behaviour has been adopted. Information is regarded 
£Ls a stimulus which, in a given situation, or for a given problem will 
elicit a particular and predictable response.
However, from my observations, information, even when processed remained 
"data" or "mere" information until the manager assigned meaning to the 
data or’mere’’information through an interpretative process. Data or 
’’mere”information may still be regarded as a stimulus or trigger for 
action; however, rather than automatically producing a predictable 
response, a process of interpretation intervenes. Thus, if the 
information system is intended to provide managers with the information 
which is meaningful to them, it is necessary, as I have attempted to do, 
to consider the nature of the interpretative process.
Within the literature on management information systems a number of 
writers have explored less restricting definitions of information than 
"information is processed data." The most cited example is that of 
Mason and Mitroff's (1973) (page 205). Lucas Jr. (19.78) specifically 
discusses the "interpretation of data" and McCosh Rahaman and Earl 
(1981) state that:
"Human behaviour is seldom a direct response to objective 
reality, but is rather a response to the individual's 
perception of that reality."
McCosh Rahaman and Earl I98I
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These ideas are not entirely consistent with ray own, for I do not 
believe that individuals can successfully be categorised into 
"psychological types" (Mason and Mitroff 1973) which are consistent 
over time and space. I further do not agree that an "objective reality" 
exists; I would suggest that it is not an individual's perception of 
that reality but rather his construction of it. However, apart from 
these criticisms such concepts have failed to create a significant 
impact on the fundamental assumptions underlying the traditional view 
of management information systems. The literature is abundant with 
phrases such as:
"If a management information system is designed with social 
and behavioural design principles in mind, it is more likely 
to be effective and to be adaptable than if only the 
technical principles are concerned."
McCosh Rahaman and Earl I98I
Whilst I whole-heartedly agree with this principle, if designers 
have had social and behavioural principles in mind they appear to 
have had little appreciable impact on the typical management information 
system. Argryris (I98O)describes these behavioural principles ajs 
Caveats that merely camouflage the essential^unilateral control 
features of the systems.
The process of interpretation as noted in these chapters enables 
managers to form a definition of the situation or event by assigning 
meaning to the data or '\nere” information supplied to them or which 
they gather for themselves. They are in effect making sense of 
situations or "finding out what the hell is going on." As I have 
noted the important factors in the construction of a definition of a
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situation are; firstly, the physical and temporal properties of the 
situation or event. Secondly, the involvement of others in terms of 
the reliability of the sources of the mere information; the involvement 
of others in the situation or event, both in its cause auid its solution; 
and the anticipated impact on and response from others to the situation 
or to any action the manager may propose to take. Finally, the likely 
impact or consequences the situation, or any proposed action, may have 
on the manager's function or himself. The official documented informat­
ion with its pre-determined and quantitative format cannot hope to 
provide the richness of detail necessary to construct a full definition 
of the situation. And thus once again it is necessary to consider the 
role of the so called ” informal"information source, or to examine the 
process of informing in its entirety.
A further point to note from these past three chapters is that indiv­
iduals develop idiosyncratic approaches to interpreting, and thus, using 
information. Gorry and Scott Morton (1971) have noted that the typical 
management information system aggregates and summarises information as 
it filters up through the levels of management. The authors argue that 
such information is not the type required by the managers at the various 
levels. Neustad (i960)reinforces this point with an illuminating study 
of American Presidents:
"It is not information of a general sort that helps a President 
see personal staOces; not summaries, not surveys, not bland 
amalgams. Rather...it is the odds and ends of tangible detail 
that pieced together in his mind illuminate the underside of 
issues put before him. To help himself he must reach out as 
widely as he can for every scrap of fact, opinion, gossip, 
bearing on his interest and relationships as President. He 
must become his own director of his own central intelligence."
Neustad I96O
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Thus, it is argued by Gorry and Scott Morton that managers require 
significantly different types of information to carry out their function 
at the various levels of the organisation. I would further suggest that 
information requirements may not only differ between different levels 
but also within each level. Managers performing ostensibly the same 
functions may develop different approaches to, and therefore require , 
different types of information. Again, the typical management 
information system, with its restricted content, format and mode of 
presentation cannot hope to fulfil the particular requirements of each 
manager. Once again the"informal"sources are more flexible for this 
purpose•
Within the literature the purposes of management information systems 
most typically emphasised have been those of the planning and control 
of resources. Given this emphasis,the typical information system at 
production level is characterised by the measurement of pre-selected 
transactions (inputs and outputs). These measures, usually quantitative, 
are presented in a format which facilitates the comparison of measured 
performance with planned performance, either through variances or 
percentage efficiencies. The purpose of such a system is the detection 
and correction of error, Argyris (I98O), error being the discrepancy 
between actual and planned performance. The plans act as targets which 
motivate managers sind operators and act as a device which co-ordinates 
the activities of the various subsystems and individuals within the 
organisation and thus ensuring consistency between the various parts. 
Performance is evaluated by measuring the degree to which the targets 
were reached.
With this perspective the management information system is designed
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for control purposes, rather than for the process of informing.
Argyris (I98O) describes the management information system as a 
mechanism of unilateral control; Boland (1979) describes it as attempt­
ing to achieve 'control over' members of the organisation; and McCosh 
Rahaman and Earl (I98I) note "An organisation attempts to 'influence* 
the behaviour of its members through its MIS." The typical management 
information system, it appears, is not designed to provide the basic 
data for managers to "find out what's going on" or to make sense of the 
events or situations taking place within the organisation. In terms of 
informing the management information system may provide a basic 
referent to give the managers "a general view" or to inform them of 
"trends" which is a valid purpose. However, viewed as the single 
legitimate source it fails to provide the type of data managers require, 
at least at the operations level of an organisation.
If the purpose of a management information system is indeed for control, 
then its effectiveness is dependant on the members of the organisation, 
who are subject to this control, decoding, using and responding to the 
"information" supplied by the system. In the Avon factory this did not 
in fact happen. The managers explicitly stated that MADCAP was not a 
control document, (page IO6). I would suggest that our knowledge of 
the process of control, which the management information system may be 
part of, is as sadly lacking as our knowledge of the process of 
informing. Possibly a future observational research project may pose 
the question, How do managers control each other?
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NOTES
1. In Boland's (1979) terminology; an important "self indication" or 
what the individual pays attention to in dealing with information 
is himself or his role. This may be subsequently modified by 
interpretations or the myths, stories, symbols and ideals shared 
with others.
2. Gore (1956) notes that "being in the know" enhsuiced one's position 
within the organisation; the managers at Avon appeared to be aware 
of this.
3* Ambiguity, uncertainty or equivocality in the decision-making process 
has been recognised by a number of authors (Cohen March and Olsen 
(1972) Mintzberg (1973) Weick (1977); and Hayes Wolf and Cooper (I98I).)* 
Weick stresses thataperson may have to "act in order to find out what 
he is doing" or in ray rhetoric may have to "try it and see." These 
issues will be discussed in the following chapters.
4. Joint action will be discussed in chapters 9 and 10.
5 . Pettigrew ( 1972) examines the relationship of information and power, 
stating that an individual with access to information, could act
as a "gate keeper" and control the flow of information and thereby 
achieve his own goals or influence the outcome of a situation.
The references to Hayes Wolf and Cooper (198I) are drawn from 
a Working Paper. This paper has subsequently been published 
with the authorship re-arranged to Cooper Hayes & Wolf (I98I).
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CHAPTER 9
IMPROVISATION AND SELECTING 
A COURSE OF ACTION
In the previous section I stated that individuals acted towards things 
on the basis of the meaning those things had for them. Until now I have 
concentrated on the manner in which the managers at Avon assigned meaning 
to the data or ’mere' information they received from the various sources 
and thereby forming a definition of the situation. In this chapter I 
intend to examine in more detail, the process by which managers select 
or choose a course of action based on that definition of the situation.
9.1 Deciding On a Course of Action
The middle manaigers at the Avon factory were confronted with a continual 
series of events or situations, many of which were defined as problematic 
and as requiring action by them, by other managers or by both.^ The very 
definition of the situation itself would include an anticipation of the 
need for action by themselves, by others or the need to enter into joint 
action with others. I have noted that a manager would inform another of a 
situation or event if he defined it as requiring action by that other.
The process which remains to be explored is that of how a manager 
selects or decides on a course of action, given that he defines the 
situation as requiring action by him.
It is possible to view the multiplicity of problematic situations that 
confront a manager in his daily activities as a continuum, ranging from 
familiar, recurrent situations to unfamiliar, unique situations.
However, a situation is not familiar or unfamiliar in an objective
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sense: rather, the familiarity or unfamiliarity is part of the subject­
ive meaning that the situation has for the manager. It is the manager’s 
definition of the situation in terms of the degree of familiarity or un­
familiarity, that will place that situation on the above continuum. In 
keeping with the symbolic interactionists’ tradition I would suggest 
that a manager would act differently towards a situation that he defines 
as being familiar, than towards a situation that he defines as being 
unfamiliar. Thus, the degree of familiarity or unfamiliarity that a 
situation has for a manager will influence his choice or selection of 
a course of action.
9.2 Familiarity
If a manager defines a situation to be wholly familiar it has the following 
implications. Firstly, it implies that the situation is recurrent and 
that the manager has personal experience of what he takes to be similar 
situations in the past. Secondly, it implies that the manager is convinced 
or certain that the definition he holds of the situation is correct. 
Finally, it implies that the manager has experience of the consequences, 
both to himself and others, of any action he might have taken on such 
situations in the past. Thus, if the manager is satisfied with the 
consequences of his previous actions for similar circumstances in the 
past he may simply repeat that course of action for the contemporary 
situation. In other words the manager may act on ’’retained wisdom”
Weick (1977)» employ a ’’scripted response” Mangham(1979)or employ a 
’’programmed solution” Simon (I96O).
Schütz (1964) argues that much of our daily lives are governed by more 
or less patterned, repetitive forms of behaviour. I have noted above 
that familiarity implies that the manager is convinced or certain that
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the definition he holds of the situation is correct. Schütz (1964) 
however, suggests that such precision implied in the above statement is 
rare in an individual's daily life.
"From heritage and education from the manifold influences of 
tradition, habits and his own previous reflection, his store 
of experience is built up. It embraces the most heterogeneous 
kinds of knowledge in a very incoherent and confused state.
Clear and distinct experiences are intermingled with vague 
conjectures; suppositions and prejudices cross well proven 
evidences; motives, means and ends as well as causes and 
effects, are strung together without clear understanding of 
their real connections. There are everywhere gaps, inter­
missions, discontinuities. Apparently there is a kind of 
organisation by habits, rules and principles which we 
regularly apply with success. But the origins of our habits 
is almost beyond our control; the rules we apply are rules 
of thumb and their validity has never been verified."
Schütz 1964
Schütz (1964) argues that given this lamentable picture we are able to 
operate quite readily in our everyday lives, for the ideal of everyday 
knowledge is not certainty but just likelihood. Anticipation of 
future states of affairs are conjectures about what is to be hoped or 
feared, or at best, about what can be reasonably expected. Schütz 
describes this kind of knowledge as "cook book knowledge" and it is 
all we need for conducting the activities of our everyday lives. He 
depicts our lives as:
"performed by following recipes produced to automatic habits 
or unquestioned platitudes."
Schütz 1964
Thus, although a manager may not have absolute certainty about a 
situation he may nevertheless act towards that situation as if it were 
familiar or similar to previous situations. The manager's actions
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may be based on knowledge in terms of likelihood,not certainty,or on 
reasonableness,not accuracy (Weick 1977).
9 .3  Unfamiliarity
With this view, a degree of ambiguity is always present. If the manager 
defines a situation to be familiar or recurrent he may largely ignore 
this ambiguity. However, if the manager defines a situation to be unique 
or unfamiliar he will have explicitly recognised this ambiguity and the 
resulting uncertainty surrounding his selection of a course of action.^ 
All situations at one time, must be unique or unfamiliar to a manager, 
all situations at one time must be shrouded in ambiguity, uncertainty 
and equivocality. In defining a situation to be unfamiliar a number of 
actions may follow.
Firstly, a manager may seek to reduce ambiguity, uncertainty or equivoc­
ality by seeking additional information from other sources which may 
alter and thereby clarify his definition of the situation. On page 248 
I have noted that managers sought additional information from other 
sources to confirm or clarify their definition of a situation in ambiguous 
and critical situations, to avoid acting on a misinterpretation and 
thereby avoiding subsequent unpleasant consequences. Weick (1979) 
recognises the ambiguous, equivocal and uncertain nature of information 
and suggests that managers strive for a workable level or certainty.
In gathering additional information the manager is attempting to make 
the unfamiliar or ambiguous, familiar or unambiguous, whereby he can 
call into play his standard course of action.
Secondly, even if a manager forms a reasonable definition of a
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situation by gathering information from a variety of sources, he may 
still define the situation to be unique, and be uncertain of what course 
of action to adopt. In such a situation the manager may seek advice 
from another, who he feels might have experienced a similar situation 
in the past and who has a solution or an appropriate course of action. 
Jim Brown sought Charlie Johnson's advice on planning issues in view 
of Charlie's forty years experience on the shop floor. In such a 
situation the manager attempts to imitate or follow another's course of 
action. The manager in effect borrows wisdom from another.
Finally, a situation may remain ill-defined or unique to everyone. If 
a manager is unable to make the unfamiliar familiar and implement a 
standard course of action, or if he is unable to imitate or follow a 
borrowed course of action, he may simply opt not to take euiy action 
and thereby allow the problem to persist. However, if this is unaccept­
able, he will have to experiment with or develop a new or novel course 
of action.
Weick (1979) suggests that the above situation which depicts ambiguity 
and uncertainty surrounding both the definition of the situation and 
the selection of a course of action sis being characteristic of much of 
a manager's daily life. He depicts everyday events as surging rather 
than emerging, implying that these events occur suddenly rather than 
gradually. He depicts our daily lives as jagged and discontinuous 
rather than smooth and continuous. Surprises sure plentiful and 
puzzles more dogged than we would wish. Our daily lives then are 
uncertain, ambiguous and equivocal. He describes his view of an 
organisation as follows:
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"The metaphor we prefer is one which argues that organisations 
keep faüLling apart and they require chronic rebuilding. 
Processes continually need to be reaccomplished."
Weick 1979
This view of social life depicts the individual in a stream of surging, 
sudden, equivocal, uncertain events. Social order appears as a fragile
4
web continuously on the brink of chaos.
How then does a manager deal with a persistent ambiguity and uncertainty? 
How does a manager construct a new or novel course of action which is 
appropriate to the unique or unfamiliar situation he is faced with?
Schütz (1964) who fosters the portrait of a more patterned, habitual 
regularity to social life recognises that an individual will be confronted 
with situations which require him to stop and think, rather than simply 
doing or acting out his standard responses. Borrowing from the ideas of 
John Dewey, Schütz (1964) argues that in such a situation the individual 
will think in the "future perfect tense." In doing so he will plot out 
or imagine the outcome or consequences of a variety of alternative 
courses of action. However, he stresses that the alternatives will be 
grounded in the individual's stock of recipes" or in the "rules and 
skill arising out of his vocational life." Schütz argues that even if 
an individual seeks advice from some expert he will get nothing else 
than recipes and systematized solutions. He further argues that;
"His choice will be a deliberate one, and having rehearsed 
all the possibilities of action open to him in the future 
perfect tense, he will put in action that solution which 
seems to have the greatest chance of success."
Schütz 1964
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Schütz (1964) recognises that the rehearsed or imagined action may have 
gaps and discontinuities and the actor may have some uncertainty about 
its chances of success, therefore he may only retrospectively see 
whether it has "stood the test or proved a failure." (Schütz 1964).
Schütz*s insistence that the individual will rely on his stock of 
recipes or recipes from experts (or others) fails to account for 
situations where the alternatives "open" to an individual appear to 
have little or no "chance of success^ Schütz relies on the situations 
depicted above where the individual attempts to make the unfamiliar 
familieur or attempts to force a standard course of action to fit an 
ambiguous or uncertain situation. Schütz (1964) further fails to 
explain what happens when the course of action proves a failure; are 
we to assume that the individual embarks on an endless programme of 
trying out each of his standard recipes, hoping through trial and 
error to arrive at a suitable solution ?
Weick (1979) who fosters the portrait of a more irregular surging 
nature to social life suggest that we adopt a try-it-and-see" approach 
to persistently ambiguous, equivocal or uncertain situations. Weick 
argues that we must "act in order to see what we are doing." Thus, 
if a manager is confronted with a situation in which the definition 
is ambiguous or in which the course of action is uncertain, he is 
only able to make sense of that situation after he has initiated or 
taken some action. Weick does recognise that wisdom may be retained 
from experience of previous situations and actions, which in turn 
will impinge on contemporary action. Weick further recognises that 
an individual may think in the "future perfect tense" which he 
describes as thinking of the acts as if they had already been
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accomplished, however it is the "reflective glance" from this anticipated 
outcome that permits the act to be accomplished. Given that he recognises 
the above points Weick persists in stressing the concept that individuals 
and managers do not really know what they are doing until they have done 
it.
Where as I noted that managers did "try it and see" (page 249 ) I would 
suggest that their action must at least, be based on some previous 
enactment, recipe or imitation of another’s action. On the other hand,
I would further suggest that a manager may also develop new or novel 
approaches to unique unfamiliar situations. This is implicit in Weick*s 
concept of enactment selection and retention. Enactment entails the 
actor who is immersed in experiential streams bracketing, punctuating 
or chopping up the stream of experience into sensible, nameable and 
named units and then imposing relationships, typically causal relation­
ships,among the punctuated elements. In my interpretation, in order to 
judge something to be sensible or to name something, the individual will 
have had to have experience, either first hand or second hand, of these 
sensible named units. I feel that Weick whilst recognising the role 
of retained wisdom or retention fails to fully develop the process 
whereby previous experience impinges on the selection of a course of 
action in a current ambiguous, equivocal or uncertain situation.
Whereas Schütz errs towards the rigid adherence to recipes or standard 
action, Weick errs toward an almost foolish "Gung-ho," "devil-may-care" 
attitude. What is required is a metaphor which will link past experience 
or standard patterned behaviour with the development of new or novel 
forms of behaviour. The metaphor I propose is Jazz, with its twin 
concepts of improvisation and arraqpment,^^ and its emphasis on 
creativity, novelty and innovation.
270
9*4 Novelty Innovation and Improvisation
The term improvisation occasionally appears in the socüogical and 
social psychological literature; however, it does not appear to be 
developed. McCall and Simmons (I966) refer to the relationship between 
an individual's personal identity and social identity as being improvised 
to deal in some variable fashion with the broad demands of one's social 
position and one's character. The authors, however, fail to adequately 
define the term improvisation or to examine in depth the nature of the 
process. Strauss et al (I963) noted that;
"the administrative attitude is affected by a profound belief 
that care of patients calls for a minimum of hard and fast 
rules, and a maximum of innovation and improvisation."
Strauss et al I963
Once again the term improvisation is used, but not developed.
Although the term improvisation is not always used, the concept of 
developing or creating novel innovative courses of action in the face 
of ambiguous, uncertain or equivocal events or situations has been 
considered by various authors. March (1976) examines the process of 
choice in uncertainty in terms of "sensible foolishness" and 
"playfulness" as opposed to the traditional assumptions held in the 
literature on choice which are, the pre-existence of purpose; the 
necessity of consistency and the primacy of rationality. March (1976) 
suggests that such assumptions, if held by the decision maker, will 
restrict the choice process. As an alternative, and one which March 
(1976) suggests will promote innovative and novel solutions, it is 
necessary first to challenge the strictures against imitation, coercion 
and rationalisation and secondly to develop some strategy for suspending
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rational imperatives towards consistency, March (1976) suggests that 
although there are dangers in imitation, coercion and rationalisation, 
they may also be used to widen an individual’s perspective by imitating 
others; coercing the individual into exploring new avenues or courses 
of action; and permitting the individual to justify or assess their 
actions after they have enacted them, thus allowing for experimentation. 
The secondrrequirement entails devising a mechanism that will permit the 
individual to perform seemingly foolish acts. To this end March (1976) 
advocates playfulness which he describes as;
"the deliberate, temporary relaxation of rules in order to 
explore the possibilities of alternative rules.When we are 
playful, we challenge the necessity of consistency. In 
effect, we announce - in advance - our rejection of the 
usual objections to behaviour that does not fit the 
standard model of intelligence."
March 1976
By encouraging foolishness March (1976) suggests that creative, innovative 
solutions may be developed which will provide the flexibility and adapt­
ability necessary for an organisation to face a dynamic and changing 
environment. Other authors to use the concept of foolishness or playful­
ness are Miller (1973) and Weick (1977b).^
Mintzberg (1979) examines the structural configuration of an organisation 
which will permit sophisticated innovation. The type of structure 
required is termed an "adhocracy;" I shall refer to this concept sub­
sequently. Weick (1977b) suggests that organisations should be garrulous, 
clumsy, superstitious, hypocritical, monstrous, octopoid, wandering and 
grouchy to promote innovation and novelty.
The literature on creativity, creative processes and the management of
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creativity (Steiner 1965; Barron 1969; Stein 1975 and Manghara 19Ô2 ) 
examine both individual and organisational characteristics which may, or 
actually do, foster and promote creativity, innovation and novelty in 
the choice process and in the actions of individuals and groups.
Each of thèse authors recognise the value of creative, innovative, novel 
courses of action in dealing, not only with unfamiliar ambiguous, 
uncertain or equivocal situations but also to question the patterned, 
taken-for-granted standard responses to problem situations. Mangham 
( 1982 ,) suggests that;
"In every conceivable type of agency, creativity is at a 
premium if these bodies are to respond effectively to 
challenges which confront them."
Mangham 1982
Whereas many of the authors appear to be prescriptive or normative, 
implying that novelty, innovation and creativity should be encouraged, 
either by promoting individual creativity or designing appropriate 
organisations or structures, I would suggest that individuals in organ­
isations and certain individuals in the Avon factory were already 
creative and innovative; furthermore they had evolved means of 
developing and expressing their creative, innovative thoughts and 
actions within the existing organisation.
To describe and articulate this process of creativity and innovation 
within an organisation context I have chosen to use the metaphors of 
improvisation and arrangement as found in the music form of Jazz.
In order to find an adequate definition of these terms I shall now 
briefly examine the musicologie ail literature on improvisation in this
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chapter and in the following chapter I shall examine the notion of an 
arrangement.
9 .5 Jazz Improvisation
Music as a metaphor is not entirely unique. Lévi-Strauss constantly 
refers to the structural similarity between myth and music and declared 
that ;
"The myth and the musical work are like conductors of an 
orchestra, whose audience becomes the silent performers."
Lévi-Strauss 1970
Edmond Leach (1976) offers an explanation to this rather opaque 
statement:
"At one level he is simply making the point that senders and 
receivers of messages which are contained in cultural 
communications are very often the same pople. When we 
participate in ritual we 'say* things to ourselves. But 
the same sequence of behaviour may mean different things 
to different people. In general all Christian sects share 
the same myths and engage in the same rites, but they 
disagree passionately about what they mean."
Leach 1976
The remainder of the discourse enters into a detailed argument of 
the relationship between melody and metonymy and harmony and metaphor,
Faulkner (1973) examines the collective action of making orchestra 
music; he identifies the conductor as a focal participant and argues 
that his authoritative directives are socially constructed and 
sustained. He then discusses these concepts with regard to their
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implications for the study of organisational dynamics generally.
Specifically relating to Jazz a number of sociiogists have studied 
various aspects of Jazz, particularly in association to the musicians' 
communities, values, attitudes and beliefs. Stebbing(l966 - I968) 
examined the Jazz community and the class, status and power among 
jazz and commercial musicians. Becker (1951) examined the professional 
dance musicians' attitudes towards commercial music and his audience. 
Means (I968) used biographical data to examine the phenomena of 
jazz in terms of social mobility, social communication and self 
expression. Each of these studies present an illuminating picture of 
the life styles, attitudes, values, beliefs and community of the 
Jazzmen, without providing a working definition of the term improv­
isation.
Cameron (1954) provided some sociological notes on the jam session, 
the arena in which the jazz men experimented and strived to great 
lengths to achieve novel, innovative, improvisations. (I shall 
draw on this work in the following discussion.)
I have only been able to find one author who has related the musical 
concepts of improvisation and in this case modulation, to some aspect 
of human behaviour. Ramos (1978) a symbolic interactionist, provides 
an article entitled 'The Use of Improvisation and Modulation in Natural 
Talk: An Alternative Approach to Conversational Analysis.' The
argument, supported by a short conversation and follow-up interviews 
with the conversants as data, argues that a conversation may be seen 
as an extemporaneous composition produced by persons practicing the 
art of improvisation, and that conversants, like musical composers,
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make topic changes within extemporaneous compositions by using a 
procedure analogous to the modulation process used in music compos­
ition. Although this paper provides some interesting material sind 
ideeis, I feel it fails to develop the concept of improvisation fully 
enough; this is partly due to the fact that he works with a deficient 
definition of improvisation.
For a suitable definition of improvisation it is necessary to go to the 
musicology literature on Jazz, firstly to understand what Jazz is, what 
improvisation is and how it is employed in the musical performance.
Finding a definition for Jazz is exceedingly difficult,principally 
because it is difficult to define verbally the characteristics of an 
art which employs non-verbal mediaof communication. Musicologically 
it is possible to define the general principles of Jazz in terms of 
its unique phrasing, its harmony, its melody and its rhythm. Such 
a definition would be of little use in the issue in hand.
Possibly the most appropriate definition is that;
"Jazz is a players'music. Everything in it is subordinated 
to the individualities of the players, or derives from a 
musical situation when the player is supreme. A piece of 
jazz is not reproduced, or even recreated, but - ideally at 
least - created and enjoyed by its players every time it is 
played. Hence - once again ideally - no two performances 
of the same piece by the same band should be exactly alike."
Newton 1959
Within, this portrait of Jazz the individual musician strives for 
creative improvisation each and every occasion he performs. Although 
such extemes are rare in our everyday lives I shall argue that all
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behaviour at one time must have been improvised.
Dictionary definitions of the term improvisation resemble the following;
IMPROVISATION: The art of performing music spontaneously,
without the aid of meuiuscripts, sketches or memory. Also 
in a more restricted sense, the art of introducing improvised 
detail into written compositions.
Harvard Dictionary of Music
IMPROVISATION: The creation of a musical work or the final
form of a musical work as it is being performed. It may 
involve the work's immediate composition by its performers, 
or the elaboration or adjustment of an existing framework 
or anything in between.
Grove Dictionary of Music and 
Musicians.
Implied in the first definition, as well as in most lay persons' 
understanding of the terra, is the idea that improvisation is an 
activity which requires no forethought or academic definition. This 
definition however, is oversimplified and greatly distorts the 
complexities of doing jazz improvisation. (Ramos 1978). The 
second definition is more satisfactory, for Jazz is the art of 
extemporaneous composition or creation of a musical work during the
7
performance. Such creativity or composition can be of a complete 
work or merely ornamentation around notated parts.
A jazz musician, during a live performance, must know what he is 
doing. He must know the general framework on which he bases his 
improvisation which includes the following features of the composition
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or tune: the length, the thematic and harmonic structure, the length
of the different sections of the tune, the tonality of the tune. 
Moreover, he must know the chord progression on which the tune is based 
and the emotional quality of the tune. Coker (1964).
Therefore every jazz improvisation is based on a theme, the theme is 
usually a popular song. The jazz musician improvises by placing new 
melodic lines over the given harmonies of the song. He can do this by 
ornamentation, that is embellishing or making slight alterations in 
the song. Andre Hodeir (1956) calls this manner of improvising "para­
phrasing." He can also improvise by creating entirely new melodic lines 
over the given harmonies - a manner of improvising Hodeir calls the 
"chorus-phrase." The decorative embellishing "paraphrase" was the main 
improvisation of the older jazz forms. The "chorus-phrase" which 
creates entirely new melodic lines, is the main improvisatory manner 
of modem jazz (1945 onwards).
Thus a single theme, for instance the song "How High the Moon" with 
its related harmonies could be improvised in three different ways, 
by three different musicians. What is more,the improvisation may 
take the form of ornamentation or three completely different melodic 
lines could be introduced.
Herein lies the crux of the metaphor. Improvisation, i.e. developing 
or selecting a new innovative course of action is based on a theme or 
on a previously experienced course of action. I would suggest that 
a new course of action, surrounded by ambiguity and uncertainty, 
developed or selected by a manager must be grounded in his previous 
actions or in imijating others' actions. The improvisation may take
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the form of embellishment or ornamentation around the theme such that the 
theme remains recognisable, this is called paraphrasing. On the other 
hand the improvisation may be of a greater order where a dramatically 
new or novel form of behaviour is constructed, such that the theme ceases
g
to be recognisable, this is called chorus phrasing.
I have depicted familiarity and unfamiliarity, which implies certainty 
and ambiguiety, as a continuum. A situation or event may be more or less 
familiar or more or less unfamiliar. I would suggest that with greater 
defined familiarity improvisation will be of a lower order (paraphrasing), 
However, with greater defined unfamiliarity, improvisation will be of 
a greater order (chorus phrasing).
Repetition ^  Paraphrasing Chorus phrasing





The following are three examples taken from my field notes:
In Jim Brown's office.
Charlie Johnson According to Tim Rotoform 3 be down for 
a couple of days. The bottom heater is 
buggered.
Jim Brown (Glancing at a board) Ski 8 oz, 
collation; how many's formed?
Charlie Johnson 18, 20 thousand, 'bout half way through the run.
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Jim Brown They need them in dispatch noon tomorrow at the 
latest. (Again looking at his board). Rotoform 
1....(he paused for a moment), 
for stock really. I suppose we had better 
break the run, put the Ski collation on that.
Charlie Johnson Right OK. I'll get the tools switched, better 
tell Cyril though.
The standard response in dealing with rush orders was to switch the 
rush order to the least urgent order (usually a stock item). In this 
CcLse the situation was almost wholly familiar, and no improvisation 
took place. The action taken was a repetition of previous courses, 
of action.
On the shop floor: Jim Brown and Peter Travers were talking to Charlie
Johnson and Cyril Jenkins. The order they were discussing was a first 
time customer from Saudi Arabia, and therefore there was a great 
amount of concern.
Cyril Jenkins What's the state of play?
Jim Brown It's been down for an hour, doesn't look promising,
Charlie Johnson It's spraying oil on to the sheet, it will take a
while to clean the tool let alone fix the leak.
Cyril Jenkins Well we'd better get the tool out, get it ready 
for another machine. Jim which would be best?
Jim Brown Well that’s the problem, none would be best, 
Charlie you tell him.
Charlie Johnson I know it sounds bloody stupid but this job will 
only run on RDM 3« You see it's the oldest 
machine the bearings on the draw rollers are 
worn and it's the only one which can take this 
thickness of material. We have to put on more 
bottom heat to cope, and Tim says that's 
what's caused the leak.
Cyril Jenkins When are they needed,Peter?
Peter Travers Friday morning.
Jim Brown That gives us 8 shifts to run 200 thousand, 
that's cutting it fine without the breakdown.
Peter Travers The only thing I can think of is injection 
moulding (the sister plant at Aldershot). They 
make a 4 litre square lid, it's better quality 
and more expensive, but this could be a big 
customer.
Cyril Jenkins Yes, have they any stock?
Peter Travers Could find out.
Cyril Jenkins OK, and I'll have a word with Chris.
They brought the lids in from Aldershot and Chris Davis who was shocked
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that only one machine, and the most unreliable at that, was making 
such an essential lid decided that the injection moulding lids should be 
used from then on and customers noted of the increase in quality and 
price.
In this interaction the situation appeared familiar, yet it had a 
twist that required a novel solution, which was introduced into the 
interaction by Peter Travers. Peter was therefore improvising, he was 
in fact improvising on a theme. When extruder capacity was a major 
problem, extruded sheet was brought in from outside suppliers, John 
just embellished upon this theme. Although he admitted this to me 
afterwards he was still pleased that his solution worked.
In Chris Davis* office:
A meeting was called to discuss the implications of the Lorry Drivers' 
Strike and the Pickets at the front gate. Present at the meeting were 
Chris Davis, Cyril Jenkins, Ian Harrison, Peter Travers, Mike Shilling, 
Jim Brown, Charlie Johnson, Martin Keyes and Sean Davies. (The following 
are extracts from the meeting.)
Chris Davis outlined the situation. The pickets were not on RTG 
property and had every intention of preventing goods suid materials from 
entering or leaving the factory. He then requested comments:
Mike Shilling If they don't let anything in or out we'll just
have to shut down.
Cyril Jenkins OK, I agree, but that must be the last resort.
we don't want to lose production or orders 
from the customers.
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Peter Travers We're aill in the same boat; Sweetheart Plastics 
and Metal Box have pickets at their gates so we're 
not going to loose any orders.
Jim Brown I know this won't help production but are the 
pickets at the outside warehouses? ( RTG had no 
warehouse facilities on site but rented space 
from other local firms).
Sean Davies Pickets are everywhere, the whole of Elliswood 
Estate is closed down.
Martin Keyes If we can't get goods to the customers why don't 
we keep the machines running by building stock.
Charlie Johnson And where are we going to bloody store them? 
There's nowhere on site.
Cyril Jenkins Well we've got a little room in the loading bay, 
but we would fill that in a day.
Martin Keyes We could cut back on production, maybe only work 
one shift or three days, then we wouldn't fill 
up the loading bay so quickly.
Charlie Johnson Why should we? We still can't get the goods to 
the customers. All we'd have is more bloody 
congestion when we started working at full 
capacity again.
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Peter Travers No. Wait a minute. There's some sense in
what Martin says. It would be good to have some
stock for Van den Berghs and Birds Eye
so we could send them out immediately after the
strike, otherwise we will lose customers. They'll
try Sweethearts and Box,if we haverft got any
stock.
CThe conversation then centred around what goods to concentrate on and 
which individuals would be laid-off)
Chris Davis OK. That's worth considering, but it's not much 
of a solution...Assuming we close down or cut 
back how do our customers stand, what levels of 
stock have they got?
Mike Shilling It doesn't matter really, they're going to be 
picketed as well. If they're not producing 
anything they won't need pots.
(A general murmur of agreement.)
Jim Brown Ah, but is that right? They're not picketing 
food manufacturers. Birds Eye, Van den Berghs, 
Walls, Cadburys, Express Dairies, Rowntrees; 
they're all food manufacturers. So they can 
go on producing until they run out of containers.
Chris Davis If you look at it that way I suppose RTG Plastics 
is part of the food producing industry.
Peter Travers Yeh, if they haven't got containers they can't 
produce the goods.
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Jim Brown It's all part of a long chain,
Chris Davis But will the pickets agree? Sean, you know some 
of the drivers.
Sean Davies It might work, but remember we make other goods,
I mean the seed trays, they're not for the food 
industry, and they know that.
Chris Davis Well we could cut that run, a representative 
could come in and make sure we're producing 
nothing but food containers.
Persuading the pickets took a long time. Union Representatives hg^ d to 
be contacted but they finally agreed.
The Lorry Drivers'Strike was a unique situation; RTG Plastics had no 
experience of such a situation before. Ambiguity, uncertainty and 
equivocality surrounded both the definition of the situation and the 
selection of a course of action. Following this interaction through, 
vividly depicts the process of improvisation. Chris Davis presented 
data or what he knew about the situation. Mike Shilling's immediate 
response was a standard or imitated theme; production plants through­
out the country were closing down because of the Pickets. At such 
an early stage in the discussion this course of action was defined 
by Cyril Jenkins as unacceptable. The following interaction was an 
attempt to clarify the situation by seeking additional information. 
Peter Travers informed the meeting that their competitors were in 
"the same boat." Jim Brown questioned whether the warehouses were 
picketed. This avenue was closed when Sean Davies informed them
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that they were. At this stage Martin Keyes introduced another theme, 
that of building stock. Stock building could be defined as a standard 
thieme, it was RTG Plastic’s practice to build stock at Christmas when 
orders were low.
Charlie Johnson, in addition to disliking Martin Keyes (see page 252 ) 
quashed this suggestion as he felt it was unreasonable i.e. it was 
not feasible to store the goods on site. Cyril Jenkins however picked 
upon on this theme, and played through or thought in the future perfect 
tense. Martin Keyes was quick to improvise i.e. work a three day week. 
Charlie Johnson again anticipated the consequences and again decided 
that this suggestion was unreasonable; the goods still could not be 
transported and congestion would result. Peter Travers, thinking 
in commercial terms, emphasised a different set of consequences, 
suggesting that by building some stocks they could have edge over 
their competitors when the strike ended. Further information was then 
exchanged.
Chris Davis took the point but did not regard it as a particularly 
worthy solution. He then switched the thrust of the discussion from
9
a production orientation to a customer orientation. Mike Shilling, 
noted for his negative disposition, attempted to "put the dampeners" 
on the discussion once again. Jim Brown, who as I have noted 
(page 252 ) did not particularly like Mike, introduced a new element 
into the discussion. It was at this stage that the real improvisation 
took place. This new theme was grounded in Jim's second hand know­
ledge that food manufacturers were not picketed, and his own realis­
ation that most of RTG Plastic's customers were food manufacturers. 
Playing this theme through Chris Davis began to redefine the
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situation and in doing so the whole nature of RTG Plastics. Until that 
point RTG Plastics was in the packaging industry, now it was in the food 
processing industry. Peter Travers and Jim Brown were quick to realise 
the potential of this definition and gave support to Chris Davis. A 
new course of action now emerged which was to persuade the Pickets to 
allow food containers to be transported. However, the interaction did 
not finish here. Chris Davis anticipated or thought in the future 
perfect tense that the Pickets might not be easily persuaded. He 
therefore tested the reasonableness of his new course of action by 
questioning Sean Davies who was a personal friend of the Pickets. Sean 
Davies commented that the solution was a possibility and had some 
chances of success.
In this process of improvisation, a novel innovative solution was 
created which fulfilled the other definitional requirement of the term 
creativity, in that the solution was accepted as useful, tenable if 
not entirely satisfying,by the other managers who would constitute 
the significant others (see chapter note 8).
The key points to the process of improvisation are that a manager will 
call into play a theme or standard course of action. He will play 
that theme through, either in minded behaviour (see page 237 ) or in 
an interaction, that is, by taMng it through with others. If the 
anticipated outcome is reasonable, he might simply act out or repeat 
the selected theme. If the theme is not entirely appropriate, he 
might alter the theme, through paraphrased or chorus phrased improv­
isation. If the improvisation does not appear to work within the 
ambiguous context on hand, he will then call into play a new theme 
and improvise around that. This process will continue until the
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manager arrives at a course of action which appears to be appropriate 
or reasonable to his definition of the situation, which in itself may 
be highly ambiguous.
The above analysis still pre-supposes that an individual is able to 
construct a course of action prior to taking action, that is it assumes 
the individual deliberately selects a course of action. This view is 
in keeping with Thomas (1937) where he states:
’’Preliminary to any self determined act of behaviour there is 
always a stage of examination and deliberation.”
Thomas 1937
In such situations, which do occur, the improvisation will be intro­
duced prior to taking action. However as noted by Schütz (1964) such 
anticipations or rehearsals are incomplete, they have gaps euid dis­
continuities. It might be, that during the action, the manager may have 
to alter his course of action by further improvisation or by introducing 
a new theme which in turn may be improvised around. This occured in the 
example of the black specks in the extruded sheet (see page 164 )
where a number of themes were called into play. Thus improvisation could 
take place during the action. This is in keeping with the view of Manis 
and Metzer (1978).
’’Human beings construct their behaviour in the course of its 
execution.”
Manis and Meltzer 197&
Finally improvisation might take place after the action is completed, 
As Weick (1977) states:
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’’Sense making in each of these cases often involves the 
individuals examining reflectively their own action, 
in order to discover what they have done and what the 
meanings to those actions are.”
Weick 1977
Thus the manager may rationalise his action after it has been carried 
out. If the action is not wholly appropriate he might then improvise 
during the ’’post mortem” and introduce those improvisations into 
subsequent courses of action for what are taken to be similar 
situations in the future.
9.6 Improvisation and the Creation of Standard Themes
I have noted on page 276 that all situations at one time must be 
defined to be unfamiliar or unique and therefore all courses of action 
must have their base in improvisation. How then do standard themes or 
regular, patterned courses of action emerge on which future improvis­
ations take place? Again it is possible to refer to the literature 
of jazz for an explanation of this process.
Continual performances by jazz musicians ensured that the most 
important jazz improvisations became classics or standards. A chorus 
phrase of excellence would be played over and over again, with minor 
embellishments, until it became recognised as one of that musician's 
standard themes. Such standard themes were recorded or remembered 
by other jazz musicians. They were then imitated and/or improvised 
upon by these other musicians to the level of skill and ability the 
imitator was able to achieve.
Thus a course of action which may be retrospectively deemed to be 
reasonable or appropriate in a given context or for a given definition
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of a situation would be repeated and initiated by others thus becoming 
a standard course of action. This theme could then be subjected to 
future improvisation by the creator or by the imitator. The two examples 
of improvisation cited above became standards and were absorbed into the 
total set of patterned behaviour that went to make up the factory's 
social order. The more expensive yet more reliable source of lids 
continued to be brought in from the injection moulding division at 
Aldershot and the managers continued to define RTG Plastics as being 
in the food manufacturing industry.
Each act, no matter how habitual,must have its origins in an individual's 
inspiration or improvisation? however the origins of our behaviour are 
often beyond our recognition (Schütz 1964). Our actions,through 
repetition,become taken-for-grsinted auid cease to be credited to the 
originator.
9 ,7  The Individual's Ability to Improvise
From my observations it appeared that certain individuals were more 
willing and able to improvise than others. Jim Brown, Peter Travers 
and Chris Davis often engaged in imagining or experimenting with new 
or novel courses of action for unique, unfamiliar situations and new
or novel courses of action for recurrent familiar problems. Jim
Brown introduced planned maintenance to solve the problem of unreliable 
machines (see page 101 ), Chris Davis introduced a three shift system
to increase capacity and Peter Travers introduced a longer lead time
for customer orders to minimise the occunence of rush orders. Other 
managers, namely Charlie Johnson, Mike Shilling and Martin Keyes 
appeared to be less able to improvise. As noted in the example of
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the Lorry Drivers' Strike Mike Shilling simply stated the most obvious 
theme or course of action and stuck with it. When Jim Brown was appointed 
as Planner, Mike Shilling who had held the post in the past, predicted 
that Jim Brown would fail to implement planning, he held the view that 
it could not be done. Charlie Johnson with his forty years experience 
was very habitual in performing his function and found the rapid changes 
introduced by the "bright boys" of RTG "difficult to cope with." Martin 
Keyes although a "bloody good machine operator" failed to cope with the 
job of Planner and Material Controller.
With closer observation of who I regarded as the more creative, innovative, 
improvising managers, namely Jim Brown, Peter Travers and Chris Davis, 
they displayed the following characteristics. Firstly, they had high 
levels of energy, actively involving themselves in situations and events, 
seeking out information from a variety of sources. Each of these 
managers visited the shop floor at least once a day and Jim Brown visited 
it more often. Secondly, each manager tended to view the status quo, the 
rules and traditional ways of getting things done as something that could 
be adjusted or modified. Rather than viewing convention as sacred, they 
regarded it as something that could be undermined or manipulated. Chris 
Davis was defined as a "trouble shooter" and was there to "sort things 
out" as he had done in RTG Cups. Jim Brown on being appointed as Planner 
questioned what he defined as the fallacies about what could and could 
not be done (see page 146). Peter Travers was promoted because of the 
chsmges he introduced in the Sales Department and the contribution he 
made to production planning. Thirdly, each manager desired to excel, 
not necessarily at the expense of any other party, rather they were 
interested in achievement or doing something well. Jim Brown was 
acutely aware of his personal and social identity and desired
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recognition as a competent manager and desired to avoid the stigma of 
being defined as a "bloody idiot," (page I5I).
Within the literature on creativity a number of characteristics are 
associated with creative individuals. Barron (I969) lists the following; 
spontaneity, relatively little interest in relations with others, 
independence, impulsiveness, self-assertion and non-conformity. Stein
(1974) lists self-confidence, courage, tolerance of ambiguity, and the 
capacity to move forward in the face of anxiety. These characteristics 
have been identified in highly creative individuals and I would hesitate 
to attribute them all to Chris Davis, Peter Travers and Jim Brown. 
However,these characteristics all connote high energy, a propensity 
towards non-conformity and a desire to move ahead or excel. The 
msuiagers at Avon no doubt exhibited these characteristics to a lesser 
degree than the creative artists and scientists;however, they exhibited 
them to a greater degree than the majority of other managers in the 
factory.
Apart from personal or individual characteristics, a number of authors 
have cited what might be described as organisational characteristics 
which may promote or impede creativity, innovation and improvisation.
Weick (1979) notes that organisations viewed and operated on the 
"military" metaphor may induce repeated, patterned solutions to even 
new or unique solutions and as noted on page 271 Weick (1977b) suggests 
that organisations should be deliberately garrulous, clumsy, super­
stitious, hypocritical, monstrous, octopoid, wandering and grouchy 
to break patterned behaviour and induce a more novel, innovative
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approach to problem solving or decision making. Cohen, March and Olsen 
(1972), view organisations as "garbage cans" or "organised anarchies" and 
as noted on page 271 advocate that innovation in such an organisation may 
be fostered by encouraging a technology of foolishness. Mintzberg (1979) 
suggests that "adhocracies" are appropriate structures for organisations 
that require creative innovation, for example; a space agency, an 
avant-garde film company, or an integrated petro-chemicals company.
Hayes, Wolf and Cooper (I981) relate the model of organised anarchy and 
the technology of foolishness to a budgetary control process, suggesting 
that whereas the budgetary control process may facilitate imitation, 
coercion and rationalisation they rarely, if ever, facilitate playfulness. 
The authors suggest that by reducing the emphasis on performance evaluation 
as prescribed by Hofstede (1967) a gamelike quality may be recognised which 
may improve motivation and facilitate self-actualisation (Maslow 1959)• 
Furthermore Hayes, Wolf and Cooper (I981), based on the works of Wilson 
(1966), suggest that creativity, innovation and experimentation may be 
stimulated by an accounting system with ambiguity, high complexity, low 
formalisation and decentralisation,and note that informal systems with 
their thick description (Geartz 1973) and multiple meanings (Clancy and 
Collins 1979) may incorporate the characteristics required.
Argyris (1971) suggests that the pursuit of the total information system 
ideal may lead to increased rationality in managers lives which may 
restrict their psychological freedom. As Argyris notes:
"How would individuals react to increased rationality in their 
lives? Will they think as many humanists believe, namely that 
information science rationality can lead to a mechanistic and
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rigid world which, because of its narrow concept of efficiency, 
will dominate man and his humaness."
Argyris 1971.
Stein (1975) suggests that patterns of communication may promote or 
impede creativity. He suggests:
"that centralised networks are good to collect information in 
one place. But if we expect to do something with the inform­
ation then decentralised networks are better."
Stein 1975
This observation is particularly interesting if considered in 
parallel with the concept of "local" and "global" information. 
Galbraith (1977) and "formal" or "informal" information.
The official documented, formal information tends to be centralised, 
presenting some global view of certain processes or transactions in 
the organisation. Such systems may be efficient for collecting 
information in one place, however the type of information tends 
to be abstract, quantitative and concerning common recurrent events 
or situations. Argyris (I980) describes this type of information 
as "distant MIS" and suggests that it induces individuals; to think 
abstractly and rationally; to conceptualise stable variance and 
general overall conditions and trends; to distance self from 
processes that produce results, and focus primarily upon the results 
of the performance; to identify errors that are exceptional; and 
to infer causality from information lacking specificity of causal 
processes or mechanics.
On the other hsind informal information tends to be decentralised.
294
presenting a local and highly specific view of certain events and 
processes. The information tends to be highly specific, richly 
descriptive, qualitative, timely and reliable. Furthermore,from the 
data presented in chapter 4 it appeared that the managers at the 
Avon factory used the informal information extensively during their 
daily activities. Argyris (I980) suggests that this type of 
information which he describes as "local MIS" induces individuals; 
to think concretely and intuitively; to conceptualise variable 
processes and specific conditions; to become close to the processes 
that produce results, and focus on them as much as on the results; to 
identify errors and correct them before they become exceptional; and 
to infer causality from information rich with situational causality 
related to specific mechanisms.
The portrait of responses depicted by Argyris (1980)for the local MIS 
appears to incorporate some of the characteristics necessary for 
creative innovation or improvisation. The local MIS produces the 
type of information that managers require to form an acceptable or 
appropriate definition of the situation on which they select a theme 
and improvise upon it.
Within the factory at Avon another factor which encouraged creativity, 
innovation and improvisation was the appointment of Chris Davis and 
other "bright young boys of RTG." Chris Davis was himself a creative 
individual and appreciated that quality in others. He re-ordered the 
management structure giving key positions, notably production 
planning, to energetic and creative managers such as Jim Brown. Thus 
the ability to improvise was rewarded by promotion (Jim Brown was 
subsequently promoted to Departmental Production Manager). Steiner
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(1975) suggests that to foster creativity in organisation channels 
for advancement should be based on creative actions. Thus, within 
the organisation there was a climate, created principally by Chris 
Davis, which fostered and encouraged improvisation. Acts of 
improvisation were considered and rewarded along with increased 
productivity and efficient utilisation of resources. Mangham 
1982 ) notes the importance of a leader who is able to encourage, 
support, co-ordinate, direct and evaluate the efforts of other 
members of the organisation.
9 .8  Agreement and Negotiation
In the examples of repetitive behaviour, paraphrased behaviour and 
chorus phrased behaviour, cited in Section 9*5 , the selection of a 
course of action in each case took place during an interaction. A 
number of managers were thus engaged in selecting a course of action 
which in turn resulted in further joint action by them. The implicit 
agreement to switch the rush order, entailed Charlie Johnson in 
rearranging his workforce and Jim Brown in rearranging his plan. 
Jointly agreeing to purchase lids from the injection moulding plant 
entailed further action being taken by the Material Buyer, Peter 
Travers, Jim Brown and Charlie Johnson. The Lorry Drivers’ Strike 
agreement, entailed further action by Sean Davies in negotiating 
with the Drivers, Peter Travers in contacting the suppliers and 
Jim Brown in scheduling-out the non-food container orders. These 
examples may be defined as a process of getting something accomplished 
when parties need to deal with each other to get those things done.
Strauss (1978) argues that one of the ways of accomplishing something 
when parties need to deal with each other is through negotiation.
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The study of negotiations origininated in I963 with a paper by Strauss
et all,which reported on an empirical study conducted in two hospitals.
In this study Strauss et al argued that individuals enter into joint
action through agreement and that agreement is achieved through a
process of negotiation. They went on to conclude that social order;
the set or rules, norms or procedure that allow for a taken-for-
granted, expectable, non-surprising orderliness could be viewed as a 
11negotiated order.
In the intervening seventeen years a number of authors have written on 
the subject of negotiations. Within the field of medical sociology 
by Schatzman and Bucher (1964; Bucher and Stalling (I969), and Bucher 
(1970). Outside this field by Scheff (I968); Campanis (1970); Hall 
(1972); Emerson (1973); Abrahams (1975); Morgan (1975); Blankenship
(1976); Zimmerman and Lawrence (1977)andMaines (1977). Throughout 
this ever expanding literature it is surprising that whereas each 
author freely uses the term negotiation to depict the process of 
reaching agreement through interaction, nowhere is there a precise 
definition or general working description of a negotiation.
It appears that each author has taken-for-granted the definition of a 
negotiation and simply expresses it in rather nebulous terms such as 
"bargaining" or "reaching an agreement." In fact Strauss (1978) 
provides thirteen synonyms of the term negotiation.
"bargaining, wheeling and dealing, compromising, making 
deals, reaching agreement after disagreements, making 
agreements, getting tacit understandings, mediating, power 




Strauss (1978) then supplies two dictionary definitions:-
"to treat for, obtain or arrange by bargain, conference and 
agreement."
"to deal or bargain with another or others...to confer with 
another so as to arrive at."
Strauss provides further guidance when he argues that these definitions 
give no clear distinction between negotiation and agreement arrived at 
without negotiation or between negotiation and other modes of attaining 
desired ends, such as persuasion, appealing to authority or the use of 
coercion or coercive threat.
He describes the distinction between agreement without negotiation and 
agreement through negotiation thus;
"I would draw a crucial distinction between agreement and 
negotiation (which always implies some tension between the 
parties less they would not be negotiating.) People can 
agree about something without negotiating (Here’s/#10 for 
your goods: Take it or leave it.)"
Strauss 1978
The phrase so casually bracketed "(which implies some tension between 
the parties less they would not be negotiating)" is in my view crucial 
to the entire concept of negotiations and requires more detailed 
treatment.
Strauss finally concludes that negotiations are:
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"One of the possible means of getting things accomplished 
parties need to deal with each other to get those things 
done."
Strauss 1978
This in my view is not a satisfactory definition. Martin (1976) provides 
further guidance. He describes negotiation as a process of coming to 
terms, he distinguishes this from bargaining which is merely an exchange 
whereas negotiation involves other strategies including bargaining. He 
further adds that negotiations are always centred on shared interests, 
in that both parties have vested interests in the overeill interaction 
and these interests are salient in the process of coming to terms. This 
definition is so general that it may include all interaction in which 
agreement is reached; however, this view is refuted by Strauss. Further­
more, the other strategies he mentions are defined as "activities designed 
to influence an individual or group to act in a way that accords with 
one's goals." Such strategies presumably include pursauding, educating, 
manipulating, appealing to rules or authority and coersion. Strauss 
(1978); however, explicitly states that such strategies are not 
negotiations. Martin (1976) finally provides a set of pre-conditions 
that are required for a negotiation to take place, included in which are 
the need for disagreement and or ambiguity. A further contradiction is 
introduced by using the term ambiguity for the term vested interest and 
the concept of one's goals implies that the negotiator knows what he 
wants out of the negotiation or knows the nature of the agreement he 
desires before the negotiation. However, ambiguity as I have described 
it, implies uncertainty about the definition of the situation and the 
desired course of action or outcome.
The key characteristics of a negotiation implied in the work of
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Strauss (1978) and Martin (1976) are: Firstly, the parties recognise
that they need to deal with each other to get something done. Secondly, 
the parties have a "vested interest" or "stakes" in the outcome of the 
interaction, this in turn implies that they have some notion of their 
desired outcome and of the way to achieve it. Thirdly, the parties are 
initially in "disagreement" about the desired outcome auid the way of 
achieving it. Fourthly, there is "tension" between the parties over 
the issue in hand. Fifthly, the parties are unable or unwilling to 
achieve "agreement" by the use of persuasion, appeals to authority, 
coersion or coersive threat. Finally, the issue on hand is such that 
the parties are unwilling to abandon it until they have reached agreement 
or come to terms.
I would suggest that these characteristics apply only to very specific 
types of interactions, notably in the area of labour bargaining, diplo­
matic negotiations, arms control negotiations, conflict resolutions and 
market bargaining. They do not, however, characterise the vast bulk of 
managers' daily interactions where ambiguity surrounds the nature of 
the desired outcome and the way of achieving it, and where there is no 
tension between the parties over the issue involved. Negotiations do 
take place in our society and organisations. However, it is not 
wsirrantable to apply what to me is a very restrictive metaphor to the 
fuller range of interactions that take place between interpreting and 
acting individuals in their daily lives. The lack of a specific 
definition or the existence of a too general definition of negotiation 
has led to just his. Couch (I98o)notes this state of affairs in terms 
of Stauss' (1978) work:
"He repeatedly tends to equate negotiation processes with 
interaction processes. However even the most cursory
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reading of this material will inform one that Strauss does not 
equate the term negotiation with interaction. Through usage, 
it becomes clear that negotiating activity refers to a 
particular form of interaction, but what is distinctive about 
that form is not specified."
Couch 1980
I recognise that negotiations do take place in organisations as do the 
use of power and politics in the form of persuasion, appeals to 
authority, coersion and coersive threat. However, such concepts do not 
explain all interactions; a further metaphor is required to explain 
how agreement is reached to enter into joint action in situations of 
uncertainty and lack of tension.
9*9 Collective Improvisation
Remaining within the jazz metaphor I suggest that it is possible to
view the interactions cited above as being a process of collective
improvisation, or the product of some previous collective improvisation
in the example of the rush order. In the earlier forms of jazz,
improvisation was typically performed by a single soloist whilst the
12remainder of the band performed the role of the rhythm section. In 
later forms of jazz collective improvisation was introduced.
Jazz performance with collective improvisation continues to be based 
on a theme or song. The soloist would then collectively improvise 
around the basic theme. Although variations on the process of collective 
improvisation exist,the basic principles of it are as follows: Having
set the basic theme for the performance, a soloist (the leading soloist) 
would introdce his improvisation, this established a second order theme 
for the other soloist(s) to interpret and in turn improvise upon. The 
second soloist(s) might alter the course of the improvisation with their
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interpretation. The leading soloist would then have to respond to this 
new interpretation, possible by adjusting the course of his improvisation 
by repeating his initial second order theme in an attempt to bring the 
other soloist(s) into line with his initial improvisation or by intro­
ducing yet another theme.
What is particularly significant about collective improvisation is that 
apart from the leading soloist's introduction the improvisors perform 
simultaneously. The soloist does not wait for the other to finish his 
improvisation before embarking on his own, but rather, the soloists 
compose and perform their improvisation whilst at the sametime listening 
to and interpreting or anticipating the course of the other soloist's 
improvisation. In this way there is a continual process of interpret­
ation, improvisation and performance; a continual process of adjustment 
and readjustment, alignment and realignment or creation and recreation.
A collective improvisation therefore, is not a neat structured perform­
ance or interaction, with a gesture followed by a response followed by 
another gesture followed by another response, rather, gesture and 
response merge, such that they become almost indistinguishable.
Through the continual process of sdignment and adjustment a superord­
inate theme emerges, which all the soloists will agree upon and play 
in unison for the finale. If the improvisation appears to be ending 
or to have exhausted its potential before the superordinate theme 
emerges, a soloist might introduce a more novel theme and thereby 
give additional impetus to the improvisation by opening up new channels 
for exploration. Alternatively, the collective improvisation could 
break down or result in cacophony. Cacophony, however is rare, for 
if the improvisation appears to be breaking down, a soloist will stress
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and restress the initial theme of the song to allow the other musicians 
to readjust their performances. The initial theme would act as a basic 
referent to reallign the individual improvisations.
It is possible to interpret the interaction over the Lorry Drivers'
Strike as a collective improvisation resulting in some superordinate 
course of action or agreement. Chris Davis introduced the basic theme, 
which was to decide on what course of action to adopt, in view of the 
strike and Pickets. Mike Shilling introduced a theme which permitted 
little or no improvisation. After a period of readjustment Martin 
Keyes introduced his theme. During this interaction the managers were 
not simply listening to each other but were engaging in minded behaviour, 
that is, they were constructing a response as soon as they caught the 
drift of the other person's line of argument and before it was fully 
expressed. The response which might simply be critical (Charlie 
Johnson's) or include an improvised or alternative theme (Cyril Jenkin's 
and subsequently Jim Brown's) would be constructed whilst the other 
person was expressing his suggestion. In some interactions the response 
may be introduced before the other person has completed his suggestion, 
this is reflected in the number of times the phrases "let me finish" or 
"I haven't finished yet" enters into the more heated discussions. On 
the other hand prematurely anticipating the drift of the suggestion 
might result in a misinterpretation of it, this again will be reflected 
in the number of times the phrases "you've got me wrong" or "that's 
not what I meant" are introduced. In such situations, which repeatedly 
occured at the Production Meetings, the initial performer would restate 
his suggestion in an attempt to clarify the misinterpretation, which 
was not always successful.
Half way through the interaction over the Lorry Drivers' Strike it
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appeared that the only solution was to cut back production and build 
stocks. Thus the interaction was about to end. Chris Davis however, 
revitalised the interaction by introducing a new theme; that of the 
customers' position. This in turn led to further improvisation until 
Jim Brown "struck the right chord" which was the beginning of the 
superordinate theme or agreement. Chris Davis responded to this idea 
and developed the theme, Jim Brown and Peter Travers picked up on the 
theme and joined in the finaleT. Thus agreement was reached through 
collective improvisation, the outcome of the interaction was not 
predictable from the initial theme and therefore the managers were 
not negotiating for their vested interest, goals or desired outcome, 
rather they were collectively creating a novel innovative solution.
Not all interactions or meetings in the factory led to such a satis­
factory solution, much of the managers criticisms of the Production 
Meetings (page 115 ) were directed at the lack of action resulting from 
these meetings. The meetings often resulted in cacophony with ill- 
feeling between the managers. The first meeting to set up a working 
party (page 34) is an example where the interaction virtually collapsed 
because of the hostility between Cyril Jenkins and David Wright. In 
this instance Chris Davis had to intervene and realign the course of 
the meeting. Another factor to determine the outcome of a collective 
improvisation is the skill of the performers. If Jim Brown had been 
absent from the meeting the solution might never have emerged. Jim 
Brown's introduction as Planner transformed the Planning Meeting which 
until then had failed to cope with the problems over production planning. 
Thus, the outcome of a collective improvisation is the product of those 
people involved and of that moment in time. Had Chris Davis been 
called away to a pressing engagement the interaction might have ended
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with the decision to cut back production and build stock. Had other 
managers been present another course of action might have been adopted.
I am not suggesting that all interactions are collective improvisations. 
The initial progress meetings between the working party where Chris Davis 
subtly persuaded us or guided us into producing a production information 
format that would conform to the MADCAP programme (page 43). In these 
instances Chris Davis knew what he wanted and therefore the interactions 
were not improvisations as such. However the initial conception of 
MADCAP by Chris Davis eind James Cook could well have been a process of 
improvisation, Chris Davis was simply repeating a successful course of 
action that he had experienced at RTG Cups (page 67). Although inter­
actions might be characterised by negotiations, appeals to rules or 
authority, coersion, persuasion and threat the initial themes introduced 
by the parties will have at one time been created by a process of 
individual or collective improvisation.
9 .10 Summary
Before embarking on a course of action an individual will attempt to 
find out what's going on. He will receive or gather information or data 
from a variety of sources about the event or situation and about the 
identity, actions and intentions of others involved in the event. Such 
"mere"information is then converted into meaningful information through 
a process of interpretation, whereby the individual assigns meaning to 
the various characteristics contained in the information and attempts 
to construct a definition of the situation. The mesuiing assigned, is 
derived through interaction; possible by the contemporary interaction 
if the situation is new or unique; or from previous interaction where
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the situation is taken to be similar to previous situations. The 
individual may be viewed as making sense of the situation or as arranging 
his"mere’’information or data in a meaningful manner (Weick 1979). Crucial 
to the arrangement is what he knows, or the information or data he has 
about the situation. This will include the actions and intentions of 
those others involved auid the impact the situation is likely to have on 
himself, his function or on others. The individual therefore gathers 
data or information, interprets it and forms it into an "arrangement ” 
which is meaningful to him.
Included in the process of arranging might be the selection of a course 
of action. The meaning of a situation or event may only become clear 
when the individual considers what he is going to do about it. In 
deciding on a course of action the individual will call into play 
themes or standard which he has had experience of before or which he 
has learnt from others and which appear to be appropriate to the 
contemporary situation. The themes called into play will be given a 
mock or trial run, either through minded behaviour, where the individual 
imagines the outcome or consequences, or through interaction whereby two 
or more individuals "talk the theme through." By doing this the theme 
is tested for its reasonableness or appropriateness to the given situation. 
The theme may be embellished or paraphrased to meet marginal differences 
from previous situations,or significantly altered or chorus phrsised, such 
as it ceases to resemble the initial theme, to meet novel or new situations. 
The individuals ability to predict, map or plot the course of the chosen 
"course of action" is limited, therefore further improvisation may take 
place during and after the course of the action, should the consequences 
or outcome differ from those expected.
306
The individual therefore is an interpreter, improvisor and arranger.
The arrangement as constructed makes two crucial statements. Firstly, 
it states how the individual sees or interprets the situation. Secondly, 
it states what the individual intends to do, what he is doing or what he 
has done.
During interaction, the reaching of agreement with others may be 
described as a process of collective improvisation, particularly when 
the situation or event under discussion is novel or unique and where the 
parties are uncertain of the course of action to adopt or the outcome they 
desire. In this way a novel or unique solution is created collectively 
by individuals floating a theme which others will improvise around, 
develop or reject and introduce another theme. In this way the inter­
actants (or improvisers) adjust and readjust their performance until 
an improvised theme emerges which appeals or appears to be appropriate 
or reasonable within the context or consensus definition of the 
situation.
Alternatively, where there is disagreement, tension and the desire to 
achieve a particular outcome, the parties may engage in negotiation or 
use other strategies such as persuasion, coersion and appeals to 
authority to either achieve their own desired course of action or to 
compromise and come to terms with the other parties.
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IMPLICATIONS FOR THE TRADITIONAL VIEW OF MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEMS: 
ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT CHOICE
The choice process within the traditional view of management information 
systems is based on the "economic rationality" model. Hayes Wolf and 
Cooper (1981) summarise this model based on the work of Von Neuman 
and Morgenstern (1947). The model implies that the decision maker
1) Can always make a decision when confronted with a range 
of alternatives;
2 ) Is able to rank all the alternatives facing him in order of 
preference in such a way that each alternative is either 
preferred, equivalent or inferior to any other;
3 ) Has a transitive preference system;
4) Selects that alternative which ranks highest in his ordering; 
and
5) Always makes the same decisions when confronted with the 
same set of alternatives.
Von Neuman and Morgenstern 1947 
in Hayes Wolf and Cooper I98I
March (I976) has summarised this model by highlighting the key concepts 
which are; the pre-existence of purpose ; consistency; suid rationality. 
Swieringa (I98O) considers how these "tenets of faith" form the under­
lying assumptions of management accounting and implicitly management 
informant systems with their emphasis firstly, on strategic planning, 
which is defined by Anthony and Deardon (1965) as "a process of 
deciding on the goals of the organisation". Secondly, on the 
information system’s role in ensuring consistency between the goals 
of the various subsystems and individuals, and the goals of the 
organisation. Finally, the setting of targets and evaluation of 
performance common to most information systems, reinforces the notion
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of a rational choice directed at achieving some goal or objective.
A number of authors have questioned these assumptions. Swieringa
(1980) cites three models, which are the "behavioural theory of the 
firm" by Cyert and March (I963); the "garbage can" model by Cohen, 
March and Olsen (1972) and the "organising model" by Weick (1969- 
1979). Hayes Wolf and Cooper have produced a similar analysis. 
Argyris (I980)questions the concept of unilateral control on which 
most management information systems are based as having inner contra­
dictions which impede organisational learning which he describes as 
the detection and correction of error.
If the perspective, that managers are interpreting, interacting, 
improvising individuals who are confronted with a multiplicity of 
problematic situations, some of which are defined as being familiar 
to previous situations suid some of which are defined as being 
unfamiliar, the assumptions of choice underlying the traditional 
view of management information systems must again be questioned.
In a situation which is defined to be familiar, it might appear that 
a manager is acting in a rational and consistent manner and that his 
actions are directed at achieving some desired state of affairs or 
goal. The individual however is simply repeating a standard theme 
or acting out a scripted response. The individual is still acting 
according to his definition of the situation, however, a major 
component in that definition is the situation's familiarity.
The concepts of rationality, consistency and the pre-existence of 
purpose further come into question when an individual is confronted
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with a situation that he defines as being unfamiliar. In the first 
instance the management information system with its pre-determined 
content, format and mode of presentation is only able to record 
recurrent familiar events. Therefore,the individual will not be 
presented with a range of alternatives to rank and to rationally 
select the highest ranking in the order. If the manager wishes 
additional information on an unfamiliar situation he will have to take 
recourse to the ’informal' system which has the richness of detail 
and flexibility to highlight the nuances and peculiarities of the 
unfamiliar situation. With the aid of the additional information 
the manager may be able to construct a fuller definition of the 
situation on which to select a course of action.
However, uncertainty, ambiguity and equivocality may still surround 
the course of action to be selected. In such a situation the manager 
will have to "act in order to find out what he is doing," Weick (1977)• 
This would then question the pre-existence of purpose, and thus 
consistency and rationality. The proponents of the "goal paradigm" 
(Georgiou 1973) would argue, that even in such a situation, the action 
was intended to bring about some result or desired state of affairs 
by virtue of the fact that the individual would have thought in the 
future perfect tense. Weick (I969) argues that thinking in the 
future perfect tense is an action in which the individual thinks 
as if the act has already been accomplished. As he suggests, "it 
is the reflective glance, not the plan per se, that permits the act 
to be accomplished in an orderly way." In Weick's view,action 
precedes goals. Goals therefore, become a retrospective rationalis­
ation of action. March (1976) reiterates this point by stating 
that "human choice is at least as much a process of discovering goals
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as for acting on them." He further stresses that "a description that 
assumes that goals come first and action comes later is frequently 
radically wrong."
With this perspective ,the information system should not be wholly 
concerned with setting goals or objectives and providing alternatives, 
for rational selection designed to achieve those goals It should be 
concerned with providing a facility through which managers may 
experiment and discover goals which may be inconsistent, and not 
rational within the traditional view of choice but might be perfectly 
"appropriate" or "intelligent" given the ambiguity, uncertainty and 
equivocality of the situation. Not only would this permit managers 
to deal with ambiguous, uncertain and equivocal situations but would 
permit them to question the taken-for-granted way of doing things.
As seen in the text March (1976) and subsequently Hayes Wolf auid Cooper
(1981) advocate that the imperative towards rationality and consistency 
should be suspended to encourage, experimental playful action which 
may generate novel solutions to familiar situations and solutions to 
unfamiliar situations. They advocated that goals should be treated 
as hypothesis; intuition should be treated as real; memory should be 
treated as an enemy; and experience should be treated as theory. I 
would suggest that such behaviour existed in the Avon factory. It’s 
existence, however, was not to be found in the formal, official facade 
of the organisation, (the focus of much research) but rather, it was 
to be found in the informal organisation with its so-called informal 
processes (including the process of informing) beneath the official 
facade.
In unfamiliar or ambiguous situations the managers attempted to gather
311
additional information from other sources (page 246); often this was 
contradictory, creating confusion or doubt about the nature or reality 
of the situation (page 248), thus achieving the semi-confusing state 
desired by Hedberg and Jonsson (1978). In such a state of confusion, 
the manager would be uncertain of what course of action to adopt. If 
after seeking advice, uncertainty still persisted, the manager or 
managers would speculate about the likely consequences of suggested 
courses of action (thereby formulating hypotheses rather than g)als).
In the process of speculation "intuition" or imagination would play a 
real role. Ideas would be floated, imagined or talked through, 
commented on, criticised, accepted, modified or rejected (pages 284 - 286) 
These ideas or themes were often treated seriously by the others 
involved, on the other hand they were often treated as trivial and 
dismissed.
Hypocrisy would exist where in developing a novel solution or course 
of action the manager would state their intentions and their desired 
outcomes. However, because of unforseen circumstances which occured 
during the course of the action, adjustments would take place during 
the action and thus create a discrepancy between action and the 
initially stated intention within the context of the particular 
situation. Hypocrisy, if it could be described as such, was not 
unduly problematic to the middle managers themselves, for they were 
often in constant contact with each other and would discuss and agree 
upon changes in the course of the action. The managers thus kept 
each other "in the picture." Such hypocrisy however was problematic 
to senior management, in that, they were often not informed of any 
changes, and thus continued to expect the outcome initially agreed 
upon, (page 1l8) where Cyril Jenkins was not informed of the state of
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Rotoforra 2 ; he assumed that they were achieving half through put, 
vhereas it had stopped completely.
Certain managers treated memory as an enemy. By memory I mean the 
collective memory of the organisation, made up of the taken-for-granted 
habitual procedures and practices. On page 146 Jim Brown noted the 
fallacies about what could and could not be done. In order to overcome 
these fallacies he gathered additional information from other sources 
and viewed the problem from a different perspective, (treating experience 
as a theory) and in so doing he questioned the taken-for-granted ways 
of doing things. Although managers did experiment with new solutions 
to existing problems (Jim Brown's planning and planned maintenances) 
they were often prone to rely on their memory and taken-for-granted 
habitual perspectives. However, if treating memory as an enemy and 
treating experience as a theory is to be encouraged, attention should 
be directed towards the existing processes that facilitate such 
behaviour, which occurs in the 'informal' processes of informing and 
selection of a course of action.
The'informal' process of informing in addition conforms to the 
prescriptions by Hayes Wolf and Cooper (I981). In that the 'informal' 
information was not used to evaluate performance, it was often ambiguous, 
of a highly complex nature, of low formalization and was decentralized; 
it further provided information of a highly specific and detailed nature 
which could be interpreted in a number of ways, and thus had multiple 
meaning.
Finally the 'informal' system conformed to some of Weick's (I977h) 
prescriptions in that it was garrulous; managers continually talked
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to each other to "find out what the hell was going on." It was 
clumsy; although there were well tried routes, information was gleaned 
from many surprising sources, for example chats at lunch and casual 
conversations. It was, hypocritical; as seen above. It was octopoid, 
(the notion of loosly coupled systems will be discussed in the following 
chapter).
The typical management information system thus fails to provide the 
type of information that managers require in dealing with unfamiliar 
situations. The typical management information system concentrates 
on recurrent easily measurable transactions sind as noted by Wilensky
(1967);
....analysis of the easy-to-measure variables (casualties 
suffered by the VietCong and South Vietnamese) was driving 
out hard-to-measure variables and long-run costs (the nature 
of popular support for a South Vietnames government, the 
effect of the war on the Western Alliance and on domestic 
civility, the effect of bombing and the will to resist) 
kill-ratious and the like represent a touch of spurious 
certainty in a highly uncertain world....
Wilensky I967
And thus as Argyris states:
"tend to produce valid information for the unimportant and 
programmed problems and invalid information for the important 
and non-programraed problems."
Argyris 1971
It must be further noted that information was not gathered simply 
for making choices. Information was required by the manager to con­
struct a picture or make sense of what was going on in the organisation
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and thus make sense of the organisation itself. Once again the type 




1. Information processes and decision making have been traditionally 
linked in the organisational theory and management information 
literature. The former discipline includes Simon (I969), Cyret 
and March (I963), Galbraith (1977), Connoly (1977) .and Knight and 
McDaniels (1979). The latter includes Anthony (I963), Lawler 
and Rhode (1976) and Murdick(l980).
2. Joint action will be more fully discussed in the following 
chapter.
3. Ambiguity surrounding the process of deciding on a course of 
action is recognised by Cyret and March (I963); Cohen and March 
(1974); March and Olsen (1976) and Weick (I969, 1977, 1979).
Hayes Wolf and Cooper (I981) utilize the concept of ambiguity
to question the traditional role of the budgetary control process.
4. March and Olsen (1972) depicting the ambiguity in organisations
by referring to them as "garbage cans" or "organised anarchies."
5. Arrangement will be discussed in the following chapter.
6. Although I have great sympathy with the concepts of the technology 
of foolishness and playfulness I have two major reservations.
Firstly, the metaphor fails to incorporate or describe how the process 
by which action is derived through playfulness, may be communicated 
to or shared with others, how it may subsequently be incorporated 
into the individuals own and others repertoire and how such actions, 
which imply change and modification affect and are affected by the 
existant organisational order or structure. Playfulness must be 
recognised to involve more than a single individual, it takes
place within some organisational context or order. Implicit in 
the term "organisational anarchy", used by March (1972) is the 
concept of some order or organising. The relationship between 
individual playfulness and that order is not made explicit.
Secondly I have reservations about the terms "technology of 
foolishness" and "playfulness." Whereas I recognise that the 
authors do not treat these terms trivially and emphasise the notion 
of creativity, adaptability, innovation, experimentation auid 
flexibility, I would suggest that it might prove difficult to 
encourage managers to internalise these terms, for they also imply 
childishness, ignorance, frivolity, lack of understanding and so 
forth. Managers take themselves and their activities seriously, 
and may interpret such terms as foolishness and playfulness as 
missing the serious import of their daily lives.
7. The term creativity is subject to some definitional confusion. 
Creativity is not simply equated with novelty or innovation 
although creativity necessarily includes something new or novel.
Stein (1975) defines creativity as a
"process that results in a novel product or idea which 
is accepted as useful, tenable or satisfying by a 
significant group of others."
Stein 1975
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For the jazz musician the improvisation firstly had to be novel 
but also to be accepted as useful, tenable and above all satis­
fying by a significant group of others. The others were the 
audience, critics and above all other knowledgable musicians.
8. Stein (1974) cites the work of Lacklen and Harmon (193&) and 
Ghiselin (I963) who suggest there are degrees of creativity. 
Ghiselin distinguishes between creative action of the "high 
sort" which he says "alters the universe of meaning itself, by 
introducing into it some new element of meaning or some new 
order of significance." Creative action of the "lower sort" 
"gives further development to an established body of meaning 
through initiating some advance in its use."
9. Ramos (1978), describes such a topic change eus a process of 
modulation.
10. Social order, or organisational order will be discussed in the 
following chapter.
11. The relationship between the individual and the band will be 
discussed in the following chapter.
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CHAPTER 10
IMPROVISATION ARRANGEMENT AND 
ORGANISATIONAL ORDER
In this chapter I recognise that individual behaviour and interactions 
do not take place within a vacuum but occur within some organisational 
context or order. In chapter 8,1 introduced the concept of Mead's I 
and ME which explained the duality between the individual and society 
and concluded that individuals and society are both determiners and 
determined, it is this theme I shall now develop.
10.1 Interactionists'View of Social Order
Interactionists are essentially anti-deterministic, they seek a balance 
between completely free-willed actors, and actors whose actions are 
fairly strictly determined or constrained (Strauss 1978). Thus, on the 
one hand we have the portrait of a social order or structure which 
constrains the activities of the individual actors; on the other hand, 
individual actors may construct new novel forms of behaviour which will 
impinge on, and possibly change some aspect of the social order or 
structure. The question posed is: How is social order created and
maintained in the light of continual change and modification? Mead 
(1936) posed the question thus:
"How can you bring those changes about in an orderly fashion 
and yet preserve order? To bring about change is seemingly 
to destroy the given order, yet society does and must change. 
That is the problem, to incorporate the method of change 
into the order of Society itself."
Mead 1934
The interactionists would argue that social or organisational order
318
and structure consists of patterns of interaction which entail the 
fitting together of separate lines of action. Organisational reality 
is located nowhere but in these patterns of interaction. I would suggest 
that the process of informing plays an integral part in these patterns 
of interaction whereby separate lines of action are fitted together, 
and organisational reality produced, reproduced and sustained. Further­
more I would suggest that the process of informing influences,and is 
influenced by,the organisational order or structure as created, modified 
or sustained by these patterns of interaction.
The emphasis of the analysis thus far, has been towards an explanation
of individual behaviour, interactions and the process of informing, it 
is now necessary to provide a metaphor or model that will include, 
individual behaviour, interactions, the process of informing and 
organisational order and structure.
10.2 Blumer; Society as Symbolic Interaction
In adopting a symbolic interactionist perspective there is a very real 
tendency to concentrate on individual behaviour as symbolic interaction 
and gloss over society as symbolic interaction. Blumer (1962) states
that most writers tend towards this state of affairs.
"A view of society as symbolic interaction has been followed 
more than it has been formulated. Partial, usually fragment­
ary statements of it are to be found in the writings of a 
number of eminent scholars.•.None of these scholars, in my 
judgement, has presented a systematic statement of the nature 
of group life from the standpoint of symbolic interaction."
Blumer I962
Blumer attempts to put the position of symbolic interaction and society 
in "better perspective." In doing so he draws heavily- on the work of
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Mead. The following is a very brief summary of this perspective.
Firstly, human society is to be seen as consisting of acting people, 
smd the life of the society is to be seen as consisting of their 
actions. Secondly, any particular action is formed in the light of 
the situation in which it takes place. The action is formed or 
constructed by interpreting the situation. Such interpretative 
behaviour may take place in the individual guiding his own action, 
in a collectivity of individuals acting in concert or in "agents 
acting on behalf of a group or organisation.
Thirdly, a distinction is made between common recurrent events, 
encountered by people in a given society which are defined or 
structured by them in some way, and situations not previously 
encountered by the people and where there are no structured or ready 
made definitions.
In dealing with common recurrent events the individuals,through previous 
interaction,develop and acquire common understandings or definitions of 
how to act in this or that situation. These common definitions enable 
people to act alike. In a unique situation, no such common definition 
or understanding may exist; in this event, their lines of action may 
not fit together readily and collective action will be Eocked. Inter­
pretations then have to be developed and effective accommodation of 
the participants to one another has to be worked out.
This perspective of society differs from the more deterministic views 
along two major lines. Firstly, from the standpoint of symbolic
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interaction the organisation of a human society is the framework
inside of which social action takes place, and is not the determinant
of that action. The social organisation enters into action only to the
extent to which it shapes situations in which people act, and to the
extent to which it supplies fixed sets of symbols which people use in
2
interpreting their situations.
Secondly, organisations and changes in them,are the product of the 
activity of acting units and not forces which leave such acting units 
out of account. Thus any social change, since it involves change in 
human action, is necessarily mediated by interpretation on the part of 
the people caught up in the change - the change appears in the form of 
new situations in which people have to construct new forms of actions.
The question, however, still remains: How are these patterns of
interaction formed? What are the mechanisms employed during successive 
interactions that enable acting individuals to act alike? How are 
interpretations developed and how do the individuals accommodate each 
other? Blumer has provided us with a framework for theorising about 
organisations and society, and although he does point to some methodol­
ogical implications of this perspective, I feel they are inadequate 
guidance for researchers to study or view social orders, their develop­
ment and change. At best the ideas encompassed in this brief account 
may enable us to glimpse organisational or social order but not to 
understand it. A more detailed perspective is provided by the 
negotiated order theorists.
10.3  Organisation as a Negotiated Order
Strauss et al (I963) depict organisational order or structure thus:
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"Something at which members of any society, and organisation 
must work for the shared agreements, the binding contracts - 
which constitute the grounds for an expectable, non-surprising, 
taken-for-granted, even ruled orderliness - are not binding 
and shared for all time. Contracts, understandings, agree­
ments, rules - all have appended to them a temporal clause 
...Review is called for, whether the outcome of review be 
rejection or renewal or revision or what not. In short, 
the basis of concerted action (social order) must be 
reconstituted continually or, as marked above, "worked at."
Strauss et al 1963
Thus all shared understandings lack permanence and must be continually 
reaffirmed or re-negotiated; rules, procedures, order and structure 
are not automatic occurrences but rather must be worked at by the 
repeated acts of the participants (Mangham 1979). For the negotiated 
order theorists, behaviour in organisations is marked by an ongoing 
process of negotiation, one in which working agreements are created, 
consolidated or overturned as members interact. Thus social order is 
a negotiated order.
In order to stress the relationship between the daily ongoing 
negotiations (interactions) and the more permanent, even ruled 
structure, Strauss (1978) introduced the concept of the Negotiation 
context”and the"structural context." The structural context derives 
from the larger transcending features of the social world within 
which the negotiation takes place, certain aspects of the world will 
be salient for the negotiation in so far as they impinge on them.
The negotiation context operates within the structural context and 
mediates those features of the structural context which actually enter 
into and condition the course of,the negotiation itself. Strauss(1978) 
argues that the structural context is larger, more encompassing than 
the negotiation context but the lines of impact may run either way.
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"Changes in the (structural context) may impact on the 
(negotiation context) and vice versa. Outcome of the 
negotiation itself, can contribute to changes in negotiation 
contexts relevant to future negotiations. They are less 
likely to affect the structural context (structural properties), 
except as they are repeated or combined with other negotiations 
and with other modes of action and so perhaps have some 
cumulative impact."
Strauss 1978
Although individual negotiations are likely to have only minimal impact 
on the larger structural properties, these structural properties are 
themselves a product of successive past negotiations. Thus, the 
structural context impinges on the negotiation context which in turn 
impinges on the individual negotiation, in turn the individual 
negotiation may impinge on the negotiation context which in turn, to 
a lesser degree, may impinge on the structural context. Strauss (1978) 
concludes that:
"Studies of complex relationships existing between the more 
stable elements of organisational order and the more fleeting 
working arrangements may profit by examining the former as 
if they were sometimes a background against which the latter 
were being evolved in the foreground - and sometimes the 
reverse is obtained."
Strauss 1978
Major criticims have been directed towards this view of negotiated order, 
Much of the controversy is directed towards the ambiguity surrounding 
the terms negotiation context and structural context. This in turn 
leads to further difficulties in operationalising Strauss' (1978) 
paradigm for the research of negotiations and negotiated order. This 
requires the researcher to identify and describe the salient charac­
teristics of the structural context, the negotiation context, the
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negotiations themselves and the lines of impact between them. Preston 
(1980) has noted that;
"Merely to list a few actual or potential external conditions 
is not adequate to claim that one has shown how interaction 
and large scale social conditions are related. Even to argue 
that somehow such external social conditions are really incor­
porated into the negotiator’s awareness begs the critical 
gap between interaction and large scale structure. Solutions 
to this problem are elusive."
Preston I98O
My own criticism is that the proposition that social order, at whatever 
societal or organisational level, is in fact, a negotiated order, rests 
on there being negotiations, and that these negotiations are the 
primary type of interaction that affect the social or organisational 
order. As I have noted in the previous chapter, a negotiation is a 
specific type of interaction, with particular characteristics. If the 
predominant type of interaction cannot be defined as a negotiation, then 
I would suggest that it is not warrantable to generalise.the concept 
of negotiated order to the whole of society or to all organisations.
The study of negotiations is a valid and worthy subject and in given 
situations the social order may be conceived of as a negotiated order. 
Strauss* paradigm is expressly designed for the study of negotiations 
and not interactions in general. Thus if a researcher wishes to study 
negotiations, he must carefully select the setting in which to conduct 
his research, which most negotiated order theorists have indeed done.
The study of negotiations is required to support the premise that 
social order is a negotiated order. For a person whose name is linked 
with the "Discovery of Grounded Theory" such a rigid, almost determ­
inistic approach to research is indeed surprising.
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10.4 Weick; Loosely Coupled Sub-Assemblies (Systems)
Preston ( 198O ) notes that solutions to the problem of the critical gap 
between interaction and large scale structures are elusive, he further 
notes that researchers may possibly be asking the question in the 
wrong manner. Weick (1974) based on the ideas of Merton (I957) argues for 
the development of middle range, as opposed to grand theories of social 
systems and offers the concept of loosely coupled sub-assemblies or 
systems. Weick (1979) states:
"If organisations are loosely coupled then relatively small 
units - such as double interacts, dyads and triads - become 
eminently sensible as places to understand the major workings 
of organisations."
Weick 1979
The concept of loose coupling (which Weick borrows from Glassman (1973) 
and March and Olsen (1975)) conveys the image that coupled events are 
responsive, but that each event also preserves its own identity and 
some evidence of its physical and logical separateness. The image is 
that events or systems are somehow attached but that each retains some 
identity and separateness. Their attachment may be circumscribed, 
infrequent, weak and its mutual affects unimportant and/or slow to 
respond. Loose coupling carries connotations of impermanance,dissolv- 
ability and tacitness all of which are potentially crucial properties 
of the "glue" that holds organisations together. Finally, the concept 
of couplings suggest the idea of building blocks that can be grafted 
on to an organisation or severed with relatively little disturbance to 
either the blocks or the organisation. Borrowing from Simon (I969)
Weick portrays complex structures or systems as being decomposable 
into stable sub-assemblies and that these are the crucial elements
325
in any organisation (Weick 1976).
The process of enactment or interaction, which Weick (1979) prefers to 
describe as a double interact, gives form and structure to these loosely 
coupled systems. These units are connected by further couplings which 
amplify the small actions within what is taken to be the "organisation." 
Causal loops are then formed which are reflected in social or organis­
ational influences and in turn impinge upon the process of enactment, 
interaction or double interacts. Thus Weick (1979) concludes;
"It is the combination of loose couplings, plus causal loops 
that amplify the consequences of small actions, plus social 
influence in double interacts, that has convinced me that 
a minimalist approach to understanding organisation is a 
productive way to start."
Weick 1979
Schütz (1964) gives crédence to this minimalist perspective when he 
depicts an individual’s view of the world as being centred around 
himself. The social world with the "alter egos" (which includes 
institutions of various kinds) in it are arranged around the self as 
a centre in various degress of intimacy and anonymity. The individual 
acts meaningfully towards those who he has an intimate relationship 
with or knowledge of, and addresses himself towards the "anonymous 
others" or institutions in a more vague or less meaningful manner. 
Thus,in understanding the process of action and interaction it is 
important to understand the scale of awareness of the acting and 
interacting individuals. Glaser and Strauss (1964) depict this as 
the "awareness context" of the individual.
An awsumess context is the total combination of what each interactant
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in a situation knows about the identity of the other (Glaser and Strauss 
1964). they further describe the awareness context as;
"the total combination of what specific people, groups 
organisations, communities know about specific issues."
Glaser and Strauss 1964
These definitions of awareness contexts provide a useful analytical tool, 
An individual's actions can be seen to take place within the context of 
what he knows about the identity and intentions of himself and others 
and his information about the specific issue or situation in hand. 
Awareness contexts can then be framed in terms of information, this has 
been recognised by Maines (1977), although only in terms of identity.
"The type of context...is determined by the type of inform­
ation one person has regarding the other."
Maines 1977
Cyert and March (I963) Mintzberg (1973, 1975.) note that an individual 
has only limited capacity to attend to all the characteristics of 
particular situations and have limited capacity to retain and process 
data, therefore an awareness context is limited to those factors that 
directly impinge on himself and his immediate surroundings. Awareness 
of wider more "organisational" implications appear vague and ill-defined 
to the individual. If we are to study organisations from the view point 
of interacting individuals it might be applicable to view them as a 
series of overlapping awareness contexts or as loosely coupled sub- 
assemblies. I would further suggest that the scale of awareness contexts 
may differ from individual to individual. A shop floor worker may have
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a more compact awareness context than the managing director who looks at 
the wider "organisational" implications or the international affairs 
specialist who has a global view. However, because of the limited 
capacity of human beings to take account of, retain and process inform­
ation it might be deduced that,the wider one's awareness context is, 
the less specific detail it contains.
10.5  Improvisation and Arrangement
How can this view of organisations as awareness contexts or loosely 
coupled sub-assemblies be incorporated into the jazz metaphor with 
its emphasis on individual and collective improvisation?
To recap; the basic interactionist perspective of organisational order 
or structure is as follows. It is a process oriented perspective stress­
ing the continuous emergence of organisational arrangements out of the 
ongoing interactions of the participants. These organisational arrange­
ments are continuously being formed, adjusted, modified or sustained 
through the day-to-day encounters of participants. The arrangements 
reached through interaction (read collective improvisation) are seldom 
stable and often represent merely surface agreements which can mean 
different things to different people (Benson 1977). Until now I have 
considered improvisation from the perspective of the soloist or 
soloists; however, it must be recognised that these individual or 
collective improvisations are performed within the context of a band 
or ensemble.
Cameron (1954) identifies two things that are simultaneously required 
of the jazz musician:
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"he must subordinate and integrate his musical personality, 
as expressed through his instrument, into the general group, 
and he must do this with no score or conductor to guide him.
On the other hand, as a soloist, he must produce startlingly 
distinctive sound patterns which are better, if possible, than 
those played by any other member of the group. How is this 
done?"
Cameron 1954
To answer Cameron we may paraphrase Mangham (1979):
"The band does not determine the jazzman’s music; nor does 
the jazzman determine the band. The band and the jazzman 
are both determined and determiners."
More specifically it is necessary to examine two seemingly 
contradictory concepts which are crucial to jazz, and as I shall 
argue to all forms of social interaction, social order auid social 
change; these are improvisation and arrangement. It might appear 
contradictory to discuss improvisation and arrangement as linked con­
cepts. For it may logically follow that the more arrangement, the 
less improvisation. However, in all forms of jazz, improvisation 
hais run hsmd-in-hand with arrangements. The jazz musician does 
not see an arrangement as an inhibition of freedom to improvise but 
as an aid. The possibilities of free improvisation are enlarged when 
the soloist knows what the musician playing with him are doing. With 
an arrangement he knows.
In a jazz combo (ensemble) once the theme or tune is selected, key 
and tempo are established in an introduction which is played typically 
by piano. Except by pre-arrangement the key and tempo are set for the 
duration of the number. The rhythm provides a basic referent which all
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are obliged to respect (Cameron 1954).
An arrangement is an agreement in advance to perform or play within a 
framework. The arrangement includes the basic theme or tune, the key, 
mood, tempo, and a schedule outlining the timing of the solos and 
identifying the soloists. The degree of arrangement varied for each 
jazz era. The big band swing jazz required considerable arrangement 
whereas the free or avant garde jazz has little or no arrangement.
In the small combos arrangements were not written, they were "head 
arrangements." Such arrangements are termed "Folkways" by Cameron 
(1954) which he describes as being informally established and are 
sharply distinct from the formally "arranged" music of the dance or 
big swing bands. The simple’head arrangements" were ideal for the 
small combos but were impractical for large units unless the musicians 
were prepared to spend an enormous amount of time at rehearsals. To 
overcome the impracticalities of the head arrangements, arrangers, 
usually the band leader, would provide a plot, expressed in musical 
notation outlining the key, tempo and the chords to be used by the 
soloists, and a schedule of when the solos were to be played. Good 
arrangements became vitally important to a band’s success, improvis­
ation was minimised and even a band’s star soloist had his work 
restricted.^
As a reaction against this restriction,small groups of musicians formed 
into jam sessions where they could extend themselves and experiment 
with novel improvisations. However,even in these jam sessions there 
were arrangements; prior to the number the musicians would discuss
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the arrangement which in itself would be very limited. Beyond this there 
were no clear cut rules to guide the performer. The musician must recog­
nise the pattern that unfolds, from what he hears of those playing 
around him. He must select a part in this pattern appropriate to the 
occasion, his instrument and his personal abilities and liabilities.
An arrangement in jazz is temporary, it is applicable to the contempor­
ary performance and may be adjusted or rearranged for subsequent per­
formances. An arrangement is distinct from an orchestrated composition, 
in that, it constitutes a basic plot or chart rather than a fully 
notated or composed through score. It is this incomplete nature that 
permits the soloist to improvise and yet maintain harmony and order 
within the band. Thus,we can describe a jazz solo as being improvisation 
on a theme within the framework of an arrangement. The improvisation is 
thus constrained by at least two factors, firstly by the theme and 
secondly by the arrangement. Other factors also constrain the jazzman, 
namely his own technical ability, the properties of the instrument, and 
more nebulous concepts such as his inspiration and creativity.
I would suggest that in the above description of arrangements in jazz 
are a number of useful concepts which may enhance our understanding of 
joint or concerted action and social order. For I would argue that 
much , if not all, our social life is characterised by arrangements, 
or by entering into arrangements with others.
10.6 Shared Arrangements
In the conclusion of the last chapter I described the process whereby 
an individual (or individuals) interprets data to arrive at a defin­
ition of a situation and calls into play a theme or course of action,
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which may be repeated or improvised around, as the formation of a 
sensible arrangement. If the chosen course of action requires joint 
action, the arrangement will have to be shared with the others involved. 
Individuals acting in concert in effect jointly agree upon and enter 
into an arrangement. A shared arrangement includes a shared definition 
of the situation and a shared theme or course of action, which in turn 
includes the acts or parts required to be performed by the individuals 
involved. As noted with the individual’s sensible arrangement, 
ambiguity and uncertainty may surround the definition of the situation 
and the theme or course of action. This possible ambiguity and 
uncertainty might be amplified in the case of a shared arrangement.
The emphasis must be placed on the concept that it is ^  arrangement, 
it is formed by a definition of the situation rather than the definition 
and a theme or course of action rather them the theme or course of 
action. Given this possible ambiguity, a shared arrangement may mean 
different things to each of the people involved. However, even with the 
possibility of ambiguity or misinterpretation, a shared arrangement 
permits an individual to act, and whilst acting, to know, even if only 
roughly, what the other parties are doing.
With this view, a shared arrangement may be likened to a loose coupling 
between a definition of a situation and a theme or course of action, 
and between the interacting individuals themselves. Alternatively or 
in addition, it may be likened to an awareness context in that it is 
formed on the basis of the information the parties have of each others’ 
identity, intentions and of the situation or issue in hand, that is, 
what each individual knows.
Thus, individual or collective improvisation, or behaviour based on
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previous improvisations, is constrained by the definition of the 
situation, the theme called into play and by the framework or context 
of the arrangement entered into with others. As with the jazz musicians, 
an individual’s abilities and liabilities will further constrain his 
actions.
It is possible to view shared arrangements as differing around a number 
of salient characteristics.
10.7  Degree of Detail or Specification
An arrangement may be highly detailed with the parts to be performed by 
the various parties explicitly specified. On the other hand, an 
arrangement may contain little detail and little specification. A 
leasing agreement or a legal contract may be defined as a highly 
detailed arrangement, with its parts tightly specified. One party 
will supply some goods, the other party will make certain payments, the 
amount and timing of which will be specified in the documented agreement 
and signed by each party. On the other hand a chance meeting with an 
old friend may be defined as an arrangement with little detailed 
specification. Although the opening gestures may be predictable the 
course of the interaction, the topics discussed, will be largely 
unknown at the outset but will emerge during the interaction.
Shared arrangements formed to take action on a unique or unfamiliar 
situation are likely to contain little detail and the parts to be 
performed may only emerge during the course of the joint action.
These may possibly be adjusted with reflection, thus providing more 
detail and specification for future arrangement in a similar situation. 
In effect the parties may arrange to collectively improvise during and
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after the interaction.
Highly detailed and specified arrangements limit the amount of improvis­
ation that can take place during the course of the action itself; 
however, the arrangement agreed on in advance may be the product of 
collective improvisation. On the other hand, loosely detailed or 
loosely specified arrangements may provide room for high degrees of 
improvisation during and after the enactment. Furthermore, highly 
detailed arrangements permit the parties to accurately judge the 
performance of each other; deviance from the arrangement may be noted 
and judged to be illegitimate. In some arrangements such as a legal 
agreement, deviation from the specified parts may be subject to some 
penal action. In loosely specified arrangements,where improvisation is 
likely, accurately judging the performance of each other may not be 
feasible. Performance will then have to be assessed in terms of its 
reasonableness or appropriateness in the context of the ambiguity of 
the situation.
Within the factory the recording and processing of production data and 
bonus payments were highly detailed and specified arrangements. Impro­
visation was frowned upon, and manipulation of production data and bonus 
payments was judged as a form of fraud or embezzlement. Manipulation 
was known to occur (pages 79-8o); however it was often difficult to 
prove. Most arrangements over novel, ambiguous events, notably the 
incident over the black specks in the extruded sheet, were loosely 
specified and with little detail. Midway between these two extremes 
it is possible to view the Production Meeting as a partially specified 
arrangement. The time, place and make-up of the meeting was specified 
and although there was no formal agenda the topic areas were often
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pre-arranged by Cyril Jenkins. However, the Production Meetings differed 
markedly from each other. Different people raised and commented on diff­
erent issues. On some occasions the discussions were peaceful and constru­
ctive; on other occasions they were heated and led nowhere. The topics 
covered were at times important and of interest; at other times they 
were defined as being trivial and meaningless. Furthermore the purpose 
of the meetings were defined differently by Cyril Jenkins, who regarded 
them as a means of "keeping abreast of events," whereas the other 
managers defined them as a "waste of time" or as a "talking shop" with 
little real action being taken.
10.8 Frequency or Repetition of Arrangements
Individuals may enter into similar arrangements frequently or the 
arrangements may be a "one-off" or "special arrangement" to meet a 
particularly unique or rare event or situation. As an arrangement is 
repeated and through the process of subsequent improvisations, adjust­
ments or alignments, an arrangement may become so familiar to the 
parties that it is taken-for-granted. Since arrangements usually 
produce certain results, a person viewed as abiding by an arrangement 
will be presumed to be intending the outcome typically associated with 
that arrangement. Thus if a manager', confronted by a familiar recurr­
ent situation, and one in which he has jointly tackled with another or 
other managers, he may take it for granted that the other managers 
will perform their parts in the contemporary arrangement, and will 
thereby be able to predict the outcome or consequences of the 
arrangement. I would suggest that such taken-for-granted arrangements 
make for a more or less patterned predictable, non-surprising, even 
ruled orderliness of the social order. The informant networks which
will subsequently described as an arrangement to inform were of this 
order.
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If an arrangement is "one-off" or unique the managers may be uncertain 
of their own and others' parts and might be unable to predict the out­
come of the joint action. When such cases occurred in the factory the 
managers carefully monitored the outcome and consequences of their own 
and others' actions in order to be able to make necessary adjustments. 
Such instances were rejected in the number of times managers requested 
to be "kept in the picture" or asked to be "filled in on the details".
It follows that the more taken-for-granted arrangements whilst permitt­
ing an orderly, non-surprising environment may also restrict the amount 
of improvisation that can take place. However, these arrangements were 
likely to have been formed through a process of improvisation. Not all 
improvisation however, was eradicated, for taken-for-granted arrangements 
need not be highly specified or detailed, in fact in the factory the 
reverse was often the case. Whereas the informant networks were more 
or less taken for granted arrangements, the parts to be played by the 
individuals were not detailed or specified. Charlie Johnson could 
inform Jim Brown by personally contacting him in his office or by phone; 
alternatively he could send one of his supervisors or send a memo, 
although the latter rarely occurred. Thus the arrangement to inform 
was honoured and the desired outcome achieved; however, the means by 
which it was accomplished or by which the arrangement was carried out 
wajs subject to some improvisation. This improvisation would be 
described as paraphrasing.
If, however, an entirely new mode of behaviour or course of action was 
introduced (chorus-phrasing), such that the typical outcome was not 
achieved, the initial taken-for-granted arrangement might be rearranged. 
Alternatively the other parties might attempt to force or persuade the
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deviant actor back into line. The introduction of Jim Brown as 
Planner significantly altered the existing, taken-for-granted planning 
arrangement. Until Jim's appointment what planning there was was con­
ducted in a rather ad hoc manner by Peter Travers and the Departmental 
Production Managers. With Jim Brown's appointment he introduced a 
formalised plain which was posted on his planning board. At first the 
managers, Charlie Johnson and Mike Shilling, were sceptical and 
continued in their "old die-hard ways." However, when Jim Brown 
managed to create longer lead times on orders from the customers and 
reduced the number of rush orders, which were so disruptive to pro­
duction, Charlie Johnson and then Mike Shilling began to accept the 
new arrangement. On the other hand attempts to improve the finished 
goods stock control and waste control proved a failure and the people 
involved returned to their old, haphazard arrangement as soon as 
possible.
Examples of taken-for-granted arrangements are: On page I36 where
Charlie Johnson explained how he could rely on his supervisors to 
perform certain decision-making functions and to inform him of them 
at a later date. On page 137 where Robin Slater described how the 
supervisors remained behind at the end of each shift to pass on a 
written and verbal handover report to the incoming supervisor. This 
arrangement further required the outgoing supervisor to have a cup 
of tea ready for his colleague. On page I38 Jim Brown described how 
he received a copy of the material requisition slips from the ware­
houseman and arranged to meet with him prior to the production 
meeting on the Monday morning.
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10.9 !Fhe Nature of the Formation of Arrangements
I have noted that arrangements are formed through the process of 
collective improvisation or have their roots in some past improvisation. 
The design of the MADCAP information system contained little improvis­
ation in that Chris Davis carefully and deliberately coerced the 
working party into preparing a document that suited his requirements 
and conformed to the MADCAP programme (page 67)* ^hus although the 
initial design of MADCAP may have been the product of improvisation the 
contemporary arrangement, that is,the use of MADCAP in RTG Plastics, 
could be viewed as an imposed arrangement. An arrangement may be 
imposed in a number of ways; it might be imposed through subtle 
coercion as above or it might be imposed by directive by some person 
or persons with the authority to do so.
The design and implementation of MADCAP only involved the senior
managers, Chris Davis, Cyril Jenkins and David Wright. MADCAP which 
could be described as an arrangement to inform was then imposed by 
directive on to the middle managers. All previous information that 
was officially supplied was stopped and after some delay MADCAP 
appeared. The middle managers were not involved in the design process, 
yet were expected to ensure that the correct data was provided from
the time sheets and production record charts and were expected to use
MADCAP as a source of information. Arrangements imposed through 
persuasion, coercion or directive contain little or no improvisation, 
in that the "powerful" party has a definite idea of the arrangement 
he wishes to achieve and will use various strategies to ensure that 
his desired outcome is achieved.
The term arrangement in music has a more precise meaning, which until
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now has not been fully expressed. A musical arrangement entails the 
transposing of an existing musical composition, written for a particular 
instrument or group of instruments, into a composition suitable for 
another instrument or other instruments. An arrangement is not simply 
a process of transcription, for a series of notes played by a saxophone 
may sound ridiculous when performed by a trumpet. Thus, the arranger 
must interpret the existing composition within the new instrument's 
properties, or characteristics. I would suggest that as individuals 
may assign meaning, interpret and act towards a single situation or 
object in a variety of different ways, an imposed arrangement, to be 
successful, must explicitly recognise the possibility of idiosyncratic 
behaviour. MADCAP, which fulfilled the requirements of Chris Davis and 
which he regarded as a reasonable arrangement within the context of 
his position and function was not a particularly reasonable arrangement 
within the context of the middle managers' position and functions. Thus 
an imposed arrangement may misinterpret or ignore the characteristics 
or idosyncratio behaviour of those others involved in the arrangement.
In a musical performance, the conductor or band leader may ensure that 
the imposed arrangement is performed accurately. However, senior 
management do not enjoy the same intimacy with their subordinates and 
thus, ensuring the accurate performance of an imposed arrangement 
might not be feasible. The middle managers,in defining an imposed 
arrangement to be unreasonable or inappropriate, might develop their 
own arrangements and thereby operate outside the formal or imposed 
arrangement. In much the same way, the jazz musicians formed "jam 
sessions" to break away from restrictions of the big swing band 
arrangements. The middle managers developed their own processes of
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informing and operated outside the confines of the MADCAP system.
In particular situations an arrangement may be formed through a process 
of negotiation. Arrangements over working conditions and facilities 
between senior management eind the workforce were of this nature. In 
such situations, there was tension and disagreement between the parties 
and the arrangement formed was detailed and highly specific. An 
example of an arrangement formed through negotiation, was where a 
machine was moved from beside the granulator, where it was excessively 
hot, to a cooler position. Cyril Jenkins was reluctant to move the 
machine because of the costs and disruption ; however, it was agreed to 
do so when an undertaking to improve productivity was reached.
10.10 Arrangements as Structural Units
In chapter 7 I have noted that individuals formed general definitions 
of each other based on successive involvement with (or entering into 
arrangement with) others or through hearsay from other third parties. 
The general definition formed would influence a manager's interpret­
ation of the other's subsequent actions and the manner in which he 
acted towards that individual. If the definition that the managers 
held of each other were complementary they might develop or form into 
more or less permanent social or working arrangements, that may be 
circumscribed or identified as structural units within the context of 
the overall organisation.
Whereais these structural units may be identified in terras of their 
physical or logical separateness, as with Weick's concept of loosely 
coupled systems or sub-assemblies, they were attached to one smother 
by further loose couplings. The structural units or more or less
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permanent social or working arrangements formed a web, with a single 
individual being a member of a number of loosely coupled units. In 
this way they provided the "glue" (Weick 1976) that held the organis­
ation together and gave it the logical appearance of form and structure.
The structural units were formed by entering into successive arrangements 
with others and through the definition held of each other -by the parties 
involved in those arrangements. Thus the structural units reflected the 
nature of the arrangements on which they were formed and the definition 
held of each other. The structural units in turn affected or impinged 
upon the subsequent arrangements entered into by the parties involved.
It is useful to view these structural units in terms of their relative 
strength, Weick (1976), or in terms of the degree of intimacy between the 
parties involved. For Circourel (1970) suggests:
"that the more spontaneous or intimate the relationship, and 
hence the interaction, the less "institutionalised" the 
behaviour of each. Thus, strangers will respond to more 
impersonal or "safe" definitions of the situation in inter­
acting with one another. Close friends would be more likely 
to innovate before each other during social interaction^ or 
they would be less constrained by third parties."
Circourel 1970
The structural unit composed of Cyril Jenkins and his Departmental 
Production Managers, Charlie Johnson and Mike Shilling reflected the 
nature of the arrangements they entered into with each other and the 
definition they held of each other. Both Charlie Johnson and Mike 
Shilling were critical of Cyril Jenkins; Mike described his appointment 
as a disaster and Charlie thought of him as an inexperienced academic. 
Furthermore, both were at pains to suggest that they did not voluntarily 
pass information on to Chris Jenkins but rather only did so on request
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(pages 135 and l4o). Thus the working arrangement between these managers 
was not intimate and could be described as being weak. Although the 
managers knew each other they often acted in an "institutionalised" or 
"formal" manner, as if they were strangers, and thus the amount of 
innovation and improvisation contained in their discussions was restricted.
The structural unit composed of Jim Brown, Peter Travers and Charlie 
Johnson in turn reflected the nature of the arrangements they entered 
into with each other and the definition they held of each other. Peter 
Travers and Jim Brown were close friends sind were full of admiration for 
each other. Although Charlie Johnson was not such a close friend, they 
all respected each other and arranged to inform each other of problematic 
situations and jointly discussed and agreed upon joint courses of action. 
The structural unit formed by these managers could be described as 
intimate, friendly and strong. Within this structural unit a high degree 
of improvisation and innovation took place.
It is possible to endlessly chop up or punctuate the organisation through 
considering the various relationships between individuals. However, not 
all of these could be defined as structural units. Structural units 
were formed by successive involvement with each other, and thus the 
frequency of the arrangement was an important factor. A shop floor 
worker observed to be talking with Chris Davis on one occasion, would 
hardly constitue a structural unit. However, the frequency of entering 
into arrangements was not sufficient to characterise the intimacy or 
strength of that structural unit. Jim Brown and Mike Shilling frequently 
entered into arrangements, but because of their hostile or antagonistic 
definition of each other, the structural unit was neither intimate nor 
particularly strong. The nature of the information passed between these
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individuals was poor and the arrangement to enter into joint action was 
stilted and grudging. Their arrangements to enter into joint action 
appeared to be more in the nature of a tentative truce than a genuine 
desire to act in concert.
The term arrangement is intended to convey the process of entering into 
and maintaining relationships rather than that of a objectifiable, fixed 
permanent structural unit. Weick (I969) argues that when describing 
organisations we should use verbs which convey processes, rather than 
nouns which convey things or fixed structures.
"the word organisation is a noun and is also a myth. If one 
looks for an organisation one will not find it. What will 
be found is that there are events, linked together, that 
transpire within concrete walls and these sequences, their 
pathways, their timing are the forms we erroneously make 
into substances when we talk about sin organisation."
Weick 1969
In a later paper Weick argues that in giving names to things that 
continually change it implies that we are trying to stabilize them. 
Unfortunately, this stabilization covers up the perpetually fluid 
process underlying all things (Weick 1974).
Thus, although the more or less permanent social or working arrangements 
may be identified aind named as structural units, their permanence must 
not be overstressed at the expense of not viewing them as processes .
As with other processes these structural units are subject to continual 
change, dissolution and rearrangement. The structural units are in a 
continual state of flux.; they are to some degree temporal, continually 
becoming;never in being. They are subject to continual modification or
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rearrangement by the improvisation and actions of the members. As 
described above, chorus phrased improvisation by a member of a structural 
unit may result in a new arrangement being formed or the other members 
attempting to bring the deviant actor into line.
10.11 Informant Networks
The informant networks as described on page 149 may be defined as 
structural units reflecting more or less permanent working arrangements 
to inform. Informant networks as structural units were formed through 
successive arrangements to inform, whereby a more permanent arrangement 
to provide each other with reliable information emerged.
The definitions held of each other,which were of particular importance 
to the formation of the informant networks,were those of reliability 
suid credibility as suppliers and receivers of information. The informant 
network arrangements required that the members could be relied upon to 
supply reliable and accurate information. Furthermore, the arrangement 
required that the members could be relied upon to receive sensitive 
information and that they were cautious in passing that information on 
to others. As I have described in chapter 8 , the managers were aware 
of the importance of these definitions to the informant network 
arrangements and were conscious not be defined as informers.
The requirement to be a reliable receiver of information set limits on 
the informant networks. For it was part of the arrangement to restirct 
the flow of information to the senior management level. Managers were 
particularly careful in communicating with Cyril Jenkins and Chris 
Davis. These managers had the ability to enforce penal action should 
the information they received have identified the person responsible
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for some event or situation. Kevin Linsey and David Clark fraternised 
too often with senior management and were often excluded from informant 
networks. David and Kevin always appeared to be the last to know any­
thing that occurred outside their immediate sphere of activity or domain.
Another characteristic of the arrangement to inform through informant 
networks was that of reciprocity. It was necessary for Jim Brown to 
provide reliable information to Charlie Johnson for Jim to expect Charlie 
to supply him in turn with reliable information. Jim described it as 
"a two way thing" (page I50). As I have noted above the way in which 
information was supplied was subject to some improvisation, the improv­
isation was accepted in so far that the desired outcome was achieved.
The exchange of information was not conducted on a value basis, with 
one piece of information being exchanged with another piece of equal 
worth, rather it was assumed or recognised that all would balance out 
even in the end.
The informant networks were in a state of flux, although fairly 
permanent arrangements existed, for example the one between Charlie 
Johnson, Jim Brown and Peter Travers. Other arrangements,for example 
the one between Jim Brown and Mike Shilling were less stable and subject 
to fluctuation because of the animosity between the individuals. However, 
even the more permanent, intimate arrangements were subject to dissolut­
ion and rearrangement. If Jim Brown continually neglected to inform 
Charlie Johnson or continually supplied him with unreliable information, 
Charlie Johnson in turn would cease to supply Jim with reliable inform­
ation. Other more personal factors, or factors outside the process of 
informing could upset the balance in the arrangements. At first 
Charlie Johnson was antagonistic towards Jim Brown as planner, because
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Charlie's exclusive control over production planning was threatened.
Jim described Charlie as being difficult to communicate with (page 147). 
However, as Jim took more advice from Charlie the antagonism between 
them was healed and the arrangement to inform developed. On the other 
hand, Jim initially found communication with Mike Shilling satisfactory; 
however, as their personal relationship deteriorated the arrangement to 
inform dissolved and Jim Brown had to develop an alternative arrange­
ment by going "through the back door" to Mike's supervisors for 
information (page 152).
The informant networls performed another crucial function: They
provided a forum where managers would construct arrangements to cope 
with specific issues. It was within these informant networks that 
consensus definitions of situations were formed, themes or courses 
of action talked through and collective improvisation took place.
When Jim Brown went to Sales to report some event, discussion would 
take place around the meaning of that event to those parties involved. 
Themes would be floated, talked through, accepted, modified or 
rejected. The degree of intimacy between the individuals within the 
informant networks affected the amount of innovative improvisation. 
Improvisation was more likely to occur between Jim Brown sind Peter 
Travers than Peter Travers and Mike Shilling.
The informant networks were thus social arrangements or structural units 
which were instrumental to the process of informing and in turn were 
formed by the process of informing. Through successive arrangements 
to inform each other, more or less permanent taken-for-granted arrange­
ments were developed and an identifiable social or structural unit was 
created. In addition to the arrangements to inform, the definitions
346
that managers held of each other, both in terms of their reliability 
and credibility as receivers and suppliers of information and in terms 
of the general definition or label held, were important factors in the 
formation of the informant networks.
I have deliberately avoided listing the members of the informant 
networks to do justice to,and emphasise, their state of flux and 
impermanence. The membership of certain informant networks could be 
listed and one could be fairly assured that it would continue for 
sometime in that make-up. However, others were observable only 
infrequently to cope with specific non-routine situations. During the 
expansion programme a new order of informant networks emerged to cope 
with the additional contingencies that were brought into play during 
this phase. The promotion of Jim Brown to Departmental Manager (page 
152) and the transfening of Peter Travers to Maidenhead, significantly 
disrupted the informant networks, as would the eventual retirement of 
Charlie Johnson. Chris Davis' reshuffling of management further 
disrupted the taken-for-granted permanent arrangements. Thus,while it 
is a useful analytical device to view an organisation.as a series of 
overlapping structural units formed by arrangements, these structural 
units are of a continually changing nature. Some changes were less 
frequent than others, and had less of an impact on other structural 
units than others. Jim Brown's appointment had a dramatic affect on 
the planning arrangement whereas Martin Keyes' appointment had little 
or no affect on the material control arrangement.
10*12 Social Groupings
Whereas the above arrangements to inform, reflected in the informant 
networks, may be defined as instrumental or task-directed arrangements.
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another order of arrangements or structural units were observable and had 
a significant impact on the order or structure of the organisation. These 
were the social groupings and may be defined as"affective"arrangements$ 
their purposes were more social than task-directed, they were primarily, 
although not exclusively, for entertainment and enjoyment rather than 
designed to "accomplish something" or to "get something done."
Whereas the informant networks as structural units were based on mutual 
definitions of reliablity and credibility, the social groupings as 
structural units were based on the more general mutual definition held 
by the members. Managers arranged to meet at lunch in the canteen, at 
tea or coffee in particular offices and at various pubs on Friday 
lunchtimes, because they enjoyed each others company, because they liked 
each other or because they had sufficient in common to engage in enter­
taining conversation. Thus, through successive involvement with one 
another and through holding complementary definitions of each other, 
individuals formed into more or less permanent social arrangements or 
structural units.
Once again,these social groupings sis structural units reflected the type 
of arrangement they were formed on, which in turn affected or impinged 
upon subsequent surrangements involving those parties. The style of the 
conversation and the topics discussed varied from social grouping to 
social grouping, reflecting the characters of the individuals. The 
character or personality of the members were in turn instrumental in 
the formation of the social grouping in the first place. The social 
grouping comprising of Jim Brown, Peter Travers and Nigel Plant and of 
which I was a member, was characterised by personal anecdotes, jokes 
and topics which were of mutual interest; cars, motor bikes and
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socializing. Furthermore,as Jim Brown, Nigel Plant and Peter Travers 
were strongly career orientated suid ambitious, a great deal of discussion 
centred around general events in the factory on which they would speculate 
as to the impact these would have on themselves. The social grouping 
made up of Simon White, Mike Shilling, Tom Jackson and Ron Welsh were 
characterised by mutual baiting, discussions about sport and politics 
and provided a forum for expressing pet gripes and complaints. The social 
grouping made up of Charlie Johnson, Tim Steed and to a lesser extent 
Mike Sampey, were characterised by discussion of family and mutual friends 
outside of the factory. Charlie Johnson always brought his newspaper to 
lunch and read out short passages which would be commented on by the 
others. There also appeared to be long periods of silence between these 
individuals which characterise a relationship of long standing.
The social groupings appeared to be fairly permanent and the bondings 
between the individuals strong and intimate, although there were differ­
ences. Simon White's group appeared to be held together through mutual 
tolerance rather than genuine affection. Jim Brown, Peter Travers and 
Nigel Plant had a genuine respect for one another. Charlie Johnson and 
Tim Steed were long-standing friends both during work and socially 
outside the organisation. Whereas informant networks might be disrupted 
when a key member was promoted or when his position changed, the social 
groupings maintained their form, unless promotion entailed moving into 
the senior management canteen, which was extremely rare.
The social groupings as arrangements contained little detail or 
specification and were to a large extent taken-for-granted. Two 
particular characteristics were however noticeable. Firstly, the 
managers avoided discussing task directed issues, especially at lunch. 
Rather, they arranged to meet after lunch to discuss such issues (page 25).
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Secondly, when members were taken into confidence over a particularly 
sensitive issue concerning one of the members, such as Peter Travers ' 
pending transfer, there was an implicit assumption that the conversation 
would "go no further."
The topic or subject matter that dominated the conversations was to do 
with setting specific issues. That is,discussions about events or 
situations that were taking place within the organisation that did not 
directly involve the members of that social grouping in taking any action. 
These events were not reported merely to inform each other, but also to 
discuss their implications and thereby form a consensus definition of 
the event. In this way the social groupings acted as information pools, 
where mauiagers introduced events or situations that they had heard about 
or had experience of and which the other members may not have. Such 
wide rsinging information and the discussion of it,allowed the mansigers 
to construct a wider, more comprehensive portrait of the events or 
situations occurring in the factory at large.
Another major topic centred around the personal characteristics of other 
individuals who were not members of the social grouping. These discuss­
ions provided the hearsay that would influence each of the members defin­
ition of the party under discussion and would affect their subsequent 
actions towards that individual. In this way the managers were able to 
construct a fuller, more graphic portrait, of the various individuals 
in the setting and could in effect prepare themselves for any possible 
encounter with them.
Although individuals could be described as members of an identifiable 
social grouping, they also maintained their separateness. Conversations
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and discussions were not restricted to social groupings. Each member 
would make contact and interact with members from other social groupings 
during their daily activities in their offices and on the shop floor. 
During these encounters information was exchanged about events in the 
factory and about the personal characteristics and actions of various 
people. Such information, if it was not sensitive, may have been gener­
ated within the managers' social groupings and further information 
gathered from these chance encounters would be discussed in the social 
grouping. Thusithe social groupings acted as accelerators of information 
aiding the spread of gossip or grapevine information.
The relative strength or intimacy of the social groupings,coupled with 
their relative permanence and frequency,made them particularly influential 
to the organisational order auid structure. In addition to being pools and 
accelerators of setting specific information, they acted as a forum for 
the sharing of confidences and the construction of courses of action 
which entailed high degrees of improvisation and which could in turn 
have a significant impact on the wider structure of the organisation.
It was in the social groupings that managers discussed the new salary 
structure and the management reshuffling and decided how they were going 
to react to these suggestions or directives from senior management. The 
introduction of the new incentive scheme for the workforce; proposed 
changes in the control of finished goods and waste; the proposed intro­
duction of the new extruder; the layout of the factory during the 
expansion period; the acceptance of a new appointment;and the formul­
ation of a complaint or suggestion to be made to senior management, all 
were discussed, evaluated and a course of action decided upon within, 
and subsequently between,the social groupings.
351
10.13 Summary
Interactions do not take place in a vacuum but occur within some 
organisational context, order, or structure. This order may be described 
as a series of loosely coupled sub-assemblies, overlapping awareness 
contexts or a series of loosely coupled shared arrangements.
For individuals to act in concert they must enter into a shared arrange­
ment, which includes a shared definition of the situation, a shared theme 
or course of action and an outline of the parts to be performed by the 
parties involved. Thus, an arrangement permits an actor to act, and 
whilst acting to know, at least roughly (for misinterpretation and 
ambiguity may exist)what the other parties are doing.
Arrangements may differ around their degree of detail or specification, 
frequence or repetition, the nature of their formation and their degree 
of permanence.
Through successive involvement in arrangements with others and through 
the definition the parties hold of each other,more or less permanent 
social and working arrangements may be established, which may be described 
to be structural units. These shared arrangements as structural units 
may be strong and intimate or weak and distanced, more permanent or 
transitory.
These more or less permanent shared arrangements are typically taken- for- 
granted and contain little detail or specification. This loose nature 
allows for minor improvisation by the parties to the degree that the 
expected outcome of the arrangement is achieved. More dramatic improvis­
ation or chorus phrasing such that the expected outcome of the arrangement
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is not achieved create disruption which may lead to rearrangement, the 
creation of a new arrangement or the other parties attempting to 
bring the deviant actor back into line.
These structural units as shared arrangements reflect the arrangement 
they are formed on and in turn affect subsequent working arrangements 
entered into by the parties involved.
Informant networks may be defined as more or less permanent working 
arrangements to inform based on the parties’ mutual definitions of each 
other in terms of reliability and credibility as suppliers and receivers 
of information.
Social groupings may be defined as more or less permanent social 
arrangements based on the parties'complementary and mutual definitions 
of each other.
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IMPLICATIONS FOR THE TRADITIONAL VIEW OF MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEMS; 
ORGANISATIONAL REALITY
The underlying assumptions of an organisation in the traditional view of 
information systems are derived principally from general systems theory.
A system is seen as a regularly interacting or independent group of 
items forming a whole. The general model of a system is input, processor 
and output, and as McCosh Rahaman and Earl (I981) note the management 
information system is an example of a system transforming data into 









The organisation therefore is seen as being made up of interacting and 
interdependent subsystems (of which the MIS is one) bounded by an 
environment. The system is maintained in equilibrium internally 
through goals and objectives which achieve coordination, consistency 
and encourage rationality, (the MIS plays an important role in this 
process). Externally, the system is held in equilibrium by exchanging 
inputs and outputs with the environment. In this way the organisation
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is regarded as an open system. Furthermore, the open system is adaptive, 
in that, it can adjust subsystem relationships and can adapt to environ­
mental change.
Internally the organisation is viewed as a hierarchy with lines of 
authority and responsibility converging towards the top, usually the 
managing director or president of the company. The hierarchymodel is 
reflected in the typical "organisational chart" with the relationships 
between the units or individuals representing information flow or lines 
of authority and responsibility.
This view of organisations conforms to the traditional view briefly 
outlined on page I79 . Organisational reality is seen to be a concrete
process in which the entity may be delineated from its environment and 
its boundary plotted or identified. The basic assumptions about human 
nature in this model is one of "man as adaptor," adapting, as the 
system adapts, to the various changing contingencies with which the 
system interacts, Morgan and Smircich (I98O).
Boland (1979) criticises the systems approach to defining information 
requirements;
"they tend to result in conceptions of the organisation as being 
in static equilibrium, interacting with an environment which 
is effectively knowable, objectively verifiable and inconse­
quentially affectedby the action of managers. The objective 
of the organisation is to adapt to its environment in some 
optimum (or satisfying) sense, and to periodically reassess 
its strategy of adaption (or goals) as the environment 
charges.
Boland 1979
Boland (1979) notes two important factors that question the above
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definition. Firstly, the environment is essentially ambiguous and 
intimately related to the manager himself (March and Olson 1976) and 
secondly, the manager interprets the world as well as decodes it - he 
deals symbolically as well as literally with the categories, events and 
interactions he encounters.
Boland (1979) argues, from the interactionist perspective, that 
organisation reality may be viewed as a process "in which the organis­
ation's members each participate in the construction of their organis­
ational reality through the interaction and co-determination of each 
others interpretive schemes," rather than depicting it as a 
objectifiable reality in its own right.
Weick (1974) argues against the systems theorists' concept of equilibrium, 
He suggests that such a concept has its roots in logical positivism or 
structural functionalism, with the system reacting and then adapting 
to external or internal forces. Weick (1969-1977-1979) suggests that 
organisations should be studied as processes. Verbs should be used to 
describe organisations and not nouns. Weick's model of the organisation 
process is that of enactment, selection and retention as discussed 
previously.
Weick (1977) further argues against the external objective environment.
"While the categories external/internal or outside/inside exist 
logically, they do not exist empirically. The "outside" or 
"external" world cannot be known. There is no methodological 
process by which one can confirm the existence of an object 
independent of the confirmatory process involving oneself."
Weick 1977
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Thus the environment, as with other contingencies may have a logical 
existence but not an empirical one. They exist as constructs and are 
useful for individuals to "punctuate" their stream of experiences; 
however, they ought not to be reified by systems designers. To return 
to the basic position of the alternative approach of viewing organisa­
tion; organisation reality is constructed by interacting individuals 
whereby the align their courses of action. The "environment" is 
constructed by interacting individuals where they share their definition 
of the environment."
Viewing the environment as an object leads to the problems encountered 
by the contingency theorist in operationalising their model and 
especially measuring the contingency variables. In reference to the 
contingency theory approach which Otley (I980) characterises as the 
"it all depends" approach he makes the following comment:
"The idea that "it all depends" tends to be used as a means 
of avoiding rather than addressing design implications. The 
contingency approach thus has the appearance of being an 
influential but ephemeral fashion, and it is particularly 
insidious because it occurs in a relatively immature field."
Otley 1980
As an alternative to the systems theory concept, an organisation may 
be viewed as patterns of interaction where by the interacting 
individuals align their courses of action. Certain patterns of 
interaction occur frequently and are taken-for-granted, this gives 
the appearance of a ruled orderliness or a more or less stable structure. 
However, the interaction as a unit should not be reified. What is of 
importance to understanding the nature of organisational reality is
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the process of interaction; the definition that the managers hold of 
each other; their strategies both overt and covert; their ambitions; 
fears, anxieties and desires; their relative strengths and weaknesses; 
their perceived authority and power; their perceived reliability or 
credibility; and the knowledge or information they have of the 
situation on hand. Each of these give the form and character to the 
interaction (and hence the organisation) and not the mere physical 
presence of two or more individuals.
Within my metaphor the process of informing, of which the management 
information system may be part, can be viewed as a series of loosely 
coupled shared arrangements to inform. The arrangements are formed 
through interaction whereby the managers align their individual courses 
of action. The arrangements reflect the nature of the interaction on 
which they are formed and in turn influence the subsequent actions and 
interactions of the parties involved. Arrangements are subject to 
change through improvisation, on the part of the members, whereby they 
may alter the definition of the situation, which includes the definition 
held of the other parties, and/or they may alter the theme of course 
of action on which the arrangement is based.
The typical management information system may be viewed as an sirrangement
to inform, however such an arrangement is usually imposed. For an
arrangement to be shared, the parties must hold complementary definitions
the
of the characteristics of/arrangement. This includes a complementary 
definition of the situation, of object or persons around which the 
arrangement is formed and of the course of actio*, purpose and conseq­
uences of that arrangement. Therefore, the managers should derive 
similar meanings from the arrangement and should be able to anticipate the
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actions of others involved in the arrangement.
From my data it appeared that managers, even within the same management 
level, dealing with similar problem situations, assigned different 
meanings to the official documented production information. I would 
suggest that a greater difference would exist between middle and 
senior management. As the majority of managers assigned little 
meaning to the official documented information, the courses of 
action selected in problematic situations were not derived from the 
'formal' information, but rather, from the various 'informal' sources. 
The surrangement to inform, through the official documented information 
sources was therefore not "shared" by the users and designers of the 
system. In such a situation an imposed arrangement may not even 
constitute part of the process of informing. To understand the process 
of informing, the part to be played by the official documented 
information and in turn the role to be performed by an "information 
system designer",it is necessary to question the assumptions under­
lying the traditional view of the process of informing. As Boland 
(1979) has attempted to do:
"Using an action based approach, the design of an information 
system is not a question of fitness for an organisational 
reality that can be modelled beforehand, but a question of 
fitness for use in the construction of an organisational 
reality through the symbolic interaction of its participants. 
In essence the information system is an environment of 
symbols within which a sense-making process will be carried 
out. The information system does not make sense in light 
of an organisation, but is used by managers to make sense 
of the organisation."
Boland 1979
Boland (1979) further argues that:
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"for these types of design issues, information systems 
are in need of new metaphors to guide the design process."
Boland 1979
This thesis was not intended to be prescriptive nor was it directed 
towards design issues, rather it was to question the nature of the 
process of informing. However, arising out of this research are a 
number of very tentative design implications. Firstly, in response 
to Boland's request for new metaphors I will offer the following.
A "system designer," may be viewed as an "arranger." This is of 
course derived once again from my jazz metaphor. Mike Westbrook (I981) 
describes the role of ein arranger in jazz;
"My job is to provide a structure and then work on it within 
the band. The music is a collective concern with aunple room 
for improvisation and individual ideas. Working together we 
create a chain reaction and that's what provides the thrills."
Westbrook I98I
The most intelligent jazz composers always recognise that jazz is 
not composed of notes or instruments but of creative men and women.
In the same way the process of informing is not composed of measures 
and pieces of paper but of creative men and women interpreting suid 
making sense of the situations and events that surround them. The 
arrangement to inform must reflect the creative nature of managers 
and should subsequently facilitate and encourage it.
Typically the designer of information systems have some 'goal' or 
'objective' underlying their design process. Murdick (I980) describes 
it as an attempt to;
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"raise the process of managing from the level of piecemeal 
spotty information, intuitive guesswork, and isolated problem 
solving to the level of systems insights, systems information, 
sophisticated data processing and systems problem solving."
Murdick I98O
The management information system is to aid the process of managing 
which includes the following functions;
Planning: Planning proceeds all managerial actions. It 
involves development of alternatives, selection of 
goals, defining of policies, and developing 
procedures and programmes to achieve organisational 
and departmental goals.
Organising: Organising involves task identification,definition, 
grouping and distribution among subordinates, fixing 
of responsibility and also ensuring co-ordination 
between different activities and efforts.
Staffing: Staffing involves the process of fulfilling personnel 
requirements of the organisation. It covers such 
functions as recruiting, selecting, training and 
hiring personnel to man the organisation and to 
perform its tasks.
Directing: Directing involves leading, guiding, supervising 
and motivating subordinates in the organisation. 
It is essentially a leadership function and is 
concerned with people.
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Control: Controlling is ensuring the performance of events to
control plans. It involves (1) setting standards 
(2 ) measurement of performance, (3 ) comparison against 
standard and (4) corrective action.
McCosh Rahsiman and Earl I98I
In order to fulfil these functions, the manager must first know what is 
going on. Thus the first and fundamental requirement of the process of 
informing, and any designers involvement in it, is to provide a facility 
through which managers may inform themselves,or as Weick (1979) states, 
a facility to reduce ambiguity, uncertainty and equivocality surrounding 
situations. In some cases, of persistent ambiguity, the manager may have 
to act in order to find out what he is doing, the process of informing 
should again fulfil the same function; he should be able to inform 
himself of what is going on whilst it is happening.
Until the facility for managers to inform themselves is available the 
process of informing should be uncoupled from the processes of planning, 
organising, staffing, directing and controlling, at least in the arranger's 
framework. The 'objective' of the arranger as designer is to provide,or 
possibly recognise and draw attention to,facilities through which 
managers may gather or receive data and through interpreting that data, 
construct a definition of the situation, in a sufficiently timely, 
accurate and detailed manner to decide upon or improvise a course of 
action.
To achieve this 'objective' the arranger as designer must identify and 
recognise the legitimacy of 'informal' sources which managers define as
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being meaningful and thus useful sources of data. These include, meetings, 
personal records, observations and interactions. The arranger as designer 
must also recognise the informant networks said social groupings existing 
in the organisation and the role they play in the process of informing.
He should further recognise the role of the official documented inform­
ation and its role in the process of informing as distinct from the 
processes of planning and control.
To talk of designing 'informal* information sources has an inherent 
contradiction. For, if the'informal'is designed it becomes'formal.'
This firstly, will result in the informal sources losing their flexib­
ility of content and format and secondly, may cause an unfavourable 
reaction from the managers who developed these processes. Information 
as has been seeion page 246 was used for both offensive and defensive 
reasons,in addition to "finding out." Thus,managers might be reluctant 
to have their sources of information-and thus the content-on general 
view. Reluctance to use informal information may come from the other 
side, with senior managers regarding it as gossip, hearsay, unreliable, 
not objective and so forth. Hence my assertion that the legitimacy 
of 'informal' sources must first be recognised. Furthermore,it should 
be noted that even senior managers use 'informal information.'
Rather than designing the informal information per se, the arranger 
would have to encourage its recognition and legitimacy and then to 
arrsoige for such information to be shared. Managers, particularly 
senior managers, should seek to be .included in the informant networks 
and enter into the shared arrangements to inform. This entails 
becoming a reliable receiver and supplier of information. The
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managers must hold complementary and shared definitions of the arrange­
ments to inform which includes a shared definition of the purpose and 
actions arising out of the arrangement. This again reinforces the 
point that the control process, with its emphasis of the evaluation 
of performance, should be uncoupled from the process of informing, 
with its emphasis on finding out what is going on.
Boland (1979) recognises the problems in 'designing* the process of 
informing;
"To a large extent the sense-making process cannot be 
designed as such. It is the natural result of active persons 
in a social world. There are no mechanical, clockwork-like 
relationship indications, objects, interactions and inter­
pretations."
Boland 1979
From this standpoint it might be argued that systems designers should 
leave the process of informing through interaction well alone, however 
Boland (1979) further argues:
"An information system does however play a role in shaping 
situations - it provides a context for social interaction.
As a context, we can approach the design of an information 
system from the standpoint of pure channels of communication. 
Apart from any consideration of the data, categories and 
measurements to be used the very existence of a channel of 
communication can be an object of design."
Boland 1979
By recognising the various arrangements to inform, understanding 
their nature, understanding the processes involved in their formation 
and particularly understanding their role in providing a context 
for social interaction and therefore creative improvisation, managers,
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until then excluded from such arrangements may be able to involve 
themselves in them, and possibly, through improvisation, re-arrange the 
arrangement if necessary. Or a designer, as arranger, may form new 
arrangements simply by providing a forum for interaction, improvisation 
and thus informing. Brain-storming sessions are an example of such 
a forum. Again the managers would have to hold complementary 
definitions for these forums, or else as was the case with the 
Production Meeting, they would serve little purpose.
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NOTES
1. The concept of selecting an appropriate theme for recurrent 
familiar situations, and the notion of agreement through collective 
improvisation for unfamiliar situations are in keeping with these 
points made by Blumer (I962).
2. The notion that accounting and management information is a language 
or provides symbols for interpreting a variety of events within an 
organisation has been noted by Hayes Wolf and Cooper (I981). They 
suggest that accounting as a language may contribute to the shared 
definitions of organisational reality and the organisation's 
situation, Berger and Luckman (I967). It however has been further 
noted by Daft and Wigington (1979) that management (accounting) 
information as a Isuiguage may be too restrictive to cope with
the complexity of many situations and suggest that common or 
colloquial language may be more suitable for expressing certain 
events or situations.
3« The restriction of an improvisors freedom through too formalised 
and too strictly enforced rules or operating procedures is yet 
another characteristic that may impede creative, innovative 
improvisation in organisations. Steiner (1965) notes that 
creativity is enhanced by permitting freedom in choice of problem 




"For some time people who manage organizations and people 
who study this managing have asked, "How does an organization 
go about doing what it does and with what consequences for 
its people, processes, products and persistence?'^ And for 
some time they've heard the same answers. In paraphrase 
the answers say essentially that an organization does what 
it does because of plans, intentional selection of means 
that get the organization to agree upon goals, and all of 
this is accomplished by such rationalized procedures as 
cost benefit analyses, division of labour, specified areas 
of discretion, authority invested in the office, job 
descriptions, and a consistent evaluation and reward system.
The only problem with that portrait is that it is raire in 
nature."
Weick 1976
This thesis is an attempt to find out what really does go on in 
organizations. The purpose of the research was not verification, but 
rather exploration and discovery. This pursuit, that is the exploration 
and discovery of what goes on in organizations, led me to adopt a long­
itudinal, participant observation methodology which required me to 
conduct the research in the "real" or "empirical" world. The study 
was longitudinal, for I believe that it is only through familiarity 
that the complex patterns of organisational life clearly emerge, and 
can be studied and analysed by the researcher and ultimately concepts 
developed.
This thesis was an attempt not only to find new answers to the question 
posed by Weick above, but also to find a new way to phrase or ask the 
question itself. The question that this thesis asked was not, "What do 
organizations do?" but rather "What do people do in organizations?" The 
answer to the first question is very simple; organisations don't do 
anythingl The answer to the second question is somewhat more complex
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and its solution requires the co-operative and cumulative effort of 
numerous researchers. In recognising this complexity I chose to 
focus my attention on a specific process in an organization, which 
involved the actions of various managers. The process I chose to 
study was the process of informing. This process took place in a 
"thing" called an organization and this it is necessary to consider 
the nature of this "thing."
To find a consensus definition of the term organization is profoundly
difficult. First and foremost it is simply a term or a word. A word
symbolically represents some "thing." The "thing" may be an "event", 
an "object," a "process," an "idea" or a "concept." If it is accepted 
that individuals develop idiosyncratic approaches to the meaning of 
words, then the word organization can represent different "things" to 
different people. As Weick (1979) notes, organizations have been 
variously portrayed as anarchies, seesaws, space stations, garbage 
cans, savage tribes, octopoid, market places and data processing 
schedules. Each of these metaphors attribute certain characteristics 
or meanings to the "thing" called an organization.
For myself, an organization is an arena, a forum, a stage, or my
preferred term, a social setting in which a number of individuals act 
out at least part of their daily lives. Within an industrial organ­
ization, as a social setting, there is an implicit recognition, by the 
acting individuals, that the task to be performed is of such a sophist­
ication or complexity that it requires they enter into joint or concerted 
action. An organization therefore, is a social setting in which the 
participants align their individual courses of action to accomplish 
some sophisticated or complex task. The acts and actions of the
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individuals are socisuL, in that they are orientated towards one 
another. The web of meanings, expectations and conduct, resulting from 
such mutuail orientations or interactions, forms the foundation of the 
organization. Given this view, the meanings, expectations and conduct, 
should be the subject matter of enquiry in the study of organizations.
Within this view of organizations, human beings are seen ais active 
agents in creating their social setting, which, in turn, influences 
their behaviour. The interactionist*s conception of human behaviour 
assumes that behaviour is self-directed, and observable at two distinct 
levels - the symbolic and the interactional (or behavioural) (Denzin 1970). 
The concern of the interactionist is not only tie observable actions or 
interactions of individuals but eilso the subjective meaning those actions 
and interactions have for the acting and interacting individuals them­
selves.
Individuals act towards "things" according to the meaning those things 
have for them. Individuals therefore, through their interpretative 
processes, assign meaning to things and thereby construct definitions 
of the situations they encounter. Individuals then construct their 
actions according to the definition thus formed. The meanings of things 
are socially derived through interaction with others whereby a consen­
sual definition or a 'social construction' of reality is agreed. Such 
meanings, and hence definitions, are fluid and may be reinterpreted or 
redefined in subsequent interactions.
My view of human behaviour, (as with the interactionist perspective) is 
basically anti-deterministic. I see individuals having the ability, 
should they choose to use it, to derive and assign new meanings to
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"things," develop novel definitions of situations and thereby construct 
creative, innovative modes of behaviour. This is not to portray individ­
uals as transcending all societal influence, for consensual definitions 
or social constructions, and agreement on acceptable modes of behaviour 
in given situations, act upon the individual. These influences may 
constrain or limit the individual's desire or his belief in himself, 
to develop creative innovative modes of behaviour. Societal influences; 
the agreed norms, values and rules that go to make up our social order 
delineate from total potential of action that which is "done" and more 
often, that which is "not done." Yet these agreed norms, values and 
rules are themselves processes which require to be continually reaffirmed. 
Alternatively the agreed norms, values and rules may be modified or alter­
ed through subsequent interaction where novel, innovative behaviour is 
introduced by at least one of the interactants and accepted as plausible 
or appropriate by the significant others.
This model of the individual and society allows for the appearance of 
a seemingly permanent, non-surprising ruled orderliness to our daily lives 
and the organizations and settings in which we act out these lives. The 
model, further allows for the seemingly inevitable change that appears to 
take place within this order if a decently long time span is considered. 
It is this pivot point of change and order that intrigued me, particularly 
during the ansilysis of my data stage in the thesis and it is towards this 
phenomena that I would conduct any future research.
To return to the organization and the managers. Within the factory at 
Avon, I observed the managers creating and being confronted by a multip­
licity of events and situations. The mansigers, in order to act towards 
these events and situations, first had to make sense of them. The
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managers had to construct definitions of the situations (or at least of 
some of the situations). The process of informing as described in the 
thesis plays an integral and crucial role in the sense making process 
and in the construction of definitions of situations. Thus, if it is 
accepted that managers act according to their definitions or the sense 
they make of their surroundings, the process of informing plays an 
integral and crucial role in the very actions and interactions of the 
managers. Further, if organizations are viewed as patterns of inter­
action the process of informing therefore has a crucial role to play in 
the creation, sustaining and modification of the organizational reality. 
Given this perspective I believe that the study of the process of 
informing will enhance our understanding of the nature of human behaviour 
and the nature of organisational reality.
This thesis was firstly addressed to the various means, media, mechanisms 
or sources through which the managers gathered, received or circulated the 
raw data or "mere" information ( processed data) about events or situations 
which had taken place, were taking place or were likely to take place 
within the organization. The managers at Avon developed idiosyncratic 
approaches to the various sources of data or "mere" information, relying 
on, and emphasising the importance of, the sources they were predisposed 
towards using. However, a number of sources were readiy identifiable 
and used to some degree by most managers. These were the official 
documented information (formal information), meetings, personal records, 
direct observations and interactions.
The thesis was secondly addressed to the process by which managers 
converted the data or "mere" information they received or gathered into 
meaningful information. I describe this as an interpretative process 
through which managers assign meaning to the data or "mere" information
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and thereby develop a definition of the situation.
The managers had an implicit or intuitive understanding of the "human" 
nature of organizations,in that, they recognised that situations and 
events invariably involved the actions of people or "others." Thus, 
crucial to the development of a definition of the situation was data 
or "mere" information on those others involved. Managers further had 
definitions or portraits of significant others in the organisation.
Crucial to the process of informing, in these personal definitions, was 
the perceived reliability of the informant (including those involved in 
the preparation of the official documented sources).
The managers at Avon, as with most human beings, had a highly developed 
and sensitive personal identity and were conscious of the impression their 
performance or actions had on significant others. Managers were thus 
acutely concerned about being well, and correctly informed. Furthermore 
managers recognised the reciprocal nature of information and were concerned 
that others defined them as reliable receivers and suppliers of information.
Thus, crucial factors in the construction of a definition of a situation 
and thus the process of informing were the actions, intentions, conse­
quences to, and responses from others and the impact to the managers' 
self and role, as well as the more physical and temporal characteristics 
of the event or situation.
The thesis was thirdly addressed to the process of selecting or construc­
ting a course of action based upon the definition of the situation the 
managers had developed from the data or "mere" information they had 
gathered or received. I differentiated problematic situations into;
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firstly, those which were defined as familiar to previous situations.
The managers could then repeat the course of action they had adopted 
on the previous occasion (if the outcome or consequences of the previous 
action were acceptable). Secondly, those situations which were defined 
as unfamiliar (even after gathering additional information). In such 
a situation the manager would recognise the ambiguity, uncertainty or 
equivocality of the situation. The manager could then attempt to 
employ a standsird or scripted response to the situation. If these 
however, proved inappropriate, he would have to create a new, innovative 
course of action or solution (unless he chose non-action on an inapprop­
riate course of action).
Borrowing from the jazz metaphor I described this creative process as 
one of "improvisation",whereby individuals created new lines of behaviour 
by improvising around existing themes. I further suggested that the 
degree of novelty in sui improvisation may vary between minor (para­
phrasing) or major (chorus phrasing)innovativeness.
The field work or data gathering stage of this thesis was not specifically 
intended to provide data on the phenomena of improvisation, rather the 
questions posed,arose during my analysis stage. The concept of improv­
isation may be regarded as a product of my "sociological imagination" 
(Denzin 1978). The concept is in part speculative, although I do offer 
episodes which I believe are illustrative of the process of improvisation. 
The concept of improvisation provides a metaphor to explain the process 
of creating innovative behaviour in the face of unfamiliarity, ambiguity 
or uncertainty. It further anchors this process to the past experience 
of the individual and previous acceptable or taken-for-granted behaviour. 
The concept of collective improvisation provides a metaphor for explaining
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how agreement is reached between a number of individuals when faced with 
a situation which is defined as unfamiliar, ambiguous and uncertain. This 
metaphor is offered as an alternative to the concept of a negotiation, 
which I found, as a metaphor, too restricting and only applicable where 
tension existed between the parties and where the interactants had a 
clear understanding of the outcome they desired.
Within my anti-deterministic view of human behaviour I suggest that 
each individual has the ability to, and often does, construct novel 
innovative behaviour in their imaginations. This minded behaviour 
however, rarely manifests itself in the empirical world. The social 
pressures to conform to that which is recognised as legitimate, and the
desire to avoid that which is "not done," represses much of the potential
original behaviour. Mead's ME, the generalized and often some specific 
other, acts upon and limits the spontaneous I. On the other hand, other 
individuals manifest their novel innovative behaviour in their actions.
And thus, the behaviour is introduced into the empirical world. If 
such behaviour is regarded as applicable or plausible in the given 
situation it may be absorbed into the total set of acceptable behaviour 
that goes to make up the social order.
The thesis fourthly introduced the metaphor of an "arrange­
ment." The metaphor was used to depict three interrelated concepts or
ideas. Firstly, the coupling of a definition of a situation and a theme
or course of action may be regarded as the formation of a "sensible 
arrangement." The emphasis is on a sensible arrangement rather than 
the sensible arrangement. It is possible to construct a variety of 
definitions of a situation and couple these with a variety of themes 
or. courses of action which in turn may be improvised around thus the
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variety of potential courses of action is vast.
Secondly, joint or concerted action, the very stuff of organizational 
reality, may be viewed as a series of"loosely coupled shared arrange­
ments." For joint action to be undertaken, the parties must hold similar 
definitions of the situation and of the theme or course of action to 
be performed. In addition,each party must be aware of the parts they 
are expected to perform within the arrangement. A shared arrangement, 
constructed around a definition of a situation enables each interactant 
to know in advance what is expected of them. Shared arrangements may 
differ around a number of characteristics; first, the degree of 
detailed specification; second, the frequency of occurrence; and 
third, the intimacy of the members.
Improvisation may be viewed as taking place within these arrangements. 
Because of their loosely coupled nature the arrangements can absorb 
and tolerate minor improvisations (paraphrases) but may have to be 
rearranged if significantly innovative behaviour (chorus phrases) are 
introduced by the existing members or by a new member.
The nature by which shared arrangements, and the purpose for which they 
were formed will be reflected in the characteristics of the arrange­
ment and will influence the subsequent actions and interactions of the 
members of the arrangement.
Thirdly, many of these arrangements which occur frequently and at 
regular intervals become so taken-for-granted that they appear as 
semi-permanent "structural" units. At the middle management level I 
identified two such arrangements as structural units. These were the
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social groupings and informant networks. The social groupings were 
intimate, frequent and of low specification, they were principally a 
forum for social or non-work related issues. However they performed an 
important role in the organization in providing setting specific inform­
ation,(gossip or hearsay)about other parties or events in other aresis 
of the organization. They were important pools of data or"mere " 
information through which the participating managers could construct 
a fuller picture or definition of the "goings on" in the organization 
and of the nature and characteristics of other members of the organiz­
ation.
The informant networks were arrangements to inform. They comprised of 
individuals who could rely on each other to keep them informed with 
reliable information. The informant networks were less intimate than 
the social groupings and their purpose was more task-directed. The 
basis of their formation was that of reciprocating information which 
was defined to be of consequence to the various members. Such 
networks were in a greater date of flux than the social groupings, 
their make-up being altered by changing circumstances; the promotion, 
transfer and retiring of personnel and the conflict that from time to 
time would develop between the members. As arrangements to inform 
these informant networks played a crucial and central role in the process 
of informing in that they created regular contacts between individual 
managers where data or "mere" information was communicated. Further­
more, these informant networks or alternatively patterns of interaction, 
provided a forum for the interactants to reach agreement on joint or 
concerted action sis well sis a forum in which collective improvisation 
could take place.
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The concept of loosely coupled shared arrangements as structural units 
is derived from Weick*s (1976) concept of loosely coupled systems. I 
however, chose the word arrangement to depict these "structural" units 
as a process of"entering into*hnd’heting within"an arrangement rather 
than as some permanent concrete system. Many arrangements were almost 
entirely taken-for-granted and commonplace. The ethnomethodologists, 
for example Garfinkel (I967) and Filmer (1972) regard these taken-for- 
granted activities (or arrangements) as a crucial area of study in the 
understanding of humsoi behaviour. Filmer (1972) notes that common 
place, everyday, taken-for-granted activities are characterised by an 
implicit order which emerges in the course of interaction and the 
activity itself. This order functions to make situations "accountable" 
that is, explainable or understandable. He states that much of our 
daily activities assume the existence of an "et cetera clause" whereby 
our expressions (verbal and non-verbal) imply a continued directive 
towards a given type of social activity that is not explicityly stated.
In my view the social order may be viewed as a shared arrangement, based 
upon a mutual definition of a situation and an agreed theme or course 
of action. Thus arrangements outline, without explicit statement on 
each occasion, the parts expected to be performed by the participating 
individuals.
Weick (1976) lists a number of potential functions and disfunctions of 
loose coupling. One advantage is that small loosely coupled arrangements 
are more effective as sensing devices or are more sensitive to the 
detection of change, errors or problematic situations. Argyris (I98O) 
reinforces this in terms of the inefficiency of the typical management 
information system in detecting errors until they have reached signif­
icant proportions; the "local MIS" or the various ’informal* modes
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of informing are more sensitive and thus detect errors or change before 
they become significant.
Another advantage cited by Weick (1976) is that localized adaption may 
take place without significantly affecting other parts of the organization. 
Thus the introduction of a new person may alter the arrangement in one 
particular area without disrupting other areas in the organisation.
Another advantage is that where th@ arrangraent and the individuals in 
them maintain their identity, uniqueness and separateness, they may form 
into new arrangements (through interaction) to face novel or new 
situations. For example, during the expansion programme in the factory 
the managers rearranged themselves to cope with the new contingencies 
brought into play.
Another advantage is that where a breakdown occurs in an arrangement,
(for example between Jim Brown said Mike Shilling) the rift may be 
localised in that area without unduly affecting other arrangements. 
Furthermore, in accordance with the previous point a new arrangement 
may be formed to cope with the deteriorated existing arrangement.
A final and most important advantage is that within loosely coupled 
shared arrangements there is "more room" for self-determination by the 
actors. In "formal " systems with the emphasis on highly specific 
detailed procedures self-determination is limited and thus restricts 
creative innovative problem solving. Argyris (1971) refers to this 
as a restriction in psychological freedom. Hayes, Wolf and Cooper (I98I) 
note that the budgetary control system may further limit self-determination.
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This concept of loosely coupled shared arrangements may appear to have 
some potential dysfunctions to the more traditional view of organizations 
in that they may not conform to the model of unilateral control, the 
imperatives to consistency, rationality and the pursuit of some 
organizational purpose or objectives.
The preceding analysis is based on direct observation of loosely coupled 
shared arrangements in an organization. The analysis is not prescriptive 
or normative, rather it describes a phenomena which occurs in the 
empirical world (albeit in the so-called informal system (world)). Thus, . 
recognising the existence of these arrangmats and recognising their 
benefits (as the managers themselves did); what is required is a re- 
evaluation of the models of organizational reality, human behaviour, and 
of the various processes such as planning,control and informing which 
have dominated the study of organization theory and behaviour.
At the end of chapters 5» 8 , 9 and 10 I have attempted to question the 
traditional view of management information systems in the light of my 
analysis; the issues centred around; firstly, the traditional viev/s 
concept of a single total system supplying all the information require­
ments of the managers; secondly, the nature of meaningful information; 
thirdly, the assumptions about choice; fourthly, the assumptions about 
the nature of organizational reality; and finally, I presented some 
tentative suggestions and a metaphor for design issues.
If the various assumptions about human nature, the nature of organisational 
reality and the various processes are to be questioned further,what are 
required are observational study with what Swieringa (1980) calls
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"nonteleogical thinking." Such thinking concerns itself not with "what 
should be or could or might be, but rather with what actually ’is.* " 
Hopwood (1980) commenting on this paper makes the following call; (it 
is expressed in terms of accounting information but implicitly relates 
to management information in general).
"My own view is that accounting researchers need to get inside 
the factory gate or the office door. There is, I think, an 
urgent need for observational studies of accounting in action."
Hopwood 1980
This thesis is an attempt, in a small way, to do just this.
In embarking upon research of this nature, particularly if the approach 
is alien to the researcher, a number of epistemological and methodolog­
ical considerations become relevant and possibly problematic. In the 
final chapter, I address myself to some issues found in the methodological 
literature which centre around this qualitative, observational style 
of research. I further draw on my own personal experiences to 
illustrate these and other issues.
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CHAPTER 12 
TRAVELLERS AND TOURISTS IN RESEARCH:
METHODOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS
The Research Process
Throughout the initial autobiographical chapters I defined my research 
variously as qualitative, in depth, longitudinal and as a participant 
observational study. I now propose to discuss these methodological 
issues in more depth, and the implications they had for my research.
I deliberately included the two autobiographical chapters and I believe 
that the process of conducting research, the selection of a topic or 
the formation of a research problem, the adoption of a particular 
ontology and epistemology, the actual methods of gathering data and the 
analysis and presentation of that data are crucial to the research act 
and its outcome. I would suggest that such issues and processes should 
be explicitly recognised and where possible described in a thesis. The 
aim of recognising and describing the process of research is two fold. 
The first is to provide an account of one’s experience so that other 
researchers adopting a similar approach may benefit. This point has 
been made by Tomkins, Rosenberg and Colville (I98O).
"An underlying assumption behind this paper is that social 
science and researchers would derive considerable benefit 
if accounts of how social science is carried out in the 
real world were available as readily as formal textbooks 
on research methodology. It is, in fact part of the common 
sense occupational culture of the social sciences that a 
considerable discrepancy exists between how social science 
has actually been done and what is found in the textbook."
Tomkins Rosenberg and Colville I98O
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Thus in the first instance my autobiographical chapters and this 
chapter are an attempt to describe how this piece of research was 
actually carried out. Secondly by providing such a descriptive account 
the reader may gain a clearer understanding of how the research unfolded 
and be more able to assess its validity or as I shall argue its reason­
ableness.
In the first instance I described my research as qualitative rather than 
quantitative; what does this mean and what implications does it have for 
research? To begin with Morgan and Smircich (I980) make the following 
point:
"Our basic thesis is that the case for any research method, 
whether qualitative or quantitative, cannot be considered or 
presented in the abstract, because the choice and adequacy of 
a method embodies a variety of assumptions regarding the 
nature of knowledge and the methods through which that 
knowledge can be obtained, as well as a set of root assumptions 
about the nature of the phenomena to be investigated."
Morgan and Smircich I98O
When embarking on a piece of research the researcher carries with him 
a set of assumptions regarding ontology, human nature and epistemology 
and these may be developed and precisely defined, or as in my case
partially developed and ill defined (page 14). I have argued that on
entering the field I was neither an expert nor a total naif ; to 
paraphrase Weick (1979) I had to conduct my research in order to find
out what I was doing and write my thesis in order to find out what I
was saying. I deliberately left this chapter on methodology until the 
end of the thesis because it was only after I had conducted the research 
that I was able to articulate my chosen ontology, my view on human nature
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and my epistemological stance. Throughout my field work, and to a large 
extent my writing-up, I had to rely on a somewhat naive understanding of 
the above concepts, and what I would describe as a common sense or 
intuitive approach to gathering and analysing my data.
In addition to whatever contribution my thesis may have made to an 
understanding of the process of informing, of managerial behaviour, of 
interaction and of social order, it was also a process of learning. In 
the first instsince the research introduced me to and required that I 
learn at least a part of a new discipline, namely sociology and social 
psychology. During this process of learning which I would argue is 
still by no means complete, I was introduced to a different way of 
"looking at things" and of conducting research. With hindsight I am 
able to describe it as a move away from the more objectivist approaches 
to social science and towards the more subjectivist approaches (Morgan 
and Smircich I98O). These rather simple categories have been variously 
termed "positivist versus interpretivist" (Halfpenny 1979), "scientific 
versus naturalistic" (Tomkins and Grove I98I), "natural scientific 
versus the alternative" (Colville I98I). Regardless of the titles each 
category conveys an epistemology, an ontology and a view of human 
behaviour or human nature. Tomkins and Grove (I98I) note that rather 
than being simple dichotomous types, these perspectives may be better 
viewed as opposite ends of a continuum. Morgan and Smircich I98O have 
provided a table representing this continuum which I can do no better 
thsm to duplicate here:
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Network of Basic Assumptions Characterizing 











reality as a 
projection of 
human imagination
reality as a 
social
construction
reality as a 
realm of symbolic 
discourse
reality as a 
contextual field of 
information
reality as a 
concrete process
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man as pure spirit,
consciousness,
being
man as a social 
constructor the 
symbol creator





man as an adaptor man as a responder




















exploration of pure 
subjectivity
hermeneutics symbolic analysis contextual analysis 
of Gestalten
historical analysis lab experiments, 
sun/eys
I would suggest that my research was a move away from reality as a 
concrete structure, process or contextual field of information, towards 
reality as a realm of symbolic discourse and to a lesser degree reality 
as a social construction. On page 12 I describe how my initial research 
proposals were scattered with the rhetoric of systems theory; rather 
naive assumptions of human behaviour in terms of needs and goal fulfill­
ing tendencies and a picture of organizational reality based on concrete 
structures and processes. However, through attending the Organisation 
Behaviour Group’s seminars, I was introduced to the more humanist or 
phenomenological sociology and social psychology and to the new paradigm 
of research methodology with its emphasis on qualitative research.
In such a situation the researcher is faced with a choice. The question 
this raises is what factors would influence the choice? My choice of 
perspective did not occur at any one moment in time but was a gradual
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process aoid was influenced by a number of factors, some conscious and 
others possibly unconscious. Furthermore the process of choice was not 
a neat chronological sequence but rather the various factors came into 
play eis being the dominant influence from time to time. The most 
influential factors were the following:
a) The Current Research Vogue in the School of Management
In my first year as a researcher many of my peers, lecturers and 
research officers were actively exploring the literature of the 
humanist sociology and social psychology and the methodological 
implications of qualitative research. Thus, there was an atmos­
phere which fostered and treated seriously such approaches to 
research. Through methodological workshops, discussions with my 
colleagues and reading the literature I became aware of and 
developed an interest in this area.
b) Supervisors Influence
Although it was largely left to me to choose ray own approach my 
supervisors undoubtedly had a very strong influence on my choice. 
My supervisors were actively involved in this new paradigm and 
encouraged its development within the school.
c) Personal Experience and Self Reflection
I had a growing disillusionment with the orthodox ontology or 
natural science approach to research because I felt that it was 
inadequate as a means of explaining my own personal experience 
and behaviour. I found sympathy for this feeling of inadequacy 
in the literature:
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"Rather the questioners hold that organisations and the 
groups of individuals who make them up differ from 
phenomena of interest to the natural sciences in ways 
that make natural science methods inappropriate for 
their study."
Behling I98O
I felt I was more able to explain my own and others actions in terms 
of the interpretivist and particularly the symbolic interactionist 
tradition rather than in terms of the more positivist or objectivist 
approaches. In addition the argument that if we, as researchers, 
wished to understand how people behaved, it was appropriate to watch 
them behaving, as advocated by participant observation, had an 
appealing logic.
d) The Data
Whilst I recognise that in adopting a particular methodology and 
ontology it will influence the type of data the researcher gathers 
and the processes or events he is likely to pay attention to; I 
would suggest that at the commencement of my fieldwork I was 
still hovering on the fence, and was likely to shift towards the 
quantitative, if the perceived risks of qualitative research 
became too great. I in fact defined my initial period of research 
in the Avon factory as an exploratory study, from which I could 
construct ahypothesis to be subsequently tested through more 
quantitative questionnaire techniques. However, the data I 
gathered was of a sufficiently rich nature that it could be 
analysed within the interpretivistic perspective and this 
encouraged me to continue with the qualitative research.
At the beginning of my research I had the intention of linking symbolic
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interactionism with the more objectivist approaches through my organiz­
ation change research model* However, as described in chapter 3, my 
data thwarted this model. A research topic which lent itself to being 
analysed within the interpretivist tradition, using qualitative methods, 
then emerged. This encouraged me to remain within the qualitative 
paradigm. Furthermore, with my growing understanding of the various 
perspectives in the social sciences it became apparent that although it 
is possible to view the objectivist/subjectivist classification as a 
continuum it must be recognised that each perspective, outlined by 
Morgan and Smircich (I98O), are derived from different and largely 
antagonistic assumptionsof ontology, of human behaviour and of epistem­
ology. Thus, an attempt to match the concept of "reality as a concrete 
process" and "reality as a realm of symbolic discourse" is hazardous.
These then, were the factors that influenced my choice of perspective.
I would suggest that this choice which would confront all astute 
researchers is of crucial importance to the research act and its 
outcome, and therefore should be included in all theses. The intellect 
tual "slogging match" included in most theses, whereby the researcher 
argues for his perspective by criticising other perspectives is a 
justification of choice rather than an explanation of it. Such 
critiques and justifications are I feel important but should not 
preclude a description of the process of choosing one’s perspective.
12.2 Metaphors and Theoretical Perspectives
Harrs'" and Secord (1972) distinguish between "accessible mechanisms" 
and "quasi accessible mechanisms" that face the researcher. The 
description of how managers informed themselves in chapter 5 
corresponds to the accessible mechanism in that they were immediately
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observable and one could, if one desired, plot or measure the various 
mechanisms by which managers gathered and circulated information.
However, the processes by which managers converted mere information or 
data into meaningful information, formed sensible arrangements and 
shared those arrangements with others, were not immediately accessible 
to the researcher, although they are implicit in the actions and accounts 
of the managers. To analyse such quasi accessible mechanisms Harre and 
Secord contend that the researcher requires more than exploration and 
observation but in addition to this the researcher requires imagination. 
They further argue that imagination is not totally unstructured but is 
based on a set of root assumptions, models or metaphors which will guide 
and impinge upon the imagination and its outcome. As Morgan and Smircich 
(1980) contend, these will include assumptions regarding ontology, human 
nature and epistemology. What follows are my root assumptions, articul­
ated after conducting the research and writing-up, but implicit (although 
ill defined) throughout the conducting of the research.
12*2.1 Ontological Assumptions and Assumptions About Human Nature
Social or organizational reality can be viewed as patterns of symbolic 
relationships and meanings created, sustained and modified by the process 
of human interaction. Organizational and social reality from this view 
is located nowhere but in these patterns of interaction. The basic 
elements of an organization are individuals and individual relationships, 
in which the individuals not only create the organization, they are the 
organization (Colville I98I). The apparent stability or routine pattern­
ed aspects of reality is achieved through the operation of rule-like 
activities that define the social milieu. However, interaction as a 
social process creates and upholds the rules, the rules do not uphold 
the process (Mangham 1979). Thus the rules or patterns are always open
388
to reaffirmation or change through the interpretations and actions of 
individual members enacting a meaningful relationship with that world. 
The meaning which actors attach to their social world is derived through 
interaction with others. Interaction and shared meaning permits individ­
ual actors to act alike or to align their individual courses of action. 
However, humans are actors with the capacity to interpret, modify and 
sometimes create new modes of behaviour. Thus the human actor in 
interpreting his social world may conform to the expectations of the 
generalized or a specific other or may improvise and introduce novel 
or new behaviour. In a very real sense the individual and the social 
world are both determiners and determined (Mangham 1979).
12.2.2 Epistemological Assumptions
Adopting such ontological assumptions and assumptions about the nature 
of human or social behaviour as opposed to the positivist or objectivist 
assumptions, raise certain implications of epistemology.
As Colvile (1981) notes the difference between the two approaches is 
reflected in the stance adopted by Durkheim and Weber as to what con­
stitutes sociology. Whereas Durkheim described the task of sociology 
SIS being the explication of social facts, Weber saw the sociiogical 
enterprise as being concerned with the understanding and interpretation 
of social action.
Viewing organizations as concrete structures would tend towards logical 
positivism with an emphasis on the empirical analysis of concrete 
relationships in sin external social world. Positivism encourages a 
concern for the precise nature of laws, regularities and relationships
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among phenomena measured in terms of social facts.
Positivism has its roots in the natural or classical sciences (physics,
chemistry and biology). In translation into the behavioural or social 
sciences three fundamental ideas have been taken for granted as 
providing a sound methodological and theoretical foundation for a 
behavioural science. These are: a mechanistic model of man; a
conception of cause that places stress on external stimuli, and a 
related methodology based upon the logical and epistemological theories 
of logical positivism. The more behavioural science has fitted itself 
into these conceptions, the more scientific validity it has believed 
itself to deserve (Harre and Secord 1972).
On the other hand if one views organizational reality as symbolic
interaction the epistemological emphasis is placed on understanding the 
nature and patterning of the symbols through which individuals interact 
and form their social reality. This position rejects the idea that the 
world can be represented in terms of deterministic relationships, in 
favour of a view that knowledge, understanding and explanations of 
social affairs must take into account how social order is fashioned by 
human beings in ways that are meaningful to them (Morgan and Smircich 
1980). Thus social reality is not something which can be taken for 
granted but must be treated as problematic (Colville I98I).
12 ,3 Methodological Implications
To operationalize the positivist perspective it requires a methodology 
which entails laboratory experimentation, and in the field, survey 
questionnaires, inventories and demographic analysis. The positivist 
is searching for ’’facts” and ’’causes” and utilizes these methods to
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produce quantitative data which will allow him statistically to prove 
relationships between operationally defined variables or elementary 
constituents. The positivists assume that the social world lends itself 
to an objective form of measurement, and that the social scientist can 
reveal the nature of the world by examining lawful relatknships between 
elements that, for the sake of accurate definition and measurement, have 
to be extracted from their context (Bogdan and Taylor 1973).
To operationalize the interpretivist perspective with its epistemology, 
alternative methodologies must be employed and these tend to be qualit­
ative rather than quantitative. Qualitative methods yield descriptive 
data which enables the interpretivist to see the world as the subject 
sees it, or as Weber terms it, through "verstehen” which represents an 
empathetic understanding of the individual's situation. Colville(19^1) 
comments:
"Verstehen does not constitute a method as such, rather it 
is a particular experimental form in which common sense 
thinking takes cognisance of the social or cultural world."
Colville 1981
I recognise that the two ontologies in Morgan and Smircich*s continuum 
of reality as a concrete process and reality as a contextual field of 
information need not adopt the extreme principles of logical positivism. 
In their attempts to understand the world as an open system or as a 
concrete process evolving over time and concern with studying the 
relationship between the organization and environment, researchers may 
adopt qualitative methodologies. However, I would suggest that the 
type of data collected under this methodology and the way by which they 
interpret it, will be significantly different from the approach that
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views reality as symbolic discourse or interaction. The different types 
of researcher will be seeking answers to different questions.
12.4 Qualitative Versus Quantitative
The term qualitative has many connotations, Halfpenny (1979) mentions 
the following which arose from an SSRC Workshop an qualitative method­
ologies: 'soft,' 'dry,' 'flexible,' 'fluid,' 'grounded,' 'descriptive,'
'exploratory,' 'pre-scientific,' 'subjective,' 'inductive,' 'speculative,' 
'illustrative,' 'political,' 'non rigorous,' 'idiographic,' 'holistic,' 
'interpretivist,' 'exposers' actors' meanings,' 'phenomenological,' 
'relativistic,''case study,' 'good' and 'bad'. Implied in these are both 
appreciations and criticisms. The questions these various connotations 
raise is; What are qualitative data?
To the positivist,data are qualitative to the extent they are not des­
cribed in quantitative terms or are not expressed in mathematical or 
formal language. Qualitative data is then seen to be expressed in 
ordinary natural language. To the positivist, qualitative data is 
problematic and deficient in that they are not expressed in objective 
measures. To the interpretivist,data are qualitative in so far as 
they are subjectively meanir^ull, which interpretivists maintain is 
an endemic feature of social data. Qualitative data is not viewed to 
be incomplete quantitative data, but rather is authentic data in its 
own right (Halfpenny 1979).
A common application of the term qualitative is that it is a study of 
single cases. For the positivists the study of single cases is 
problematic.
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"Since social science purportedly aims at a nomothetic 
generalizable goal, a case history (read single case) 
is thoroughly flawed."
Faraday & Plummer 1979
The positivist may employ qualitative data from a single case to 
generate hypotheses, however these hypotheses when generated must be 
tested and incorporated into theory conceived in the positivistic 
manner as a set of "interrelated nomic universais" (Faraday and Plummer 
1979).
Halfpenny (1979) claims that for the interpretist, enquiry is to explain 
actions and interactions by conveying a culturally appropriate under­
standing of them;so interpretivist studies are necessarily case studies - 
studies of one culture, one conceptual framework, one frame of meaning. 
Thus generalizability is not problematic to the interpretivist. In 
addition to the assumption of uniqueness the interpretivists would also 
argue that the phenomena of interest to them, are subject to continual 
change, making it difficult if not impossible to combine different 
data at different times let alone different data from different settings.
I would suggest that the above is a rather extreme view of the inter­
pretivist approach. Denzin (1978) argues that research methods serve 
to provide the researcher with data that later may be placed in a 
deductive scheme of thought. Through observation of several discrete 
concepts or a set of concepts,the researcher is able to move above the 
single instance or indeed case.
"A failure to move beyond particular observations leaves the 
sociologist at the level of descriptive empiricism.
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Articulation between observations sind some variety of 
theory must be established...Methods are one of the 
major ways by which sociologists gather observations to 
test modify and develop theory."
Denzin 1978
Thus although a researcher engaged in observation must record the 
dynamics of the specific observational or social setting, he must 
also articulate these observations in terms of some theory. To 
achieve this the researcher must use his "sociological imagination" 
(Mills 1959).
12.g Empirical Validity
A second contention between the positivists and interpretivists is 
the issue of empirical validity. The positivists would assert that 
establishing validity is to be achieved through the testing of a 
priori hypotheses. The researcher starts with the construction of a 
scheme, theory or model of the empirical world, setting or phenomena 
under study. The researcher then constructs hypotheses based on his 
assertions as to what he expects to happen under such and such a set 
of circumstances. The researcher then arranges a study of a given 
empirical area that represents these circumstances. (The researcher 
may replicate these circumstances in a laboratory). If the findings 
from such a study verifies the hypothesis the researcher assumes 
that the scheme, the model or the theory which the hypothesis has 
been drawn, is empirically valid. A theoretical assertion or 
hypothesis may be given greater objective validation by developing 
specific regularized procedures for approaching the empirical world. 
The given procedures may be the use of a test, a scale, a measuring 
instrument or a standardised mode of enquiry (Blumer 1970).
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Blumer states that this approach results in:
"An endless parade of research studies that consist of no 
more than app^ing already devised instruments, such as a 
scale or test to a different setting of group life. Without 
wishing to be overly harsh, I believe one must recognise 
that the prevailing mode in the social and psychological 
sciences is to turn away from direct examination of the 
empirical social world and to give preference, instead, 
to theoretical schemes to preconceived models, to arrays 
of vague concepts, to sophisticated techniques of research, 
and to an almost slavish adherence to what passes as the 
proper protocol of research enquiry...The prevailing 
disposition and practice is to allow the theory the model, 
the concept, the technique and the scientific protocol to 
coerce the research and thus to bend the resulting analytical 
depiction of the empirical world to suit their form."
Blumer 1978
Thus by applying this approach the findings may give validity to the 
methods and theory but not to the empirical world.
For Blumer, the empirical world must, forever, be the central point of 
concern.
"It is the point of departure and the point of return in 
the case of empirical science. It is the testing ground 
for any assertions made about the empirical world. 
"Reality" for empirical science exists only in the 
empirical world, can be sought only there, and can be
verified only there."
Blumer 1978
The researcher therefore must have a profound respect for the character 
of the empirical world. It demands that the investigator takes his 
theories and methods to that world, and therein enter into an empathetic 
understanding of the individuals. The aim of the researcher is to gain 
an understcinding of the subjective meaning through which individuals
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form their social world. The essence of most qualitative studies and 
particularly this thesis was one of discovery and development of concepts 
rather than the verification of hypotheses or some pre-existent theory.
12.6 Subjectivity Versus Objectivity
The above reference to "subjective meaning" has led the more positivist 
researchers to claim that interpretivist research is itself subjective. 
However as Colville (I981) notes:
"If social science begins in an appreciation of subjective 
meaning that is attached to behaviour then it does not 
rest there."
Colville 1981
It is necessary to maintain a distinction between the sociologist’s 
conceptions of a subject’s behaviour and the motives and definitions 
that subjects ascribe to their own conduct. Becker (1964) notes that 
the sociological view of the world is "abstract, relativistic and 
generalizing." On the other hand the everyday conception of reality 
that guides the subject’s conduct is specific, tends to be generaliz­
ing and is based on special concepts that often lack scientific validity* 
Denzin (19?8) suggests that the subjects own subjective meaning be 
termed "first order concepts" whilst the researchers concepts be termed 
"second-order concepts." The researcher must operate between multiple 
worlds - the everyday worlds of the subjects and the world of his own 
perspective. Qualitative research goes further than merely taking the 
role of the other; the researcher must also place his analysis within 
an interpretive framework. However these 'second-order' concepts must 
always include and refer back to the subjective meaning which the action has 
for the actor (Schutz I962). Thus the label subjectivist ascribed by
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Morgan and Smircich (1980) is inappropriate, for qualitative research, 
which although interested in the subjective meaning of the actor, is 
not simply subjectivism itself. In fact Blumer would argue the reverse 
to be the case.
"To try and catch the interpretive process by remaining aloof 
as a so-called "objective observer" sind refusing to take the 
role of the acting unit is to risk the worst kind of subject­
ivism, the objective observer is likely to fill in the process 
of interpretation with his own surmises in place of catching 




The inclusion of, and referral back to,the subjective meaning an action 
has for the actor, allows for the generation of a theory which has its 
basis in the data gathered from the empirical world. Glaser and Strauss 
(1967) offer the principle of grounded theory which is based on the 
concept of generating theory from the data. Theory is inductively 
developed from data and is said to be 'discovered'. Glaser and Strauss 
are critical of any procedures or approaches which either bias the 
collection of data or distort its subsequent development into theory.
This view of theory developing from, or emerging out of the data, is 
altogether too naive. I would assert that no matter how ill defined 
a researcher's perspective is, it will impinge on the formation of the 
research problem, the gathering of the data and the subsequent analysis 
and development of theory. The entire act of research is oriented and 
shaped by the underlying perspective or picture of the empirical world 
that is used by the researcher. The ontological assumptions, assump­
tions about human nature and epistemology held by the researcher will
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influence the development of theory or the outcome of the research act.
Thus the researcher moves from theory or possibly multiple theories 
(precisely or ill defined) to direct or concrete observations. This 
search for data may be likened to the process of exploration. Exploration 
involves a very free and unstructured set of observational activities.
The researcher will admit any data and the data thus gathered will be 
used to critically evaluate his own theoretical perspective and in doing 
so the researcher will refine, develop or re^focus his perspective 
(Denzin 1978).
Having described the approach and perspective of the qualitative, inter­
pretivist researcher it is now necessary to discuss the methods employed 
by me to formulate a research problem and gather data in this research 
project.
12.8 Methods
Whereas my perspective shifted and my topic changed during my field 
research the methods I employed to gather data remained fairly consistent. 
The method was that of participant observation which is defined thus:
"Participant observations as a process in which the observer's 
presence in a social situation is maintained for the purpose 
of scientific investigation. The observer is in a face-to- 
face relationship with the observed, and, by participating 
with them in their natural life setting, he gathers data.
Thus the observer is part of the context being observed 
cuid he both modifies and is influenced by this context."
Schwartz and Schwartz 1955
The participant observer gathers data by participating in the daily 
life of the groùp or organization he studies. He watches the people
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he is studying to see in what situations they ordinarily meet and how 
they behave in them. He enters into conversation with some or all of the 
particçants in these situations emd discovers their interpretations of 
the events he has observed. Thus participant observation, allows the 
researcher to secure his data within the medium, symbols and experience 
which have subjective meaning to the members of the setting.
Thus, I observed the managers at Avon informing themselves through 
their observations, their interactions, their personal records, meetings 
and through the use of MADCAP and other official documents. In addition 
to this I talked with the managers at lunch, tea and coffee in their 
offices and on the shop floor. I interviewed some of the managers, 
more formally with a tape recorder, about the way they informed 
themselves and the meaning such information had to them. I observed 
them using information which they defined as meaningful to inform others 
and enter into joint action or arrangements with others. With my grow­
ing familiarity with the setting I observed the more or less permanent 
arrangements of the social groups and informant networks. I observed 
the managers behaviour within these arrangements and whilst much of 
their behaviour was repetitive, the managers were also able to improvise 
and develop new novel solutions for canmon problems and for new, novel 
problems.
The first two chapters are am attempt to describe my experiences as a 
participant observer which I would liken to that of a traveller rather 
than a tourist. In travelling there is no clearly defined route or 
destination. The traveller has a general geographic location in mind; 
however, the stopping places and routes between, are not known with any 
certainty. The journey is characterised by unscheduled interim destin­
ations; the path decided en route, based on the tales of fellow
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travellers and local inhabitants.
The spirit of the traveller is the pursuit of that which is unfamiliar, 
in doing so the journey is shrouded in uncertainty. The traveller will 
see and experience the country at ground level amidst the noise and 
seeming chaos. He will seek to understand the places he stops at and 
the people he meets. He will observe and talk to the locals about the 
culture, the customs and religion of their everday lives. He will
exchange stories and anecdotes about their lives and ambitions and about
their fears and frustrations. When a place is so familiar that it 
becomes common place he will move on, seeking new, unfamiliar experiences 
and greater understanding.
Through his understanding of these new and unfamiliar experiences he will 
bring into question that which is familiar to him, he will review the 
rules, conventions and customs of his own community and ultimately bring 
into question himself and the way he views the world. The traveller will
take risks and forgo the security of convention and comfort, he will in
effect relinquish his hold or loosen his grip on certainty and familiar­
ity and actively pursue that which is unfamiliar and uncertain. This to 
me encapsulates the spirit of the participant observer.
The tourist on the other hand starts out with a predetermined route or 
schedule; including, the places to stop; the length of stay; the time 
and mode of transport between these stopping places. The route is 
planned in advance from travel guides or is bought in a package deal.
The tourist will know beforehand what sights he is going to see, when 
he is going to see them and how he will get to see them. The tourist 
will talk with other tourists and the front men in the country; the
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tourist guides and the hotel staff. What they say will be rehearsed and 
practised, based on their definition of what the tourist wishes to hear. 
The tourist will see the historical tourist sights, the polished 
monuments, maintained to please the foreign-currency-earning internat­
ional tourist. The tourist will be transported in luxury air-condit­
ioned coaches, protected from the less pleasant experiences of the 
inhabitants’everyday lives.
Through planning, uncertainty is minimised, the tourist guides and 
travel brochures will provide the necessary background (later to be 
reinforced by the tour guides) for the tourist to construct a picture 
of the reality he is going to view, before he views it. His picture 
of reality will incorporate the values, norms and taken-for-granted 
knowledge of his own community or society. Carrying this intellectual 
baggage with him, he will interpret the customs, culture and actions of 
the people he meets and the events he observes within his preconceived 
framework. The tourist then will not understand the places and people 
he meets within the context of the place and the peoples’behaviour, but 
will do so within his own context. Whereas the traveller will bring 
into question his own community's norms and values and himself, the 
tourist will reinforce his own values and norms and his conception of 
self. The traveller in journeying may alter the way he views the world, 
the tourist almost certainly will not. This for me describes the 
research act of the positivist.
12*8.1 Selecting a Setting
In this particular research project, the selection of a setting occured 
through a combination of fortuitous circumstance and desperation. After
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my experiences with the Area Health Authority, I was prepared to accept 
any research setting as long as it was an organization which dealt with 
financial information. I was fortunate in finding RTG and Thomas Bart 
who granted me access or arranged for me to have access to RTG Plastics. 
The process of negotiating entry was not a particular issue at the 
outset of my research in that no formal contract or agreement was drawn 
up. The arrangement I entered into with Chris Davis and the other 
members of the setting evolved, I would suggest, through improvisation 
once I had gained access. The nature of the arrangement will unfold 
in the following discussion.
12 .8.2 Topic Selection
The selection or ,finding of a setting is related to the selection or 
choice of a topic for research. Johnson (1976) notes:
"The methodological literature would have us believe that in 
conducting research we have a clearly defined problem and 
method to investigate that problem in a chosen social setting. 
Whereas in reality the researcher will first find a setting 
which will grant access to the researcher who will then seek 
a problem to study."
Johnson I976
At the beginning of my research I had a topic to study, namely; to 
study the effect that a change in the financial information system 
would have on the organization and its members. On arriving at Avon 
I was expecting to study the introduction of the contribution approach 
(page 25). Circumstances and the interests of Chris Davis was to 
change that. Firstly, the contribution approach had already been 
introduced and secondly, Chris Davis had a vested interest in my 
aiding in the development of a production information system. Thus 
the research setting in part determined the research topic.. This
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topic still permitted me to introduce my organization change model 
(page 30) and thus I was willing to remain in the setting. In attempt­
ing to operationalize the model I was thwarted by my data, in that 
although we produced MADCAP suid although changes did take place, none 
of the managers attributed these changes to the introduction of MADCAP 
(page 99). Through my previous observations and conversations with the 
managers and the stalemate I had arrived at with my change model, a new 
topic emerged, namely to study how managers informed themselves. This 
led to ray interest in "informal information" and in particular the 
process of informing sind interaction.
My selection of a topic to study was then grounded in the empirical 
world and my data. It was in keeping with the spirit of the traveller 
and the concept of exploration. Blumer (1978) describes the process 
of exploration.
"The purpose of exploratory investigation is to move towards 
a clearer understanding of how one's problem is to be posed, 
to learn what are appropriate data, to develop ideas of what 
are significant lines of relation, and to evolve one's 
conceptual tools in the light of what one is learning about 
the area of life. In this respect it differs from the 
somewhat pretentious posture of the research scholar, who 
under established scientific protocol is required in advance 
of his study to present a fixed clearly structured problem."
Blumer 1978
By allowing the topic to emerge the researcher can identify what is 
meaningful and live to the participants of the setting. By maintaining 
flexibility the researcher will gather all possible data and through 
understanding and familiarity with the people in the setting, identify 
that data which reflects a topic or problem which is of a defined 
consequence to the lives of those people. This does not mean that the
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research has no structure or direction, rather that the topic of 
interest should be general, that the focus should be broad. I would 
suggest that it is important to ask general and simple questions at 
the beginning of a research project. Such as; How do managers inform 
themselves?
12.8 .3 Data Gathering Techniques
Participant observation may be formal or informal; overt or covert; 
active or passive. The stance the participant observer takes will 
influence the definition the members of the setting holds for the 
researcher suid thus the quality and type of data gathered. I would 
describe my stance as being informal, largely overt and highly active.
My research style was informal in that I entered into the lives of the 
individuals, I shared anecdotes, stories and jokes with the managers,
I took an interest in their personal, social lives as well as the work 
lives. I discussed topics of general, setting specific and tsisk 
directed natures. Furthermore I became good friends with some of the 
managers. Vidich ( 1955 ) notes that:
"Whether a field worker is totally, partially or not at all 
disguised, the respondent forms an image of him and uses 
that image as a basis of response. Without such am image 
the relationship between the field worker and respondent, 
by definition, does not exist."
Vidich 1935
Thus to a large part the researcher's role in an organization is one 
of managing his performance and others ’definitions of him. The 
managers had differing images or definitions of me just as they had 
differing definitions of each other and in turn just as I had
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different definitions of them. My earliest encounter with David Clark 
at the accountants conference set the style of our relationship (page 8). 
Throughout my research David Clark was a reluctant subject. Mike Shilling 
at first defined me as the lackey of Chris Davis and let it be known that 
he had no intention of being interviewed; however, through being careful 
with Mike, he ultimately provided me with valuable information (page $6). 
Charlie Johnson viewed academics with disdain; however, through inter­
acting with him, and telling him of my work experience and of my journey 
in America he changed his image of me and again supplied me with valuable 
and extremely rich data (page 39). Simon White had to deal with me in 
my infancy, when the production process and the people in the factory 
were alien to me. He had to put up with my interminable questioning 
which quite simply made him "fed up with me." Although Simon supplied 
me with data he did so with reluctance. Jim Brown, Peter Travers and 
later Nigel Plant took an active interest in me, they questioned me 
about my work and about my social life. They were of the ssune age 
group and shared similar interest to me and we became extremely good 
friends. My informal style went down well with Mary and Jane who 
provided me with much valuable background material of the "goings on " 
in the. factory.
I became a familiar figure in the factory by remaining there for four 
days a week, eating with the managers at lunch and having morning coffee 
and afternoon tea. I learned the language of the plastic container 
manufacturers, the names of the various materials, machines and the 
nature of the production process itself. Furthermore, through observ­
ation at meetings and through hearsay, I built up a picture of the 
social relationships between the managers, the conflicts, hostility 
and friendships. In doing this I could enter into conversations using
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their own language, including the swearing and thereby become more 
inconspicuous. However, although I became a pseudo member of the 
setting, I was never a full member, for I belonged to a different sett­
ing and life style. Like the traveller I remained a foreigner. This 
pseudo membership afforded me the ability to distance myself from the 
setting whilst also allowing me to enter into the lives of the members 
and gain an understanding of the subjective meaning their actions had 
for them. Thus whilst I inmersed myself in the setting I never drowned. 
I maintained a critical distance which permitted me to interpret as 
well as record the actions and interactions of the members.
My research was largely overt in that my function as a researcher was 
made explicit. Each individual knew I was from Bath University and was 
interested in studying information. I say largely overt because there 
was considerable ambiguity about my role.
Being introduced by David Clark as an expert coming to "sort out" their 
information system created a false image of me and my role. It took a 
considerable effort to convince the managers that I was there primarily 
to learn. Although the managers knew that I was interested in inform­
ation there was some ambiguity about what aspects of information I 
was interested in, this was in part because of my own uncertainty but 
also because I kept the description of my interests vague. This 
allowed me to ask questions of a general nature which meant that my 
interviews and discussions were essentially unstructured. By cultiv­
ating this ambiguity my data gathering was in part covert, for the 
mauiagers were never quite sure which parts of our conversations were 
data and which were not. My research was further covert in that most 
of the managers did not regard our informal talks at lunch and in the
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pub as being part of ray research.
The advantage of this approach was that performances specifically con­
structed for me as a researcher were minimised. I think such perform­
ances did occur, for instance Charlie Johnson enjoyed our conversations 
and regarded them as a forum for expressing his dislike about certain 
issues and indeed people; see page 172 where he comments on Cyril 
Jenkins and page 64 where he was insistent on discussing the newly 
introduced incentive scheme.
My research was active in that I did not adopt an aloof position, sis an 
impartial uninvolved observer but was actively involved in certain 
projects. Firstly I was a member of the working party to design 
MADCAP, or to tidy up the existing information, and wsis also involved 
in producting a report on finished goods stock control. My active 
participation created a certain amount of confusion; however, it 
permitted me to drop my researcher script which allowed closer contact 
with the managers. Whilst engaged in these activities I continued to 
gather further data (page 55)-
12 .8.4 Researcher Bias
The degree of closeness I achieved has a number of implications for the 
data I gathered. As mentioned in the initial definition of participant 
observation the presence of the researcher would affect the setting. My 
presence introduced a new element into the factory life which could be 
argued would influence the data I gathered. This is undeniably true, 
however I would argue that an aloof participant observer would introduce 
more bias into the data. A passive observer would for ever remain
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conspicuous and thus not be able to develop the trust and confidence of 
the members of the setting. Furthermore, it is the intention of the 
qualitative researcher to gain an insight into the subjective meaning 
the participants held for their actions, this in my view requires a 
closeness. The researcher must be able to speak the same language as 
the participants and frame his questions within that language. The 
researcher requires a closeness to gather the first order concepts to 
be later interpreted within the framework of the theoretical perspective,
2 .8 .5 Verification
Another implication is that by developing a closeness the researcher may 
be unable to verify the data he gathers. In answer to this question of 
verification Denzin (1978) advocates triangulation, or using a combination 
of methods for gathering data. He suggest that the participant observer 
may use a combination of interviewing, document analysis, direct observ­
ation and observer participation. I would suggest that this is what I 
actually did in my research. However, although I gathered samples of 
managers*personal records and observed their format, content, circulation 
and timeliness (document anlysis) and was myself involved in the design 
of MADCAP (observer participation) ray main sources of data came from 
direct observation of the managers'actions and through discussing these 
during informal talks and more formal interviews.
In observing managers gathering and using information I subsequently 
discussed these observations with the managers, in turn these discussions 
led to further observation of events or actions brought up by the managers 
and which I had failed to observe previously. For example, being informed 
that the managers had failed to receive a copy of MADCAP during its trial 
run, pointed me towards observing how managers did inform themselves
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without the production information (page 104). Comments made by Peter 
Travers concerning the inaccuracy of the stock levels led me to unearth 
the personal records kept by the Sales Account Executives. Thus I was 
continually verifying my observations through the accounts supplied by 
the managers and verifying the accounts by further more detailed 
observations.
I was in effect engaged in a kind of immediate "account analysis" where 
I could test the warrantability and intelligibility of the accounts 
supplied to me by the managers (Harre and Secord 1977). Through 
continual observation of events and of the actions of the managers I 
became sufficiently familiar with the setting to judge whether their 
accounts were valid or credible. Furthermore I developed definitions 
of managers as key informants who I could rely on to supply me with 
reliable information. For example, during my work on stock control, 
Peter Travers supplied me with examples of inaccurate recording.
12,8.6 Ethics and Confidentiality
I, in effect, developed an informant network, in consequence the concept 
of reciprocity of information became important. In order to be supplied 
with reliable information, I in turn had to supply the managers with 
equally reliable information,(see page 61 where I informed the managers 
of the new RTG salary structure; page 6l where I informed them of the 
new Personnel Manager’s identity; and page 60 where I informed them 
of Chris Davis' relationship.) The supplying of information has 
implications in terms of ethics and in terms of confidentiality. 
Ethically I was in the wrong to report Chris Davis' personal life to 
the managers, but in doing so I formed a more valuable arrangement with 
Jim Brown and Peter Travers for they in turn supplied me with detailed
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information on their definition of others which I regarded as being 
crucial to the process of informing. In terms of confidentiality I had 
to develop the image of myself as an informant and not an informer; 
however in being an informant to the middle managers I necessarily 
became an informer to the senior management. I suspect my closeness 
to the middle managers was responsible for Cyril Jenkins*avoidance of 
being formally interviewed. I was particularly careful to avoid passing 
on sensitive information to the middle managers and only passed on inform­
ation that was to be made public shortly afterwards.
In conclusion I would assert that wherever possible one's own actions in
a research setting should be made explicit; for the reader must be
afforded the ability to examine the role of the researcher and the way 
in which the data is gathered. In qualitative research the researcher 
must take himself seriously; in this sense the researcher becomes both 
object suid subject of his studies. His reflections on himself and his 
conduct in interactive sequences become data in themselves (Denzin 1978).
12.8.7 Analysis of Data
From a mechanical stand point dealing with a year's worth of field notes 
and tape recordings was problematic. In presenting the data in a 
narrative style I was at first able to structure the data chronologic­
ally; selecting particular events that were of significance to my 
experiences as an observer; the initial meeting with Jane and Mary; my 
first lunch in the canteen; meeting Chris Davis; the Working Party 
Meetings; the production and planning meetings; and so forth. Dealing 
with the data concerning the managers before and after view of MADCAP
was structured at its point of collection and I was able to arrange it
in various categories such as criticisms of inaccuracy, untimeliness and
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so forth. I structured the data on "informal" or alternative information 
sources in terms of the media, subject matter and degree of contact. Thus 
the mechanics of how managers informed themselves were relatively simple 
to deal with.
In categorising the data, some structure was imposed. It provided a 
descriptive map which wsis useful in that it provided a picture of the 
setting and of the processes and the people involved in the setting. 
However, at this stage the research was simply investigative journalism, 
valid in its own right but inadequate for scientific enquiry. It was 
then necessary to analyse or interpret the story or map and in doing so 
I had to employ my"sociiogical imagination. "
Having identified the externally observable, "accessible mechanisms" I 
required a model to interpret the internal subjective processes whereby 
the managers converted mere information or data into meaningful inform­
ation. My chosen model of conceptual framework was that of symbolic 
interaction. This model was satisfactory in terms of interpreting the 
individual in interaction. The analysis depicted interactions in a 
vacuum; however, interaction took place in some organizational context. 
Not wishing to introduce an antagonistic theory, I examined negotiated 
order theory which has its roots in interactionism. At first this theory 
appeared satisfactory, however with close examination and in attempting 
to operationalize Strauss's paradignm, with its ambiguities, a number of 
contradictions between my observations and the theory became apparent.
In seeking a solution, the concept of improvisation arose. It was a 
term I used extensively through listening to and reading about jazz.
The concepts of improvisation and arrangement provided an appropriate 
metaphor to interpret the individual creative nature of the managers.
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the nature of joint action, and the creation, modification and or 
sustaining of organizational order at the middle management level of the 
factory.
Thus my conceptual framework, for I would not claim it constituted a 
theory as such, emerged out of a combination of observation and theory, 
which was in turn influenced by my ontological assumptions, assumptions 
about human nature and epistemology. Strauss (1970) raises the issue 
of discovering new theory from old theory when he argues that we need 
not ignore previous theory to:
"Show ourselves master of our own data or to parade our 
originality."
Strauss 1970
Bulraer (1979) similarly notes that:
"The distinctive character of concepts in empirical social 
science derives from this dual theoretical and empirical 
character. The process is one in which concepts are formed 
and modified both in the light of empirical evidence and 
the context of theory. Both theory and evidence can 
exercise compelling influence on what emerges."
Bulmer 1979
12.8.8 Thesis Presentation
The initial quote in this section by Tomkins Rosenberg and Colville 
(1981) implies that writings in the social sciences and management 
information systems rarely provide an account of how the actual research 
took place. This state of affairs is again attributable to the "slavish 
adherence to scientific protocol" at the presentation stage. For even
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in qualitative research there is often a pressure to conform to the 
conventional manner of presentation. Writers attempt to minimise their 
own presence by referring to themselves as "we," or "the author," the 
"grant holder" or the "researcher." I attempted to experiment with the 
style of presentation, to express the data section in the first person 
singular and adopt a narrative style. Only then having told the story 
did I embark on the presentation of analysis and interpretation.
Blumer (1978) advocates that the research should depict the entire 
scientific act which includes the following:
a) The possession auid use of a prior picture or scheme of the 
empirical world under study; these premises should be made 
explicit. Blumer argues that it is:
"the unavoidable task of genuine methodological treatment 
is to identify and assess these premises."
b) The asking of questions of the empirical world and the conversion 
of questions into problems; Blumer argues that it is
"highly important for the methodologist to examine carefully 
and appraise critically how problems are selected and 
formulated."
c) Determination of the data to be sought and the means to be 
employed in getting the data; Blumer argues that:
"Even though set by the problem, the data need to be 
constantly examined to see if they require the revision 
or rejection of the problem." Beyond this it is 
important to recognize that the means used to get the 
data depend on the nature of the data to be sought."
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d) Determination of relations between the data; Blumer argues that;
"Since the establishment of connections between the data 
yield the findings of the study, it is highly important 
to be aware of how such connections are reached."
e) Interpretations of the findings; Blumer argues that;
"This terminal step carries the scientist beyond the 
confines of the problem he has studied, since in making 
interpretations he has to relate his findings to an 
outside body of theory or to a set of conceptions that 
transcend the study he has made."
In presenting this thesis I have attempted to fulfil these recommend­
ations and make my role, the role of the researcher, explicit in the 
scientific act. In summary I quote Young (I980) as reflecting ray stance,
"Social science methodology in its quantitative mode should 
recognise the primitive character of its operations and not 
insinuate these as superior to folk methods. One should 
realize that quantification is a process by which the richness 
of everyday life is made progressively more barren as it 
proceeds. One discards information (variety) as human 
behaviour is organized into word sets. Still more inform­
ation is discarded as one transfers data from words sets 
into number sets - a number set is simply not as informative 
as a word set since word sets are not limited by the 
constraints of number sets - ordinality, intervality, and 
rationality. One loses still more information as one 
converts descriptive parameters into summary statistics. 
Quantification, then,is a process by which information is 
systematically discarded. One must not assume that, since 
valuable information is obtained by such distillation, this 
knowledge surpasses that produced by symbolic interaction 
using words or by behavioural interaction.
If the quality of human life is intimately conneded to the 
quality of its symbolic systems (as indeed they are), then 
passion, anger, joy, disgust, hope and rage should not be 
excluded from the pages of authentically human endeavour.
The languages of business, mathematics, computers and science 
are too poor a vehicle upon which to place the fate of human 
society. They are too meagre, too remote, and too barren a 
soil in which to plant ideas."
Young 1980
4l4
If we recognise the humanness of the individuals we research,we must 
also recognise the humanness of the researcher. The "Routine Observat­
ional Boob" (Douglas 1977) and the "Ideal Sentential Automaton’’(Churchland 
1979) are myths of the research world.
12.9  Multi-Disciplinary Research
At the outset, my research was intended to be multi-disciplinary.
Embarking on a multi-disciplinary research project has a number of 
implications for the researcher and the research act. Two approaches 
to multi-disciplinary research exist. Two or more researchers from 
different disciplines may jointly engage in research, thus forming a 
multi-disciplinary team. See Tomkins Rosenberg and Colville (I980) for 
an account of such an approach. On the other hand a single researcher 
may "go it alone" and attempt to become multi-disciplinary himself, this 
is the approach I chose.
At the beginning of any research project the researcher will be in 
possession of a body of knowledge. This body of knowledge represents 
the "mother discipline," the tradition or orthodoxy of the researcher.
If the researcher wishes to become multi-disciplinary he will have to 
develop an understanding or knowledge of some other discipline. In my 
case my "mother discipline" was financial or management information 
systems theory and I attempted to become familiar with sociology and 
social psychology.
Immediately a problem arises. Sociology and social psychology are 
pluralistic disciplines, characterised by numerous alternative 
conceptions of theory, explanation and data. There are in fact, 
numerous different approaches, perspectives, orientations or paradigms.
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Thus within the social sciences there are a number of complementary and 
antagonistic perspectives that purport to explain the same phenomena 
(Colville 1981).
If a researcher possesses a "mother discipline" he will be familiar with 
its theoretical perspective, its methodology, its accepted method of 
analysis and its mode of presentation. It is therefore hardly surprising 
if a researcher explores the discipline he wishes to borrow from in 
order to unearth a theoretical perspective, with a methodology, an 
accepted method of analysis and a mode of presentation that is complement­
ary with his "mother discipline." The study of the behavioural implicat­
ions of accountancy and management information systems have in the main 
done just this. The model of man or assumption about human behaviour 
borrowed, mainly from psychology, have tended to depict man as machine 
or adaptor and which emphasises his need fulfilling or goal achieving 
tendencies. Colville (I98I) describes the state of affairs thus:
"Accountants (and management information theorists) tended to 
approach the behavioural sciences in the role of voyeurs and 
collectors. The literature has been examined with the intention 
of identifying theories and concepts which are directly or 
potentially relevant to the study of the behavioural aspects 
of accounting. While there is nothing inherently wrong or 
illegitimate about such an activity, it demands an awareness 
of the context in which the theory was developed, its range 
of convenience and how it stands in relation to other approaches 
which purport to explain the saune phenomena."
Colville 1981
In the main the study of the behavioural and organizational aspects of 
accountancy and management information systems have tended to borrow 
outdated theories from the social sciences and which have come under 
considerable attack in their mother discipline.
4l6
It is my belief that the multi-disciplinary researcher must attempt to 
operate at the forefront of the discipline he wishes to borrow from. He 
must also develop a genuine understanding of that theory. He must come 
to terms with the philosophical underpinnings, the ontological assumptions 
and the assumptions about the nature of human behaviour on which the 
theory was generated. To attempt this, as Birnberg (1973) notes,requires 
a considerable amount of effort and time. The social science rhetoric 
poses many difficulties for the unfamiliar or uninitiated, single terms 
have multiple definitions and the differences between the various 
perspectives, which are readily apparent to social scientists themselves, 
appear subtle and confusing to the naif. It was in my attempt to 
achieve this state of affairs that I developed my knowledge of symbolic 
interactionism. This theory however, I found to be antagonistic to the 
assumptions and philospical underpinnings of management information 
systems theory. Furthermore the methodology, the method of anlysis and 
mode of presentation advocated by symbolic interactionists wais significantly 
different from that of the MIS theorists .Because of the fundamental 
inconsistencies between the two disciplines a match between them was not 
feasible. The purpose of symbolic interactionist research is to uncover 
the subjective meaning the action has for the actor and how these actions 
and interactions shape and form organizational reality. The information 
systems theorists are interested in the design of concrete structures and 
processes, and appear to be interested in human behaviour only in so far 
as it is affected by and affects these structures auid process. Individual 
and group behaviour is viewed as a contingency factor and is studied in 
terms of consonance and dissonance between the factor and the management 
information system (Gordon and Miller 1976 and Waterhouse smd Tiessen
1976).
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With my growing appreciation of symbolic interaction I began to drift 
away from the traditional management information perspective. The 
unfamiliar (symbolic interactionism) became familiar and my mother 
discipline,management information system theory, became unfamiliar or 
alien to me. What commenced as a multi-disciplinary research to study 
information systems and behaviour became more of a single disciplinary 
project examining the process of informing. References to the 
traditional view of management information systems were in the main 
critical. My observations and the symbolic interactionist perspective 
undermined my belief in,and commitment to,the traditional view of 
information systems.
It it my belief that researchers, from any discipline, should adopt 
a perspective, and especially a methodology, that will allow them to 
find out what actually goes on in organisations whatever the consequences 
for their models of reality as constructed and perpetuated by academic 
researchers. It is only when we know what "is" (Swieringa I98O) may 







OUTLINE OF PROPOSED RESEARCH
PROPOSED TOPIC
To study the effects of human behaviour on the financial inform­
ation system, and the effects of the financial information on 
human behaviour.
(The financial information system being the collecting, processing 
and use of financial data within the organisation.)
OVERALL RESEARCH DESIGN
I intend to make a comparative study, that is, to study indepth 
a number of organisations of differing natures, or ones working 
towards different objectives. Interms of my proposed research 
in R.T.G. I would ideally like to select two or three divisions 
within the group, and as a comparison choose two or three district 
health authorities in one area of the National Health Service.
METHOD OF RESEARCH
I would use a qualitative method of research with the emphasis 
on interviewing and observations to gather data, rather than 
questionnaires and statistics. The principles of science that I 
will be working on assert that the classical hypothesis testing 
model is inappropriate for the study of human behaviour. Rather 
than preparing the hypothesis befor the fieldwork, the hypothesis 
be prepared during and after this perion. This method is described 
as being like the process ofdiscovery and exploration rather than 
laboratory experimentation.
Although I have no fixed hypothesis to test there are certain points 
or ideas that I will home in on at the beginning of mV fieldwork. 
These are:
1. To compare a working description of financial information systems
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with the textbook definitions.
2. To examine the characteristics of the system in relation to the 
structure of the company, its objectives, the nature of the product 
and the culture of the management.
3. To study how people define or describe the system; what terms they
use to refer to it; and to accountancy in general.
4 . If possible I would like to see how, if at all, differences in the
definitions affect the efficiency of the system and the goals of
the organisation.
5. I would like to feed back my findings to the people involved, and 
if there are problems or areas of discrepancy in the definitions 
held, to discuss these in an open forum.
ACADEMIC CONSIDERATIONS
Considerable work has been done on the structure and mechanical 
processes of financial information systems. These works have us­
ually avoided dealing with any aspect of human behaviour.
Although designers may have developed technically efficient systems, 
they have one flaw. The system, designers have failed to adequately 
consider the effects of human behaviour on the systems and the 
effect of the systems on human behaviour. Any work that has deIt 
with human behaviour has usually assumed man to be a rational 
economic being, or one motivated by a need hierarchy. I feel that 
this is either unfair or too simplistic a definition of man. In 
this research I propose to concentrate on the behavioural implic­
ations of information systems, rather than on the technical. I 
further intend to adopt a more human view of man, as is emerging 
in the social science literature.
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APPENDIX II 
MY EARLIEST RESEARCH PROPOSAL
422
RESEARCH MODEL AND ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT 
THE INTERFACE OF O.D. AND FINANCIAL CONTROL SYSTEMS
O.D. may be viewed as a means to an end rather than as an end in 
itself. The end is in fact some clearly defined goal or objective.
O.D. is
1) the PROCESS by which this goal is to be achieved
2 ) a me sms to facilitate organization self-renewal 
taking place in the future i.e. to develop an 
ON GOING CYCLE.
Traditionally O.D. focuses on human behaviour processes within the 
organisation, such as the attitudes, values and beliefs of the 
individuals, and interpersonal, group and intergroup relationships.
This focus I contend is often not sufficient to ensure
1) that the goal will be accomplished
2) that change in behaviour will be maintained
3) that O.D. will develop into an ongoing process 
within the organization.
Thus if any O.D. effort in which changes in behaviour are to be used 
to accomplish a goal, it must also include means of ensuring that 
such changes will occur, will be maintained and where desired will 
be ongoing.
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In order to achieve this, I propose a model with the following 
characteristics:
1) it is a systems approach
2) it is concerned with structural and processual variables
3) it is action research oriented.
An organization viewed as a system may be divided into subsystems 
in many dimensions. I have identified four key areas, (functions 
or subsystems),which have a high degree of influence on the other 
subsystems in the organization, and are in turn influenced by them. 
These are:
1) OBJECTIVES (0)
2) ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM (AS)
3) CULTURE (C)
4) TASK (T)
as can be seen, these divisions axe not from one single dimension. 
The fifth subsystem to be included and examined, by virtue of 
the title of the research is the financial control system (FC), 
it could as easily have been the production system, the marketing 
and sales function or the personnel function.
In using a systems approach three factors must be considered:
1) the inter-dependency between the subsystems
2 ) the fact that each system has a structure and process
3) the raorphogenic properties of an organization i.e 
the system can change shape, size and nature.
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The interdependency factor means that a change in any subsystem could 
reverberate throughout the whole system and effect each other sub­
system in turn. Such a situation must be explicitly taken into account 
in the model, otherwise dissonance between the subsystem may arise.
The fact that each subsystem has a process and structure needs to be 
taken into account, for a change in the process of the subsystem 
without a resulting change in the structure could lead to internsd 
dissonance.
The morphogenic nature of organizations makes it legitimate to 
consider changing the shape, size and nature of the various subsystems 
in order to find consonance between, and within them, and to accomplish 
the objectives of the change programme.
Another point to be considered before the model is presented, is in 
which area of the system and subsystem does the traditionally 
behavioural oriented O.D. programme have most impact? As stated in 
the beginning, O.D. is concerned with the human behavioural processes. 
Its greatest influence would seem to be in the area of cultural 
processes, however, because of the interdependency factor all sub­
systems would be influenced to some degree or other. Because O.D. 
itself is a process and is concerned with the human behavioural 
processes in the organization it follows that an O.D. intervention 
would have the greatest impact on the processes of the subsystems 









j financial Control 
/ System
Culture
This model is an attempt to show:
1) The interdependencies between
a) O.D., the 4 key subsystems and the financial control 
system.
b) The subsystems themselves
c) The structure and process within each subsystem.
The interdependencies are represented by the lines of interaction. 
These interactions could be of:
a) Interactive dissonance
b) Interactive consonance
2) That the main impact on an organization through an O.D. programme 
is in the processes of the subsystem involved and not the structure.
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This model could be further refined by dividing the process subdivision 
into two parts, the division would be
Mechanical or instrumental process 
Human behavioural process
The mechanical or instrumental process would be the physical means of 
accomplishing the functions within the subsystem.
Thus for the communication system within the administrative system 
one could have:
STRUCTURE 
Who communicates with 














The research would be action oriented in that the researcher would 
be actively involved in a change programme. In addition to the 
data gathered during the design and implementation stage, questionnairres 
and follow up interviews would be arranged before the O.D. programme 
and after its completion.
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